QUESTIONS 50-74 QUESTION OF THE SUBSTANCE OF THE ANGELS ABSOLUTELY CONSIDERED (FIVE ARTICLES) Now we consider the distinction of corporeal and spiritual creatures: firstly, the purely spiritual creature which in Holy Scripture is called angel; secondly, the creature wholly corporeal; thirdly, the composite creature, corporeal and spiritual, which is man.

Concerning the angels, we consider first what belongs to their substance; secondly, what belongs to their intellect; thirdly, what belongs to their will; fourthly, what belongs to their creation.

Their substance we consider absolutely and in relation to corporeal things.

Concerning their substance absolutely considered, there are five points of inquiry: (1) Whether there is any entirely spiritual creature, altogether incorporeal? (2) Supposing that an angel is such, we ask whether it is composed of matter and form? (3) We ask concerning their number. (4) Of their difference from each other. (5) Of their immortality or incorruptibility.

P(1)- Q(50)- A(1) Whether an angel is altogether incorporeal?

P(1)- Q(50)- A(1)- O(1) — It would seem that an angel is not entirely incorporeal. For what is incorporeal only as regards ourselves, and not in relation to God, is not absolutely incorporeal. But Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii) that “an angel is said to be incorporeal and immaterial as regards us; but compared to God it is corporeal and material. Therefore he is not simply incorporeal.”

P(1)- Q(50)- A(1)- O(2) — Further, nothing is moved except a body, as the Philosopher says (Phys. vi, text 32). But Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii) that “an angel is an ever movable intellectual substance.” Therefore an angel is a corporeal substance.

P(1)- Q(50)- A(1)- O(3) — Further, Ambrose says (De Spir. Sanct. i, 7): “Every creature is limited within its own nature.” But to be limited belongs to bodies. Therefore, every creature is corporeal. Now angels are God’s creatures, as appears from <19E802> Psalm 148:2: “Praise ye” the Lord, “all His angels”; and, farther on (verse 4), “For He spoke, and they were made; He commanded, and they were created.” Therefore angels are corporeal.

P(1)- Q(50)- A(1) — On the contrary, It is said ( <19A304> Psalm 103:4): “Who makes His angels spirits.”

P(1)- Q(50)- A(1) — I answer that, There must be some incorporeal creatures. For what is principally intended by God in creatures is good, and this consists in assimilation to God Himself. And the perfect assimilation of an effect to a cause is accomplished when the effect imitates the cause according to that whereby the cause produces the effect; as heat makes heat. Now, God produces the creature by His intellect and will ( Q(14), A(8) ; Q(19), A(4) ). Hence the perfection of the universe requires that there should be intellectual creatures. Now intelligence cannot be the action of a body, nor of any corporeal faculty; for every body is limited to “here” and “now.” Hence the perfection of the universe requires the existence of an incorporeal creature.

The ancients, however, not properly realizing the force of intelligence, and failing to make a proper distinction between sense and intellect, thought that nothing existed in the world but what could be apprehended by sense and imagination. And because bodies alone fall under imagination, they supposed that no being existed except bodies, as the Philosopher observes (Phys. iv, text 52,57). Thence came the error of the Sadducees, who said there was no spirit ( Acts 23:8).

But the very fact that intellect is above sense is a reasonable proof that there are some incorporeal things comprehensible by the intellect alone.

P(1)- Q(50)- A(1)- RO(1) — Incorporeal substances rank between God and corporeal creatures. Now the medium compared to one extreme appears to be the other extreme, as what is tepid compared to heat seems to be cold; and thus it is said that angels, compared to God, are material and corporeal, not, however, as if anything corporeal existed in them.

P(1)- Q(50)- A(1)- RO(2) — Movement is there taken in the sense in which it is applied to intelligence and will. Therefore an angel is called an ever mobile substance, because he is ever actually intelligent, and not as if he were sometimes actually and sometimes potentially, as we are. Hence it is clear that the objection rests on an equivocation.

P(1)- Q(50)- A(1)- RO(3) — To be circumscribed by local limits belongs to bodies only; whereas to be circumscribed by essential limits belongs to all creatures, both corporeal and spiritual. Hence Ambrose says (De Spir.

Sanct. i, 7) that “although some things are not contained in corporeal place, still they are none the less circumscribed by their substance.”

P(1)- Q(50)- A(2) Whether an angel is composed of matter and form?

P(1)- Q(50)- A(2)- O(1) — It would seem that an angel is composed of matter and form. For everything which is contained under any genus is composed of the genus, and of the difference which added to the genus makes the species. But the genus comes from the matter, and the difference from the form (Metaph. xiii, text 6). Therefore everything which is in a genus is composed of matter and form. But an angel is in the genus of substance. Therefore he is composed of matter and form.

P(1)- Q(50)- A(2)- O(2) — Further, wherever the properties of matter exist, there is matter. Now the properties of matter are to receive and to substand; whence Boethius says (De Trin.) that “a simple form cannot be a subject”: and the above properties are found in the angel. Therefore an angel is composed of matter and form.

P(1)- Q(50)- A(2)- O(3) — Further, form is act. So what is form only is pure act. But an angel is not pure act, for this belongs to God alone.

Therefore an angel is not form only, but has a form in matter.

P(1)- Q(50)- A(2)- O(4) — Further, form is properly limited and perfected by matter. So the form which is not in matter is an infinite form. But the form of an angel is not infinite, for every creature is finite. Therefore the form of an angel is in matter.

P(1)- Q(50)- A(2) — On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv): “The first creatures are understood to be as immaterial as they are incorporeal.”

P(1)- Q(50)- A(2) — I answer that, Some assert that the angels are composed of matter and form; which opinion Avicebron endeavored to establish in his book of the Fount of Life. For he supposes that whatever things are distinguished by the intellect are really distinct. Now as regards incorporeal substance, the intellect apprehends that which distinguishes it from corporeal substance, and that which it has in common with it. Hence he concludes that what distinguishes incorporeal from corporeal substance is a kind of form to it, and whatever is subject to this distinguishing form, as it were something common, is its matter. Therefore, he asserts the universal matter of spiritual and corporeal things is the same; so that it must be understood that the form of incorporeal substance is impressed in the matter of spiritual things, in the same way as the form of quantity is impressed in the matter of corporeal things.

But one glance is enough to show that there cannot be one matter of spiritual and of corporeal things. For it is not possible that a spiritual and a corporeal form should be received into the same part of matter, otherwise one and the same thing would be corporeal and spiritual. Hence it would follow that one part of matter receives the corporeal form, and another receives the spiritual form. Matter, however, is not divisible into parts except as regarded under quantity; and without quantity substance is indivisible, as Aristotle says (Phys. i, text 15). Therefore it would follow that the matter of spiritual things is subject to quantity; which cannot be.

Therefore it is impossible that corporeal and spiritual things should have the same matter.

It is, further, impossible for an intellectual substance to have any kind of matter. For the operation belonging to anything is according to the mode of its substance. Now to understand is an altogether immaterial operation, as appears from its object, whence any act receives its species and nature.

For a thing is understood according to its degree of immateriality; because forms that exist in matter are individual forms which the intellect cannot apprehend as such. Hence it must be that every individual substance is altogether immaterial.

But things distinguished by the intellect are not necessarily distinguished in reality; because the intellect does not apprehend things according to their mode, but according to its own mode. Hence material things which are below our intellect exist in our intellect in a simpler mode than they exist in themselves. Angelic substances, on the other hand, are above our intellect; and hence our intellect cannot attain to apprehend them, as they are in themselves, but by its own mode, according as it apprehends composite things; and in this way also it apprehends God ( Q(3) ).

P(1)- Q(50)- A(2)- RO(1) — It is difference which constitutes the species.

