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| This Liberty Vindicated in Respect of Its Original Creation; Suitable Also for Exhibiting the Goodness and the Purpose of God. Reward and Punishment Impossible If Man Were Good or Evil Through Necessity and Not Choice.
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Chapter VI.—This
Liberty Vindicated in Respect of Its Original Creation; Suitable Also
for Exhibiting the Goodness and the Purpose of God. Reward and
Punishment Impossible If Man Were Good or Evil Through Necessity and
Not Choice.
But although we shall be understood, from our
argument, to be only so affirming man’s unshackled power over his
will, that what happens to him should be laid to his own charge, and
not to God’s, yet that you may not object, even now, that he
ought not to have been so constituted, since his liberty and power of
will might turn out to be injurious, I will first of all maintain that
he was rightly so constituted, that I may with the greater confidence
commend both his actual constitution, and the additional fact of its
being worthy of the Divine Being; the cause which led to man’s
being created with such a constitution being shown to be the better
one. Moreover, man thus constituted will be protected by both the
goodness of God and by His purpose,2771
| 2771 Ratio, or, “His
reason.” We have used both words, which are equally suitable to
the Divine Being, as seemed most convenient. | both of which
are always found in concert in our God. For His purpose is no purpose
without goodness; nor is His goodness goodness without a purpose,
except forsooth in the case of Marcion’s god, who is
purposelessly2772
| 2772 Irrationaliter, or,
“irrationally.” | good, as we have
shown.2773
| 2773 See above, book i.
chap. xxiii. p. 288. | Well, then, it was
proper that God should be known; it was no doubt2774
a good and reasonable2775
| 2775 Rationale, or,
“consistent with His purpose.” | thing. Proper also was it that there should
be something worthy of knowing God. What could be found so worthy
as the image and likeness of God? This also was undoubtedly good and
reasonable. Therefore it was proper that (he who is) the image and
likeness of God should be formed with a free will and a mastery of
himself;2776
so that this very thing—namely,
freedom of will and self-command—might be reckoned as the image
and likeness of God in him. For this purpose such an essence2777
was adapted2778
to
man as suited this character,2779
even the afflatus
of the Deity, Himself free and uncontrolled.2780
But if you will take some other view of the case,2781
how came it to pass2782
that man, when in possession of the whole world, did not above all
things reign in self-possession2783
| 2783 Animi sui
possessione. | —a master
over others, a slave to himself? The goodness of God, then, you
can learn from His gracious gift2784
to man, and
His purpose from His disposal of all things.2785
| 2785 Ex dispositione. The
same as the “universa disponendo” above. | At
present, let God’s goodness alone occupy our attention,
that which gave so large a gift to man, even the liberty of his
will. God’s purpose claims some other opportunity of
treatment, offering as it does instruction of like import. Now, God
alone is good by nature. For He, who has that which is without
beginning, has it not by creation,2786
but by nature.
Man, however, who exists entirely by creation, having a beginning,
along with that beginning obtained the form in which he exists; and
thus he is not by nature disposed to good, but by creation, not having
it as his own attribute to be good, because, (as we have said,) it is
not by nature, but by creation, that he is disposed to good, according
to the appointment of his good Creator, even the Author of all good. In
order, therefore, that man might have a goodness of his own,2787
| 2787 Bonum jam suum, not
bonitatem. | bestowed2788
on him by God,
and there might be henceforth in man a property, and in a certain sense
a natural attribute of goodness, there was assigned to him in the
constitution of his nature, as a formal witness2789
| 2789 Libripens. The
language here is full of legal technicalities, derived from the Roman
usage in conveyance of property. “Libripens quasi arbiter
mancipationis” (Rigalt.). | of
the goodness which God bestowed upon him, freedom and power of the
will, such as should cause good to be performed spontaneously by man,
as a property of his own, on the ground that no less than this2790
| 2790 Quoniam (with a subj.)
et hoc. | would be required in the matter of a
goodness which was to be voluntarily exercised by him, that is to say,
by the liberty of his will, without either favour or servility to the
constitution of his nature, so that man should be good2791
just up to this point,2792
if he should display his goodness in
accordance with his natural constitution indeed, but still as the
result of his will, as a property of his nature; and, by a similar
exercise of volition,2793
should show himself
to be too strong2794
in defence against
evil also (for even this God, of course, foresaw), being free, and
master of himself; because, if he were wanting in this prerogative
of self-mastery, so as to perform even good by necessity and not
will, he would, in the helplessness of his servitude, become subject to
the usurpation of evil, a slave as much to evil as to good. Entire
freedom of will, therefore, was conferred upon him in both tendencies;
so that, as master of himself, he might constantly encounter good by
spontaneous observance of it, and evil by its spontaneous avoidance;
because, were man even otherwise circumstanced, it was yet his bounden
duty, in the judgment of God, to do justice according to the
motions2795
of his will
regarded, of course, as free. But the reward neither of good nor
of evil could be paid to the man who should be found to have been
either good or evil through necessity and not choice. In this really
lay2796
the law which did not exclude, but rather
prove, human liberty by a spontaneous rendering of obedience, or
a spontaneous commission of iniquity; so patent was the liberty of
man’s will for either issue. Since, therefore, both the goodness
and purpose of God are2797
| 2797 Our author’s
word invenitur (in the singular) combines the bonitas and
ratio in one view. | discovered in the
gift to man of freedom in his will, it is not right, after ignoring the
original definition of goodness and purpose which it was necessary to
determine previous to any discussion of the subject, on subsequent
facts to presume to say that God ought not in such a way to have formed
man, because the issue was other than what was assumed to be2798
| 2798 The verb is
subj., “deceret.” | proper for God. We ought rather,2799
| 2799 Sed, with
oportet understood. | after duly considering that it behoved God
so to create man, to leave this consideration unimpaired, and to
survey the other aspects of the case. It is, no doubt, an easy process
for persons who take offence at the fall of man, before they have
looked into the facts of his creation, to impute the blame of what
happened to the Creator, without any examination of His purpose. To
conclude: the goodness of God, then fully considered from the
beginning of His works, will be enough to convince us that nothing evil
could possibly have
come forth from God; and the liberty of man will, after a second
thought,2800
| 2800 Recogitata. [Again, a
noble Theodicy.] | show us that it
alone is chargeable with the fault which itself
committed.E.C.F. INDEX & SEARCH
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