QUESTIONS 103-119 QUESTION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THINGS IN GENERAL (EIGHT ARTICLES) Having considered the creation of things and their distinction, we now consider in the third place the government thereof, and (1) the government of things in general; (2) in particular, the effects of this government.

Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry: (1) Whether the world is governed by someone? (2) What is the end of this government? (3) Whether the world is governed by one? (4) Of the effects of this government? (5) Whether all things are subject to Divine government? (6) Whether all things are immediately governed by God? (7) Whether the Divine government is frustrated in anything? (8) Whether anything is contrary to the Divine Providence?

P(1)- Q(103)- A(1) Whether the world is governed by anyone?

P(1)- Q(103)- A(1)- O(1) — It would seem that the world is not governed by anyone. For it belongs to those things to be governed, which move or work for an end. But natural things which make up the greater part of the world do not move, or work for an end; for they have no knowledge of their end. Therefore the world is not governed.

P(1)- Q(103)- A(1)- O(2) — Further, those things are governed which are moved towards an object. But the world does not appear to be so directed, but has stability in itself. Therefore it is not governed.

P(1)- Q(103)- A(1)- O(3) — Further, what is necessarily determined by its own nature to one particular thing, does not require any external principle of government. But the principal parts of the world are by a certain necessity determined to something particular in their actions and movements. Therefore the world does not require to be governed.

P(1)- Q(103)- A(1) — On the contrary, It is written (Wis. 14:3): “But Thou, O Father, governest all things by Thy Providence.” And Boethius says (De Consol. iii): “Thou Who governest this universe by mandate eternal.”

P(1)- Q(103)- A(1) — I answer that, Certain ancient philosophers denied the government of the world, saying that all things happened by chance.

But such an opinion can be refuted as impossible in two ways. First, by observation of things themselves: for we observe that in nature things happen always or nearly always for the best; which would not be the case unless some sort of providence directed nature towards good as an end; which is to govern. Wherefore the unfailing order we observe in things is a sign of their being governed; for instance, if we enter a well-ordered house we gather therefrom the intention of him that put it in order, as Tullius says (De Nat. Deorum ii), quoting Aristotle [*Cleanthes]. Secondly, this is clear from a consideration of Divine goodness, which, as we have said above ( Q(44), A(4) ; Q(65), A(2) ), was the cause of the production of things in existence. For as “it belongs to the best to produce the best,” it is not fitting that the supreme goodness of God should produce things without giving them their perfection. Now a thing’s ultimate perfection consists in the attainment of its end. Therefore it belongs to the Divine goodness, as it brought things into existence, so to lead them to their end: and this is to govern.

P(1)- Q(103)- A(1)- RO(1) — A thing moves or operates for an end in two ways. First, in moving itself to the end, as man and other rational creatures; and such things have knowledge of their end, and of the means to the end. Secondly, a thing is said to move or operate for an end, as though moved or directed by another thereto, as an arrow directed to the target by the archer, who knows the end unknown to the arrow. Wherefore, as the movement of the arrow towards a definite end shows clearly that it is directed by someone with knowledge, so the unvarying course of natural things which are without knowledge, shows clearly that the world is governed by some reason.

P(1)- Q(103)- A(1)- RO(2) — In all created things there is a stable element, at least primary matter; and something belonging to movement, if under movement we include operation. And things need governing as to both: because even that which is stable, since it is created from nothing, would return to nothingness were it not sustained by a governing hand, as will be explained later ( Q(104), A(1) ).

P(1)- Q(103)- A(1)- RO(3) — The natural necessity inherent in those beings which are determined to a particular thing, is a kind of impression from God, directing them to their end; as the necessity whereby an arrow is moved so as to fly towards a certain point is an impression from the archer, and not from the arrow. But there is a difference, inasmuch as that which creatures receive from God is their nature, while that which natural things receive from man in addition to their nature is somewhat violent.

Wherefore, as the violent necessity in the movement of the arrow shows the action of the archer, so the natural necessity of things shows the government of Divine Providence.

P(1)- Q(103)- A(2) Whether the end of the government of the world is something outside the world?

P(1)- Q(103)- A(2)- O(1) — It would seem that the end of the government of the world is not something existing outside the world. For the end of the government of a thing is that whereto the thing governed is brought. But that whereto a thing is brought is some good in the thing itself; thus a sick man is brought back to health, which is something good in him. Therefore the end of government of things is some good not outside, but within the things themselves.

P(1)- Q(103)- A(2)- O(2) — Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 1): “Some ends are an operation; some are a work” — i.e. produced by an operation. But nothing can be produced by the whole universe outside itself; and operation exists in the agent. Therefore nothing extrinsic can be the end of the government of things.

P(1)- Q(103)- A(2)- O(3) — Further, the good of the multitude seems to consist in order, and peace which is the “tranquillity of order,” as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 13). But the world is composed of a multitude of things. Therefore the end of the government of the world is the peaceful order in things themselves. Therefore the end of the government of the world is not an extrinsic good.

P(1)- Q(103)- A(2) — On the contrary, It is written ( Proverbs 16:4): “The Lord hath made all things for Himself.” But God is outside the entire order of the universe. Therefore the end of all things is something extrinsic to them.

P(1)- Q(103)- A(2) — I answer that, As the end of a thing corresponds to its beginning, it is not possible to be ignorant of the end of things if we know their beginning. Therefore, since the beginning of all things is something outside the universe, namely, God, it is clear from what has been expounded above ( Q(44), AA(1),2 ), that we must conclude that the end of all things is some extrinsic good. This can be proved by reason. For it is clear that good has the nature of an end; wherefore, a particular end of anything consists in some particular good; while the universal end of all things is the Universal Good; Which is good of Itself by virtue of Its Essence, Which is the very essence of goodness; whereas a particular good is good by participation. Now it is manifest that in the whole created universe there is not a good which is not such by participation. Wherefore that good which is the end of the whole universe must be a good outside the universe.

P(1)- Q(103)- A(2)- RO(1) — We may acquire some good in many ways: first, as a form existing in us, such as health or knowledge; secondly, as something done by us, as a builder attains his end by building a house; thirdly, as something good possessed or acquired by us, as the buyer of a field attains his end when he enters into possession. Wherefore nothing prevents something outside the universe being the good to which it is directed.

P(1)- Q(103)- A(2)- RO(2) — The Philosopher is speaking of the ends of various arts; for the end of some arts consists in the operation itself, as the end of a harpist is to play the harp; whereas the end of other arts consists in something produced, as the end of a builder is not the act of building, but the house he builds. Now it may happen that something extrinsic is the end not only as made, but also as possessed or acquired or even as represented, as if we were to say that Hercules is the end of the statue made to represent him. Therefore we may say that some good outside the whole universe is the end of the government of the universe, as something possessed and represented; for each thing tends to a participation thereof, and to an assimilation thereto, as far as is possible.

P(1)- Q(103)- A(2)- RO(3) — A good existing in the universe, namely, the order of the universe, is an end thereof; this. however, is not its ultimate end, but is ordered to the extrinsic good as to the end: thus the order in an army is ordered to the general, as stated in Metaph. xii, Did. xi, 10.

P(1)- Q(103)- A(3) Whether the world is governed by one?

