QUESTIONS 22-48 QUESTION OF THE SUBJECT OF THE SOUL’S PASSIONS (THREE ARTICLES) We must now consider the passions of the soul: first, in general; secondly, in particular. Taking them in general, there are four things to be considered: (1) Their subject: (2) The difference between them: (3) Their mutual relationship: (4) Their malice and goodness.

Under the first head there are three points of inquiry: (1) Whether there is any passion in the soul? (2) Whether passion is in the appetitive rather than in the apprehensive part? (3) Whether passion is in the sensitive appetite rather than in the intellectual appetite, which is called the will?

P(2a)- Q(22)- A(1) Whether any passion is in the soul?

P(2a)- Q(22)- A(1)- O(1) — It would seem that there is no passion in the soul. Because passivity belongs to matter. But the soul is not composed of matter and form, as stated in the P(1), Q(75), A(5) . Therefore there is no passion in the soul.

P(2a)- Q(22)- A(1)- O(2) — Further, passion is movement, as is stated in Phys. iii, 3. But the soul is not moved, as is proved in De Anima i, 3.

Therefore passion is not in the soul.

P(2a)- Q(22)- A(1)- O(3) — Further, passion is the road to corruption; since “every passion, when increased, alters the substance,” as is stated in Topic. vi, 6. But the soul is incorruptible. Therefore no passion is in the soul.

P(2a)- Q(22)- A(1) — On the contrary, The Apostle says ( Romans 7:5): “When we were in the flesh, the passions of sins which were by the law, did the work in our members.”

Now sins are, properly speaking, in the soul. Therefore passions also, which are described as being “of sins,” are in the soul.

P(2a)- Q(22)- A(1) — I answer that, The word “passive” is used in three ways. First, in a general way, according as whatever receives something is passive, although nothing is taken from it: thus we may say that the air is passive when it is lit up. But this is to be perfected rather than to be passive. Secondly, the word “passive” is employed in its proper sense, when something is received, while something else is taken away: and this happens in two ways. For sometimes that which is lost is unsuitable to the thing: thus when an animal’s body is healed, and loses sickness. At other times the contrary occurs: thus to ail is to be passive; because the ailment is received and health is lost. And here we have passion in its most proper acceptation. For a thing is said to be passive from its being drawn to the agent: and when a thing recedes from what is suitable to it, then especially does it appear to be drawn to something else. Moreover in De Generat. i, 3 it is stated that when a more excellent thing is generated from a less excellent, we have generation simply, and corruption in a particular respect: whereas the reverse is the case, when from a more excellent thing, a less excellent is generated. In these three ways it happens that passions are in the soul. For in the sense of mere reception, we speak of “feeling and understanding as being a kind of passion” (De Anima i, 5). But passion, accompanied by the loss of something, is only in respect of a bodily transmutation; wherefore passion properly so called cannot be in the soul, save accidentally, in so far, to wit, as the “composite” is passive. But here again we find a difference; because when this transmutation is for the worse, it has more of the nature of a passion, than when it is for the better: hence sorrow is more properly a passion than joy.

P(2a)- Q(22)- A(1)- RO(1) — It belongs to matter to be passive in such a way as to lose something and to be transmuted: hence this happens only in those things that are composed of matter and form. But passivity, as implying mere reception, need not be in matter, but can be in anything that is in potentiality. Now, though the soul is not composed of matter and form, yet it has something of potentiality, in respect of which it is competent to receive or to be passive, according as the act of understanding is a kind of passion, as stated in De Anima iii, 4.

P(2a)- Q(22)- A(1)- RO(2) — Although it does not belong to the soul in itself to be passive and to be moved, yet it belongs accidentally as stated in De Anima i, 3.

P(2a)- Q(22)- A(1)- RO(3) — This argument is true of passion accompanied by transmutation to something worse. And passion, in this sense, is not found in the soul, except accidentally: but the composite, which is corruptible, admits of it by reason of its own nature.

P(2a)- Q(22)- A(2) Whether passion is in the appetitive rather than in the apprehensive part?

P(2a)- Q(22)- A(2)- O(1) — It would seem that passion is in the apprehensive part of the soul rather than in the appetitive. Because that which is first in any genus, seems to rank first among all things that are in that genus, and to be their cause, as is stated in Metaph. ii, 1. Now passion is found to be in the apprehensive, before being in the appetitive part: for the appetitive part is not affected unless there be a previous passion in the apprehensive part. Therefore passion is in the apprehensive part more than in the appetitive.

P(2a)- Q(22)- A(2)- O(2) — Further, what is more active is less passive; for action is contrary to passion. Now the appetitive part is more active than the apprehensive part. Therefore it seems that passion is more in the apprehensive part.

P(2a)- Q(22)- A(2)- O(3) — Further, just as the sensitive appetite is the power of a corporeal organ, so is the power of sensitive apprehension. But passion in the soul occurs, properly speaking, in respect of a bodily transmutation. Therefore passion is not more in the sensitive appetitive than in the sensitive apprehensive part.

P(2a)- Q(22)- A(2) — On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ix, 4) that “the movement of the soul, which the Greeks called \pathe\, are styled by some of our writers, Cicero [*Those things which the Greeks call \pathe\, we prefer to call disturbances rather than diseases (Tusc. 4:5)] for instance, disturbances; by some, affections or emotions; while others rendering the Greek more accurately, call them passions.” From this it is evident that the passions of the soul are the same as affections. But affections manifestly belong to the appetitive, and not to the apprehensive part. Therefore the passions are in the appetitive rather than in the apprehensive part.

P(2a)- Q(22)- A(2) — I answer that, As we have already stated ( A(1) ) the word “passion” implies that the patient is drawn to that which belongs to the agent. Now the soul is drawn to a thing by the appetitive power rather than by the apprehensive power: because the soul has, through its appetitive power, an order to things as they are in themselves: hence the Philosopher says (Metaph. vi, 4) that “good and evil,” i.e. the objects of the appetitive power, “are in things themselves.” On the other hand the apprehensive power is not drawn to a thing, as it is in itself; but knows it by reason of an “intention” of the thing, which “intention” it has in itself, or receives in its own way. Hence we find it stated (Metaph. vi, 4) that “the true and the false,” which pertain to knowledge, “are not in things, but in the mind.” Consequently it is evident that the nature of passion is consistent with the appetitive, rather than with the apprehensive part.

P(2a)- Q(22)- A(2)- RO(1) — In things relating to perfection the case is the opposite, in comparison to things that pertain to defect. Because in things relating to perfection, intensity is in proportion to the approach to one first principle; to which the nearer a thing approaches, the more intense it is. Thus the intensity of a thing possessed of light depends on its approach to something endowed with light in a supreme degree, to which the nearer a thing approaches the more light it possesses. But in things that relate to defect, intensity depends, not on approach to something supreme, but in receding from that which is perfect; because therein consists the very notion of privation and defect. Wherefore the less a thing recedes from that which stands first, the less intense it is: and the result is that at first we always find some small defect, which afterwards increases as it goes on. Now passion pertains to defect, because it belongs to a thing according as it is in potentiality. Wherefore in those things that approach to the Supreme Perfection, i.e. to God, there is but little potentiality and passion: while in other things, consequently, there is more. Hence also, in the supreme, i.e. the apprehensive, power of the soul, passion is found less than in the other powers.