Now everything is constituted in a species according as it is determined to some special grade of being because “the species of things are like numbers,” which differ by addition and subtraction of unity, as the Philosopher says (Metaph. viii, text 10). But in material things there is one thing which determines to a special grade, and that is the form; and another thing which is determined, and this is the matter; and hence from the latter the “genus” is derived, and from the former the “difference.” Whereas in immaterial things there is no separate determinator and thing determined; each thing by its own self holds a determinate grade in being; and therefore in them “genus” and “difference” are not derived from different things, but from one and the same. Nevertheless, this differs in our mode of conception; for, inasmuch as our intellect considers it as indeterminate, it derives the idea of their “genus”; and inasmuch as it considers it determinately, it derives the idea of their “difference.”

P(1)- Q(50)- A(2)- RO(2) — This reason is given in the book on the Fount of Life, and it would be cogent, supposing that the receptive mode of the intellect and of matter were the same. But this is clearly false. For matter receives the form, that thereby it may be constituted in some species, either of air, or of fire, or of something else. But the intellect does not receive the form in the same way; otherwise the opinion of Empedocles (De Anima i, 5, text 26) would be true, to the effect that we know earth by earth, and fire by fire. But the intelligible form is in the intellect according to the very nature of a form; for as such is it so known by the intellect.

Hence such a way of receiving is not that of matter, but of an immaterial substance.

P(1)- Q(50)- A(2)- RO(3) — Although there is no composition of matter and form in an angel, yet there is act and potentiality. And this can be made evident if we consider the nature of material things which contain a twofold composition. The first is that of form and matter, whereby the nature is constituted. Such a composite nature is not its own existence but existence is its act. Hence the nature itself is related to its own existence as potentiality to act. Therefore if there be no matter, and supposing that the form itself subsists without matter, there nevertheless still remains the relation of the form to its very existence, as of potentiality to act. And such a kind of composition is understood to be in the angels; and this is what some say, that an angel is composed of, “whereby he is,” and “what is,” or “existence,” and “what is,” as Boethius says. For “what is,” is the form itself subsisting; and the existence itself is whereby the substance is; as the running is whereby the runner runs. But in God “existence” and “what is” are not different as was explained above ( Q(3) , A(4) ). Hence God alone is pure act.

P(1)- Q(50)- A(2)- RO(4) — Every creature is simply finite, inasmuch as its existence is not absolutely subsisting, but is limited to some nature to which it belongs. But there is nothing against a creature being considered relatively infinite. Material creatures are infinite on the part of matter, but finite in their form, which is limited by the matter which receives it. But immaterial created substances are finite in their being; whereas they are infinite in the sense that their forms are not received in anything else; as if we were to say, for example, that whiteness existing separate is infinite as regards the nature of whiteness, forasmuch as it is not contracted to any one subject; while its “being” is finite as determined to some one special nature.

P(1)- Q(50)- A(2)- RO(4) Whence it is said (De Causis, prop. 16) that “intelligence is finite from above,” as receiving its being from above itself, and is “infinite from below,” as not received in any matter.

P(1)- Q(50)- A(3) Whether the angels exist in any great number?

P(1)- Q(50)- A(3)- O(1) — It would seem that the angels are not in great numbers. For number is a species of quantity, and follows the division of a continuous body. But this cannot be in the angels, since they are incorporeal, as was shown above ( A(1) ). Therefore the angels cannot exist in any great number.

P(1)- Q(50)- A(3)- O(2) — Further, the more a thing approaches to unity, so much the less is it multiplied, as is evident in numbers. But among other created natures the angelic nature approaches nearest to God. Therefore since God is supremely one, it seems that there is the least possible number in the angelic nature.

P(1)- Q(50)- A(3)- O(3) — Further, the proper effect of the separate substances seems to be the movements of the heavenly bodies. But the movements of the heavenly bodies fall within some small determined number, which we can apprehend. Therefore the angels are not in greater number than the movements of the heavenly bodies.

P(1)- Q(50)- A(3)- O(4) — Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that “all intelligible and intellectual substances subsist because of the rays of the divine goodness.” But a ray is only multiplied according to the different things that receive it. Now it cannot be said that their matter is receptive of an intelligible ray, since intellectual substances are immaterial, as was shown above ( A(2) ). Therefore it seems that the multiplication of intellectual substances can only be according to the requirements of the first bodies — that is, of the heavenly ones, so that in some way the shedding form of the aforesaid rays may be terminated in them; and hence the same conclusion is to be drawn as before.

P(1)- Q(50)- A(3) — On the contrary, It is said ( Daniel 7:10): “Thousands of thousands ministered to Him, and ten thousands times a hundred thousand stood before Him.”

P(1)- Q(50)- A(3) — I answer that, There have been various opinions with regard to the number of the separate substances. Plato contended that the separate substances are the species of sensible things; as if we were to maintain that human nature is a separate substance of itself: and according to this view it would have to be maintained that the number of the separate substances is the number of the species of sensible things. Aristotle, however, rejects this view (Metaph. i, text 31) because matter is of the very nature of the species of sensible things. Consequently the separate substances cannot be the exemplar species of these sensible things; but have their own fixed natures, which are higher than the natures of sensible things. Nevertheless Aristotle held (Metaph. xi, text 43) that those more perfect natures bear relation to these sensible things, as that of mover and end; and therefore he strove to find out the number of the separate substances according to the number of the first movements.

But since this appears to militate against the teachings of Sacred Scripture, Rabbi Moses the Jew, wishing to bring both into harmony, held that the angels, in so far as they are styled immaterial substances, are multiplied according to the number of heavenly movements or bodies, as Aristotle held (Metaph. xi, text 43); while he contended that in the Scriptures even men bearing a divine message are styled angels; and again, even the powers of natural things, which manifest God’s almighty power. It is, however, quite foreign to the custom of the Scriptures for the powers of irrational things to be designated as angels.

Hence it must be said that the angels, even inasmuch as they are immaterial substances, exist in exceeding great number, far beyond all material multitude. This is what Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. xiv): “There are many blessed armies of the heavenly intelligences, surpassing the weak and limited reckoning of our material numbers.” The reason whereof is this, because, since it is the perfection of the universe that God chiefly intends in the creation of things, the more perfect some things are, in so much greater an excess are they created by God. Now, as in bodies such excess is observed in regard to their magnitude, so in things incorporeal is it observed in regard to their multitude. We see, in fact, that incorruptible bodies, exceed corruptible bodies almost incomparably in magnitude; for the entire sphere of things active and passive is something very small in comparison with the heavenly bodies. Hence it is reasonable to conclude that the immaterial substances as it were incomparably exceed material substances as to multitude.

P(1)- Q(50)- A(3)- RO(1) — In the angels number is not that of discrete quantity, brought about by division of what is continuous, but that which is caused by distinction of forms; according as multitude is reckoned among the transcendentals, as was said above ( Q(30), A(3) ;).

P(1)- Q(50)- A(3)- RO(2) — From the angelic nature being the nighest unto God, it must needs have least of multitude in its composition, but not so as to be found in few subjects.

P(1)- Q(50)- A(3)- RO(3) — This is Aristotle’s argument (Metaph. xii, text 44), and it would conclude necessarily if the separate substances were made for corporeal substances. For thus the immaterial substances would exist to no purpose, unless some movement from them were to appear in corporeal things. But it is not true that the immaterial substances exist on account of the corporeal, because the end is nobler than the means to the end. Hence Aristotle says (Metaph. xii, text 44) that this is not a necessary argument, but a probable one. He was forced to make use of this argument, since only through sensible things can we come to know intelligible ones.

P(1)- Q(50)- A(3)- RO(4) — This argument comes from the opinion of such as hold that matter is the cause of the distinction of things; but this was refuted above ( Q(47), A(1) ). Accordingly, the multiplication of the angels is not to be taken according to matter, nor according to bodies, but according to the divine wisdom devising the various orders of immaterial substances.

P(1)- Q(50)- A(4) Whether the angels differ in species?