P(1)- Q(103)- A(3)- O(1) — It would seem that the world is not governed by one. For we judge the cause by the effect. Now, we see in the government of the universe that things are not moved and do not operate uniformly, but some contingently and some of necessity in variously different ways. Therefore the world is not governed by one.

P(1)- Q(103)- A(3)- O(2) — Further, things which are governed by one do not act against each other, except by the incapacity or unskillfulness of the ruler; which cannot apply to God. But created things agree not together, and act against each other; as is evident in the case of contraries. Therefore the world is not governed by one.

P(1)- Q(103)- A(3)- O(3) — Further, in nature we always find what is the better. But it “is better that two should be together than one” ( Ecclesiastes 4:9). Therefore the world is not governed by one, but by many.

P(1)- Q(103)- A(3) — On the contrary, We confess our belief in one God and one Lord, according to the words of the Apostle ( 1 Corinthians 8:6): “To us there is but one God, the Father . . . and one Lord”: and both of these pertain to government. For to the Lord belongs dominion over subjects; and the name of God is taken from Providence as stated above ( Q(13), A(8) ). Therefore the world is governed by one.

P(1)- Q(103)- A(3) — I answer that, We must of necessity say that the world is governed by one. For since the end of the government of the world is that which is essentially good, which is the greatest good; the government of the world must be the best kind of government. Now the best government is the government by one. The reason of this is that government is nothing but the directing of the things governed to the end; which consists in some good. But unity belongs to the idea of goodness, as Boethius proves (De Consol. iii, 11) from this, that, as all things desire good, so do they desire unity; without which they would cease to exist.

For a thing so far exists as it is one. Whence we observe that things resist division, as far as they can; and the dissolution of a thing arises from defect therein. Therefore the intention of a ruler over a multitude is unity, or peace. Now the proper cause of unity is one. For it is clear that several cannot be the cause of unity or concord, except so far as they are united.

Furthermore, what is one in itself is a more apt and a better cause of unity than several things united. Therefore a multitude is better governed by one than by several. From this it follows that the government of the world, being the best form of government, must be by one. This is expressed by the Philosopher (Metaph. xii, Did. xi, 10): “Things refuse to be ill governed; and multiplicity of authorities is a bad thing, therefore there should be one ruler.”

P(1)- Q(103)- A(3)- RO(1) — Movement is “the act of a thing moved, caused by the mover.” Wherefore dissimilarity of movements is caused by diversity of things moved, which diversity is essential to the perfection of the universe ( Q(47), AA(1),2 ; Q(48), A(2) ), and not by a diversity of governors.

P(1)- Q(103)- A(3)- RO(2) — Although contraries do not agree with each other in their proximate ends, nevertheless they agree in the ultimate end, so far as they are included in the one order of the universe.

P(1)- Q(103)- A(3)- RO(3) — If we consider individual goods, then two are better than one. But if we consider the essential good, then no addition is possible.

P(1)- Q(103)- A(4) Whether the effect of government is one or many?

P(1)- Q(103)- A(4)- O(1) — It would seem that there is but one effect of the government of the world and not many. For the effect of government is that which is caused in the things governed. This is one, namely, the good which consists in order; as may be seen in the example of an army.

Therefore the government of the world has but one effect.

P(1)- Q(103)- A(4)- O(2) — Further, from one there naturally proceeds but one. But the world is governed by one as we have proved ( A(3) ).

Therefore also the effect of this government is but one.

P(1)- Q(103)- A(4)- O(3) — Further, if the effect of government is not one by reason of the unity of the Governor, it must be many by reason of the many things governed. But these are too numerous to be counted.

Therefore we cannot assign any definite number to the effects of government.

P(1)- Q(103)- A(4) — On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. xii): “God contains all and fills all by His providence and perfect goodness.”

But government belongs to providence. Therefore there are certain definite effects of the Divine government.

P(1)- Q(103)- A(4) — I answer that, The effect of any action may be judged from its end; because it is by action that the attainment of the end is effected. Now the end of the government of the world is the essential good, to the participation and similarity of which all things tend. Consequently the effect of the government of the world may be taken in three ways.

First, on the part of the end itself; and in this way there is but one effect, that is, assimilation to the supreme good. Secondly, the effect of the government of the world may be considered on the part of those things by means of which the creature is made like to God. Thus there are, in general, two effects of the government. For the creature is assimilated to God in two things; first, with regard to this, that God is good; and so the creature becomes like Him by being good; and secondly, with regard to this, that God is the cause of goodness in others; and so the creature becomes like God by moving others to be good. Wherefore there are two effects of government, the preservation of things in their goodness, and the moving of things to good. Thirdly, we may consider in the individual the effects of the government of the world; and in this way they are without number.

P(1)- Q(103)- A(4)- RO(1) — The order of the universe includes both the preservation of things created by God and their movement. As regards these two things we find order among them, inasmuch as one is better than another; and one is moved by another.

From what has been said above, we can gather the replies to the other two objections.

P(1)- Q(103)- A(5) Whether all things are subject to the Divine government?

P(1)- Q(103)- A(5)- O(1) — It would seem that not all things are subject to the Divine government. For it is written ( Ecclesiastes 9:11): “I saw that under the sun the race is not to the swift, nor the battle to the strong, nor bread to the wise, nor riches to the learned, nor favor to the skillful, but time and chance in all.”

But things subject to the Divine government are not ruled by chance.

Therefore those things which are under the sun are not subject to the Divine government.

P(1)- Q(103)- A(5)- O(2) — Further, the Apostle says ( 1 Corinthians 9:9): “God hath no care for oxen.” But he that governs has care for the things he governs. Therefore all things are not subject to the Divine government.

P(1)- Q(103)- A(5)- O(3) — Further, what can govern itself needs not to be governed by another. But the rational creature can govern itself; since it is master of its own act, and acts of itself; and is not made to act by another, which seems proper to things which are governed. Therefore all things are not subject to the Divine government.

P(1)- Q(103)- A(5) — On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei v, 11): “Not only heaven and earth, not only man and angel, even the bowels of the lowest animal, even the wing of the bird, the flower of the plant, the leaf of the tree, hath God endowed with every fitting detail of their nature.” Therefore all things are subject to His government.

P(1)- Q(103)- A(5) — I answer that, For the same reason is God the ruler of things as He is their cause, because the same gives existence as gives perfection; and this belongs to government. Now God is the cause not indeed only of some particular kind of being, but of the whole universal being, as proved above ( Q(44), AA(1),2 ). Wherefore, as there can be nothing which is not created by God, so there can be nothing which is not subject to His government. This can also be proved from the nature of the end of government. For a man’s government extends over all those things which come under the end of his government. Now the end of the Divine government is the Divine goodness; as we have shown ( A(2) ). Wherefore, as there can be nothing that is not ordered to the Divine goodness as its end, as is clear from what we have said above ( Q(44), A(4) ; Q(65), A(2) ), so it is impossible for anything to escape from the Divine government.

Foolish therefore was the opinion of those who said that the corruptible lower world, or individual things, or that even human affairs, were not subject to the Divine government. These are represented as saying, “God hath abandoned the earth” ( Ezekiel 9:9).