P(2a)- Q(22)- A(2)- RO(2) — The appetitive power is said to be more active, because it is, more than the apprehensive power, the principle of the exterior action: and this for the same reason that it is more passive, namely, its being related to things as existing in themselves: since it is through the external action that we come into contact with things.

P(2a)- Q(22)- A(2)- RO(3) — As stated in the P(1), Q(78), A(3)- the organs of the soul can be changed in two ways. First, by a spiritual change, in respect of which the organ receives an “intention” of the object. And this is essential to the act of the sensitive apprehension: thus is the eye changed by the object visible, not by being colored, but by receiving an intention of color. But the organs are receptive of another and natural change, which affects their natural disposition; for instance, when they become hot or cold, or undergo some similar change. And whereas this kind of change is accidental to the act of the sensitive apprehension; for instance, if the eye be wearied through gazing intently at something or be overcome by the intensity of the object: on the other hand, it is essential to the act of the sensitive appetite; wherefore the material element in the definitions of the movements of the appetitive part, is the natural change of the organ; for instance, “anger is” said to be “a kindling of the blood about the heart.” Hence it is evident that the notion of passion is more consistent with the act of the sensitive appetite, than with that of the sensitive apprehension, although both are actions of a corporeal organ.

P(2a)- Q(22)- A(3) Whether passion is in the sensitive appetite rather than in the intellectual appetite, which is called the will?

P(2a)- Q(22)- A(3)- O(1) — It would seem that passion is not more in the sensitive than in the intellectual appetite. For Dionysius declares (Div.

Nom. ii) Hierotheus “to be taught by a kind of yet more Godlike instruction; not only by learning Divine things, but also by suffering [patiens] them.” But the sensitive appetite cannot “suffer” Divine things, since its object is the sensible good. Therefore passion is in the intellectual appetite, just as it is also in the sensitive appetite.

P(2a)- Q(22)- A(3)- O(2) — Further, the more powerful the active force, the more intense the passion. But the object of the intellectual appetite, which is the universal good, is a more powerful active force than the object of the sensitive appetite, which is a particular good. Therefore passion is more consistent with the intellectual than with the sensitive appetite.

P(2a)- Q(22)- A(3)- O(3) — Further, joy and love are said to be passions.

But these are to be found in the intellectual and not only in the sensitive appetite: else they would not be ascribed by the Scriptures to God and the angels. Therefore the passions are not more in the sensitive than in the intellectual appetite.

P(2a)- Q(22)- A(3) — On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 22), while describing the animal passions: “Passion is a movement of the sensitive appetite when we imagine good or evil: in other words, passion is a movement of the irrational soul, when we think of good or evil.”

P(2a)- Q(22)- A(3) — I answer that, As stated above ( A(1) ) passion is properly to be found where there is corporeal transmutation. This corporeal transmutation is found in the act of the sensitive appetite, and is not only spiritual, as in the sensitive apprehension, but also natural. Now there is no need for corporeal transmutation in the act of the intellectual appetite: because this appetite is not exercised by means of a corporeal organ. It is therefore evident that passion is more properly in the act of the sensitive appetite, than in that of the intellectual appetite; and this is again evident from the definitions of Damascene quoted above.

P(2a)- Q(22)- A(3)- RO(1) — By “suffering” Divine things is meant being well affected towards them, and united to them by love: and this takes place without any alteration in the body.

P(2a)- Q(22)- A(3)- RO(2) — Intensity of passion depends not only on the power of the agent, but also on the passibility of the patient: because things that are disposed to passion, suffer much even from petty agents.

Therefore although the object of the intellectual appetite has greater activity than the object of the sensitive appetite, yet the sensitive appetite is more passive.

P(2a)- Q(22)- A(3)- RO(3) — When love and joy and the like are ascribed to God or the angels, or to man in respect of his intellectual appetite, they signify simple acts of the will having like effects, but without passion.

Hence Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ix, 5): “The holy angels feel no anger while they punish . . . no fellow-feeling with misery while they relieve the unhappy: and yet ordinary human speech is wont to ascribe to them also these passions by name, because, although they have none of our weakness, their acts bear a certain resemblance to ours.”

QUESTION HOW THE PASSIONS DIFFER FROM ONE ANOTHER (FOUR ARTICLES) We must now consider how the passions differ from one another: and under this head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether the passions of the concupiscible part are different from those of the irascible part? (2) Whether the contrariety of passions in the irascible part is based on the contrariety of good and evil? (3) Whether there is any passion that has no contrary? (4) Whether, in the same power, there are any passions, differing in species, but not contrary to one another?

P(2a)- Q(23)- A(1) Whether the passions of the concupiscible part are different from those of the irascible part?

P(2a)- Q(23)- A(1)- O(1) — It would seem that the same passions are in the irascible and concupiscible parts. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 5) that the passions of the soul are those emotions “which are followed by joy or sorrow.” But joy and sorrow are in the concupiscible part.

Therefore all the passions are in the concupiscible part, and not some in the irascible, others in the concupiscible part.

P(2a)- Q(23)- A(1)- O(2) — Further, on the words of Matthew 13:33, “The kingdom of heaven is like to leaven,” etc., Jerome’s gloss says: “We should have prudence in the reason; hatred of vice in the irascible faculty; desire of virtue, in the concupiscible part.” But hatred is in the concupiscible faculty, as also is love, of which it is the contrary, as is stated in Topic. ii, 7. Therefore the same passion is in the concupiscible and irascible faculties.

P(2a)- Q(23)- A(1)- O(3) — Further, passions and actions differ specifically according to their objects. But the objects of the irascible and concupiscible passions are the same, viz. good and evil. Therefore the same passions are in the irascible and concupiscible faculties.

P(2a)- Q(23)- A(1) — On the contrary, The acts of the different powers differ in species; for instance, to see, and to hear. But the irascible and the concupiscible are two powers into which the sensitive appetite is divided, as stated in the P(1), Q(81), A(2) . Therefore, since the passions are movements of the sensitive appetite, as stated above ( Q(22), A(3) ), the passions of the irascible faculty are specifically distinct from those of the concupiscible part.

P(2a)- Q(23)- A(1) — I answer that, The passions of the irascible part differ in species from those of the concupiscible faculty. For since different powers have different objects, as stated in the P(1), Q(77), A(3), the passions of different powers must of necessity be referred to different objects. Much more, therefore, do the passions of different faculties differ in species; since a greater difference in the object is required to diversify the species of the powers, than to diversify the species of passions or actions. For just as in the physical order, diversity of genus arises from diversity in the potentiality of matter, while diversity of species arises from diversity of form in the same matter; so in the acts of the soul, those that belong to different powers, differ not only in species but also in genus, while acts and passions regarding different specific objects, included under the one common object of a single power, differ as the species of that genus.

In order, therefore, to discern which passions are in the irascible, and which in the concupiscible, we must take the object of each of these powers. For we have stated in the P(1), Q(81), A(2), that the object of the concupiscible power is sensible good or evil, simply apprehended as such, which causes pleasure or pain. But, since the soul must, of necessity, experience difficulty or struggle at times, in acquiring some such good, or in avoiding some such evil, in so far as such good or evil is more than our animal nature can easily acquire or avoid; therefore this very good or evil, inasmuch as it is of an arduous or difficult nature, is the object of the irascible faculty. Therefore whatever passions regard good or evil absolutely, belong to the concupiscible power; for instance, joy, sorrow, love, hatred, and such like: whereas those passions which regard good or bad as arduous, through being difficult to obtain or avoid, belong to the irascible faculty; such are daring, fear, hope and the like.

