PREVIOUS CHAPTER - NEXT CHAPTER - HELP     

ON IMPORTANT THEOLOGICAL CONTROVERSIES.

CHAPTER CONCERNING GODS MORAL GOVERNMENT. A FUTURE STATE, AND THE IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL. 1. The Creator of the world is doubtless also the Governor of it. He that had power to give being to the world, and set all the parts of it in order, has doubtless power to dispose of the world, to continue the order he has constituted, or to alter it. He that first gave the laws of nature, must have all nature in his hands; so that it is evident God has the world in his hands, to dispose of as he pleases. And, as God is able, so he is inclined, to govern the world. For, as he is an intelligent being, he had some end in what he did, otherwise he did not act as a voluntary agent in making the world.

That being never acts voluntarily that has no end in what he does, and aims at nothing at all in it. Neither God nor man is properly said to make any thing that necessarily or accidentally proceeds from them, but that only which is voluntarily produced. Besides, we see in the particular parts of the world, that God had a particular end in their formation. They are fitted for such an end. By which it appears, that the Creator did act as a voluntary agent, proposing final causes in the work of creation; and is that made the particular parts for certain ends, doubtless made the whole for a certain end. And, if God made the world for some end, doubtless he will choose to have this world disposed of to answer that end. For his proposing the end, supposes, that he chooses it should be obtained. Therefore, it follows, that God will choose to take care that the world be disposed of to the obtaining of his own ends, which is the same thing as his choosing to have the government of the world, And it is manifest, in fact, that God is not careless how the affairs and concerns of the world he has made proceed, because he was not careless of this matter in the creation itself; as it is apparent, by the manner and order in which things were created, that God, in creating, took care of the future progress and state of things in the world. This being established, I now proceed to show, that it must be, that God maintains a moral government over the world of mankind. 2. If it be certain, that God is concerned, and does take care, how things proceed in the state of the world he has made, then he will be especially concerned how things proceed in the state of the world of mankind.

Mankind are the principal part of the visible creation. They have understanding, are voluntary agents, and can produce works of their own will, design, and contrivance, as God does. And the Creator looks upon them as the principal part of his visible creation, as is manifest, because he hath set them at the head of his creation. The world is evidently made to be a habitation for man, and all things about him are surbordinated to his use.

Now, if God be careful how the world that he has made be regulated, that His end may be answered, and that it may not be in vain, He will be especially careful of this concerning the principal part of it, and in the same proportion that it is principal or superior in his own account to the rest.

The more God has respect to any part of the world he has made, the more concerned he will be about the state of that part. But, it is manifest by the creation itself, that God has more respect or regard to man, than to any other part of the visible creation; because he has evidently made and fitted other parts to man’s use. And therefore God will not leave the world of mankind to themselves, without taking any care to govern and order their state. It is evident, by the manner in which God has formed and constituted other things, that he has respect to beauty, good order and regulation, proportion and harmony; so, in the system of the world, in the seasons of the year, in the formation of plants, and of the various parts of the human body. Surely, therefore, he will not leave the principal part of the creation, about the state of which he is evidently, in fact, chiefly concerned, without making any proper provision for its being in any other than a state of deformity, discord, and the most hateful and dreadful confusion. 3. By what has been already said, God is most concerned about the state and government of that which is highest in his creation, and which He values most; and so he is principally concerned about the ordering the state of mankind, which is a part of the creation that he has made superior, and that he values most: and therefore, in like manner, it follows, that He is principally concerned about the regulation of that which he values most in men, viz. what appertains to his intelligence and voluntary acts. If there be any thing in the principal part of the creation, that the Creator values more than other parts, it must be that wherein it is above them, or, at least, something wherein it differs from them. But the only thing wherein men differ from the inferior creation, is intelligent perception and action. This is that in which the Creator has made-man to differ from the rest of the creation, and by which he has set him over it, and by which he governs the inferior creatures, and uses them for himself; and therefore it must needs be, that the Creator should be chiefly concerned that the state of mankind should be regulated according to his will, with respect to what appertains to him as an intelligent, voluntary creature. Hence it must be, that God does take care that a good moral government should be maintained over men; that his intelligent, voluntary acts should be all subject to rules; and that with respect to them all, he should be the subject of judicial proceeding. For unless this be, there is no care taken that the state of mankind, with respect to their intelligent, voluntary acts, should be regulated at all; but all things will be remedilessly in the utmost deformity, confusion, and ruin. The world of mankind, instead of being superior, will be the worse, and the more hateful, and the more vile and miserable, for having the faculties of reasons and will; and this highest part of the creation will be the lowest, and infinitely the most confused, deformed, and detestable, without any provision for rectifying its evils. And the God of order, peace, and harmony, that constituted the inferior parts of the world, which he has subjected to man, and made subservient to him, in such decency, beauty, and harmony, will appear to have left this chief part of his work, and the end of all the rest, to the reign of everlasting discord, confusion, and ruin; contradicting and conflicting with its own nature and faculties; having reason, and yet acting in all things contradictory to it; being men, but yet beasts; setting sense above reason; improving reason only as a weapon of mischief and destruction of God’s workmanship. 4. I would again argue, that God must maintain a moral government over mankind, thus: — It is evident, that it was agreeable to the Creator’s design, that there should be some moral government maintained amongst men; because, without any, either in nations, provinces, towns, or families, and also without any divine government over the whole, the world of mankind could not subsist, but would destroy itself. Men would be not only much more destructive to each other, than any kind of animals are to their own species, but a thousand times more than any kind of beasts are to those of any other species. Therefore, the nature that God has given all mankind, and the circumstances in which he has placed them, lead all, in all ages throughout the habitable world, into moral government. And the Creator doubtless intended this for the preservation of this highest species of creatures; otherwise he has made much less provision for the defence and preservation of this species, than of any other. There is no kind of creature that he has left without proper means for its own preservation.