P(1)- Q(103)- A(5)- RO(1) — These things are said to be under the sun which are generated and corrupted according to the sun’s movement. In all such things we find chance: not that everything is casual which occurs in such things; but that in each one there is an element of chance. And the very fact that an element of chance is found in those things proves that they are subject to government of some kind. For unless corruptible things were governed by a higher being, they would tend to nothing definite, especially those which possess no kind of knowledge. So nothing would happen unintentionally; which constitutes the nature of chance. Wherefore to show how things happen by chance and yet according to the ordering of a higher cause, he does not say absolutely that he observes chance in all things, but “time and chance,” that is to say, that defects may be found in these things according to some order of time.

P(1)- Q(103)- A(5)- RO(2) — Government implies a certain change effected by the governor in the things governed. Now every movement is the act of a movable thing, caused by the moving principle, as is laid down Phys. iii, 3. And every act is proportionate to that of which it is an act.

Consequently, various movable things must be moved variously, even as regards movement by one and the same mover. Thus by the one art of the Divine governor, various things are variously governed according to their variety. Some, according to their nature, act of themselves, having dominion over their actions; and these are governed by God, not only in this, that they are moved by God Himself, Who works in them interiorly; but also in this, that they are induced by Him to do good and to fly from evil, by precepts and prohibitions, rewards and punishments. But irrational creatures which do not act but are acted upon, are not thus governed by God. Hence, when the Apostle says that “God hath no care for oxen,” he does not wholly withdraw them from the Divine government, but only as regards the way in which rational creatures are governed.

P(1)- Q(103)- A(5)- RO(3) — The rational creature governs itself by its intellect and will, both of which require to be governed and perfected by the Divine intellect and will. Therefore above the government whereby the rational creature governs itself as master of its own act, it requires to be governed by God.

P(1)- Q(103)- A(6) Whether all things are immediately governed by God?

P(1)- Q(103)- A(6)- O(1) — It would seem that all things are governed by God immediately. For Gregory of Nyssa (Nemesius, De Nat. Hom.) reproves the opinion of Plato who divides providence into three parts. The first he ascribes to the supreme god, who watches over heavenly things and all universals; the second providence he attributes to the secondary deities, who go the round of the heavens to watch over generation and corruption; while he ascribes a third providence to certain spirits who are guardians on earth of human actions. Therefore it seems that all things are immediately governed by God.

P(1)- Q(103)- A(6)- O(2) — Further, it is better that a thing be done by one, if possible, than by many, as the Philosopher says (Phys. viii, 6). But God can by Himself govern all things without any intermediary cause.

Therefore it seems that He governs all things immediately.

P(1)- Q(103)- A(6)- O(3) — Further, in God nothing is defective or imperfect. But it seems to be imperfect in a ruler to govern by means of others; thus an earthly king, by reason of his not being able to do everything himself, and because he cannot be everywhere at the same time, requires to govern by means of ministers. Therefore God governs all things immediately.

P(1)- Q(103)- A(6) — On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 4): “As the lower and grosser bodies are ruled in a certain orderly way by bodies of greater subtlety and power; so all bodies are ruled by the rational spirit of life; and the sinful and unfaithful spirit is ruled by the good and just spirit of life; and this spirit by God Himself.”

P(1)- Q(103)- A(6) — I answer that, In government there are two things to be considered; the design of government, which is providence itself; and the execution of the design. As to the design of government, God governs all things immediately; whereas in its execution, He governs some things by means of others.

The reason of this is that as God is the very essence of goodness, so everything must be attributed to God in its highest degree of goodness.

Now the highest degree of goodness in any practical order, design or knowledge (and such is the design of government) consists in knowing the individuals acted upon; as the best physician is not the one who can only give his attention to general principles, but who can consider the least details; and so on in other things. Therefore we must say that God has the design of the government of all things, even of the very least.

But since things which are governed should be brought to perfection by government, this government will be so much the better in the degree the things governed are brought to perfection. Now it is a greater perfection for a thing to be good in itself and also the cause of goodness in others, than only to be good in itself. Therefore God so governs things that He makes some of them to be causes of others in government; as a master, who not only imparts knowledge to his pupils, but gives also the faculty of teaching others.

P(1)- Q(103)- A(6)- RO(1) — Plato’s opinion is to be rejected, because he held that God did not govern all things immediately, even in the design of government; this is clear from the fact that he divided providence, which is the design of government, into three parts.

P(1)- Q(103)- A(6)- RO(2) — If God governed alone, things would be deprived of the perfection of causality. Wherefore all that is effected by many would not be accomplished by one.

P(1)- Q(103)- A(6)- RO(3) — That an earthly king should have ministers to execute his laws is a sign not only of his being imperfect, but also of his dignity; because by the ordering of ministers the kingly power is brought into greater evidence.

P(1)- Q(103)- A(7) Whether anything can happen outside the order of the Divine government?

P(1)- Q(103)- A(7)- O(1) — It would seem possible that something may occur outside the order of the Divine government. For Boethius says (De Consol. iii) that “God disposes all for good.” Therefore, if nothing happens outside the order of the Divine government, it would follow that no evil exists.

P(1)- Q(103)- A(7)- O(2) — Further, nothing that is in accordance with the pre-ordination of a ruler occurs by chance. Therefore, if nothing occurs outside the order of the Divine government, it follows that there is nothing fortuitous and casual.

P(1)- Q(103)- A(7)- O(3) — Further, the order of Divine Providence is certain and unchangeable; because it is in accordance with the eternal design. Therefore, if nothing happens outside the order of the Divine government, it follows that all things happen by necessity, and nothing is contingent; which is false. Therefore it is possible for something to occur outside the order of the Divine government.

P(1)- Q(103)- A(7) — On the contrary, It is written (Esther 13:9): “O Lord, Lord, almighty King, all things are in Thy power, and there is none that can resist Thy will.”

P(1)- Q(103)- A(7) — I answer that, It is possible for an effect to result outside the order of some particular cause; but not outside the order of the universal cause. The reason of this is that no effect results outside the order of a particular cause, except through some other impeding cause; which other cause must itself be reduced to the first universal cause; as indigestion may occur outside the order of the nutritive power by some such impediment as the coarseness of the food, which again is to be ascribed to some other cause, and so on till we come to the first universal cause. Therefore as God is the first universal cause, not of one genus only, but of all being in general, it is impossible for anything to occur outside the order of the Divine government; but from the very fact that from one point of view something seems to evade the order of Divine providence considered in regard to one particular cause, it must necessarily come back to that order as regards some other cause.

P(1)- Q(103)- A(7)- RO(1) — There is nothing wholly evil in the world, for evil is ever founded on good, as shown above ( Q(48), A(3) ). Therefore something is said to be evil through its escaping from the order of some particular good. If it wholly escaped from the order of the Divine government, it would wholly cease to exist.

P(1)- Q(103)- A(7)- RO(2) — Things are said to be fortuitous as regards some particular cause from the order of which they escape. But as to the order of Divine providence, “nothing in the world happens by chance,” as Augustine declares (QQ. 83, qu. 24).