P(2a)- Q(23)- A(1)- RO(1) — As stated in the P(1), Q(81), A(2), the irascible faculty is bestowed on animals, in order to remove the obstacles that hinder the concupiscible power from tending towards its object, either by making some good difficult to obtain, or by making some evil hard to avoid. The result is that all the irascible passions terminate in the concupiscible passions: and thus it is that even the passions which are in the irascible faculty are followed by joy and sadness which are in the concupiscible faculty.

P(2a)- Q(23)- A(1)- RO(2) — Jerome ascribes hatred of vice to the irascible faculty, not by reason of hatred, which is properly a concupiscible passion; but on account of the struggle, which belongs to the irascible power.

P(2a)- Q(23)- A(1)- RO(3) — Good, inasmuch as it is delightful, moves the concupiscible power. But if it prove difficult to obtain, from this very fact it has a certain contrariety to the concupiscible power: and hence the need of another power tending to that good. The same applies to evil. And this power is the irascible faculty. Consequently the concupiscible passions are specifically different from the irascible passions.

P(2a)- Q(23)- A(2) Whether the contrariety of the irascible passions is based on the contrariety of good and evil?

P(2a)- Q(23)- A(2)- O(1) — It would seem that the contrariety of the irascible passions is based on no other contrariety than that of good and evil. For the irascible passions are ordained to the concupiscible passions, as stated above ( A(1), ad 1). But the contrariety of the concupiscible passions is no other than that of good and evil; take, for instance, love and hatred, joy and sorrow. Therefore the same applies to the irascible passions.

P(2a)- Q(23)- A(2)- O(2) — Further, passions differ according to their objects; just as movements differ according to their termini. But there is no other contrariety of movements, except that of the termini, as is stated in Phys. v, 3. Therefore there is no other contrariety of passions, save that of the objects. Now the object of the appetite is good or evil. Therefore in no appetitive power can there be contrariety of passions other than that of good and evil.

P(2a)- Q(23)- A(2)- O(3) — Further, “every passion of the soul is by way of approach and withdrawal,” as Avicenna declares in his sixth book of Physics. Now approach results from the apprehension of good; withdrawal, from the apprehension of evil: since just as “good is what all desire” (Ethic. i, 1), so evil is what all shun. Therefore, in the passions of the soul, there can be no other contrariety than that of good and evil.

P(2a)- Q(23)- A(2) — On the contrary, Fear and daring are contrary to one another, as stated in Ethic. iii, 7. But fear and daring do not differ in respect of good and evil: because each regards some kind of evil. Therefore not every contrariety of the irascible passions is that of good and evil.

P(2a)- Q(23)- A(2) — I answer that, Passion is a kind of movement, as stated in Phys. iii, 3. Therefore contrariety of passions is based on contrariety of movements or changes. Now there is a twofold contrariety in changes and movements, as stated in Phys. v, 5. One is according to approach and withdrawal in respect of the same term: and this contrariety belongs properly to changes, i.e. to generation, which is a change “to being,” and to corruption, which is a change “from being.” The other contrariety is according to opposition of termini, and belongs properly to movements: thus whitening, which is movement from black to white, is contrary to blackening, which is movement from white to black.

Accordingly there is a twofold contrariety in the passions of the soul: one, according to contrariety of objects, i.e. of good and evil; the other, according to approach and withdrawal in respect of the same term. In the concupiscible passions the former contrariety alone is to be found; viz. that which is based on the objects: whereas in the irascible passions, we find both forms of contrariety. The reason of this is that the object of the concupiscible faculty, as stated above ( A(1) ), is sensible good or evil considered absolutely. Now good, as such, cannot be a term wherefrom, but only a term whereto, since nothing shuns good as such; on the contrary, all things desire it. In like manner, nothing desires evil, as such; but all things shun it: wherefore evil cannot have the aspect of a term whereto, but only of a term wherefrom. Accordingly every concupiscible passion in respect of good, tends to it, as love, desire and joy; while every concupiscible passion in respect of evil, tends from it, as hatred, avoidance or dislike, and sorrow. Wherefore, in the concupiscible passions, there can be no contrariety of approach and withdrawal in respect of the same object.

On the other hand, the object of the irascible faculty is sensible good or evil, considered not absolutely, but under the aspect of difficulty or arduousness. Now the good which is difficult or arduous, considered as good, is of such a nature as to produce in us a tendency to it, which tendency pertains to the passion of “hope”; whereas, considered as arduous or difficult, it makes us turn from it; and this pertains to the passion of “despair.” In like manner the arduous evil, considered as an evil, has the aspect of something to be shunned; and this belongs to the passion of “fear”: but it also contains a reason for tending to it, as attempting something arduous, whereby to escape being subject to evil; and this tendency is called “daring.” Consequently, in the irascible passions we find contrariety in respect of good and evil (as between hope and fear): and also contrariety according to approach and withdrawal in respect of the same term (as between daring and fear).

From what has been said the replies to the objections are evident.

P(2a)- Q(23)- A(3) Whether any passion of the soul has no contrariety?

P(2a)- Q(23)- A(3)- O(1) — It would seem that every passion of the soul has a contrary. For every passion of the soul is either in the irascible or in the concupiscible faculty, as stated above ( A(1) ). But both kinds of passion have their respective modes of contrariety. Therefore every passion of the soul has its contrary.

P(2a)- Q(23)- A(3)- O(2) — Further, every passion of the soul has either good or evil for its object; for these are the common objects of the appetitive part. But a passion having good for its object, is contrary to a passion having evil for its object. Therefore every passion has a contrary.

P(2a)- Q(23)- A(3)- O(3) — Further, every passion of the soul is in respect of approach or withdrawal, as stated above ( A(2) ). But every approach has a corresponding contrary withdrawal, and vice versa. Therefore every passion of the soul has a contrary.

P(2a)- Q(23)- A(3) — On the contrary, Anger is a passion of the soul. But no passion is set down as being contrary to anger, as stated in Ethic. iv, 5.

Therefore not every passion has a contrary.

P(2a)- Q(23)- A(3) — I answer that, The passion of anger is peculiar in this, that it cannot have a contrary, either according to approach and withdrawal, or according to the contrariety of good and evil. For anger is caused by a difficult evil already present: and when such an evil is present, the appetite must needs either succumb, so that it does not go beyond the limits of “sadness,” which is a concupiscible passion; or else it has a movement of attack on the hurtful evil, which movement is that of “anger.”

But it cannot have a movement of withdrawal: because the evil is supposed to be already present or past. Thus no passion is contrary to anger according to contrariety of approach and withdrawal.

In like manner neither can there be according to contrariety of good and evil. Because the opposite of present evil is good obtained, which can be no longer have the aspect of arduousness or difficulty. Nor, when once good is obtained, does there remain any other movement, except the appetite’s repose in the good obtained; which repose belongs to joy, which is a passion of the concupiscible faculty.

Accordingly no movement of the soul can be contrary to the movement of anger, and nothing else than cessation from its movement is contrary thereto; thus the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 3) that “calm is contrary to anger,” by opposition not of contrariety but of negation or privation.

From what has been said the replies to the objections are evident.

P(2a)- Q(23)- A(4) Whether in the same power, there are any passions, specifically different, but not contrary to one another?

P(2a)- Q(23)- A(4)- O(1) — It would seem that there cannot be, in the same power, specifically different passions that are not contrary to one another.