But unless man’s own reason, to be improved in moral rule and order, be the means he has provided for the preservation of man, he has provided him with no means at all. Therefore, it is doubtless the original design of the Creator, that there should be moral subordination amongst men, and that he designed there should be heads, princes, or governors, to whom honour, subjection, and obedience should be paid. Now, this strongly argues, that the Creator himself will maintain a moral government over the whole. For, without this, the preservation of the species is bunt very imperfectly provided for. If men have nothing but human government to be a restraint upon their lusts, and have no rule or judgment of an universal omniscient governor to be a restraint upon their consciences, still they are left in a most woeful condition; and the preservation and common benefit of the species, according to its necessities, and the exigencies of its place, nature, and circumstances in the creation, is in nowise provided for, as the preservation and necessities of other species are.

Now, is it reasonable to think, that the Creator would so constitute the circumstances of mankind, that some particular persons, that have only a little image and shadow of his greatness and power over men, should exercise it in giving forth edicts, and executing judgment; and that he who is above all, and the original of all, should exercise no power in this way himself, when mankind stand in so much more need of such an exercise of his power, than of the power of human governors? — He has infinitely the greatest right to exercise the power of a moral governor, if he pleases. His relation to man as his Creator, most naturally leads to it. He is infinitely the most worthy of that respect, honour, and subjection that is due to a moral governor. He has infinitely the best qualifications of a governor, being infinitely wise, powerful, and holy, and his government will be infinitely the most effectual to answer the ends of government. 5. It is manifest, that the Creator of the world, in constituting human moral governments among men, has, in that constitution, had great respect to those qualifications, that relation, and those rights and obligations, in those whom he has appointed to be rulers, and in putting others under their moral government, which he has in himself in a vastly more eminent degree. As particularly, in the government of parents over their children, which of all other kinds of human moral government is most evidently founded in nature, and which the preservation of the species doth most immediately require. Here God hath set those to be moral rulers, who are the wiser and stronger, and has appointed those to be in subjection who are less knowing, and weaker, and have received being from their rulers, and are dependent, preserved, and maintained. Would not he therefore maintain moral government himself over mankind, who is their universal father, their universal preserver, who maintains all, and provides all with food and raiment, and all the necessaries and enjoyments of life, and is infinitely wiser and stronger than they? Would not he maintain a moral government over men, who need his government, as children need the government of their parents, and who are no more fit to be left to themselves in the world without his rules, directions, authority, promises, threatenings, and judgment, than children are fit to be left to themselves in a house? 6. As man is made capable of knowing his Creator, so he is capable of a high esteem of his perfections, his power, wisdom, and goodness. He is capable of a proper esteem of God for his wise, excellent, and wonderful works, which he beholds; and for their admirable contrivance, which appears in so excellently ordering all things; and of gratitude to him for all the goodness of which he himself is the subject: or, on the contrary, of slighting and despising him, and hating him, finding fault with his works, reproaching him for them, slighting all his goodness which he receives from him; yea, hating him or ordering things in his providence to him us he has done, and cursing and blaspheming him for it.

Now, it is unreasonable to suppose, that God should be an indifferent spectator of those things in his creature made in his own image, and made superior to all other creatures; and in a creature that he values above all the rest of the creation. It cannot be equally agreeable to him, whether man gives him proper esteem, love, honour, and gratitude; or, on the contrary, unreasonably despises, hates, and curses him. And if he be not an indifferent spectator of these things, then he will not act us a perfectly indifferent spectator, and wholly let men alone, and order things in no respect differently for those ends one way or other. But so it must be, of God maintains no moral government over mankind. 7. As man is made capable of knowing his Creator, so he is capable of knowing his will in many things, i.e. he is capable of knowing his ends in this and the other works which he beholds. For it is this way principally that he comes to know there is a God, even by seeing the final causes of things; by seeing that such and such things are plainly designed and contrived for such and such ends; and therefore he is capable of either complying with the will of his Creator, or opposing it. He is capable of falling in with God’s ends, and what he sees his Creator aim at, and cooperating with him, or of setting himself against the Creator’s designs. It is manifest, that it is the Creator’s design, that parents should nourish their children, and that children should be subject to their parents. If a man therefore should murder his children, or if children should rise up and murder their parents, they would oppose the Creator’s aims. So if men use the several bodily organs to quite contrary purposes to those for which they were given, and if they use the faculties of their own minds to ends quite contrary to those for which they were fitted, (for doubtless they were given and fitted for some end or other,) he may perversely use his dominion over the creatures against the ends to which they were given.