P(1)- Q(50)- A(4)- O(1) — It would seem that the angels do not differ in species. For since the “difference” is nobler than the ‘genus,’ all things which agree in what is noblest in them, agree likewise in their ultimate constitutive difference; and so they are the same according to species. But all angels agree in what is noblest in them — that is to say, in intellectuality. Therefore all the angels are of one species.

P(1)- Q(50)- A(4)- O(2) — Further, more and less do not change a species.

But the angels seem to differ only from one another according to more and less — namely, as one is simpler than another, and of keener intellect.

Therefore the angels do not differ specifically.

P(1)- Q(50)- A(4)- O(3) — Further, soul and angel are contra-distinguished mutually from each other. But all souls are of the one species. So therefore are the angels.

P(1)- Q(50)- A(4)- O(4) — Further, the more perfect a thing is in nature, the more ought it to be multiplied. But this would not be so if there were but one individual under one species. Therefore there are many angels of one species.

P(1)- Q(50)- A(4) — On the contrary, In things of one species there is no such thing as “first” and “second” [prius et posterius], as the Philosopher says (Metaph. iii, text 2). But in the angels even of the one order there are first, middle, and last, as Dionysius says (Hier. Ang. x). Therefore the angels are not of the same species.

P(1)- Q(50)- A(4) — I answer that, Some have said that all spiritual substances, even souls, are of the one species. Others, again, that all the angels are of the one species, but not souls; while others allege that all the angels of one hierarchy, or even of one order, are of the one species.

But this is impossible. For such things as agree in species but differ in number, agree in form, but are distinguished materially. If, therefore, the angels be not composed of matter and form, as was said above ( A(2) ), it follows that it is impossible for two angels to be of one species; just as it would be impossible for there to be several whitenesses apart, or several humanities, since whitenesses are not several, except in so far as they are in several substances. And if the angels had matter, not even then could there be several angels of one species. For it would be necessary for matter to be the principle of distinction of one from the other, not, indeed, according to the division of quantity, since they are incorporeal, but according to the diversity of their powers; and such diversity of matter causes diversity not merely of species, but of genus.

P(1)- Q(50)- A(4)- RO(1) — “Difference” is nobler than “genus,” as the determined is more noble than the undetermined, and the proper than the common, but not as one nature is nobler than another; otherwise it would be necessary that all irrational animals be of the same species; or that there should be in them some form which is higher than the sensible soul.

Therefore irrational animals differ in species according to the various determined degrees of sensitive nature; and in like manner all the angels differ in species according to the diverse degrees of intellectual nature.

P(1)- Q(50)- A(4)- RO(2) — More and less change the species, not according as they are caused by the intensity or remissness of one form, but according as they are caused by forms of diverse degrees; for instance, if we say that fire is more perfect than air: and in this way the angels are diversified according to more or less.

P(1)- Q(50)- A(4)- RO(3) — The good of the species preponderates over the good of the individual. Hence it is much better for the species to be multiplied in the angels than for individuals to be multiplied in the one species.

P(1)- Q(50)- A(4)- RO(4) — Numerical multiplication, since it can be drawn out infinitely, is not intended by the agent, but only specific multiplication, as was said above ( Q(47), A(3) ). Hence the perfection of the angelic nature calls for the multiplying of species, but not for the multiplying of individuals in one species.

P(1)- Q(50)- A(5) Whether the angels are incorruptible?

P(1)- Q(50)- A(5)- O(1) — It would seem that the angels are not incorruptible; for Damascene, speaking of the angel, says (De Fide Orth. ii, 3) that he is “an intellectual substance, partaking of immortality by favor, and not by nature.”

P(1)- Q(50)- A(5)- O(2) — Further, Plato says in the Timaeus: “O gods of gods, whose maker and father am I: You are indeed my works, dissoluble by nature, yet indissoluble because I so will it.” But gods such as these can only be understood to be the angels. Therefore the angels are corruptible by their nature P(1)- Q(50)- A(5)- O(3) — Further, according to Gregory (Moral. xvi), “all things would tend towards nothing, unless the hand of the Almighty preserved them.” But what can be brought to nothing is corruptible.

Therefore, since the angels were made by God, it would appear that they are corruptible of their own nature.

P(1)- Q(50)- A(5) — On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that the intellectual substances “have unfailing life, being free from all corruption, death, matter, and generation.”

P(1)- Q(50)- A(5) — I answer that, It must necessarily be maintained that the angels are incorruptible of their own nature. The reason for this is, that nothing is corrupted except by its form being separated from the matter.

Hence, since an angel is a subsisting form, as is clear from what was said above ( A(2) ), it is impossible for its substance to be corruptible. For what belongs to anything considered in itself can never be separated from it; but what belongs to a thing, considered in relation to something else, can be separated, when that something else is taken away, in view of which it belonged to it. Roundness can never be taken from the circle, because it belongs to it of itself; but a bronze circle can lose roundness, if the bronze be deprived of its circular shape. Now to be belongs to a form considered in itself; for everything is an actual being according to its form: whereas matter is an actual being by the form. Consequently a subject composed of matter and form ceases to be actually when the form is separated from the matter. But if the form subsists in its own being, as happens in the angels, as was said above ( A(2) ), it cannot lose its being. Therefore, the angel’s immateriality is the cause why it is incorruptible by its own nature.

A token of this incorruptibility can be gathered from its intellectual operation; for since everything acts according as it is actual, the operation of a thing indicates its mode of being. Now the species and nature of the operation is understood from the object. But an intelligible object, being above time, is everlasting. Hence every intellectual substance is incorruptible of its own nature.

P(1)- Q(50)- A(5)- RO(1) — Damascene is dealing with perfect immortality, which includes complete immutability; since “every change is a kind of death,” as Augustine says (Contra Maxim. iii). The angels obtain perfect immutability only by favor, as will appear later ( Q(62) ).

P(1)- Q(50)- A(5)- RO(2) — By the expression ‘gods’ Plato understands the heavenly bodies, which he supposed to be made up of elements, and therefore dissoluble of their own nature; yet they are for ever preserved in existence by the Divine will.

P(1)- Q(50)- A(5)- RO(3) — As was observed above ( Q(44), A(1) ) there is a kind of necessary thing which has a cause of its necessity. Hence it is not repugnant to a necessary or incorruptible being to depend for its existence on another as its cause. Therefore, when it is said that all things, even the angels, would lapse into nothing, unless preserved by God, it is not to be gathered therefrom that there is any principle of corruption in the angels; but that the nature of the angels is dependent upon God as its cause. For a thing is said to be corruptible not merely because God can reduce it to nonexistence, by withdrawing His act of preservation; but also because it has some principle of corruption within itself, or some contrariety, or at least the potentiality of matter.

QUESTION OF THE ANGELS IN COMPARISON WITH BODIES (THREE ARTICLES) We next inquire about the angels in comparison with corporeal things; and in the first place about their comparison with bodies; secondly, of the angels in comparison with corporeal places; and, thirdly, of their comparison with local movement.

Under the first heading there are three points of inquiry: (1) Whether angels have bodies naturally united to them? (2) Whether they assume bodies? (3) Whether they exercise functions of life in the bodies assumed?

P(1)- Q(51)- A(1) Whether the angels have bodies naturally united to them?

P(1)- Q(51)- A(1)- O(1) — It would seem that angels have bodies naturally united to them. For Origen says (Peri Archon i): “It is God’s attribute alone — that is, it belongs to the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost, as a property of nature, that He is understood to exist without any material substance and without any companionship of corporeal addition.” Bernard likewise says (Hom. 6:super Cant.): “Let us assign incorporeity to God alone even as we do immortality, whose nature alone, neither for its own sake nor on account of anything else, needs the help of any corporeal organ. But it is clear that every created spirit needs corporeal substance.”

Augustine also says (Genesis ad lit. iii): “The demons are called animals of the atmosphere because their nature is akin to that of aerial bodies.” But the nature of demons and angels is the same. Therefore angels have bodies naturally united to them.