P(1)- Q(103)- A(7)- RO(3) — Certain effects are said to be contingent as compared to their proximate causes, which may fail in their effects; and not as though anything could happen entirely outside the order of Divine government. The very fact that something occurs outside the order of some proximate cause, is owing to some other cause, itself subject to the Divine government.

P(1)- Q(103)- A(8) Whether anything can resist the order of the Divine government?

P(1)- Q(103)- A(8)- O(1) — It would seem possible that some resistance can be made to the order of the Divine government. For it is written ( Isaiah 3:8): “Their tongue and their devices are against the Lord.”

P(1)- Q(103)- A(8)- O(2) — Further, a king does not justly punish those who do not rebel against his commands. Therefore if no one rebelled against God’s commands, no one would be justly punished by God.

P(1)- Q(103)- A(8)- O(3) — Further, everything is subject to the order of the Divine government. But some things oppose others. Therefore some things rebel against the order of the Divine government.

P(1)- Q(103)- A(8) — On the contrary, Boethius says (De Consol. iii): “There is nothing that can desire or is able to resist this sovereign good. It is this sovereign good therefore that ruleth all mightily and ordereth all sweetly,” as is said (Wis. 8) of Divine wisdom.

P(1)- Q(103)- A(8) — I answer that, We may consider the order of Divine providence in two ways: in general, inasmuch as it proceeds from the governing cause of all; and in particular, inasmuch as it proceeds from some particular cause which executes the order of the Divine government.

Considered in the first way, nothing can resist the order of the Divine government. This can be proved in two ways: firstly from the fact that the order of the Divine government is wholly directed to good, and everything by its own operation and effort tends to good only, “for no one acts intending evil,” as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv): secondly from the fact that, as we have said above ( A(1), ad 3; A(5), ad 2), every inclination of anything, whether natural or voluntary, is nothing but a kind of impression from the first mover; as the inclination of the arrow towards a fixed point is nothing but an impulse received from the archer. Wherefore every agent, whether natural or free, attains to its divinely appointed end, as though of its own accord. For this reason God is said “to order all things sweetly.”

P(1)- Q(103)- A(8)- RO(1) — Some are said to think or speak, or act against God: not that they entirely resist the order of the Divine government; for even the sinner intends the attainment of a certain good: but because they resist some particular good, which belongs to their nature or state.

Therefore they are justly punished by God.

P(1)- Q(103)- A(8)- RO(2) — is clear from the above.

P(1)- Q(103)- A(8)- RO(3) — From the fact that one thing opposes another, it follows that some one thing can resist the order of a particular cause; but not that order which depends on the universal cause of all things.

QUESTION THE SPECIAL EFFECTS OF THE DIVINE GOVERNMENT (FOUR ARTICLES) We next consider the effects of the Divine government in particular; concerning which four points of inquiry arise: (1) Whether creatures need to be kept in existence by God? (2) Whether they are immediately preserved by God? (3) Whether God can reduce anything to nothingness? (4) Whether anything is reduced to nothingness?

P(1)- Q(104)- A(1) Whether creatures need to be kept in being by God?

P(1)- Q(104)- A(1)- O(1) — It would seem that creatures do not need to be kept in being by God. For what cannot not-be, does not need to be kept in being; just as that which cannot depart, does not need to be kept from departing. But some creatures by their very nature cannot not-be.

Therefore not all creatures need to be kept in being by God. The middle proposition is proved thus. That which is included in the nature of a thing is necessarily in that thing, and its contrary cannot be in it; thus a multiple of two must necessarily be even, and cannot possibly be an odd number.

Now form brings being with itself, because everything is actually in being, so far as it has form. But some creatures are subsistent forms, as we have said of the angels ( Q(50), AA(2),5 ): and thus to be is in them of themselves. The same reasoning applies to those creatures whose matter is in potentiality to one form only, as above explained of heavenly bodies ( Q(66), A(2) ). Therefore such creatures as these have in their nature to be necessarily, and cannot not-be; for there can be no potentiality to notbeing, either in the form which has being of itself, or in matter existing under a form which it cannot lose, since it is not in potentiality to any other form.

P(1)- Q(104)- A(1)- O(2) — Further, God is more powerful than any created agent. But a created agent, even after ceasing to act, can cause its effect to be preserved in being; thus the house continues to stand after the builder has ceased to build; and water remains hot for some time after the fire has ceased to heat. Much more, therefore, can God cause His creature to be kept in being, after He has ceased to create it.

P(1)- Q(104)- A(1)- O(3) — Further, nothing violent can occur, except there be some active cause thereof. But tendency to not-being is unnatural and violent to any creature, since all creatures naturally desire to be. Therefore no creature can tend to not-being, except through some active cause of corruption. Now there are creatures of such a nature that nothing can cause them to corrupt; such are spiritual substances and heavenly bodies.

Therefore such creatures cannot tend to not-being, even if God were to withdraw His action.

P(1)- Q(104)- A(1)- O(4) — Further, if God keeps creatures in being, this is done by some action. Now every action of an agent, if that action be efficacious, produces something in the effect. Therefore the preserving power of God must produce something in the creature. But this is not so; because this action does not give being to the creature, since being is not given to that which already is: nor does it add anything new to the creature; because either God would not keep the creature in being continually, or He would be continually adding something new to the creature; either of which is unreasonable. Therefore creatures are not kept in being by God.

P(1)- Q(104)- A(1) — On the contrary, It is written ( Hebrews 1:3): “Upholding all things by the word of His power.”

P(1)- Q(104)- A(1) — I answer that, Both reason and faith bind us to say that creatures are kept in being by God. To make this clear, we must consider that a thing is preserved by another in two ways. First, indirectly, and accidentally; thus a person is said to preserve anything by removing the cause of its corruption, as a man may be said to preserve a child, whom he guards from falling into the fire. In this way God preserves some things, but not all, for there are some things of such a nature that nothing can corrupt them, so that it is not necessary to keep them from corruption.

Secondly, a thing is said to preserve another ‘per se’ and directly, namely, when what is preserved depends on the preserver in such a way that it cannot exist without it. In this manner all creatures need to be preserved by God. For the being of every creature depends on God, so that not for a moment could it subsist, but would fall into nothingness were it not kept in being by the operation of the Divine power, as Gregory says (Moral. xvi).

This is made clear as follows: Every effect depends on its cause, so far as it is its cause. But we must observe that an agent may be the cause of the “becoming” of its effect, but not directly of its “being.” This may be seen both in artificial and in natural beings: for the builder causes the house in its “becoming,” but he is not the direct cause of its “being.” For it is clear that the “being” of the house is a result of its form, which consists in the putting together and arrangement of the materials, and results from the natural qualities of certain things. Thus a cook dresses the food by applying the natural activity of fire; thus a builder constructs a house, by making use of cement, stones, and wood which are able to be put together in a certain order and to preserve it. Therefore the “being” of a house depends on the nature of these materials, just as its “becoming” depends on the action of the builder. The same principle applies to natural things.

For if an agent is not the cause of a form as such, neither will it be directly the cause of “being” which results from that form; but it will be the cause of the effect, in its “becoming” only.

Now it is clear that of two things in the same species one cannot directly cause the other’s form as such, since it would then be the cause of its own form, which is essentially the same as the form of the other; but it can be the cause of this form for as much as it is in matter — in other words, it may be the cause that “this matter” receives “this form.” And this is to be the cause of “becoming,” as when man begets man, and fire causes fire.