For the passions of the soul differ according to their objects. Now the objects of the soul’s passions are good and evil; and on this distinction is based the contrariety of the passions. Therefore no passions of the same power, that are not contrary to one another, differ specifically.

P(2a)- Q(23)- A(4)- O(2) — Further, difference of species implies a difference of form. But every difference of form is in respect of some contrariety, as stated in Metaph. x, 8. Therefore passions of the same power, that are not contrary to one another, do not differ specifically.

P(2a)- Q(23)- A(4)- O(3) — Further, since every passion of the soul consists in approach or withdrawal in respect of good or evil, it seems that every difference in the passions of the soul must needs arise from the difference of good and evil; or from the difference of approach and withdrawal; or from degrees in approach or withdrawal. Now the first two differences cause contrariety in the passions of the soul, as stated above ( A(2) ): whereas the third difference does not diversify the species; else the species of the soul’s passions would be infinite. Therefore it is not possible for passions of the same power to differ in species, without being contrary to one another.

P(2a)- Q(23)- A(4) — On the contrary, Love and joy differ in species, and are in the concupiscible power; and yet they are not contrary to one another; rather, in fact, one causes the other. Therefore in the same power there are passions that differ in species without being contrary to one another.

P(2a)- Q(23)- A(4) — I answer that, Passions differ in accordance with their active causes, which, in the case of the passions of the soul, are their objects. Now, the difference in active causes may be considered in two ways: first, from the point of view of their species or nature, as fire differs from water; secondly, from the point of view of the difference in their active power. In the passions of the soul we can treat the difference of their active or motive causes in respect of their motive power, as if they were natural agents. For every mover, in a fashion, either draws the patient to itself, or repels it from itself. Now in drawing it to itself, it does three things in the patient. Because, in the first place, it gives the patient an inclination or aptitude to tend to the mover: thus a light body, which is above, bestows lightness on the body generated, so that it has an inclination or aptitude to be above. Secondly, if the generated body be outside its proper place, the mover gives it movement towards that place.

Thirdly, it makes it to rest, when it shall have come to its proper place: since to the same cause are due, both rest in a place, and the movement to that place. The same applies to the cause of repulsion.

Now, in the movements of the appetitive faculty, good has, as it were, a force of attraction, while evil has a force of repulsion. In the first place, therefore, good causes, in the appetitive power, a certain inclination, aptitude or connaturalness in respect of good: and this belongs to the passion of “love”: the corresponding contrary of which is “hatred” in respect of evil. Secondly, if the good be not yet possessed, it causes in the appetite a movement towards the attainment of the good beloved: and this belongs to the passion of “desire” or “concupiscence”: and contrary to it, in respect of evil, is the passion of “aversion” or “dislike.” Thirdly, when the good is obtained, it causes the appetite to rest, as it were, in the good obtained: and this belongs to the passion of “delight” or “joy”; the contrary of which, in respect of evil, is “sorrow” or “sadness.”

On the other hand, in the irascible passions, the aptitude, or inclination to seek good, or to shun evil, is presupposed as arising from the concupiscible faculty, which regards good or evil absolutely. And in respect of good not yet obtained, we have “hope” and “despair.” In respect of evil not yet present we have “fear” and “daring.” But in respect of good obtained there is no irascible passion: because it is no longer considered in the light of something arduous, as stated above ( A(3) ). But evil already present gives rise to the passion of “anger.”

Accordingly it is clear that in the concupiscible faculty there are three couples of passions; viz. love and hatred, desire and aversion, joy and sadness. In like manner there are three groups in the irascible faculty; viz. hope and despair, fear and daring, and anger which has not contrary passion.

Consequently there are altogether eleven passions differing specifically; six in the concupiscible faculty, and five in the irascible; and under these all the passions of the soul are contained.

From this the replies to the objections are evident.

QUESTION OF GOOD AND EVIL IN THE PASSIONS OF THE SOUL (FOUR ARTICLES) We must now consider good and evil in the passions of the soul: and under this head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether moral good and evil can be found in the passions of the soul? (2) Whether every passion of the soul is morally evil? (3) Whether every passion increases or decreases the goodness of malice of an act? (4) Whether any passion is good or evil specifically?

P(2a)- Q(24)- A(1) Whether moral good and evil can be found in the passions of the soul?

P(2a)- Q(24)- A(1)- O(1) — It would seem that no passion of the soul is morally good or evil. For moral good and evil are proper to man: since “morals are properly predicated of man,” as Ambrose says (Super Luc.

Prolog.). But passions are not proper to man, for he has them in common with other animals. Therefore no passion of the soul is morally good or evil.

P(2a)- Q(24)- A(1)- O(2) — Further, the good or evil of man consists in “being in accord, or in disaccord with reason,” as Dionysius says (Div.

Nom. iv). Now the passions of the soul are not in the reason, but in the sensitive appetite, as stated above ( Q(22), A(3) ). Therefore they have no connection with human, i.e. moral, good or evil.

P(2a)- Q(24)- A(1)- O(3) — Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 5) that “we are neither praised nor blamed for our passions.” But we are praised and blamed for moral good and evil. Therefore the passions are not morally good or evil.

P(2a)- Q(24)- A(1) — On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 7) while speaking of the passions of the soul: “They are evil if our love is evil; good if our love is good.”

I answer that, We may consider the passions of the soul in two ways: first, in themselves; secondly, as being subject to the command of the reason and will. If then the passions be considered in themselves, to wit, as movements of the irrational appetite, thus there is no moral good or evil in them, since this depends on the reason, as stated above ( Q(18), A(5) ). If, however, they be considered as subject to the command of the reason and will, then moral good and evil are in them. Because the sensitive appetite is nearer than the outward members to the reason and will; and yet the movements and actions of the outward members are morally good or evil, inasmuch as they are voluntary. Much more, therefore, may the passions, in so far as they are voluntary, be called morally good or evil. And they are said to be voluntary, either from being commanded by the will, or from not being checked by the will.

P(2a)- Q(24)- A(1)- RO(1) — These passions, considered in themselves, are common to man and other animals: but, as commanded by the reason, they are proper to man.

P(2a)- Q(24)- A(1)- RO(2) — Even the lower appetitive powers are called rational, in so far as “they partake of reason in some sort” (Ethic. i, 13).

P(2a)- Q(24)- A(1)- RO(3) — The Philosopher says that we are neither praised nor blamed for our passions considered absolutely; but he does not exclude their becoming worthy of praise or blame, in so far as they are subordinate to reason. Hence he continues: “For the man who fears or is angry, is not praised . . . or blamed, but the man who is angry in a certain way, i.e. according to, or against reason.”

P(2a)- Q(24)- A(2) Whether every passion of the soul is evil morally?

P(2a)- Q(24)- A(2)- O(1) — It would seem that all the passions of the soul are morally evil. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ix, 4) that “some call the soul’s passions diseases or disturbances of the soul” [*Those things which the Greeks call \pathe\, we prefer to call disturbances rather than diseases (Tusc. 4:5)]. But every disease or disturbance of the soul is morally evil.

Therefore every passion of the soul is evil morally.

P(2a)- Q(24)- A(2)- O(2) — Further, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 22) that “movement in accord with nature is an action, but movement contrary to nature is passion.” But in movements of the soul, what is against nature is sinful and morally evil: hence he says elsewhere (De Fide Orth. ii, 4) that “the devil turned from that which is in accord with nature to that which is against nature.” Therefore these passions are morally evil.