P(1)- Q(51)- A(1)- O(2) — Further, Gregory (Hom. x in Ev.) calls an angel a rational animal. But every animal is composed of body and soul. Therefore angels have bodies naturally united to them.

P(1)- Q(51)- A(1)- O(3) — Further, life is more perfect in the angels than in souls. But the soul not only lives, but gives life to the body. Therefore the angels animate bodies which are naturally united to them.

P(1)- Q(51)- A(1) — On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that “the angels are understood to be incorporeal.”

P(1)- Q(51)- A(1) — I answer that, The angels have not bodies naturally united to them. For whatever belongs to any nature as an accident is not found universally in that nature; thus, for instance, to have wings, because it is not of the essence of an animal, does not belong to every animal. Now since to understand is not the act of a body, nor of any corporeal energy, as will be shown later ( Q(75), A(2) ), it follows that to have a body united to it is not of the nature of an intellectual substance, as such; but it is accidental to some intellectual substance on account of something else.

Even so it belongs to the human soul to be united to a body, because it is imperfect and exists potentially in the genus of intellectual substances, not having the fulness of knowledge in its own nature, but acquiring it from sensible things through the bodily senses, as will be explained later on ( Q(84), A(6) ; Q(89), A(1) ). Now whenever we find something imperfect in any genus we must presuppose something perfect in that genus.

Therefore in the intellectual nature there are some perfectly intellectual substances, which do not need to acquire knowledge from sensible things.

Consequently not all intellectual substances are united to bodies; but some are quite separated from bodies, and these we call angels.

P(1)- Q(51)- A(1)- RO(1) — As was said above ( Q(50), A(1) ) it was the opinion of some that every being is a body; and consequently some seem to have thought that there were no incorporeal substances existing except as united to bodies; so much so that some even held that God was the soul of the world, as Augustine tells us (De Civ. Dei vii). As this is contrary to Catholic Faith, which asserts that God is exalted above all things, according to Psalm 8:2: “Thy magnificence is exalted beyond the heavens”; Origen, while refusing to say such a thing of God, followed the above opinion of others regarding the other substances; being deceived here as he was also in many other points, by following the opinions of the ancient philosophers.

Bernard’s expression can be explained, that the created spirit needs some bodily instrument, which is not naturally united to it, but assumed for some purpose, as will be explained ( A(2) ). Augustine speaks, not as asserting the fact, but merely using the opinion of the Platonists, who maintained that there are some aerial animals, which they termed demons.

P(1)- Q(51)- A(1)- RO(2) — Gregory calls the angel a rational animal metaphorically, on account of the likeness to the rational nature.

P(1)- Q(51)- A(1)- RO(3) — To give life effectively is a perfection simply speaking; hence it belongs to God, as is said ( 1 Kings 2:6): “The Lord killeth, and maketh alive.” But to give life formally belongs to a substance which is part of some nature, and which has not within itself the full nature of the species. Hence an intellectual substance which is not united to a body is more perfect than one which is united to a body.

P(1)- Q(51)- A(2) Whether angels assume bodies?

P(1)- Q(51)- A(2)- O(1) — It would seem that angels do not assume bodies.

For there is nothing superfluous in the work of an angel, as there is nothing of the kind in the work of nature. But it would be superfluous for the angels to assume bodies, because an angel has no need for a body, since his own power exceeds all bodily power. Therefore an angel does not assume a body.

P(1)- Q(51)- A(2)- O(2) — Further, every assumption is terminated in some union; because to assume implies a taking to oneself [ad se sumere]. But a body is not united to an angel as to a form, as stated ( A(1) ); while in so far as it is united to the angel as to a mover, it is not said to be assumed, otherwise it would follow that all bodies moved by the angels are assumed by them. Therefore the angels do not assume bodies.

P(1)- Q(51)- A(2)- O(3) — Further, angels do not assume bodies from the earth or water, or they could not suddenly disappear; nor again from fire, otherwise they would burn whatever things they touched; nor again from air, because air is without shape or color. Therefore the angels do not assume bodies.

P(1)- Q(51)- A(2) — On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xvi) that angels appeared to Abraham under assumed bodies.

P(1)- Q(51)- A(2) — I answer that, Some have maintained that the angels never assume bodies, but that all that we read in Scripture of apparitions of angels happened in prophetic vision — that is, according to imagination.

But this is contrary to the intent of Scripture; for whatever is beheld in imaginary vision is only in the beholder’s imagination, and consequently is not seen by everybody. Yet Divine Scripture from time to time introduces angels so apparent as to be seen commonly by all; just as the angels who appeared to Abraham were seen by him and by his whole family, by Lot, and by the citizens of Sodom; in like manner the angel who appeared to Tobias was seen by all present. From all this it is clearly shown that such apparitions were beheld by bodily vision, whereby the object seen exists outside the person beholding it, and can accordingly be seen by all. Now by such a vision only a body can be beheld. Consequently, since the angels are not bodies, nor have they bodies naturally united with them, as is clear from what has been said ( A(1) ; Q(50), A(1) ), it follows that they sometimes assume bodies.

P(1)- Q(51)- A(2)- RO(1) — Angels need an assumed body, not for themselves, but on our account; that by conversing familiarly with men they may give evidence of that intellectual companionship which men expect to have with them in the life to come. Moreover that angels assumed bodies under the Old Law was a figurative indication that the Word of God would take a human body; because all the apparitions in the Old Testament were ordained to that one whereby the Son of God appeared in the flesh.

P(1)- Q(51)- A(2)- RO(2) — The body assumed is united to the angel not as its form, nor merely as its mover, but as its mover represented by the assumed movable body. For as in the Sacred Scripture the properties of intelligible things are set forth by the likenesses of things sensible, in the same way by Divine power sensible bodies are so fashioned by angels as fittingly to represent the intelligible properties of an angel. And this is what we mean by an angel assuming a body.

P(1)- Q(51)- A(2)- RO(3) — Although air as long as it is in a state of rarefaction has neither shape nor color, yet when condensed it can both be shaped and colored as appears in the clouds. Even so the angels assume bodies of air, condensing it by the Divine power in so far as is needful for forming the assumed body.

P(1)- Q(51)- A(3) Whether the angels exercise functions of life in the bodies assumed?

P(1)- Q(51)- A(3)- O(1) — It would seem that the angels exercise functions of life in assumed bodies. For pretence is unbecoming in angels of truth.

But it would be pretence if the body assumed by them, which seems to live and to exercise vital functions, did not possess these functions.

Therefore the angels exercise functions of life in the assumed body.

P(1)- Q(51)- A(3)- O(2) — Further, in the works of the angels there is nothing without a purpose. But eyes, nostrils, and the other instruments of the senses, would be fashioned without a purpose in the body assumed by the angel, if he perceived nothing by their means. Consequently, the angel perceives by the assumed body; and this is the most special function of life.

P(1)- Q(51)- A(3)- O(3) — Further, to move hither and thither is one of the functions of life, as the Philosopher says (De Anima ii). But the angels are manifestly seen to move in their assumed bodies. For it was said ( Genesis 18:16) that “Abraham walked with” the angels, who had appeared to him, “bringing them on the way”; and when Tobias said to the angel (Tob. 5:7,8): “Knowest thou the way that leadeth to the city of Medes?” he answered: “I know it; and I have often walked through all the ways thereof.” Therefore the angels often exercise functions of life in assumed bodies.

P(1)- Q(51)- A(3)- O(4) — Further, speech is the function of a living subject, for it is produced by the voice, while the voice itself is a sound conveyed from the mouth. But it is evident from many passages of Sacred Scripture that angels spoke in assumed bodies. Therefore in their assumed bodies they exercise functions of life.

P(1)- Q(51)- A(3)- O(5) — Further, eating is a purely animal function.

Hence the Lord after His Resurrection ate with His disciples in proof of having resumed life ( Luke 24). Now when angels appeared in their assumed bodies they ate, and Abraham offered them food, after having previously adored them as God ( Genesis 18). Therefore the angels exercise functions of life in assumed bodies.