For, however far we suppose man may be from being capable of properly frustrating his Creator, yet he is capable of showing that his will is contrary to his Creator’s ends. He may oppose his Creator in his will he may dislike God’s ends, and seek others. Now, the Creator cannot be an indifferent spectator of this; for it is a contradiction to suppose, that opposition to his will and aims should be as agreeable to him in itself, as complying with his will. And if he is not an indifferent spectator, then he will not act as such, and so he must maintain a moral government over mankind. 8. This argument is peculiarly strong, as it respects man’s being capable of falling in with or opposing God’s ends in his own creation, and his endowing him with faculties above the rest of the world, It is exceeding manifest concerning mankind, that God must have made them for some end; not only as it is evident that God must have made the world in general for some end, and as man is an intelligent voluntary agent; but as it is especially manifest from fact, that God has made mankind for some special end. For it is apparent, in fact, that God has made the inferior parts of the world for some end, and that the special end he made them for, is to subserve the benefit of mankind. Therefore, above all, may it be argued, that God has made mankind for some end. If an artificer accomplishes some great piece of workmanship, very complicated, and with a vast variety of parts, but the whole is so contrived and connected together, that there is some particular part which-all the other parts are to subserve, we should well conclude that the workman had some special design to serve by that part, and that his peculiar aim in the whole, was what he intended should be obtained by that part. Now, man, the principal part of the creation, is capable of knowing his Creator, and is capable of discerning God’s ends in the formation of other things; therefore, doubtless, since God discovers to him the ends for which he has made other things, it would be very strange if he should not let him know the end for which he himself is made, or for which he had such distinguishing faculties given him, whereby he is set above other parts of the creation. Therefore, in the use of his own faculties, he must either fall in with the known design of the Creator in giving them, or thwart it. He must either co-operate with his Creator, as complying with the end of his own being, or wittingly set himself as his enemy, Of this the Creator cannot be an indifferent spectator; and therefore, by what was said before, must maintain moral government over mankind. 9. It may be argued, that God maintains a moral government over the world of mankind, from this, that the special end of the being of man is something wherein he has to do with his Creator. The special end of the brute creation is something wherein they are concerned with men. But man’s special end is some improvement or use of his faculties towards God. For the special end for which God made mankind, is something very diverse and very superior to those ends for which he made any part of the inferior creation; because God has made man very different from them. But man’s special end does not respect any other parts of the visible creation.

All these are below him, and all, as we observed before, are made for him, to be subservient to his use. Their special end respects him; but his special end does not respect them. For, this is unreasonable in itself: if they are in their formation and end subordinated to him, and subjected to him, then the Maker sets a greater value on him than them, and therefore he has not made him for them. For that would be to suppose them most valuable in the eves of their Maker, And it is manifest, in fact, that the being of mankind does not subserve the benefit of the inferior creatures, any farther than is just necessary to turn them to his own use, and s end them in it.

To this we may add, that the happiness of the greater part of mankind, in their worldly enjoyments, is not great enough, or durable enough, to prove that the end of all things in the whole visible universe is only that happiness. - Therefore, nothing else remains, no other supposition is possible, but that man’s special end is something wherein he has immediately to do with his Creator. 10. If God has made men above other creatures, with capacities superior to them, for some special end, for which other creatures are not made, that special end must be something peculiar to them, for which they are capacitated and fitted by those superior faculties: Now, the greatest thing that men are capacitated for, by their faculties, more than the beasts, is, that they are capable of having intercourse with their Creator, as intelligent and voluntary agents. They are capable of knowing, esteeming, and loving him, and capable of receiving instructions and commands from him, and capable of obeying and serving him, if he be pleased to give commands, and make a revelation of his mind. Surely this is not without some end. He that has done nothing in the inferior world in vain, has not given man this capacity in vain. The sun has not its light given it without a final cause; and shall we suppose, that mankind has this light of the knowledge of their Creator without a final cause?

Thus, it is evident, that the special end for which God has made man, is something wherein he has intercourse with his Creator, as an intelligent, voluntary agent. Hence, the consequence is certain, that mankind are subject to God’s moral government. For there can be no such thing maintained, as a communication between God and man, as between intelligent, voluntary agents, without moral government. For in maintaining communication or converse, one must yield to the other, must comply with the other; there must be union of wills; one must be clothed with authority, the other with submission. If God has made man to converse with himself, he is not indifferent how he is conversed with. One manner of behaviour must be agreeable to his will, and another not; and therefore God cannot act as indifferent in this matter. He cannot let man alone, to behave toward him just as he pleases; therefore there must be moral government. God cannot be indifferent, whether he is respected and honoured, or is contemned and hated. 11. Now as the consequence of the whole, I would infer two things: 1. A future state of rewards and punishments. For, unless there be such a state, it will certainly follow, that God, in fact, maintains no moral government over the world of mankind. For, otherwise, it is apparent, that there is no such thing as rewarding or punishing mankind, according to any visible rule, or indeed, according to any order or method whatsoever. Without this, there may be desires manifested, but there can be no proper laws established, and no authority maintained.