P(2a)- Q(24)- A(2)- O(3) — Further, whatever leads to sin, has an aspect of evil. But these passions lead to sin: wherefore they are called “the passions of sins” ( Romans 7:5). Therefore it seems that they are morally evil.

P(2a)- Q(24)- A(2) — On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 9) that “all these emotions are right in those whose love is rightly placed . . .

For they fear to sin, they desire to persevere; they grieve for sin, they rejoice in good works.”

P(2a)- Q(24)- A(2) — I answer that, On this question the opinion of the Stoics differed from that of the Peripatetics: for the Stoics held that all passions are evil, while the Peripatetics maintained that moderate passions are good. This difference, although it appears great in words, is nevertheless, in reality, none at all, or but little, if we consider the intent of either school. For the Stoics did not discern between sense and intellect; and consequently neither between the intellectual and sensitive appetite.

Hence they did not discriminate the passions of the soul from the movements of the will, in so far as the passions of the soul are in the sensitive appetite, while the simple movements of the will are in the intellectual appetite: but every rational movement of the appetitive part they call will, while they called passion, a movement that exceeds the limits of reason. Wherefore Cicero, following their opinion (De Tusc.

Quaest. iii, 4) calls all passions “diseases of the soul”: whence he argues that “those who are diseased are unsound; and those who are unsound are wanting in sense.” Hence we speak of those who are wanting in sense of being “unsound.”

On the other hand, the Peripatetics give the name of “passions” to all the movements of the sensitive appetite. Wherefore they esteem them good, when they are controlled by reason; and evil when they are not controlled by reason. Hence it is evident that Cicero was wrong in disapproving (De Tusc. Quaest. iii, 4) of the Peripatetic theory of a mean in the passions, when he says that “every evil, though moderate, should be shunned; for, just as a body, though it be moderately ailing, is not sound; so, this mean in the diseases or passions of the soul, is not sound.” For passions are not called “diseases” or “disturbances” of the soul, save when they are not controlled by reason.

Hence the reply to the First Objection is evident.

P(2a)- Q(24)- A(2)- RO(2) — In every passion there is an increase or decrease in the natural movement of the heart, according as the heart is moved more or less intensely by contraction and dilatation; and hence it derives the character of passion. But there is no need for passion to deviate always from the order of natural reason.

P(2a)- Q(24)- A(2)- RO(3) — The passions of the soul, in so far as they are contrary to the order of reason, incline us to sin: but in so far as they are controlled by reason, they pertain to virtue.

P(2a)- Q(24)- A(3) Whether passion increases or decreases the goodness or malice of an act?

P(2a)- Q(24)- A(3)- O(1) — It would seem that every passion decreases the goodness of a moral action. For anything that hinders the judgment of reason, on which depends the goodness of a moral act, consequently decreases the goodness of the moral act. But every passion hinders the judgment of reason: for Sallust says (Catilin.): “All those that take counsel about matters of doubt, should be free from hatred, anger, friendship and pity.” Therefore passion decreases the goodness of a moral act.

P(2a)- Q(24)- A(3)- O(2) — Further, the more a man’s action is like to God, the better it is: hence the Apostle says ( Ephesians 5:1): “Be ye followers of God, as most dear children.”

But “God and the holy angels feel no anger when they punish . . . no fellow-feeling with misery when they relieve the unhappy,” as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ix, 5). Therefore it is better to do such like deeds without than with a passion of the soul.

P(2a)- Q(24)- A(3)- O(3) — Further, just as moral evil depends on its relation to reason, so also does moral good. But moral evil is lessened by passion: for he sins less, who sins from passion, than he who sins deliberately. Therefore he does a better deed, who does well without passion, than he who does with passion.

P(2a)- Q(24)- A(3) — On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ix, 5) that “the passion of pity is obedient to reason, when pity is bestowed without violating right, as when the poor are relieved, or the penitent forgiven.” But nothing that is obedient to reason lessens the moral good.

Therefore a passion of the soul does not lessen moral good.

P(2a)- Q(24)- A(3) — I answer that, As the Stoics held that every passion of the soul is evil, they consequently held that every passion of the soul lessens the goodness of an act; since the admixture of evil either destroys good altogether, or makes it to be less good. And this is true indeed, if by passions we understand none but the inordinate movements of the sensitive appetite, considered as disturbances or ailments. But if we give the name of passions to all the movements of the sensitive appetite, then it belongs to the perfection of man’s good that his passions be moderated by reason. For since man’s good is founded on reason as its root, that good will be all the more perfect, according as it extends to more things pertaining to man. Wherefore no one questions the fact that it belongs to the perfection of moral good, that the actions of the outward members be controlled by the law of reason. Hence, since the sensitive appetite can obey reason, as stated above ( Q(17), A(7) ), it belongs to the perfection of moral or human good, that the passions themselves also should be controlled by reason.

Accordingly just as it is better that man should both will good and do it in his external act; so also does it belong to the perfection of moral good, that man should be moved unto good, not only in respect of his will, but also in respect of his sensitive appetite; according to Psalm 83:3: “My heart and my flesh have rejoiced in the living God”: where by “heart” we are to understand the intellectual appetite, and by “flesh” the sensitive appetite.

P(2a)- Q(24)- A(3)- RO(1) — The passions of the soul may stand in a twofold relation to the judgment of reason. First, antecedently: and thus, since they obscure the judgment of reason, on which the goodness of the moral act depends, they diminish the goodness of the act; for it is more praiseworthy to do a work of charity from the judgment of reason than from the mere passion of pity. In the second place, consequently: and this in two ways. First, by way of redundance: because, to wit, when the higher part of the soul is intensely moved to anything, the lower part also follows that movement: and thus the passion that results in consequence, in the sensitive appetite, is a sign of the intensity of the will, and so indicates greater moral goodness. Secondly, by way of choice; when, to wit, a man, by the judgment of his reason, chooses to be affected by a passion in order to work more promptly with the co-operation of the sensitive appetite. And thus a passion of the soul increases the goodness of an action.

P(2a)- Q(24)- A(3)- RO(2) — In God and the angels there is no sensitive appetite, nor again bodily members: and so in them good does not depend on the right ordering of passions or of bodily actions, as it does in us.

P(2a)- Q(24)- A(3)- RO(3) — A passion that tends to evil, and precedes the judgment of reason, diminishes sin; but if it be consequent in either of the ways mentioned above (Reply OBJ 1), it aggravates the sin, or else it is a sign of its being more grievous.

P(2a)- Q(24)- A(4) Whether any passion is good or evil in its species?

P(2a)- Q(24)- A(4)- O(1) — It would seem that no passion of the soul is good or evil morally according to its species. Because moral good and evil depend on reason. But the passions are in the sensitive appetite; so that accordance with reason is accidental to them. Since, therefore, nothing accidental belongs to a thing’s species, it seems that no passion is good or evil according to its species.

P(2a)- Q(24)- A(4)- O(2) — Further, acts and passions take their species from their object. If, therefore, any passion were good or evil, according to its species, it would follow that those passions the object of which is good, are specifically good, such as love, desire and joy: and that those passions, the object of which is evil, are specifically evil, as hatred, fear and sadness. But this is clearly false. Therefore no passion is good or evil according to its species.

P(2a)- Q(24)- A(4)- O(3) — Further, there is no species of passion that is not to be found in other animals. But moral good is in man alone. Therefore no passion of the soul is good or evil according to its species.