P(1)- Q(51)- A(3)- O(6) — Further, to beget offspring is a vital act. But this has befallen the angels in their assumed bodies; for it is related: “After the sons of God went in to the daughters of men, and they brought forth children, these are the mighty men of old, men of renown” ( Genesis 6:4).

Consequently the angels exercised vital functions in their assumed bodies.

P(1)- Q(51)- A(3) — On the contrary, The bodies assumed by angels have no life, as was stated in the previous article (ad 3). Therefore they cannot exercise functions of life through assumed bodies.

P(1)- Q(51)- A(3) — I answer that, Some functions of living subjects have something in common with other operations; just as speech, which is the function of a living creature, agrees with other sounds of inanimate things, in so far as it is sound; and walking agrees with other movements, in so far as it is movement. Consequently vital functions can be performed in assumed bodies by the angels, as to that which is common in such operations; but not as to that which is special to living subjects; because, according to the Philosopher (De Somn. et Vig. i), “that which has the faculty has the action.” Hence nothing can have a function of life except what has life, which is the potential principle of such action.

P(1)- Q(51)- A(3)- RO(1) — As it is in no wise contrary to truth for intelligible things to be set forth in Scripture under sensible figures, since it is not said for the purpose of maintaining that intelligible things are sensible, but in order that properties of intelligible things may be understood according to similitude through sensible figures; so it is not contrary to the truth of the holy angels that through their assumed bodies they appear to be living men, although they are really not. For the bodies are assumed merely for this purpose, that the spiritual properties and works of the angels may be manifested by the properties of man and of his works. This could not so fittingly be done if they were to assume true men; because the properties of such men would lead us to men, and not to angels.

P(1)- Q(51)- A(3)- RO(2) — Sensation is entirely a vital function.

Consequently it can in no way be said that the angels perceive through the organs of their assumed bodies. Yet such bodies are not fashioned in vain; for they are not fashioned for the purpose of sensation through them, but to this end, that by such bodily organs the spiritual powers of the angels may be made manifest; just as by the eye the power of the angel’s knowledge is pointed out, and other powers by the other members, as Dionysius teaches (Coel. Hier.).

P(1)- Q(51)- A(3)- RO(3) — Movement coming from a united mover is a proper function of life; but the bodies assumed by the angels are not thus moved, since the angels are not their forms. Yet the angels are moved accidentally, when such bodies are moved, since they are in them as movers are in the moved; and they are here in such a way as not to be elsewhere which cannot be said of God. Accordingly, although God is not moved when the things are moved in which He exists, since He is everywhere; yet the angels are moved accidentally according to the movement of the bodies assumed. But they are not moved according to the movement of the heavenly bodies, even though they be in them as the movers in the thing moved, because the heavenly bodies do not change place in their entirety; nor for the spirit which moves the world is there any fixed locality according to any restricted part of the world’s substance, which now is in the east, and now in the west, but according to a fixed quarter; because “the moving energy is always in the east,” as stated in Phys. viii, text 84.

P(1)- Q(51)- A(3)- RO(4) — Properly speaking, the angels do not talk through their assumed bodies; yet there is a semblance of speech, in so far as they fashion sounds in the air like to human voices.

P(1)- Q(51)- A(3)- RO(5) — Properly speaking, the angels cannot be said to eat, because eating involves the taking of food convertible into the substance of the eater.

P(1)- Q(51)- A(3)- RO(5) Although after the Resurrection food was not converted into the substance of Christ’s body, but resolved into pre-existing matter; nevertheless Christ had a body of such a true nature that food could be changed into it; hence it was a true eating. But the food taken by angels was neither changed into the assumed body, nor was the body of such a nature that food could be changed into it; consequently, it was not a true eating, but figurative of spiritual eating. This is what the angel said to Tobias: “When I was with you, I seemed indeed to eat and to drink; but I use an invisible meat and drink” (Tob. 12:19).

Abraham offered them food, deeming them to be men, in whom, nevertheless, he worshipped God, as God is wont to be in the prophets, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xvi).

P(1)- Q(51)- A(3)- RO(6) — As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xv): “Many persons affirm that they have had the experience, or have heard from such as have experienced it, that the Satyrs and Fauns, whom the common folk call incubi, have often presented themselves before women, and have sought and procured intercourse with them. Hence it is folly to deny it.

But God’s holy angels could not fall in such fashion before the deluge.

Hence by the sons of God are to be understood the sons of Seth, who were good; while by the daughters of men the Scripture designates those who sprang from the race of Cain. Nor is it to be wondered at that giants should be born of them; for they were not all giants, albeit there were many more before than after the deluge.” Still if some are occasionally begotten from demons, it is not from the seed of such demons, nor from their assumed bodies, but from the seed of men taken for the purpose; as when the demon assumes first the form of a woman, and afterwards of a man; just as they take the seed of other things for other generating purposes, as Augustine says (De Trin. iii), so that the person born is not the child of a demon, but of a man.

QUESTION OF THE ANGELS IN RELATION TO PLACE (THREE ARTICLES) We now inquire into the place of the angels. Touching this there are three subjects of inquiry: (1) Is the angel in a place? (2) Can he be in several places at once? (3) Can several angels be in the same place?

P(1)- Q(52)- A(1) Whether an angel is in a place?

P(1)- Q(52)- A(1)- O(1) — It would seem that an angel is not in a place. For Boethius says (De Hebdom.): “The common opinion of the learned is that things incorporeal are not in a place.” And again, Aristotle observes (Phys. iv, text 48,57) that “it is not everything existing which is in a place, but only a movable body.” But an angel is not a body, as was shown above ( Q(50) ). Therefore an angel is not in a place.

P(1)- Q(52)- A(1)- O(2) — Further, place is a “quantity having position.”

But everything which is in a place has some position. Now to have a position cannot benefit an angel, since his substance is devoid of quantity, the proper difference of which is to have a position. Therefore an angel is not in a place.

P(1)- Q(52)- A(1)- O(3) — Further, to be in a place is to be measured and to be contained by such place, as is evident from the Philosopher (Phys. iv, text 14,119). But an angel can neither be measured nor contained by a place, because the container is more formal than the contained; as air with regard to water (Phys. iv, text 35,49). Therefore an angel is not in a place.

P(1)- Q(52)- A(1) — On the contrary, It is said in the Collect [*Prayer at Compline, Dominican Breviary]: “Let Thy holy angels who dwell herein, keep us in peace.”

P(1)- Q(52)- A(1) — I answer that, It is befitting an angel to be in a place; yet an angel and a body are said to be in a place in quite a different sense.

A body is said to be in a place in such a way that it is applied to such place according to the contact of dimensive quantity; but there is no such quantity in the angels, for theirs is a virtual one. Consequently an angel is said to be in a corporeal place by application of the angelic power in any manner whatever to any place.

Accordingly there is no need for saying that an angel can be deemed commensurate with a place, or that he occupies a space in the continuous; for this is proper to a located body which is endowed with dimensive quantity. In similar fashion it is not necessary on this account for the angel to be contained by a place; because an incorporeal substance virtually contains the thing with which it comes into contact, and is not contained by it: for the soul is in the body as containing it, not as contained by it. In the same way an angel is said to be in a place which is corporeal, not as the thing contained, but as somehow containing it.

And hereby we have the answers to the objections.

P(1)- Q(52)- A(2) Whether an angel can be in several places at once?

P(1)- Q(52)- A(2)- O(1) — It would seem that an angel can be in several places at once. For an angel is not less endowed with power than the soul.

But the soul is in several places at once, for it is entirely in every part of the body, as Augustine says (De Trin. vi). Therefore an angel can be in several places at once.

P(1)- Q(52)- A(2)- O(2) — Further, an angel is in the body which he assumes; and, since the body which he assumes is continuous, it would appear that he is in every part thereof. But according to the various parts there are various places. Therefore the angel is at one time in various places.

