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| The Falsity of the General Opinion respecting Fate is proved by the Consideration of Human Laws, and by the Works of Creation, the Course of which is not Fortuitous, but according to an Orderly Arrangement which evinces the Design of the Creator.
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Chapter VI.—The Falsity of the General Opinion respecting
Fate3389
| 3389 For a full discussion of various definitions and usage of the word
Fate (ἡ εἰριαρμένη) in Greek philosophy, compare Zeller, Stoics,
Epicureans, and Sceptics (Lond. 1880), p. 170–171,
notes. | is proved by the
Consideration of Human Laws, and by the Works of Creation, the Course
of which is not Fortuitous, but according to an Orderly Arrangement
which evinces the Design of the Creator.
The great majority, however, in their folly, ascribe the regulation of
the universe to nature, while some imagine fate, or accident,3390
| 3390 αὐτόματον. The usual word for chance or accident is τύχη.
These may be here, as is often the case, simple synonyms, but both
words are used in the same phrase later in such way as to suggest
that τύχη
is parallel with “fate” rather than
“chance” in the author’s mind. αὐτόματον
seems to be used of
“self-originating,” τύχη of originating
from some unknown cause or without any cause. The former is the modern,
self-energized, “lift-yourselves-by-your-own-boot-straps”
evolution. The latter is a form of agnosticism. Aristotle
(Metaph. 10. 8) defines chance (τύχη) as a
“cause by accident” (συμβέβηκος), or more literally “coincidence,” which is
substantially what Janet (Final Causes, 1878, p. 19) means by
defining chance as the coincidence of causes. At the end of the same
chapter Aristotle uses αὐτόματον
in contrast with τύχη—“τύχη or even
αὐτόματον,” which has been rendered (M’Mahon)
“chance or even spontaneity.” In modern phrase those who
hold these three various views of the universe might be characterized
as “material evolutionists,” “transcendental
idealists,” and “philosophical (or perhaps
‘agnostic’) evolutionists.” | to be the cause. With regard to those
who attribute the control of all things to fate, they know not that in
using this term they utter a mere word, but designate no active power,
nor anything which has real and substantial existence. For what can
this fate be, considered in itself, if nature be the first cause of all
things? Or what shall we suppose nature itself to be, if the law of
fate be inviolable? Indeed, the very assertion that there is a law of
fate implies that such law is the work of a legislator: if, therefore,
fate itself be a law, it must be a law devised by God. All things,
therefore, are subject to God, and nothing is beyond the sphere of his
power. If it be said that fate is the will3391
of God, and is so considered, we admit
the fact. But in what respect do justice,3392
| 3392 δικαιοσύνη, better “righteousness,” “correctness of
thinking, feeling, and acting” (Thayer, Lex. p. 149). So
its opposite mentioned below (ἀδικία) is better
“unrighteousness,” as generally in the revised English
version of the N.T., “mammon of unrighteousness”
(Luke
xvi. 9, e.g.). The word means more than our “just,”
“more,” as Socrates said (Plat. Rep. 1. 331),
“than to speak the truth and pay your debts.” Righteousness
is the better translation, but we are met with the difficulty that it
has generally been rendered justice in translations of the
philosophers. | or self-control,3393
| 3393 σωφροσύνη, temperance, vs. ἀκολασία, intemperance, below; soundness of mind vs. insanity (cf.
use in Acts xxvi. 25,
and of verb in Mark v. 15; Luke viii. 35; also use in Plato,
Rep. 332, &c.); self-control vs. unbridled desire.
This same contrast of σωφροσύνη
and ἀκολασία is found in Aristotle, Eth. 2, vii. 3; 7, vii. I; and
especially 7, ix. 5. | or the other virtues, depend on fate?