Nothing is more manifest, than that in this world there is no such thing as a regular, equal disposing of rewards and punishments of men according to their moral estate. There is nothing in God’s disposals toward men in this world, to make his distributive justice and judicial equity visible, but all things are in the greatest confusion. Often the wicked prosper, and are not in trouble as other men.- They become mighty in power; yea, it has commonly been so in all ages, that they have been uppermost in the world. They have the ascendant over the righteous. They are mounted on thrones; while the righteous remain in cottages. And, in this world, the cause of the just is not vindicated.- Many wicked men have the righteous in their power, and trample them under foot, and become their cruel persecutors: and the righteous are oppressed, and suffer all manner of injuries and cruelties; while the wicked live, and reign in great glory and prosperity. 2. What has been said, does invincibly argue a divine revelation.

Because, if God maintains a moral government over mankind, then there must be rewards and punishments. But these sanctions must be declared: for instance, the punishments which enforce God’s laws must be made known. To suppose that God keeps up an equal, perfect moral government over the world, and yet leaves men wholly at a loss about the nature, manner, degree, time, place, and continuance (if their punishment, or leaves it only to their guesses, or for them to argue it out from the nature of things, as well as they can, and every one to make his judgment according as his notions shall guide him, is a very unreasonable supposition. If moral government be maintained, the order and method of government must be visible; otherwise it loses the nature of moral government. There may be a powerful disposal, as inanimate, unintelligible things are the subjects of God’s government, in a visible and established order; but no moral government. The order of government serves to maintain authority, and to influence and rule the subject morally, no further than it is visible. The notion of a moral government, without a revelation or declaration of the mind of the head, by his word, or some voluntary sign or signification, in the whole of it is absurd. How absurd is it to suppose, that there should be converse and moral government maintained between the head and subjects, when both are intelligent, voluntary agents, without a voluntary communication of minds and expressions, thoughts and inclinations, between the head and the members of the society. 12. It need not be looked upon as any objection to men’s remaining in being after the death of their bodies, that the beasts that are made for man cease to be when they die. For it is manifest, in fact, that man is the end of the rest of the creatures in this lower world. This world, with all its parts, inanimate, vegetative, and sensitive, was made for an habitation for man during his present state: and if man be the end of the rest of the creatures, for which the rest were made, and to whose use they are subordinated, then man is ‘instar omnium’. The end of all is equivalent to the whole.

Therefore there is no need of any thing else to be preserved; nothing is lost; no part is in vain. If the end of all be preserved, all is preserved: because he is all, the rest is only for his occasional use. The beasts subserve man’s use in the present state: and then, though they cease, jet their end is obtained, and their good, which is their en, remains still in man. Though the tent that was set up for man to sojourn in during his state of probation, ceases when that occasion is over, surely that is no argument that the inhabitant ceases too.

And that the beasts are made for man, affords a good positive argument for a future state of man’s existence. For that all other creatures in this lower world are made for man, and that he himself should be made for no more than they, viz, a short continuance in this world to enjoy the things of it is unreasonable. 13. The natural world, which is in such continual labour, as is described in the first chapter of Ecclesiastes, constantly going round in such revolutions, will doubtless come to an end: these revolutions are not for nothing. There is some great event and issue of things, some grand period, aimed at. Does God make the world restless, to move and revolve in all its parts, to make no progress? to labour with motions so mighty and vast, only to come to the same place again? Some great end is nearer to an accomplishment, after a thousand revolutions are finished, than when there was only one finished. The waters of the sea are not so restless, continually to ascend into the heavens, and then descend on the earth, and then return to the sea again, only that things may be as they were before. One generation of men does not come, another go, and so continually from age to age, only that at last there may be what there was at first, viz, mankind upon earth. The wheels of God’s chariot, after they have gone round a thousand times, do not remain just in the same place that they were in at first, without having carried the chariot nearer to a journey’s end. 14. This is a confirmation of a future state. For, if these revolutions have not something in another state that is to succeed this, then they are in vain.

If any thing of this world is to remain, after its revolutions are at an end, doubtless it will be that part which is the head of all the rest; or that creature for which all the rest is made; and that is man. For, if he wholly ceases, and is extinct, it is as if the whole were totally extinct: because he is the end of all. He is that creature, to serve whom the labours and revolutions of this world are, and whom they affect; and therefore, if he does not remain after the revolutions have ceased, then no end is obtained by all these revolutions: because nothing abides as the fruit of them after they are finished. But all comes to no more than just what was before this world itself began, viz., an universal nonexistence; all is extinct; all is as if the world had never been; and therefore all has been in vain; for nothing remains as the fruit, He that is carried in the chariot, does not remain after he is brought with so much labour and vast ado to the end of his journey; but ceases to be, as the chariot itself does. 15. This confirms the divinity of the christian revelation; which gives this account of things, that this world is come to an end; it is to be dissolved; that the revolutions of the world have an appointed period; and that man, the end of this lower world, is to remain in being afterwards; and gives a rational account of the great period, design, and issue of all things, worthy of the infinite wisdom and majesty of God. 16. Some part of the world, in that which is the highest, the head, and the end of the rest, must be of eternal duration, even the intelligent, reasonable creatures. For, if these creatures, the head and end of all the rest of the creation, come to an end, and be annihilated, it is the same thing as if the whole were annihilated. And if the world be of a temporary duration, and then drops into nothing, it is in vain, i.e. no end is obtained worthy of God.