Thus whenever a natural effect is such that it has an aptitude to receive from its active cause an impression specifically the same as in that active cause, then the “becoming” of the effect, but not its “being,” depends on the agent.

Sometimes, however, the effect has not this aptitude to receive the impression of its cause, in the same way as it exists in the agent: as may be seen clearly in all agents which do not produce an effect of the same species as themselves: thus the heavenly bodies cause the generation of inferior bodies which differ from them in species. Such an agent can be the cause of a form as such, and not merely as existing in this matter, consequently it is not merely the cause of “becoming” but also the cause of “being.”

Therefore as the becoming of a thing cannot continue when that action of the agent ceases which causes the “becoming” of the effect: so neither can the “being” of a thing continue after that action of the agent has ceased, which is the cause of the effect not only in “becoming” but also in “being.”

This is why hot water retains heat after the cessation of the fire’s action; while, on the contrary, the air does not continue to be lit up, even for a moment, when the sun ceases to act upon it, because water is a matter susceptive of the fire’s heat in the same way as it exists in the fire.

Wherefore if it were to be reduced to the perfect form of fire, it would retain that form always; whereas if it has the form of fire imperfectly and inchoately, the heat will remain for a time only, by reason of the imperfect participation of the principle of heat. On the other hand, air is not of such a nature as to receive light in the same way as it exists in the sun, which is the principle of light. Therefore, since it has not root in the air, the light ceases with the action of the sun.

Now every creature may be compared to God, as the air is to the sun which enlightens it. For as the sun possesses light by its nature, and as the air is enlightened by sharing the sun’s nature; so God alone is Being in virtue of His own Essence, since His Essence is His existence; whereas every creature has being by participation, so that its essence is not its existence. Therefore, as Augustine says (Genesis ad lit. iv, 12): “If the ruling power of God were withdrawn from His creatures, their nature would at once cease, and all nature would collapse.” In the same work (Genesis ad lit. viii, 12) he says: “As the air becomes light by the presence of the sun, so is man enlightened by the presence of God, and in His absence returns at once to darkness.”

P(1)- Q(104)- A(1)- RO(1) — “Being” naturally results from the form of a creature, given the influence of the Divine action; just as light results from the diaphanous nature of the air, given the action of the sun. Wherefore the potentiality to not-being in spiritual creatures and heavenly bodies is rather something in God, Who can withdraw His influence, than in the form or matter of those creatures.

P(1)- Q(104)- A(1)- RO(2) — God cannot grant to a creature to be preserved in being after the cessation of the Divine influence: as neither can He make it not to have received its being from Himself. For the creature needs to be preserved by God in so far as the being of an effect depends on the cause of its being. So that there is no comparison with an agent that is not the cause of ‘being’ but only of “becoming.”

P(1)- Q(104)- A(1)- RO(3) — This argument holds in regard to that preservation which consists in the removal of corruption: but all creatures do not need to be preserved thus, as stated above.

P(1)- Q(104)- A(1)- RO(4) — The preservation of things by God is a continuation of that action whereby He gives existence, which action is without either motion or time; so also the preservation of light in the air is by the continual influence of the sun.

P(1)- Q(104)- A(2) Whether God preserves every creature immediately?

P(1)- Q(104)- A(2)- O(1) — It would seem that God preserves every creature immediately. For God creates and preserves things by the same action, as above stated ( A(1), ad 4). But God created all things immediately. Therefore He preserves all things immediately.

P(1)- Q(104)- A(2)- O(2) — Further, a thing is nearer to itself than to another. But it cannot be given to a creature to preserve itself; much less therefore can it be given to a creature to preserve another. Therefore God preserves all things without any intermediate cause preserving them.

P(1)- Q(104)- A(2)- O(3) — Further, an effect is kept in being by the cause, not only of its “becoming,” but also of its being. But all created causes do not seem to cause their effects except in their “becoming,” for they cause only by moving, as above stated ( Q(45), A(3) ). Therefore they do not cause so as to keep their effects in being.

P(1)- Q(104)- A(2) — On the contrary, A thing is kept in being by that which gives it being. But God gives being by means of certain intermediate causes. Therefore He also keeps things in being by means of certain causes.

P(1)- Q(104)- A(2) — I answer that, As stated above ( A(1) ), a thing keeps another in being in two ways; first, indirectly and accidentally, by removing or hindering the action of a corrupting cause; secondly, directly and “per se,” by the fact that that on it depends the other’s being, as the being of the effect depends on the cause. And in both ways a created thing keeps another in being. For it is clear that even in corporeal things there are many causes which hinder the action of corrupting agents, and for that reason are called preservatives; just as salt preserves meat from putrefaction; and in like manner with many other things. It happens also that an effect depends on a creature as to its being. For when we have a series of causes depending on one another, it necessarily follows that, while the effect depends first and principally on the first cause, it also depends in a secondary way on all the middle causes. Therefore the first cause is the principal cause of the preservation of the effect which is to be referred to the middle causes in a secondary way; and all the more so, as the middle cause is higher and nearer to the first cause.

For this reason, even in things corporeal, the preservation and continuation of things is ascribed to the higher causes: thus the Philosopher says (Metaph. xii, Did. xi, 6), that the first, namely the diurnal movement is the cause of the continuation of things generated; whereas the second movement, which is from the zodiac, is the cause of diversity owing to generation and corruption. In like manner astrologers ascribe to Saturn, the highest of the planets, those things which are permanent and fixed. So we conclude that God keeps certain things in being, by means of certain causes.

P(1)- Q(104)- A(2)- RO(1) — God created all things immediately, but in the creation itself He established an order among things, so that some depend on others, by which they are preserved in being, though He remains the principal cause of their preservation.

P(1)- Q(104)- A(2)- RO(2) — Since an effect is preserved by its proper cause on which it depends; just as no effect can be its own cause, but can only produce another effect, so no effect can be endowed with the power of self-preservation, but only with the power of preserving another.

P(1)- Q(104)- A(2)- RO(3) — No created nature can be the cause of another, as regards the latter acquiring a new form, or disposition, except by virtue of some change; for the created nature acts always on something presupposed. But after causing the form or disposition in the effect, without any fresh change in the effect, the cause preserves that form or disposition; as in the air, when it is lit up anew, we must allow some change to have taken place, while the preservation of the light is without any further change in the air due to the presence of the source of light.

P(1)- Q(104)- A(3) Whether God can annihilate anything?

P(1)- Q(104)- A(3)- O(1) — It would seem that God cannot annihilate anything. For Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 21) that “God is not the cause of anything tending to non-existence.” But He would be such a cause if He were to annihilate anything. Therefore He cannot annihilate anything.

P(1)- Q(104)- A(3)- O(2) — Further, by His goodness God is the cause why things exist, since, as Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 32): “Because God is good, we exist.” But God cannot cease to be good.

Therefore He cannot cause things to cease to exist; which would be the case were He to annihilate anything.

P(1)- Q(104)- A(3)- O(3) — Further, if God were to annihilate anything it would be by His action. But this cannot be; because the term of every action is existence. Hence even the action of a corrupting cause has its term in something generated; for when one thing is generated another undergoes corruption. Therefore God cannot annihilate anything.