P(1)- Q(52)- A(2)- O(3) — Further, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii) that “where the angel operates, there he is.” But occasionally he operates in several places at one time, as is evident from the angel destroying Sodom ( Genesis 19:25). Therefore an angel can be in several places at the one time.

P(1)- Q(52)- A(2) — On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii) that “while the angels are in heaven, they are not on earth.”

P(1)- Q(52)- A(2) — I answer that, An angel’s power and nature are finite, whereas the Divine power and essence, which is the universal cause of all things, is infinite: consequently God through His power touches all things, and is not merely present in some places, but is everywhere. Now since the angel’s power is finite, it does not extend to all things, but to one determined thing. For whatever is compared with one power must be compared therewith as one determined thing. Consequently since all being is compared as one thing to God’s universal power, so is one particular being compared as one with the angelic power. Hence, since the angel is in a place by the application of his power to the place, it follows that he is not everywhere, nor in several places, but in only one place.

Some, however, have been deceived in this matter. For some who were unable to go beyond the reach of their imaginations supposed the indivisibility of the angel to be like that of a point; consequently they thought that an angel could be only in a place which is a point. But they were manifestly deceived, because a point is something indivisible, yet having its situation; whereas the angel is indivisible, and beyond the genus of quantity and situation. Consequently there is no occasion for determining in his regard one indivisible place as to situation: any place which is either divisible or indivisible, great or small suffices, according as to his own free-will he applies his power to a great or to a small body. So the entire body to which he is applied by his power, corresponds as one place to him.

Neither, if any angel moves the heavens, is it necessary for him to be everywhere. First of all, because his power is applied only to what is first moved by him. Now there is one part of the heavens in which there is movement first of all, namely, the part to the east: hence the Philosopher (Phys. vii, text 84) attributes the power of the heavenly mover to the part which is in the east. Secondly, because philosophers do not hold that one separate substance moves all the spheres immediately. Hence it need not be everywhere.

So, then, it is evident that to be in a place appertains quite differently to a body, to an angel, and to God. For a body is in a place in a circumscribed fashion, since it is measured by the place. An angel, however, is not there in a circumscribed fashion, since he is not measured by the place, but definitively, because he is in a place in such a manner that he is not in another. But God is neither circumscriptively nor definitively there, because He is everywhere.

From this we can easily gather an answer to the objections: because the entire subject to which the angelic power is immediately applied, is reputed as one place, even though it be continuous.

P(1)- Q(52)- A(3) Whether several angels can be at the same time in the same place?

P(1)- Q(52)- A(3)- O(1) — It would seem that several angels can be at the same time in the same place. For several bodies cannot be at the same time in the same place, because they fill the place. But the angels do not fill a place, because only a body fills a place, so that it be not empty, as appears from the Philosopher (Phys. iv, text 52,58). Therefore several angels can be in the one place.

P(1)- Q(52)- A(3)- O(2) — Further, there is a greater difference between an angel and a body than there is between two angels. But an angel and a body are at the one time in the one place: because there is no place which is not filled with a sensible body, as we find proved in Phys. iv, text. 58. Much more, then, can two angels be in the same place.

P(1)- Q(52)- A(3)- O(3) — Further, the soul is in every part of the body, according to Augustine (De Trin. vi). But demons, although they do not obsess souls, do obsess bodies occasionally; and thus the soul and the demon are at the one time in the same place; and consequently for the same reason all other spiritual substances.

P(1)- Q(52)- A(3) — On the contrary, There are not two souls in the same body. Therefore for a like reason there are not two angels in the same place.

P(1)- Q(52)- A(3) — I answer that, There are not two angels in the same place. The reason of this is because it is impossible for two complete causes to be the causes immediately of one and the same thing. This is evident in every class of causes: for there is one proximate form of one thing, and there is one proximate mover, although there may be several remote movers. Nor can it be objected that several individuals may row a boat, since no one of them is a perfect mover, because no one man’s strength is sufficient for moving the boat; while all together are as one mover, in so far as their united strengths all combine in producing the one movement. Hence, since the angel is said to be in one place by the fact that his power touches the place immediately by way of a perfect container, as was said ( A(1) ), there can be but one angel in one place.

P(1)- Q(52)- A(3)- RO(1) — Several angels are not hindered from being in the same place because of their filling the place; but for another reason, as has been said.

P(1)- Q(52)- A(3)- RO(2) — An angel and a body are not in a place in the same way; hence the conclusion does not follow.

P(1)- Q(52)- A(3)- RO(3) — Not even a demon and a soul are compared to a body according to the same relation of causality; since the soul is its form, while the demon is not. Hence the inference does not follow.

QUESTION OF THE LOCAL MOVEMENT OF THE ANGELS (THREE ARTICLES) We must next consider the local movement of the angels; under which heading there are three points of inquiry: (1) Whether an angel can be moved locally. (2) Whether in passing from place to place he passes through intervening space? (3) Whether the angel’s movement is in time or instantaneous?

P(1)- Q(53)- A(1) Whether an angel can be moved locally?

P(1)- Q(53)- A(1)- O(1) — It seems that an angel cannot be moved locally.

For, as the Philosopher proves (Phys. vi, text 32,86) “nothing which is devoid of parts is moved”; because, while it is in the term “wherefrom,” it is not moved; nor while it is in the term “whereto,” for it is then already moved; consequently it remains that everything which is moved, while it is being moved, is partly in the term “wherefrom” and partly in the term “whereto.” But an angel is without parts. Therefore an angel cannot be moved locally.

P(1)- Q(53)- A(1)- O(2) — Further, movement is “the act of an imperfect being,” as the Philosopher says (Phys. iii, text 14). But a beatified angel is not imperfect. Consequently a beatified angel is not moved locally.

P(1)- Q(53)- A(1)- O(3) — Further, movement is simply because of want.

But the holy angels have no want. Therefore the holy angels are not moved locally.

P(1)- Q(53)- A(1) — On the contrary, It is the same thing for a beatified angel to be moved as for a beatified soul to be moved. But it must necessarily be said that a blessed soul is moved locally, because it is an article of faith that Christ’s soul descended into Hell. Therefore a beatified angel is moved locally.

P(1)- Q(53)- A(1) — I answer that, A beatified angel can be moved locally.

As, however, to be in a place belongs equivocally to a body and to an angel, so likewise does local movement. For a body is in a place in so far as it is contained under the place, and is commensurate with the place. Hence it is necessary for local movement of a body to be commensurate with the place, and according to its exigency. Hence it is that the continuity of movement is according to the continuity of magnitude; and according to priority and posteriority of local movement, as the Philosopher says (Phys. iv, text 99). But an angel is not in a place as commensurate and contained, but rather as containing it. Hence it is not necessary for the local movement of an angel to be commensurate with the place, nor for it to be according to the exigency of the place, so as to have continuity therefrom; but it is a non-continuous movement. For since the angel is in a place only by virtual contact, as was said above ( Q(52), A(1) ), it follows necessarily that the movement of an angel in a place is nothing else than the various contacts of various places successively, and not at once; because an angel cannot be in several places at one time, as was said above ( Q(52), A(2) ).

Nor is it necessary for these contacts to be continuous. Nevertheless a certain kind of continuity can be found in such contacts. Because, as was said above ( Q(52), A(1) ), there is nothing to hinder us from assigning a divisible place to an angel according to virtual contact; just as a divisible place is assigned to a body by contact of magnitude. Hence as a body successively, and not all at once, quits the place in which it was before, and thence arises continuity in its local movement; so likewise an angel can successively quit the divisible place in which he was before, and so his movement will be continuous. And he can all at once quit the whole place, and in the same instant apply himself to the whole of another place, and thus his movement will not be continuous.