P(2a)- Q(24)- A(4) — On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ix, 5) that “pity is a kind of virtue.” Moreover, the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 7) that modesty is a praiseworthy passion. Therefore some passions are good or evil according to their species.

P(2a)- Q(24)- A(4) — I answer that, We ought, seemingly, to apply to passions what has been said in regard to acts ( Q(18), AA(5),6 ; Q(20), A(1) ) — viz. that the species of a passion, as the species of an act, can be considered from two points of view. First, according to its natural genus; and thus moral good and evil have no connection with the species of an act or passion. Secondly, according to its moral genus, inasmuch as it is voluntary and controlled by reason. In this way moral good and evil can belong to the species of a passion, in so far as the object to which a passion tends, is, of itself, in harmony or in discord with reason: as is clear in the case of “shame” which is base fear; and of “envy” which is sorrow for another’s good: for thus passions belong to the same species as the external act.

P(2a)- Q(24)- A(4)- RO(1) — This argument considers the passions in their natural species, in so far as the sensitive appetite is considered in itself.

But in so far as the sensitive appetite obeys reason, good and evil of reason are no longer accidentally in the passions of the appetite, but essentially.

P(2a)- Q(24)- A(4)- RO(2) — Passions having a tendency to good, are themselves good, if they tend to that which is truly good, and in like manner, if they turn away from that which is truly evil. On the other hand, those passions which consist in aversion from good, and a tendency to evil, are themselves evil.

P(2a)- Q(24)- A(4)- RO(3) — In irrational animals the sensitive appetite does not obey reason. Nevertheless, in so far as they are led by a kind of estimative power, which is subject to a higher, i.e. the Divine reason, there is a certain likeness of moral good in them, in regard to the soul’s passions.

QUESTION OF THE ORDER OF THE PASSIONS TO ONE ANOTHER (FOUR ARTICLES) We must now consider the order of the passions to one another: and under this head there are four points of inquiry: (1) The relation of the irascible passions to the concupiscible passions; (2) The relation of the concupiscible passions to one another; (3) The relation of the irascible passions to one another; (4) The four principal passions.

P(2a)- Q(25)- A(1) Whether the irascible passions precede the concupiscible passions, or vice versa?

P(2a)- Q(25)- A(1)- O(1) — It would seem that the irascible passions precede the concupiscible passions. For the order of the passions is that of their objects. But the object of the irascible faculty is the difficult good, which seems to be the highest good. Therefore the irascible passions seem to precede the concupiscible passions.

P(2a)- Q(25)- A(1)- O(2) — Further, the mover precedes that which is moved. But the irascible faculty is compared to the concupiscible, as mover to that which is moved: since it is given to animals, for the purposed of removing the obstacles that hinder the concupiscible faculty from enjoying its object, as stated above ( Q(23), A(1), ad 1; P(1), Q(81), A(2) ). Now “that which removes an obstacle, is a kind of mover” (Phys. viii, 4). Therefore the irascible passions precede the concupiscible passions.

P(2a)- Q(25)- A(1)- O(3) — Further, joy and sadness are concupiscible passions. But joy and sadness succeed to the irascible passions: for the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 5) that”retaliation causes anger to cease, because it produces pleasure instead of the previous pain.” Therefore the concupiscible passions follow the irascible passions.

P(2a)- Q(25)- A(1) — On the contrary, The concupiscible passions regard the absolute good, while the irascible passions regard a restricted, viz. the difficult, good. Since, therefore, the absolute good precedes the restricted good, it seems that the concupiscible passions precede the irascible.

P(2a)- Q(25)- A(1) — I answer that, In the concupiscible passions there is more diversity than in the passions of the irascible faculty. For in the former we find something relating to movement — e.g. desire; and something belonging to repose, e.g. joy and sadness. But in the irascible passions there is nothing pertaining to repose, and only that which belongs to movement. The reason of this is that when we find rest in a thing, we no longer look upon it as something difficult or arduous; whereas such is the object of the irascible faculty.

Now since rest is the end of movement, it is first in the order of intention, but last in the order of execution. If, therefore, we compare the passions of the irascible faculty with those concupiscible passions that denote rest in good, it is evident that in the order of execution, the irascible passions take precedence of such like passions of the concupiscible faculty: thus hope precedes joy, and hence causes it, according to the Apostle ( Romans 12:12): “Rejoicing in hope.” But the concupiscible passion which denotes rest in evil, viz. sadness, comes between two irascible passions: because it follows fear; since we become sad when we are confronted by the evil that we feared: while it precedes the movement of anger; since the movement of self-vindication, that results from sadness, is the movement of anger. And because it is looked upon as a good thing to pay back the evil done to us; when the angry man has achieved this he rejoices. Thus it is evident that every passion of the irascible faculty terminates in a concupiscible passion denoting rest, viz. either in joy or in sadness.

But if we compare the irascible passions to those concupiscible passions that denote movement, then it is clear that the latter take precedence: because the passions of the irascible faculty add something to those of the concupiscible faculty; just as the object of the irascible adds the aspect of arduousness or difficulty to the object of the concupiscible faculty. Thus hope adds to desire a certain effort, and a certain raising of the spirits to the realization of the arduous good. In like manner fear adds to aversion or detestation a certain lowness of spirits, on account of difficulty in shunning the evil.

Accordingly the passions of the irascible faculty stand between those concupiscible passions that denote movement towards good or evil, and those concupiscible passions that denote rest in good or evil. And it is therefore evident that the irascible passions both arise from and terminate in the passions of the concupiscible faculty.

P(2a)- Q(25)- A(1)- RO(1) — This argument would prove, if the formal object of the concupiscible faculty were something contrary to the arduous, just as the formal object of the irascible faculty is that which is arduous. But because the object of the concupiscible faculty is good absolutely, it naturally precedes the object of the irascible, as the common precedes the proper.

P(2a)- Q(25)- A(1)- RO(2) — The remover of an obstacle is not a direct but an accidental mover: and here we are speaking of passions as directly related to one another. Moreover, the irascible passion removes the obstacle that hinders the concupiscible from resting in its object.

Wherefore it only follows that the irascible passions precede those concupiscible passions that connote rest. The third object leads to the same conclusion.

P(2a)- Q(25)- A(2) Whether love is the first of the concupiscible passions?

P(2a)- Q(25)- A(2)- O(1) — It would seem that love is not the first of the concupiscible passions. For the concupiscible faculty is so called from concupiscence, which is the same passion as desire. But “things are named from their chief characteristic” (De Anima ii, 4). Therefore desire takes precedence of love.

P(2a)- Q(25)- A(2)- O(2) — Further, love implies a certain union; since it is a “uniting and binding force,” as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv). But concupiscence or desire is a movement towards union with the thing coveted or desired. Therefore desire precedes love.

P(2a)- Q(25)- A(2)- O(3) — Further, the cause precedes its effect. But pleasure is sometimes the cause of love: since some love on account of pleasure (Ethic. viii, 3,4). Therefore pleasure precedes love; and consequently love is not the first of the concupiscible passions.

P(2a)- Q(25)- A(2) — On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 7,9) that all the passions are caused by love: since “love yearning for the beloved object, is desire; and, having and enjoying it, is joy.” Therefore love is the first of the concupiscible passions.

I answer that, Good and evil are the object of the concupiscible faculty.

Now good naturally precedes evil; since evil is privation of good.