P(1)- Q(104)- A(3) — On the contrary, It is written ( Jeremiah 10:24): “Correct me, O Lord, but yet with judgment; and not in Thy fury, lest Thou bring me to nothing.”

P(1)- Q(104)- A(3) — I answer that, Some have held that God, in giving existence to creatures, acted from natural necessity. Were this true, God could not annihilate anything, since His nature cannot change. But, as we have said above ( Q(19), A(4) ), such an opinion is entirely false, and absolutely contrary to the Catholic faith, which confesses that God created things of His own free-will, according to <19D406> Psalm 134:6: “Whatsoever the Lord pleased, He hath done.”

Therefore that God gives existence to a creature depends on His will; nor does He preserve things in existence otherwise than by continually pouring out existence into them, as we have said. Therefore, just as before things existed, God was free not to give them existence, and not to make them; so after they are made, He is free not to continue their existence; and thus they would cease to exist; and this would be to annihilate them.

P(1)- Q(104)- A(3)- RO(1) — Non-existence has no direct cause; for nothing is a cause except inasmuch as it has existence, and a being essentially as such is a cause of something existing. Therefore God cannot cause a thing to tend to non-existence, whereas a creature has this tendency of itself, since it is produced from nothing. But indirectly God can be the cause of things being reduced to non-existence, by withdrawing His action therefrom.

P(1)- Q(104)- A(3)- RO(2) — God’s goodness is the cause of things, not as though by natural necessity, because the Divine goodness does not depend on creatures; but by His free-will. Wherefore, as without prejudice to His goodness, He might not have produced things into existence, so, without prejudice to His goodness, He might not preserve things in existence.

P(1)- Q(104)- A(3)- RO(3) — If God were to annihilate anything, this would not imply an action on God’s part; but a mere cessation of His action.

P(1)- Q(104)- A(4) Whether anything is annihilated?

P(1)- Q(104)- A(4)- O(1) — It would seem that something is annihilated.

For the end corresponds to the beginning. But in the beginning there was nothing but God. Therefore all things must tend to this end, that there shall be nothing but God. Therefore creatures will be reduced to nothing.

P(1)- Q(104)- A(4)- O(2) — Further, every creature has a finite power. But no finite power extends to the infinite. Wherefore the Philosopher proves (Phys. viii, 10) that, “a finite power cannot move in infinite time.”

Therefore a creature cannot last for an infinite duration; and so at some time it will be reduced to nothing.

P(1)- Q(104)- A(4)- O(3) — Further, forms and accidents have no matter as part of themselves. But at some time they cease to exist. Therefore they are reduced to nothing.

P(1)- Q(104)- A(4) — On the contrary, It is written ( Ecclesiastes 3:14): “I have learned that all the works that God hath made continue for ever.”

P(1)- Q(104)- A(4) — I answer that, Some of those things which God does in creatures occur in accordance with the natural course of things; others happen miraculously, and not in accordance with the natural order, as will be explained ( Q(105), A(6) ). Now whatever God wills to do according to the natural order of things may be observed from their nature; but those things which occur miraculously, are ordered for the manifestation of grace, according to the Apostle, “To each one is given the manifestation of the Spirit, unto profit” ( 1 Corinthians 12:7); and subsequently he mentions, among others, the working of miracles.

Now the nature of creatures shows that none of them is annihilated. For, either they are immaterial, and therefore have no potentiality to nonexistence; or they are material, and then they continue to exist, at least in matter, which is incorruptible, since it is the subject of generation and corruption. Moreover, the annihilation of things does not pertain to the manifestation of grace; since rather the power and goodness of God are manifested by the preservation of things in existence. Wherefore we must conclude by denying absolutely that anything at all will be annihilated.

P(1)- Q(104)- A(4)- RO(1) — That things are brought into existence from a state of non-existence, clearly shows the power of Him Who made them; but that they should be reduced to nothing would hinder that manifestation, since the power of God is conspicuously shown in His preserving all things in existence, according to the Apostle: “Upholding all things by the word of His power” ( Hebrews 1:3).

P(1)- Q(104)- A(4)- RO(2) — A creature’s potentiality to existence is merely receptive; the active power belongs to God Himself, from Whom existence is derived. Wherefore the infinite duration of things is a consequence of the infinity of the Divine power. To some things, however, is given a determinate power of duration for a certain time, so far as they may be hindered by some contrary agent from receiving the influx of existence which comes from Him Whom finite power cannot resist, for an infinite, but only for a fixed time. So things which have no contrary, although they have a finite power, continue to exist for ever.

P(1)- Q(104)- A(4)- RO(3) — Forms and accidents are not complete beings, since they do not subsist: but each one of them is something “of a being”; for it is called a being, because something is by it. Yet so far as their mode of existence is concerned, they are not entirely reduced to nothingness; not that any part of them survives, but that they remain in the potentiality of the matter, or of the subject.

QUESTION OF THE CHANGE OF CREATURES BY GOD (EIGHT ARTICLES) We now consider the second effect of the Divine government, i.e. the change of creatures; and first, the change of creatures by God; secondly, the change of one creature by another.

Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry: (1) Whether God can move immediately the matter to the form? (2) Whether He can immediately move a body? (3) Whether He can move the intellect? (4) Whether He can move the will? (5) Whether God works in every worker? (6) Whether He can do anything outside the order imposed on things? (7) Whether all that God does is miraculous? (8) Of the diversity of miracles.

P(1)- Q(105)- A(1) Whether God can move the matter immediately to the form?

P(1)- Q(105)- A(1)- O(1) — It would seem that God cannot move the matter immediately to receive the form. For as the Philosopher proves (Metaph. vii, Did. vi, 8), nothing can bring a form into any particular matter, except that form which is in matter; because, like begets like. But God is not a form in matter. Therefore He cannot cause a form in matter.

P(1)- Q(105)- A(1)- O(2) — Further, any agent inclined to several effects will produce none of them, unless it is determined to a particular one by some other cause; for, as the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 11), a general assertion does not move the mind, except by means of some particular apprehension. But the Divine power is the universal cause of all things.

Therefore it cannot produce any particular form, except by means of a particular agent.

P(1)- Q(105)- A(1)- O(3) — As universal being depends on the first universal cause, so determinate being depends on determinate particular causes; as we have seen above ( Q(104), A(2) ). But the determinate being of a particular thing is from its own form. Therefore the forms of things are produced by God, only by means of particular causes.

P(1)- Q(105)- A(1) — On the contrary, It is written ( Genesis 2:7): “God formed man of the slime of the earth.”

P(1)- Q(105)- A(1) — I answer that, God can move matter immediately to form; because whatever is in passive potentiality can be reduced to act by the active power which extends over that potentiality. Therefore, since the Divine power extends over matter, as produced by God, it can be reduced to act by the Divine power: and this is what is meant by matter being moved to a form; for a form is nothing else but the act of matter.

P(1)- Q(105)- A(1)- RO(1) — An effect is assimilated to the active cause in two ways. First, according to the same species; as man is generated by man, and fire by fire. Secondly, by being virtually contained in the cause; as the form of the effect is virtually contained in its cause: thus animals produced by putrefaction, and plants, and minerals are like the sun and stars, by whose power they are produced. In this way the effect is like its active cause as regards all that over which the power of that cause extends.