There is nobody but what will own, that if God had created the world, and then it had dropped into nothing the next minute, it would have been in vain; no end could be obtained worthy of God. And the only reason is, that the end would have been so small, by reason of the short continuance of the good obtained by it. And so it is still infinitely little, if it stand a million of ages, and then drops into nothing. That is as a moment in the sight of God. It is, in comparison of him, absolutely equivalent to nothing, and therefore an end not worthy of him. No end is worthy of an infinite God, but an infinite end; and therefore the good obtained must be of infinite duration. If it be not so, who shall fix the bounds? Who shall say a million of years is long enough? And if it be, who shall say a good of a thousand years’ continuance does not become the wisdom of God? And if it does, how can we say but that a good of still shorter continuance would not answer the ends of wisdom? If it would, who can say that the sovereignty of God shall not fix on a good of a minute’s continuance as sufficient; which is as great in comparison with him as a million of years? The only reason why a good of a minute’s continuance is not great enough to become the Creator of the world, is, that it is a good so little, when compared with him. And the same reason stands in equal force against a good of any limited duration whatsoever. 17. It is often declared in the Old Testament, that God will bring every work into judgment; that there is verily a God that judgeth in the earth; that his eves are on the way of man; that he considers all his goings: that the sins of the wicked, and the good deeds of the righteous, are exactly observed, and written in a book of remembrance, and none of them forgotten; that they are sealed and laid up among God’s treasures; and that he will render to every man according to his works: that the Judge of all the earth will do right; and that therefore God will not destroy the righteous with the wicked: that as to the righteous, it shall be well with him, for he shall eat the fruit of his doings; that as to the wicked, it shall be ill with him, for the reward of his hands shall be given him; that it is impossible it should be otherwise; that there is no darkness nor shadow of death, where the workers of iniquity can hide themselves from God the Judge; that God cannot forget his people; that a woman may sooner forget her sucking child; that God has graven them on the palms of his hands; that God beholds and takes notice of all their afflictions, and pities them, as a father pitieth his children; but that he is the enemy of wicked men; that their sins shall find them out; that though hand join in hand, the wicked shall not go unpunished; that the way of righteousness is a certain way to happiness, and the way of sin a sure way to misery. Solomon himself is more abundant than all other penmen of the Old Testament, in observing the difference between the righteous and the wicked in this respect, the greatness and the certainty of that difference. And, in Ecclesiastes 12:13,14. Solomon declares,” That to fear God and keep his commandments, is the whole duty of man: because God will bring every work into judgment, with every secret thing, whether it be good or whether it be evil.” And chap. 5:8.” If thou seest the oppression of the poor, and the violent perverting of judgment and justice in a province, marvel not at the matter; for he that is higher than the highest regardeth, and there be higher than they.” Chap. 8:11.” Because sentence against an evil work is not executed speedily, therefore the heart of the sons of men is fully set in them to do evil.” And therefore, there is some other time, beside the time of this life, for executing the sentence which he observes will so surely he executed. In Proverbs 10:7. Solomon says, the memory of the just is blessed, but the name of the wicked shall rot. And of this memory or good name of the just, he says, (Eccles.v 2:1.) that “ it is better than precious ointment, (meaning the precious ointment they were wont to anoint the children of great and rich men with, when first born,) and that, upon this account, the day of a godly man’s death (followed with a good name and so blessed a memory) is better than the day of one’s birth.” 18. If God has perfectly forgiven all the sins of the righteous, and they are so high in his favour; and if the great evidence of this favour be the durableness of the benefits that are the fruits of it, and the chief fruit of it is life; then it is at least to be expected, that they will escape that mortality which is such a remarkable disgrace to those that have the human nature, and so wonderful to behold in those whom the Most High has made to differ so much from the beasts in capacity, dignity, end, and design. We might surely expect, that these high favourites should, with regard to life and durableness of happiness, not be mere beasts, and have no preeminence above them; and that they should not be like the grass, and the flower of the field, which in the morning flourisheth and groweth up, but in the evening is cut down and withered; that all their happiness and all the benefits of God’s favour should not he like a shadow, like a dream, like a tale that is told; that it should not be as a span, and should not pass away as the swift ships, as the eagle that hasteth to the prey; to which things the life of man is compared in Scripture.

The things of this world are spoken of as having no profit or value, because they are not lasting, but must be left at death, and therefore are mere vanity, and not worthy that any maim should set his heart on them; Psalm 49:6, to the end; Proverbs 23:4,5. Proverbs 11:7. Ecclesiastes 2:15,16, 1- 7. chap. 3 ten first verses; verse 19. chap. 5:14, 15, 16. But the rewards of righteousness are abundantly represented as exceedingly valuable and worthy that men should set their hearts upon them, because they are lasting; Proverbs 3:16. 8:18. and 10:25, 27. Isaiah 55:3. Psalm 1:3, to the end; Isaiah 17:7, 8- and innumerable other places. How can these things consist one with another, unless there be a future state?

