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| God is Not a Being of Simple Goodness; Other Attributes Belong to Him. Marcion Shows Inconsistency in the Portraiture of His Simply Good and Emotionless God.
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Chapter
XXV.—God is Not a Being of Simple Goodness; Other Attributes
Belong to Him. Marcion Shows Inconsistency in the Portraiture of His
Simply Good and Emotionless God.
As touching this question of goodness, we have in
these outlines of our argument shown it to be in no way compatible with
Deity,—as being neither natural,2636
| 2636 Ingenitam. In chap.
xxii. this word seems to be synonymous with naturalem. Comp.
book ii. 3, where it has this sense in the phrase “Deo
ingenita.” |
nor rational, nor perfect, but wrong,2637
and unjust, and unworthy of the very name of goodness,—because,
as far as the congruity of the divine character is concerned, it cannot
indeed be fitting that that Being should be regarded as God who is
alleged to have such a goodness, and that not in a modified way,
but simply and solely. For it is, furthermore, at this point quite open
to discussion, whether God ought to be regarded as a Being of simple
goodness, to the exclusion of all those other attributes,2638
sensations, and affections, which the
Marcionites indeed transfer from their god to the Creator, and which we
acknowledge to be worthy characteristics of the Creator too, but only
because we consider Him to be God. Well, then, on this ground we shall
deny him to be God in whom all things are not to be found which befit
the Divine Being. If (Marcion) chose2639
to take any
one of the school of Epicurus, and entitle him God in the name of
Christ, on the ground that what is happy and incorruptible can
bring no trouble either on itself or anything else (for Marcion, while
poring over2640
this opinion of the
divine indifference, has removed from him all the severity and energy
of the judicial2641
character), it was
his duty to have developed his conceptions into some imperturbable and
listless god (and then what could he have had in common with
Christ, who occasioned trouble both to the Jews by what He taught, and
to Himself by what He felt?), or else to have admitted that he was
possessed of the same emotions as others2642
(and in such case what would he have had to do with Epicurus, who was
no friend2643
to either him or
Christians?). For that a being who in ages past2644
was in a quiescent state, not caring to communicate any knowledge of
himself by any work all the while, should come after so long a time to
entertain a concern for man’s salvation, of course by his own
will,—did he not by this very fact become susceptible of the
impulse2645
of a new volition,
so as palpably to be open to all other emotions? But what volition is
unaccompanied with the spur of desire?2646
Who wishes for what he desires not? Moreover, care will be another
companion of the will. For who will wish for any object and desire to
have it, without also caring to obtain it? When, therefore,
(Marcion’s god) felt both a will and a desire for man’s
salvation, he certainly occasioned some concern and trouble both to
himself and others. This Marcion’s theory suggests, though
Epicurus demurs. For he2647
| 2647 (i.e., Marcion’s
god.) | raised up an
adversary against himself in that very thing against which his will and
desire, and care were directed,—whether it were sin or
death,—and more especially in their Tyrant and Lord, the Creator
of man. Again,2648
nothing will ever
run its course without hostile rivalry,2649
which shall not (itself) be without a hostile aspect. In fact,2650
when willing, desiring, and caring to
deliver man, (Marcion’s god) already in the very act encounters a
rival, both in Him from whom He effects the deliverance (for of
course2651
he means the
liberation to be an opposition to Him), and also in those things from
which the deliverance is wrought (the intended liberation being to the
advantage of some other things). For it must needs be, that upon
rivalry its own ancillary passions2652
will be in
attendance, against whatever objects its emulation is directed: anger,
discord, hatred, disdain, indignation, spleen, loathing, displeasure.
Now, since all these emotions are present to rivalry; since, moreover,
the rivalry which arises in liberating man excites them; and since,
again, this deliverance of man is an operation of goodness, it follows
that this goodness avails nothing without its endowments,2653
that is to say, without those sensations and
affections whereby it carries out its purpose2654
against the Creator; so that it cannot even in this be ruled2655
to be irrational, as if it were wanting in
proper sensations and affections. These points we shall have to insist
on2656
much more fully, when we come to plead the
cause of the Creator, where they will also incur our
condemnation.E.C.F. INDEX & SEARCH
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