Now the power of God extends to both matter and form; as we have said above ( Q(14), A(2) ; Q(44), A(2) ); wherefore if a composite thing be produced, it is likened to God by way of a virtual inclusion; or it is likened to the composite generator by a likeness of species. Therefore just as the composite generator can move matter to a form by generating a composite thing like itself; so also can God. But no other form not existing in matter can do this; because the power of no other separate substance extends over matter. Hence angels and demons operate on visible matter; not by imprinting forms in matter, but by making use of corporeal seeds.

P(1)- Q(105)- A(1)- RO(2) — This argument would hold if God were to act of natural necessity. But since He acts by His will and intellect, which knows the particular and not only the universal natures of all forms, it follows that He can determinately imprint this or that form on matter.

P(1)- Q(105)- A(1)- RO(3) — The fact that secondary causes are ordered to determinate effects is due to God; wherefore since God ordains other causes to certain effects He can also produce certain effects by Himself without any other cause.

P(1)- Q(105)- A(2) Whether God can move a body immediately?

P(1)- Q(105)- A(2)- O(1) — It would seem that God cannot move a body immediately. For as the mover and the moved must exist simultaneously, as the Philosopher says (Phys. vii, 2), it follows that there must be some contact between the mover and moved. But there can be no contact between God and a body; for Dionysius says (Div. Nom. 1): “There is no contact with God.” Therefore God cannot move a body immediately.

P(1)- Q(105)- A(2)- O(2) — Further, God is the mover unmoved. But such also is the desirable object when apprehended. Therefore God moves as the object of desire and apprehension. But He cannot be apprehended except by the intellect, which is neither a body nor a corporeal power.

Therefore God cannot move a body immediately.

P(1)- Q(105)- A(2)- O(3) — Further, the Philosopher proves (Phys. viii, 10) that an infinite power moves instantaneously. But it is impossible for a body to be moved in one instant; for since every movement is between opposites, it follows that two opposites would exist at once in the same subject, which is impossible. Therefore a body cannot be moved immediately by an infinite power. But God’s power is infinite, as we have explained ( Q(25), A(2) ). Therefore God cannot move a body immediately.

P(1)- Q(105)- A(2) — On the contrary, God produced the works of the six days immediately among which is included the movements of bodies, as is clear from Genesis 1:9 “Let the waters be gathered together into one place.” Therefore God alone can move a body immediately.

P(1)- Q(105)- A(2) — I answer that, It is erroneous to say that God cannot Himself produce all the determinate effects which are produced by any created cause. Wherefore, since bodies are moved immediately by created causes, we cannot possibly doubt that God can move immediately any bodies whatever. This indeed follows from what is above stated ( A(1) ).

For every movement of any body whatever, either results from a form, as the movements of things heavy and light result from the form which they have from their generating cause, for which reason the generator is called the mover; or else tends to a form, as heating tends to the form of heat.

Now it belongs to the same cause, to imprint a form, to dispose to that form, and to give the movement which results from that form; for fire not only generates fire, but it also heats and moves things upwards. Therefore, as God can imprint form immediately in matter, it follows that He can move any body whatever in respect of any movement whatever.

P(1)- Q(105)- A(2)- RO(1) — There are two kinds of contact; corporeal contact, when two bodies touch each other; and virtual contact, as the cause of sadness is said to touch the one made sad. According to the first kind of contact, God, as being incorporeal, neither touches, nor is touched; but according to virtual contact He touches creatures by moving them; but He is not touched, because the natural power of no creature can reach up to Him. Thus did Dionysius understand the words, “There is no contact with God”; that is, so that God Himself be touched.

P(1)- Q(105)- A(2)- RO(2) — God moves as the object of desire and apprehension; but it does not follow that He always moves as being desired and apprehended by that which is moved; but as being desired and known by Himself; for He does all things for His own goodness.

P(1)- Q(105)- A(2)- RO(3) — The Philosopher (Phys. viii, 10) intends to prove that the power of the first mover is not a power of the first mover “of bulk,” by the following argument. The power of the first mover is infinite (which he proves from the fact that the first mover can move in infinite time). Now an infinite power, if it were a power “of bulk,” would move without time, which is impossible; therefore the infinite power of the first mover must be in something which is not measured by its bulk.

Whence it is clear that for a body to be moved without time can only be the result of an infinite power. The reason is that every power of bulk moves in its entirety; since it moves by the necessity of its nature. But an infinite power surpasses out of all proportion any finite power. Now the greater the power of the mover, the greater is the velocity of the movement. Therefore, since a finite power moves in a determinate time, it follows that an infinite power does not move in any time; for between one time and any other time there is some proportion. On the other hand, a power which is not in bulk is the power of an intelligent being, which operates in its effects according to what is fitting to them; and therefore, since it cannot be fitting for a body to be moved without time, it does not follow that it moves without time.

P(1)- Q(105)- A(3) Whether God moves the created intellect immediately?

P(1)- Q(105)- A(3)- O(1) — It would seem that God does not immediately move the created intellect. For the action of the intellect is governed by its own subject; since it does not pass into external matter; as stated in Metaph. ix, Did. viii, 8. But the action of what is moved by another does not proceed from that wherein it is; but from the mover. Therefore the intellect is not moved by another; and so apparently God cannot move the created intellect.

P(1)- Q(105)- A(3)- O(2) — Further, anything which in itself is a sufficient principle of movement, is not moved by another. But the movement of the intellect is its act of understanding; in the sense in which we say that to understand or to feel is a kind of movement, as the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 7). But the intellectual light which is natural to the soul, is a sufficient principle of understanding. Therefore it is not moved by another.

P(1)- Q(105)- A(3)- O(3) — Further, as the senses are moved by the sensible, so the intellect is moved by the intelligible. But God is not intelligible to us, and exceeds the capacity of our intellect. Therefore God cannot move our intellect.

P(1)- Q(105)- A(3) — On the contrary, The teacher moves the intellect of the one taught. But it is written ( Psalm 93:10) that God “teaches man knowledge.” Therefore God moves the human intellect.

P(1)- Q(105)- A(3) — I answer that, As in corporeal movement that is called the mover which gives the form that is the principle of movement, so that is said to move the intellect, which is the cause of the form that is the principle of the intellectual operation, called the movement of the intellect. Now there is a twofold principle of intellectual operation in the intelligent being; one which is the intellectual power itself, which principle exists in the one who understands in potentiality; while the other is the principle of actual understanding, namely, the likeness of the thing understood in the one who understands. So a thing is said to move the intellect, whether it gives to him who understands the power of understanding; or impresses on him the likeness of the thing understood.

Now God moves the created intellect in both ways. For He is the First immaterial Being; and as intellectuality is a result of immateriality, it follows that He is the First intelligent Being. Therefore since in each order the first is the cause of all that follows, we must conclude that from Him proceeds all intellectual power. In like manner, since He is the First Being, and all other beings pre-exist in Him as in their First Cause, it follows that they exist intelligibly in Him, after the mode of His own Nature. For as the intelligible types of everything exist first of all in God, and are derived from Him by other intellects in order that these may actually understand; so also are they derived by creatures that they may subsist. Therefore God so moves the created intellect, inasmuch as He gives it the intellectual power, whether natural, or superadded; and impresses on the created intellect the intelligible species, and maintains and preserves both power and species in existence.