It is spoken of as a remarkable thing, and what one would not expect, that good men should die as wicked men do, as it seems to be, by good men’s dying a temporal death as wicked men do; Ecclesiastes 2:16. chap. 9:3, 4, 5. And therefore, it may he argued, that it does but seem to be so; but that in reality it shall not be so, inasmuch as, though good men die a temporal death as wicked men do, yet, as to their happiness, they die not, but live for ever in a future state. It is an evidence of a future state, that in the Old Testament so many promises are made to the godly, of things that shall be after they are dead, which shall be testimonies of God’s great favour to them, and blessed rewards of his favour; so many promises concerning their name, and concerning their posterity, and the future church of God in the world; and yet that we are so much taught in the Old Testament that men are never the better for what comes to pass after they are dead, concerning these things (i.e. if we look only at the present life, without taking any other state of existence into consideration,) Job 14:21.

Ecclesiastes 1:2, 3:22. and 9:5, 6. Yea, the wise man says expressly, that the dead have no more a reward, (Ecclesiastes 9:5.) i.e. in any thing in this world-That man shall die as a beast, seems to he spoken of, Ecclesiastes 3:16, to the end; as a vanity, an evil, a kind of mischief and confusion, that appears in the world. Therefore this is an argument, that God, the wise orderer of all things, who brings order out of confusion, will rectify this disorder by appointing a future state. 19. It is an argument that the Old Testament affords for the proof (if a future life and immortality, that we are there taught, that mortality is brought in by sin, and comes as a punishment of sin. Therefore, it is natural to suppose, that when complete forgiveness is promised, and perfect restoration to favour, and deliverance from death, and the bestowment of life, as the fruit of this favour, eternal life and immortality is intended-The better men are, the more terrible would it make death, if there were no future state. For the better they are, the more they love God. Good men have found the fountain of good. Those men who have a high degree of love to God, greatly delight in God. They have experience of a much better happiness in life than others; and therefore it must be more dreadful for them to have their beings eternally extinct by death. Hence we may strongly argue a future state: for it is not to be supposed, that God would make man such a creature as to be capable of looking forward beyond death, and capable of knowing and loving him, and delighting in him as the fountain of all good, which will necessarily increase in him a dread of annihilation, and an eager desire of immortality; and yet so order it, that such desire should he disappointed; so that his loving his Creator, should in some sense make him the more miserable. 20. Nothing is more manifest, than that it is absolutely necessary, iii order to a man’s being thoroughly, universally, and stedfastly virtuous, that his mind and heart should be thoroughly weaned from this world; which is a great evidence, that God intends another world for virtuous men. He surely would not require them, in their thoughts, affections, and expectations, wholly to relinquish this world, if it were all the world they were to expect: if he had made them for this world wholly and only, and had created the world for them, to be their only country and home, all the resting-place ever designed for them.- If all the creatures God has made are to come to and end, and the world itself is to come to an end, and so to be as though it had never been, then it will be with all God’s glorious and magnificent works, agreeably to what is said of the temporal of the wicked, Job 20:6,7,8. “Though its excellency be never so great, yet it shall perish for ever; in shall all fly away as a dream; it shall be chased away as a vision of the night.” It shall vanish totally, and absolutely he as though it had not been.

CHAPTER - CONCERNING THE ENDLESS PUNISHMENT OF THOSE WHO DIE IMPENITENT. 1. The word everlasting is used in the very sentence of the Judge at the last day, whom we cannot suppose to use rhetorical tropes and figures. The wicked that are finally impenitent, are represented as wholly cast away, lost, made no account of, etc. which is quite inconsistent with their punishment being medicinal, and for their good and purification, and to fit them for final and eternal happiness. — Eternal punishment is not eternal annihilation. Surely they will not he raised to life at the last day only to lie annihilated. “The words used to signify the duration of the punishment of the wicked, do, in their etymology, truly signify a proper eternity; and if they are sometimes used in a less strict sense, when the nature of the thing requires it, yet that can never pass as any reason why they are not tn be understood absolutely, when the subject is capable of it. They are terms the most expressive of an endless duration, of any that can be used or imagined. And they always signify so far positively endless, as to be express against any other period or conclusion, than what arises from the nature of the thing. They are never used in Scripture in any other limited sense, than to exclude all positive abolition, annihilation, or conclusion, other than what the natural intent or constitution of the subject spoken of must necessarily admit. The word which is the word generally used by the sacred writers, is, we know, derived from the adverb ..., which signifies for ever, and cannot without force be used in any lower sense. And, particularly, this is the word by which the eternal and immutable attributes of Deity are several times expressed.” Dodwell’s Sermoms in answer to Whiston, p. 15, 16. 2. If the torments of hell are purifying pains, that purge the damned from their sins, it must be by bringing them to repentance, convincing them of the evil of sin, and inducing them to forsake it, and with a sincere heart to turn from sin to God, and heartily to choose virtue and holiness, There is no other way for sinners being purged as moral agents; and, if hell fire is the means of any other purification, it cannot be a moral purification.

If the wicked in hell are the subjects of torments, in order to their purification, and so being fitted for, and finally brought to, eternal happiness; then they are the subjects of a dispensation, that is truly a dispensation of love, and of divine and infinite goodness and benevolence, towards them.-And if the design of the pains of hell be that of kind and benevolent chastisement, to bring sinners to repentance, and compliance with the divine will; then we cannot suppose that they will be continued after the sinner has repented, and is actually brought to yield and comply.