P(1)- Q(53)- A(1)- RO(1) — This argument fails of its purpose for a twofold reason. First of all, because Aristotle’s demonstration deals with what is indivisible according to quantity, to which responds a place necessarily indivisible. And this cannot be said of an angel.

Secondly, because Aristotle’s demonstration deals with movement which is continuous. For if the movement were not continuous, it might be said that a thing is moved where it is in the term “wherefrom,” and while it is in the term “whereto”: because the very succession of “wheres,” regarding the same thing, would be called movement: hence, in whichever of those “wheres” the thing might be, it could be said to be moved. But the continuity of movement prevents this; because nothing which is continuous is in its term, as is clear, because the line is not in the point.

Therefore it is necessary for the thing moved to be not totally in either of the terms while it is being moved; but partly in the one, and partly in the other. Therefore, according as the angel’s movement is not continuous, Aristotle’s demonstration does not hold good. But according as the angel’s movement is held to be continuous, it can be so granted, that, while an angel is in movement, he is partly in the term “wherefrom,” and partly in the term “whereto” (yet so that such partiality be not referred to the angel’s substance, but to the place); because at the outset of his continuous movement the angel is in the whole divisible place from which he begins to be moved; but while he is actually in movement, he is in part of the first place which he quits, and in part of the second place which he occupies.

This very fact that he can occupy the parts of two places appertains to the angel from this, that he can occupy a divisible place by applying his power; as a body does by application of magnitude. Hence it follows regarding a body which is movable according to place, that it is divisible according to magnitude; but regarding an angel, that his power can be applied to something which is divisible.

P(1)- Q(53)- A(1)- RO(2) — The movement of that which is in potentiality is the act of an imperfect agent. But the movement which is by application of energy is the act of one in act: because energy implies actuality.

P(1)- Q(53)- A(1)- RO(3) — The movement of that which is in potentiality is the act of an imperfect but the movement of what is in act is not for any need of its own, but for another’s need. In this way, because of our need, the angel is moved locally, according to Hebrews 1:14: “They are all [*Vulg.: ‘Are they not all . . . ?’] ministering spirits, sent to minister for them who receive the inheritance of salvation.”

P(1)- Q(53)- A(2) Whether an angel passes through intermediate space?

P(1)- Q(53)- A(2)- O(1) — It would seem that an angel does not pass through intermediate space. For everything that passes through a middle space first travels along a place of its own dimensions, before passing through a greater. But the place responding to an angel, who is indivisible, is confined to a point. Therefore if the angel passes through middle space, he must reckon infinite points in his movement: which is not possible.

P(1)- Q(53)- A(2)- O(2) — Further, an angel is of simpler substance than the soul. But our soul by taking thought can pass from one extreme to another without going through the middle: for I can think of France and afterwards of Syria, without ever thinking of Italy, which stands between them. Therefore much more can an angel pass from one extreme to another without going through the middle.

P(1)- Q(53)- A(2) — On the contrary, If the angel be moved from one place to another, then, when he is in the term “whither,” he is no longer in motion, but is changed. But a process of changing precedes every actual change: consequently he was being moved while existing in some place.

But he was not moved so long as he was in the term “whence.” Therefore, he was moved while he was in mid-space: and so it was necessary for him to pass through intervening space.

P(1)- Q(53)- A(2) — I answer that, As was observed above in the preceding article, the local motion of an angel can be continuous, and noncontinuous.

If it be continuous, the angel cannot pass from one extreme to another without passing through the mid-space; because, as is said by the Philosopher (Phys. v, text 22; vi, text 77), “The middle is that into which a thing which is continually moved comes, before arriving at the last into which it is moved”; because the order of first and last in continuous movement, is according to the order of the first and last in magnitude, as he says (Phys. iv, text 99).

But if an angel’s movement be not continuous, it is possible for him to pass from one extreme to another without going through the middle: which is evident thus. Between the two extreme limits there are infinite intermediate places; whether the places be taken as divisible or as indivisible. This is clearly evident with regard to places which are indivisible; because between every two points that are infinite intermediate points, since no two points follow one another without a middle, as is proved in Phys. vi, text. 1. And the same must of necessity be said of divisible places: and this is shown from the continuous movement of a body. For a body is not moved from place to place except in time. But in the whole time which measures the movement of a body, there are not two “nows” in which the body moved is not in one place and in another; for if it were in one and the same place in two “nows,” it would follow that it would be at rest there; since to be at rest is nothing else than to be in the same place now and previously. Therefore since there are infinite “nows” between the first and the last “now” of the time which measures the movement, there must be infinite places between the first from which the movement begins, and the last where the movement ceases. This again is made evident from sensible experience. Let there be a body of a palm’s length, and let there be a plane measuring two palms, along which it travels; it is evident that the first place from which the movement starts is that of the one palm; and the place wherein the movement ends is that of the other palm. Now it is clear that when it begins to move, it gradually quits the first palm and enters the second. According, then, as the magnitude of the palm is divided, even so are the intermediate places multiplied; because every distinct point in the magnitude of the first palm is the beginning of a place, and a distinct point in the magnitude of the other palm is the limit of the same. Accordingly, since magnitude is infinitely divisible and the points in every magnitude are likewise infinite in potentiality, it follows that between every two places there are infinite intermediate places.

Now a movable body only exhausts the infinity of the intermediate places by the continuity of its movement; because, as the intermediate places are infinite in potentiality, so likewise must there be reckoned some infinitudes in movement which is continuous. Consequently, if the movement be not continuous, then all the parts of the movement will be actually numbered. If, therefore, any movable body be moved, but not by continuous movement, it follows, either that it does not pass through all the intermediate places, or else that it actually numbers infinite places: which is not possible. Accordingly, then, as the angel’s movement is not continuous, he does not pass through all intermediate places.

Now, the actual passing from one extreme to the other, without going through the mid-space, is quite in keeping with an angel’s nature; but not with that of a body, because a body is measured by and contained under a place; hence it is bound to follow the laws of place in its movement. But an angel’s substance is not subject to place as contained thereby, but is above it as containing it: hence it is under his control to apply himself to a place just as he wills, either through or without the intervening place.

P(1)- Q(53)- A(2)- RO(1) — The place of an angel is not taken as equal to him according to magnitude, but according to contact of power: and so the angel’s place can be divisible, and is not always a mere point. Yet even the intermediate divisible places are infinite, as was said above: but they are consumed by the continuity of the movement, as is evident from the foregoing.

P(1)- Q(53)- A(2)- RO(2) — While an angel is moved locally, his essence is applied to various places: but the soul’s essence is not applied to the things thought of, but rather the things thought of are in it. So there is no comparison.

P(1)- Q(53)- A(2)- RO(3) — In continuous movement the actual change is not a part of the movement, but its conclusion; hence movement must precede change. Accordingly such movement is through the mid-space. But in movement which is not continuous, the change is a part, as a unit is a part of number: hence the succession of the various places, even without the mid-space, constitutes such movement.

P(1)- Q(53)- A(3) Whether the movement of an angel is instantaneous?

P(1)- Q(53)- A(3)- O(1) — It would seem that an angel’s movement is instantaneous. For the greater the power of the mover, and the less the moved resist the mover, the more rapid is the movement. But the power of an angel moving himself exceeds beyond all proportion the power which moves a body. Now the proportion of velocities is reckoned according to the lessening of the time. But between one length of time and any other length of time there is proportion. If therefore a body is moved in time, an angel is moved in an instant.

P(1)- Q(53)- A(3)- O(2) — Further, the angel’s movement is simpler than any bodily change. But some bodily change is effected in an instant, such as illumination; both because the subject is not illuminated successively, as it gets hot successively; and because a ray does not reach sooner what is near than what is remote. Much more therefore is the angel’s movement instantaneous.