P(1)- Q(105)- A(3)- RO(1) — The intellectual operation is performed by the intellect in which it exists, as by a secondary cause; but it proceeds from God as from its first cause. For by Him the power to understand is given to the one who understands.

P(1)- Q(105)- A(3)- RO(2) — The intellectual light together with the likeness of the thing understood is a sufficient principle of understanding; but it is a secondary principle, and depends upon the First Principle.

P(1)- Q(105)- A(3)- RO(3) — The intelligible object moves our human intellect, so far as, in a way, it impresses on it its own likeness, by means of which the intellect is able to understand it. But the likenesses which God impresses on the created intellect are not sufficient to enable the created intellect to understand Him through His Essence, as we have seen above ( Q(12), A(2) ; Q(56), A(3) ). Hence He moves the created intellect, and yet He cannot be intelligible to it, as we have explained ( Q(12), A(4) ).

P(1)- Q(105)- A(4) Whether God can move the created will?

P(1)- Q(105)- A(4)- O(1) — It would seem that God cannot move the created will. For whatever is moved from without, is forced. But the will cannot be forced. Therefore it is not moved from without; and therefore cannot be moved by God.

P(1)- Q(105)- A(4)- O(2) — Further, God cannot make two contradictories to be true at the same time. But this would follow if He moved the will; for to be voluntarily moved means to be moved from within, and not by another. Therefore God cannot move the will.

P(1)- Q(105)- A(4)- O(3) — Further, movement is attributed to the mover rather than to the one moved; wherefore homicide is not ascribed to the stone, but to the thrower. Therefore, if God moves the will, it follows that voluntary actions are not imputed to man for reward or blame. But this is false. Therefore God does not move the will.

P(1)- Q(105)- A(4) — On the contrary, It is written ( Philippians 2:13): “It is God who worketh in us [Vulg. — ’you’] both to will and to accomplish.”

P(1)- Q(105)- A(4) — I answer that, As the intellect is moved by the object and by the Giver of the power of intelligence, as stated above ( A(3) ), so is the will moved by its object, which is good, and by Him who creates the power of willing. Now the will can be moved by good as its object, but by God alone sufficiently and efficaciously. For nothing can move a movable thing sufficiently unless the active power of the mover surpasses or at least equals the potentiality of the thing movable. Now the potentiality of the will extends to the universal good; for its object is the universal good; just as the object of the intellect is the universal being. But every created good is some particular good; God alone is the universal good. Whereas He alone fills the capacity of the will, and moves it sufficiently as its object.

In like manner the power of willing is caused by God alone. For to will is nothing but to be inclined towards the object of the will, which is universal good. But to incline towards the universal good belongs to the First Mover, to Whom the ultimate end is proportionate; just as in human affairs to him that presides over the community belongs the directing of his subjects to the common weal. Wherefore in both ways it belongs to God to move the will; but especially in the second way by an interior inclination of the will.

P(1)- Q(105)- A(4)- RO(1) — A thing moved by another is forced if moved against its natural inclination; but if it is moved by another giving to it the proper natural inclination, it is not forced; as when a heavy body is made to move downwards by that which produced it, then it is not forced. In like manner God, while moving the will, does not force it, because He gives the will its own natural inclination.

P(1)- Q(105)- A(4)- RO(2) — To be moved voluntarily, is to be moved from within, that is, by an interior principle: yet this interior principle may be caused by an exterior principle; and so to be moved from within is not repugnant to being moved by another.

P(1)- Q(105)- A(4)- RO(3) — If the will were so moved by another as in no way to be moved from within itself, the act of the will would not be imputed for reward or blame. But since its being moved by another does not prevent its being moved from within itself, as we have stated (ad 2), it does not thereby forfeit the motive for merit or demerit.

P(1)- Q(105)- A(5) Whether God works in every agent?

P(1)- Q(105)- A(5)- O(1) — It would seem that God does not work in every agent. For we must not attribute any insufficiency to God. If therefore God works in every agent, He works sufficiently in each one.

Hence it would be superfluous for the created agent to work at all.

P(1)- Q(105)- A(5)- O(2) — Further, the same work cannot proceed at the same time from two sources; as neither can one and the same movement belong to two movable things. Therefore if the creature’s operation is from God operating in the creature, it cannot at the same time proceed from the creature; and so no creature works at all.

P(1)- Q(105)- A(5)- O(3) — Further, the maker is the cause of the operation of the thing made, as giving it the form whereby it operates. Therefore, if God is the cause of the operation of things made by Him, this would be inasmuch as He gives them the power of operating. But this is in the beginning, when He makes them. Thus it seems that God does not operate any further in the operating creature.

P(1)- Q(105)- A(5) — On the contrary, It is written ( Isaiah 26:12): “Lord, Thou hast wrought all our works in [Vulg.: ‘for’] us.”

P(1)- Q(105)- A(5) — I answer that, Some have understood God to work in every agent in such a way that no created power has any effect in things, but that God alone is the ultimate cause of everything wrought; for instance, that it is not fire that gives heat, but God in the fire, and so forth.

But this is impossible. First, because the order of cause and effect would be taken away from created things: and this would imply lack of power in the Creator: for it is due to the power of the cause, that it bestows active power on its effect. Secondly, because the active powers which are seen to exist in things, would be bestowed on things to no purpose, if these wrought nothing through them. Indeed, all things created would seem, in a way, to be purposeless, if they lacked an operation proper to them; since the purpose of everything is its operation. For the less perfect is always for the sake of the more perfect: and consequently as the matter is for the sake of the form, so the form which is the first act, is for the sake of its operation, which is the second act; and thus operation is the end of the creature. We must therefore understand that God works in things in such a manner that things have their proper operation.

In order to make this clear, we must observe that as there are few kinds of causes; matter is not a principle of action, but is the subject that receives the effect of action. On the other hand, the end, the agent, and the form are principles of action, but in a certain order. For the first principle of action is the end which moves the agent; the second is the agent; the third is the form of that which the agent applies to action (although the agent also acts through its own form); as may be clearly seen in things made by art. For the craftsman is moved to action by the end, which is the thing wrought, for instance a chest or a bed; and applies to action the axe which cuts through its being sharp.

Thus then does God work in every worker, according to these three things.

First as an end. For since every operation is for the sake of some good, real or apparent; and nothing is good either really or apparently, except in as far as it participates in a likeness to the Supreme Good, which is God; it follows that God Himself is the cause of every operation as its end. Again it is to be observed that where there are several agents in order, the second always acts in virtue of the first; for the first agent moves the second to act. And thus all agents act in virtue of God Himself: and therefore He is the cause of action in every agent. Thirdly, we must observe that God not only moves things to operated, as it were applying their forms and powers to operation, just as the workman applies the axe to cut, who nevertheless at times does not give the axe its form; but He also gives created agents their forms and preserves them in being. Therefore He is the cause of action not only by giving the form which is the principle of action, as