For that would be to continue them for no purpose; to go on using means and endeavours to obtain the end, when the end is accomplished, and the thing aimed at is fully obtained already.-Moreover, if the damned, after many ages suffering extreme torment in hell, are to be delivered, and made perfectly and eternally happy, then they must be in a state of probation during this long season of their confinement to such extreme misery. If they are not in a state of probation, or on any trial how they will behave themselves under these severe and terrible inflictions of wrath, but are to be delivered, and made eternally happy at the end of a certain period; then what restraints are they under from giving an unbounded loose and license to their wickedness, in expressions of enmity against God, in cursing and blaspheming, and whatever their hearts are inclined to? And if they are in such a state as this, wherein they are thus left to unrestrained wickedness, and every curb to their most wicked inclination is taken off, being nevertheless sure of deliverance and everlasting happiness; how far is this state fit to be a state of purgation of rational creatures and moral agents from sin, being a state wherein they are so far from means of repentance, reformation, and entirely reclaiming and purging them from sin, that all manner of means are rather removed; and so much is every restraint taken off, that they are given up wholly to sin, which, instead of purifying them, will tend above all things that can be conceived, to harden them in sin, and desperately establish the habits of it? 3. A state of purgation of moral agents, that is, a state to ‘bring sinners to repentance and reformation, and not a state of trial, is a gross absurdity. If any should say, that, “ though we should maintain- that the pains of hell are purifying pains, to bring sinners to repentance, in order to their deliverance and eternal happiness; yet there will be no necessity of sup posing, either that they may sin with impunity, and so without restraint; or that they are properly in a state of probation: for they have no probation whether they shall finally have eternal happiness, because it is absolutely determined by the benevolent Creator, concerning his intelligent creatures, that they shall finally be brought to a state of happiness: but yet their circumstances may be such as may tend greatly to restrain their wickedness, because that the time of their torment shall be longer or shorter, according as they behave themselves under their chastisements more or less perversely; or that their torment shall be raised to a greater height, and additions be made in proportion to the wickedness they commit in their purgatory flames.” To this I Answer:

Even on this supposition they are in a state of probation for a more speedy possession of eternal life and happiness, and deliverance from further misery and punishment; this makes their state as much a state of probation, as their state in the present life. For here it is supposed by these men, that sinners are not in a state of trial, whether ever they shall obtain eternal happiness or no; because that is absolutely determined, and the determination known or knowable concerning all without any trial. But only it is a state of trial whether they shall obtain eternal life so soon as at the end of their lives, or at the day of judgment. Neither have they any trial during this life, whether they shall escape all affliction and chastisement for sin or not; but whether they shall be relieved from a state of suffering so soon, and shall escape those severer and longer chastisements that, with respect to many, are to come afterwards.

And on the supposition of the objection, there must be the proper circumstances of a state of probation in hell, as well as on earth. There they must likewise be continued in that state of free agency, that renders them properly the subjects of judgment and retribution. For the supposition of the objection, they shall be punished for their wickedness in hell, by an addition to their misery proportioned to their sin; and they shall be the subjects of God’s merciful strivings, endeavours, and means to bring them to repentance, as well as here. And there must be a divine judgment after the trial, to determine their retribution, as much as after this life, And the same, or like things, must be determined by the Supreme Judge, as will be determined at the day of judgment. At that great day, on the supposition of such as I oppose, What will be determined concerning the impenitent? not what their eternal state shall be, but only whether they shall have eternal happiness immediately; whether they have repented, and are qualified for immediate admission to heavenly glory; or, whether the bestowment of it shall be delayed, and further chastisements made use of, and so it must be again after their castigatory purifying pains. At the end of all, there must be a judgment, whether now they truly repent, and so have performed the condition of deliverance, and immediate admission to the state of the blessed, or whether there shall be a further season of misery; which brings it in all respects to be a proper judgment, as much as that at the general resurrection; and the preceding time of the use of means and God’s striving with them to bring them to repentance, is as much a proper time of trial in order to judgment, as the time of this life. 4. But if the damned are in a state of trial, let it be considered how unreasonable this is. If they are in a state of trial, then they must be in a state of liberty and moral agency, as those men will doubtless own; and so, according to their notion of liberty, must be under no necessity of continuing in their rebellion and wickedness, but may cast away their abominations, and turn to God and their duty, in a thorough subjection to his will, very speedily. And then, seeing the end of their probationary state, and the severe means God uses with them to bring them to repentance, is obtained; how unreasonable will it be to sup pose, that God, after this, would continue them still under hell torments for a long succession of ages? But if God should speedily deliver them on their speedy repentance, how are the threatenings and predictions of their everlasting punishment fulfilled in any sense, according to the sense even of those who deny the absolute eternity of the misery of hell, and hold, that the words everlasting and for ever, etc. when applied to the misery of the damned; are not to be taken in the strictest sense? They yet allow they signify a very long time, a great many ages. 5. If the devils and damned spirits are in a state of probation, and have liberty of will, and are under the last and most extreme means to bring them to repentance, and consequently the greatest means, having the strongest tendency of all to be effectual, I say, if thus, then is it possible that the greatest part, if not all, of them may be reclaimed by those extreme means, and may be brought to thorough repentance before the day of judgment; yea, it is possible, it might be very soon. And, if so, how could it certainly be predicted concerning the devil, that he would do such and such great things in opposition to Christ and his church, from age to age? and that at last he should be judged and punished, and have God’s wrath more terribly executed upon him? as, “And the devil that deceived them, was cast into the lake of fire and brimstone, where the beast and false prophet are, and shall be tormented day and night, for ever and ever.” (Revelation 20:10.)