From whence, if so, do their contraries, as injustice and intemperance,
proceed? For vice has its origin from nature, not from fate; and virtue
is the due regulation of natural character and disposition. But,
granting that the varied results of actions, whether right or erroneous
in themselves, depend on fortune or fate: in what sense can the general
principle of justice,3394
| 3394 τὶ
δίκαιον,
not δικαιοσύνη | the principle
of rendering to every one his due, be ascribed to fate?3395
| 3395 This is very free, and follows translation of Valesius and
1709 text. 1709 marg. translates more literally,
“But either crimes, or, on the other hand, brave performances,
which are [the property] of a good and right purpose of mind, if they
happen sometimes one way, at others another,” and Molz.
somewhat similarly. It is possible that it should read: “Granted
that either evil actions proceeding from a good and upright will, or
contrariwise, good actions [from an evil will] which issue directly
contrary [to their own nature or to just expectation] may be ascribed
to chance or fate, how can the right,” &c. | Or how can it be said that laws,
encouragements to virtue and dissuasives from what is evil, praise,
blame, punishment, in short whatever operates as a motive to virtue,
and deters from the practice of vice, derive their origin from fortune
or accident, and not rather from that of justice,3396
which is a characteristic attribute of
the God of providence? For the events which befall men are consequent
upon the tenor of their lives. Hence pestilence or sedition, famine and
plenty, succeed in turn, declaring plainly and emphatically that all
these things are regulated with reference to our course of life. For
the Divine Being delights in goodness, but turns with aversion from all
impiety; looks with acceptance on the humble spirit, but abhors
presumption, and that pride which exalts itself above what becomes a
creature. And though the proofs of these truths are clear and manifest
to our sight, they appear in a still stronger light, when we collect,
and as it were concentrate our thoughts within ourselves, and ponder
their causes with deep attention. I say, then, that it becomes us to
lead a life of modesty and gentleness, not suffering our thoughts to
rise proudly above our natural condition, and ever mindful that God is
near us, and is the observer of all our actions. But let us still farther
test the truth of the proposition, that the order of the universe
depends on chance3397
or
accident.3398
Are we then to suppose that
the stars and other heavenly bodies, the earth and sea, fire and wind,
water and air, the succession of the seasons, the recurrence of summer
and winter, that all these have an undesigned and fortuitous existence,
and not rather that they proceed from the creative hand of God? Some,
indeed, are so senseless as to say that most of these things have been
devised by mankind because of their need of them. Let it be admitted
that this opinion has a semblance of reason in regard to earthly and
corruptible things (though Nature herself supplies every good with a
lavish hand); yet can we believe that things which are immortal and
unchangeable are the inventions of men? These, indeed, and all things
else which are beyond the reach of our senses, and comprehended by the
intellect3399
| 3399 νόος was not
narrowed to the mere intellectual functions. “Intellectual”
is not to be taken of brain function only, but of brain and
heart,—real knowing, as against the “intellectuation”
which men nowadays try to force the word “know” to
mean. | alone, receive their being, not
from the material life of man, but from the intellectual and eternal
essence of God. Again, the orderly arrangement of these things is the
work of his providence: for instance, that the day, deriving radiance
from the sun, is bright; that night succeeds his setting, and the
starry host3400
| 3400 “Quire of the stars,” 1709. | by which night itself is redeemed
from total darkness. And what shall we say of the moon, which when most
distant from, and opposite to the sun, is filled with light, but wanes
in proportion to the nearness of her approach to him? Do not these
things manifestly evince the intelligence3401
| 3401 The
“λόγος
ἐνδι€θετος” of Philo, frequent in Alexandrian theologians. It
is the unuttered thought vs. the expressed word. |
and sagacious wisdom of God? Add to this that needful warmth of the
solar rays which ripens the fruits of the earth; the currents of wind,
so conducive to the fertility of the seasons; the cool and refreshing
showers; and the harmony of all these things in accordance with which
all are reasonably and systematically conducted: lastly, the
everlasting order of the planets, which return to the self-same place
at their appointed times: are not all these, as well as the perfect
ministry of the stars, obedient to a divine law, evident proofs of the
ordinance3402
| 3402 Fore-ordination, or plan. | of God? Again, do the mountain
heights, the deep and hollow valleys, the level and extensive plains,
useful as they are, as well as pleasing to the eye, appear to exist
independently of the will of God? Or do not the proportion and
alternate succession of land and water, serviceable, the one for
husbandry, the other for the transport of such foreign products as we
need, afford a clear demonstration of his exact and proportionate
providential care? For instance, the mountains contain a store of
water, which the level ground receives, and after imbibing sufficient
for the renovation of the soil, sends forth the residue into the sea,
and the sea in turn passes it onward to the ocean. And still we dare to
say that all these things happen by chance3403
and accident; unable though we be to
show by what shape or form this chance is characterized; a thing which
has no foundation either in intellect or sense existence; which rings
in our ears as the mere sound of an unsubstantial name!E.C.F. INDEX & SEARCH
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