Wherefore all the passions, the object of which is good, are naturally before those, the object of which is evil — that is to say, each precedes its contrary passion: because the quest of a good is the reason for shunning the opposite evil.

Now good has the aspect of an end, and the end is indeed first in the order of intention, but last in the order of execution. Consequently the order of the concupiscible passions can be considered either in the order of intention or in the order of execution. In the order of execution, the first place belongs to that which takes place first in the thing that tends to the end. Now it is evident that whatever tends to an end, has, in the first place, an aptitude or proportion to that end, for nothing tends to a disproportionate end; secondly, it is moved to that end; thirdly, it rests in the end, after having attained it. And this very aptitude or proportion of the appetite to good is love, which is complacency in good; while movement towards good is desire or concupiscence; and rest in good is joy or pleasure. Accordingly in this order, love precedes desire, and desire precedes pleasure. But in the order of intention, it is the reverse: because the pleasure intended causes desire and love. For pleasure is the enjoyment of the good, which enjoyment is, in a way, the end, just as the good itself is, as stated above ( Q(11), A(3), ad 3).

P(2a)- Q(25)- A(2)- RO(1) — We name a thing as we understand it, for “words are signs of thoughts,” as the Philosopher states (Peri Herm. i, 1).

Now in most cases we know a cause by its effect. But the effect of love, when the beloved object is possessed, is pleasure: when it is not possessed, it is desire or concupiscence: and, as Augustine says (De Trin. x, 12), “we are more sensible to love, when we lack that which we love.”

Consequently of all the concupiscible passions, concupiscence is felt most; and for this reason the power is named after it.

P(2a)- Q(25)- A(2)- RO(2) — The union of lover and beloved is twofold.

There is real union, consisting in the conjunction of one with the other.

This union belongs to joy or pleasure, which follows desire. There is also an affective union, consisting in an aptitude or proportion, in so far as one thing, from the very fact of its having an aptitude for and an inclination to another, partakes of it: and love betokens such a union. This union precedes the movement of desire.

P(2a)- Q(25)- A(2)- RO(3) — Pleasure causes love, in so far as it precedes love in the order of intention.

P(2a)- Q(25)- A(3) Whether hope is the first of the irascible passions?

P(2a)- Q(25)- A(3)- O(1) — It would seem that hope is not the first of the irascible passions. Because the irascible faculty is denominated from anger.

Since, therefore, “things are names from their chief characteristic” (cf. A(2), O(1) ), it seems that anger precedes and surpasses hope.

P(2a)- Q(25)- A(3)- O(2) — Further, the object of the irascible faculty is something arduous. Now it seems more arduous to strive to overcome a contrary evil that threatens soon to overtake us, which pertains to daring; or an evil actually present, which pertains to anger; than to strive simply to obtain some good. Again, it seems more arduous to strive to overcome a present evil, than a future evil. Therefore anger seems to be a stronger passion than daring, and daring, than hope. And consequently it seems that hope does not precede them.

P(2a)- Q(25)- A(3)- O(3) — Further, when a thing is moved towards an end, the movement of withdrawal precedes the movement of approach.

But fear and despair imply withdrawal from something; while daring and hope imply approach towards something. Therefore fear and despair precede hope and daring.

P(2a)- Q(25)- A(3) — On the contrary, The nearer a thing is to the first, the more it precedes others. But hope is nearer to love, which is the first of the passions. Therefore hope is the first of the passions in the irascible faculty.

P(2a)- Q(25)- A(3) — I answer that, As stated above ( A(1) ) all irascible passions imply movement towards something. Now this movement of the irascible faculty towards something may be due to two causes: one is the mere aptitude or proportion to the end; and this pertains to love or hatred, those whose object is good, or evil; and this belongs to sadness or joy. As a matter of fact, the presence of good produces no passion in the irascible, as stated above ( Q(23), AA(3),4 ); but the presence of evil gives rise to the passion of anger.

Since then in order of generation or execution, proportion or aptitude to the end precedes the achievement of the end; it follows that, of all the irascible passions, anger is the last in the order of generation. And among the other passions of the irascible faculty, which imply a movement arising from love of good or hatred of evil, those whose object is good, viz. hope and despair, must naturally precede those whose object is evil, viz. daring and fear: yet so that hope precedes despair; since hope is a movement towards good as such, which is essentially attractive, so that hope tends to good directly; whereas despair is a movement away from good, a movement which is consistent with good, not as such, but in respect of something else, wherefore its tendency from good is accidental, as it were.

In like manner fear, through being a movement from evil, precedes daring.

And that hope and despair naturally precede fear and daring is evident from this — that as the desire of good is the reason for avoiding evil, so hope and despair are the reason for fear and daring: because daring arises from the hope of victory, and fear arises from the despair of overcoming.

Lastly, anger arises from daring: for no one is angry while seeking vengeance, unless he dare to avenge himself, as Avicenna observes in the sixth book of his Physics. Accordingly, it is evident that hope is the first of all the irascible passions.

And if we wish to know the order of all the passions in the way of generation, love and hatred are first; desire and aversion, second; hope and despair, third; fear and daring, fourth; anger, fifth; sixth and last, joy and sadness, which follow from all the passions, as stated in Ethic. ii, 5: yet so that love precedes hatred; desire precedes aversion; hope precedes despair; fear precedes daring; and joy precedes sadness, as may be gathered from what has been stated above.

P(2a)- Q(25)- A(3)- RO(1) — Because anger arises from the other passions, as an effect from the causes that precede it, it is from anger, as being more manifest than the other passions, that the power takes its name.

P(2a)- Q(25)- A(3)- RO(2) — It is not the arduousness but the good that is the reason for approach or desire. Consequently hope, which regards good more directly, takes precedence: although at times daring or even anger regards something more arduous.

P(2a)- Q(25)- A(3)- RO(3) — The movement of the appetite is essentially and directly towards the good as towards its proper object; its movement from evil results from this. For the movement of the appetitive part is in proportion, not to natural movement, but to the intention of nature, which intends the end before intending the removal of a contrary, which removal is desired only for the sake of obtaining the end.

P(2a)- Q(25)- A(4) Whether these are the four principal passions: joy, sadness, hope and fear?

P(2a)- Q(25)- A(4)- O(1) — It would seem that joy, sadness, hope and fear are not the four principal passions. For Augustine (De Civ. Dei xiv, 3,[7] sqq.) omits hope and puts desire in its place.

P(2a)- Q(25)- A(4)- O(2) — Further, there is a twofold order in the passions of the soul: the order of intention, and the order of execution or generation. The principal passions should therefore be taken, either in the order of intention; and thus joy and sadness, which are the final passions, will be the principal passions; or in the order of execution or generation, and thus love will be the principal passion. Therefore joy and sadness, hope and fear should in no way be called the four principal passions.

P(2a)- Q(25)- A(4)- O(3) — Further, just as daring is caused by hope, so fear is caused by despair. Either, therefore, hope and despair should be reckoned as principal passions, since they cause others: or hope and daring, from being akin to one another.