P(1)- Q(53)- A(3)- O(3) — Further, if an angel be moved from place to place in time, it is manifest that in the last instant of such time he is in the term “whereto”: but in the whole of the preceding time, he is either in the place immediately preceding, which is taken as the term “wherefrom”; or else he is partly in the one, and partly in the other, it follows that he is divisible; which is impossible. Therefore during the whole of the preceding time he is in the term “wherefrom.” Therefore he rests there: since to be at rest is to be in the same place now and previously, as was said ( A(2) ).

Therefore it follows that he is not moved except in the last instant of time.

P(1)- Q(53)- A(3) — On the contrary, In every change there is a before and after. Now the before and after of movement is reckoned by time.

Consequently every movement, even of an angel, is in time, since there is a before and after in it.

P(1)- Q(53)- A(3) — I answer that, Some have maintained that the local movement of an angel is instantaneous. They said that when an angel is moved from place to place, during the whole of the preceding time he is in the term “wherefrom”; but in the last instant of such time he is in the term “whereto.” Nor is there any need for a medium between the terms, just as there is no medium between time and the limit of time. But there is a midtime between two “nows” of time: hence they say that a last “now” cannot be assigned in which it was in the term “wherefrom,” just as in illumination, and in the substantial generation of fire, there is no last instant to be assigned in which the air was dark, or in which the matter was under the privation of the form of fire: but a last time can be assigned, so that in the last instant of such time there is light in the air, or the form of fire in the matter. And so illumination and substantial generation are called instantaneous movements.

But this does not hold good in the present case; and it is shown thus. It is of the nature of rest that the subject in repose be not otherwise disposed now than it was before: and therefore in every “now” of time which measures rest, the subject reposing is in the same “where” in the first, in the middle, and in the last “now.” On the other hand, it is of the very nature of movement for the subject moved to be otherwise now than it was before: and therefore in every “now” of time which measures movement, the movable subject is in various dispositions; hence in the last “now” it must have a different form from what it had before. So it is evident that to rest during the whole time in some (disposition), for instance, in whiteness, is to be in it in every instant of such time. Hence it is not possible for anything to rest in one term during the whole of the preceding time, and afterwards in the last instant of that time to be in the other term.

But this is possible in movement: because to be moved in any whole time, is not to be in the same disposition in every instant of that time. Therefore all instantaneous changes of the kind are terms of a continuous movement: just as generation is the term of the alteration of matter, and illumination is the term of the local movement of the illuminating body. Now the local movement of an angel is not the term of any other continuous movement, but is of itself, depending upon no other movement. Consequently it is impossible to say that he is in any place during the whole time, and that in the last “now” he is in another place: but some “now” must be assigned in which he was last in the preceding place. But where there are many “nows” succeeding one another, there is necessarily time; since time is nothing else than the reckoning of before and after in movement. It remains, then, that the movement of an angel is in time. It is in continuous time if his movement be continuous, and in non-continuous time if his movement is non-continuous for, as was said ( A(1) ), his movement can be of either kind, since the continuity of time comes of the continuity of movement, as the Philosopher says (Phys. iv, text 99).

But that time, whether it be continuous or not, is not the same as the time which measures the movement of the heavens, and whereby all corporeal things are measured, which have their changeableness from the movement of the heavens; because the angel’s movement does not depend upon the movement of the heavens.

P(1)- Q(53)- A(3)- RO(1) — If the time of the angel’s movement be not continuous, but a kind of succession of ‘nows,’ it will have no proportion to the time which measures the movement of corporeal things, which is continuous; since it is not of the same nature. If, however, it be continuous, it is indeed proportionable, not, indeed, because of the proportion of the mover and the movable, but on account of the proportion of the magnitudes in which the movement exists. Besides, the swiftness of the angel’s movement is not measured by the quantity of his power, but according to the determination of his will.

P(1)- Q(53)- A(3)- RO(2) — Illumination is the term of a movement; and is an alteration, not a local movement, as though the light were understood to be moved to what is near, before being moved to what is remote. But the angel’s movement is local, and, besides, it is not the term of movement; hence there is no comparison.

P(1)- Q(53)- A(3)- RO(3) — This objection is based on continuous time.

But the same time of an angel’s movement can be non-continuous. So an angel can be in one place in one instant, and in another place in the next instant, without any time intervening. If the time of the angel’s movement be continuous, he is changed through infinite places throughout the whole time which precedes the last ‘now’; as was already shown ( A(2) ).

Nevertheless he is partly in one of the continuous places, and partly in another, not because his substance is susceptible of parts, but because his power is applied to a part of the first place and to a part of the second, as was said above ( A(2) ).

QUESTION OF THE KNOWLEDGE OF THE ANGELS (FIVE ARTICLES) After considering what belongs to the angel’s substance, we now proceed to his knowledge. This investigation will be fourfold. In the first place inquiry must be made into his power of knowledge: secondly, into his medium of knowledge: thirdly, into the objects known: and fourthly, into the manner whereby he knows them.

Under the first heading there are five points of inquiry: (1) Is the angel’s understanding his substance? (2) Is his being his understanding? (3) Is his substance his power of intelligence? (4) Is there in the angels an active and a passive intellect? (5) Is there in them any other power of knowledge besides the intellect?

P(1)- Q(54)- A(1) Whether an angel’s act of understanding is his substance?

P(1)- Q(54)- A(1)- O(1) — It would seem that the angel’s act of understanding is his substance. For the angel is both higher and simpler than the active intellect of a soul. But the substance of the active intellect is its own action; as is evident from Aristotle (De Anima iii) and from his Commentator [*Averroes, A.D. 1126-1198]. Therefore much more is the angel’s substance his action — that is, his act of understanding.

P(1)- Q(54)- A(1)- O(2) — Further, the Philosopher says (Metaph. xii, text 39) that “the action of the intellect is life.” But “since in living things to live is to be,” as he says (De Anima ii, text 37), it seems that life is essence. Therefore the action of the intellect is the essence of an angel who understands.

P(1)- Q(54)- A(1)- O(3) — Further, if the extremes be one, then the middle does not differ from them; because extreme is farther from extreme than the middle is. But in an angel the intellect and the object understood are the same, at least in so far as he understands his own essence. Therefore the act of understanding, which is between the intellect and the thing understood, is one with the substance of the angel who understands.

P(1)- Q(54)- A(1) — On the contrary, The action of anything differs more from its substance than does its existence. But no creature’s existence is its substance, for this belongs to God only, as is evident from what was said above ( Q(3) , A(4) ). Therefore neither the action of an angel, nor of any other creature, is its substance.

P(1)- Q(54)- A(1) — I answer that, It is impossible for the action of an angel, or of any creature, to be its own substance. For an action is properly the actuality of a power; just as existence is the actuality of a substance or of an essence. Now it is impossible for anything which is not a pure act, but which has some admixture of potentiality, to be its own actuality: because actuality is opposed to potentiality. But God alone is pure act.

Hence only in God is His substance the same as His existence and His action.

Besides, if an angel’s act of understanding were his substance, it would be necessary for it to be subsisting. Now a subsisting act of intelligence can be but one; just as an abstract thing that subsists. Consequently an angel’s substance would neither be distinguished from God’s substance, which is His very act of understanding subsisting in itself, nor from the substance of another angel.

Also, if the angel were his own act of understanding, there could then be no degrees of understanding more or less perfectly; for this comes about through the diverse participation of the act of understanding.

P(1)- Q(54)- A(1)- RO(1) — When the active intellect is said to be its own action, such predication is not essential, but concomitant, because, since its very nature consists in act, instantly, so far as lies in itself, action accompanies it: which cannot be said of the passive intellect, for this has no actions until after it has been reduced to act.

P(1)- Q(54)- A(1)- RO(2) — The relation between “life” and “to live” is not the same as that between “essence” and “to be”; but rather as that between “a race” and “to run,” one of which signifies the act in the abstract, and the other in the concrete. Hence it does not follow, if “to live” is “to be,” that “life” is “essence.” Although life is sometimes put for the essence, as Augustine says (De Trin. x), “Memory and understanding and will are one essence, one life”: yet it is not taken in this sense by the