P(2a)- Q(25)- A(4) — On the contrary, Boethius (De Consol. i) in enumerating the four principal passions, says: “Banish joys: banish fears:

Away with hope: away with tears.” P(2a)- Q(25)- A(4) — I answer that, These four are commonly called the principal passions. Two of them, viz. joy and sadness, are said to be principal because in them all the other passions have their completion and end; wherefore they arise from all the other passions, as is stated in Ethic. ii, 5. Fear and hope are principal passions, not because they complete the others simply, but because they complete them as regards the movement of the appetite towards something: for in respect of good, movement begins in love, goes forward to desire, and ends in hope; while in respect of evil, it begins in hatred, goes on to aversion, and ends in fear. Hence it is customary to distinguish these four passions in relation to the present and the future: for movement regards the future, while rest is in something present: so that joy relates to present good, sadness relates to present evil; hope regards future good, and fear, future evil.

As to the other passions that regard good or evil, present or future, they all culminate in these four. For this reason some have said that these four are the principal passions, because they are general passions; and this is true, provided that by hope and fear we understand the appetite’s common tendency to desire or shun something.

P(2a)- Q(25)- A(4)- RO(1) — Augustine puts desire or covetousness in place of hope, in so far as they seem to regard the same object, viz. some future good.

P(2a)- Q(25)- A(4)- RO(2) — These are called principal passions, in the order of intention and completion. And though fear and hope are not the last passions simply, yet they are the last of those passions that tend towards something as future. Nor can the argument be pressed any further except in the case of anger: yet neither can anger be reckoned a principal passion, because it is an effect of daring, which cannot be a principal passion, as we shall state further on ( RO(3) ).

P(2a)- Q(25)- A(4)- RO(3) — Despair implies movement away from good; and this is, as it were, accidental: and daring implies movement towards evil; and this too is accidental. Consequently these cannot be principal passions; because that which is accidental cannot be said to be principal.

And so neither can anger be called a principal passion, because it arises from daring.

QUESTION OF THE PASSIONS OF THE SOUL IN PARTICULAR: AND FIRST, OF LOVE (FOUR ARTICLES) We have now to consider the soul’s passions in particular, and (1) the passions of the concupiscible faculty; (2) the passions of the irascible faculty.

The first of these considerations will be threefold: since we shall consider 1) Love and hatred; (2) Desire and aversion; (3) Pleasure and sadness.

Concerning love, three points must be considered: (1) Love itself; (2) The cause of love; (3) The effects of love.

Under the first head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether love is in the concupiscible power? (2) Whether love is a passion? (3) Whether love is the same as dilection? (4) Whether love is properly divided into love of friendship, and love of concupiscence?

P(2a)- Q(26)- A(1) Whether love is in the concupiscible power?

P(2a)- Q(26)- A(1)- O(1) — It would seem that love is not in the concupiscible power. For it is written (Wis. 8:2): “Her,” namely wisdom, “have I loved, and have sought her out from my youth.” But the concupiscible power, being a part of the sensitive appetite, cannot tend to wisdom, which is not apprehended by the senses. Therefore love is not in the concupiscible power.

P(2a)- Q(26)- A(1)- O(2) — Further, love seems to be identified with every passion: for Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 7): “Love, yearning for the object beloved, is desire; having and enjoying it, is joy; fleeing what is contrary to it, is fear; and feeling what is contrary to it, is sadness.” But not every passion is in the concupiscible power; indeed, fear, which is mentioned in this passage, is in the irascible power. Therefore we must not say absolutely that love is in the concupiscible power.

P(2a)- Q(26)- A(1)- O(3) — Further, Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv) mentions a “natural love.” But natural love seems to pertain rather to the natural powers, which belong to the vegetal soul. Therefore love is not simply in the concupiscible power.

P(2a)- Q(26)- A(1) — On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Topic. ii, 7) that “love is in the concupiscible power.”

P(2a)- Q(26)- A(1) — I answer that, Love is something pertaining to the appetite; since good is the object of both. Wherefore love differs according to the difference of appetites. For there is an appetite which arises from an apprehension existing, not in the subject of the appetite, but in some other: and this is called the “natural appetite.” Because natural things seek what is suitable to them according to their nature, by reason of an apprehension which is not in them, but in the Author of their nature, as stated in the P(1), Q(6) , A(1), ad 2; P(1), Q(103), A(1), ad 1,3. And there is another appetite arising from an apprehension in the subject of the appetite, but from necessity and not from free-will. Such is, in irrational animals, the “sensitive appetite,” which, however, in man, has a certain share of liberty, in so far as it obeys reason. Again, there is another appetite following freely from an apprehension in the subject of the appetite. And this is the rational or intellectual appetite, which is called the “will.”

Now in each of these appetites, the name “love” is given to the principle movement towards the end loved. In the natural appetite the principle of this movement is the appetitive subject’s connaturalness with the thing to which it tends, and may be called “natural love”: thus the connaturalness of a heavy body for the centre, is by reason of its weight and may be called “natural love.” In like manner the aptitude of the sensitive appetite or of the will to some good, that is to say, its very complacency in good is called “sensitive love,” or “intellectual” or “rational love.” So that sensitive love is in the sensitive appetite, just as intellectual love is in the intellectual appetite. And it belongs to the concupiscible power, because it regards good absolutely, and not under the aspect of difficulty, which is the object of the irascible faculty.

P(2a)- Q(26)- A(1)- RO(1) — The words quoted refer to intellectual or rational love.

P(2a)- Q(26)- A(1)- RO(2) — Love is spoken of as being fear, joy, desire and sadness, not essentially but causally.

P(2a)- Q(26)- A(1)- RO(3) — Natural love is not only in the powers of the vegetal soul, but in all the soul’s powers, and also in all the parts of the body, and universally in all things: because, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv), “Beauty and goodness are beloved by all things”; since each single thing has a connaturalness with that which is naturally suitable to it.

P(2a)- Q(26)- A(2) Whether love is a passion?

P(2a)- Q(26)- A(2)- O(1) — It would seem that love is not a passion. For no power is a passion. But every love is a power, as Dionysius says (Div.

Nom. iv). Therefore love is not a passion.

P(2a)- Q(26)- A(2)- O(2) — Further, love is a kind of union or bond, as Augustine says (De Trin. viii, 10). But a union or bond is not a passion, but rather a relation. Therefore love is not a passion.

P(2a)- Q(26)- A(2)- O(3) — Further, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 22) that passion is a movement. But love does not imply the movement of the appetite; for this is desire, of which movement love is the principle.

Therefore love is not a passion.

P(2a)- Q(26)- A(2) — On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. viii, 5) that “love is a passion.”

P(2a)- Q(26)- A(2) — I answer that, Passion is the effect of the agent on the patient. Now a natural agent produces a twofold effect on the patient: for in the first place it gives it the form; and secondly it gives it the movement that results from the form. Thus the generator gives the generated body both weight and the movement resulting from weight: so that weight, from being the principle of movement to the place, which is connatural to that body by reason of its weight, can, in a way, be called “natural love.” In the same way the appetible object gives the appetite, first, a certain adaptation to itself, which consists in complacency in that object; and from this follows movement towards the appetible object. For “the appetitive movement is circular,” as stated in De Anima iii, 10; because the appetible object moves the appetite, introducing itself, as it were, into its intention; while the appetite moves towards the realization of the appetible object, so that the movement ends where it began.

Accordingly, the first change wrought in the appetite by the appetible object is called “love,” and is nothing else than complacency in that object; and from this complacency results a movement towards that same object, and this movement is “desire”; and lastly, there is rest which is “joy.”

Since, therefore, love consists in a change wrought in the appetite by the appetible object, it is evident that love is a passion: properly so called, according as it is in the concupiscible faculty; in a wider and extended sense, according as it is in the will.

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