And how is it said in Scripture, that when he fell, he was cast down from heaven, and reserved under chains of darkness unto judgment? The expression seems naturally to signify strong and irrefragable bonds, which admit of no comfort or hope of escape. And besides, a being reserved in chains unto judgment, is not consistent with the appointment of another time of trial and opportunity to escape the judgment and condemnation, It is said, Jude 6. “They are reserved in everlasting chains under darkness unto the judgment of the great day.” And if any of the separate souls of the wicked, that are in the case that the soul of the rich man was in, when he died and lift up his eves in hell being in torments, should repent and be delivered before the day of judgment, and so should appear at the right hand among the righteous at that day, then how could that be verified, “For we must all stand before the judgment-seat of Christ, that every one may receive the things done in his body, whether good or bad?”( 2 Corinthians 5:10.)

And we have reason to think, that the time of standing before the judgment-seat of Christ, which the apostle has a special respect to, is the day of judgment, if we compare thus with other scriptures; as that of the same apostle, Acts 17:31. “He hath appointed a day in which he will judge the world in righteousness, by that man whom he hath ordained.” And many other places. 6. And how does their being in a state of trial, many of them for so many ages after death before the day of judgment, during all which time they have opportunity to repent, consist with those words of Christ, Mark 8:38. “Whosoever therefore shall be ashamed of me and my words in this adulterous and sinful generation, of him also shall the Son of man be ashamed, when he cometh in the glory of his Father, with the holy angels?”

How is their continuing in a state of trial from the time of that generation, and from the end of their lives to the day of judgment, consistent with its being declared to them from God beforehand, that they shall certainly be condemned at the day of judgment? or, with Christ’s certifying them beforehand, that whatever trial they shall have, whatever opportunity God should give them for repentance and pardon, for so many ages, all would be in vain; which in effect is passing the sentence. We may argue in like manner, from those words, Matthew 10:14,15. “And whosoever shall not receive you, and hear your words,-verily I say unto you, It shall be more tolerable for the land of Sodom and Gomorrha in the day of judgment, than for that city.” So Matthew 11:2 1-24. “Woe unto thee, Chorazin, woe unto thee, Bethsaida: — I say unto you, It shall be more tolerable for Tyre and Sidon in the day of judgment, than for you. — And thou, Capernaum, which art exalted to heaven, shalt be brought down to hell. I say unto you, It shall be more tolerable for the land of Sodom in the day of judgment, than for thee.”

It is here declared, what the state of those obstinate unbelievers should he at the day of judgment for their wickedness here in the body, with an asseveration, I say unto you. And sentence indeed is passed beforehand upon them by their Judge, concerning the punishment that shall be executed upon them at the day of judgment. The declaration is made in the form of a solemn denunciation or sentence: Woe unto thee, Chorazin, woe unto thee, Bethsaida, etc. And is it reasonable to suppose, that the very Judge that is to judge them at the end of the world, would peremptorily declare, that they should not escape punishment at the day of judgment; yea, solemnly denounce sentence upon them, dooming them to the distinguished punishment they should then suffer for their obstinacy in their lifetime; and yet appoint another time of trial, of a great many hundred years between their death and the day of judgment, wherein they should have opportunity to escape that punishment? 7. It is here also to be observed, that the wicked inhabitants of Sodom and Gomorrha should be condemned to misery at the day of judgment, though they had already been in their purifying flames, and in a state of probation.

The apostle (Romans 2:16.) repeatedly tells us, when these things shall be, that men shall thus receive their retribution; “In the day when God shall judge the secrets of men according to my gospel;” which shows that this life is the only state of trial, and that all men shall be judged at the end of the world according to their behaviour in this life, and not according to their behaviour in another state of trial, between this life and that day. So it is apparent, by 2 Thessalonians 1:5-9. “Which is a manifest token of the righteous judgment of God-seeing it is a righteous thing with God to recompense tribulation to them that trouble you, When the Lord Jesus shall be revealed from heaven with his mighty angels, in flaming fire, taking vengeance on them that know not God, and obey not the gospel of Jesus Christ; who shall he punished with everlasting destruction,” etc. Here it is manifest, that all who are obstinate unbelievers, rejecters of the gospel, shall at the day of judgment be punished with everlasting destruction. So that no room is left for a state of trial, and a space to repent before that time for ages in hell. So it is apparent, Matthew 25:that none will be found at the right hand, but they that have done such good works, as can be done only in this world; which would not be declared beforehand, if there was an opportunity given for millions of others to obtain that privilege. 8. It may be proved, that the day of man’s trial, and the time of God’s striving in the use of means to bring him to repentance, and waiting for his repentance under the use of means, will not be continued after this life, from those words, (Sen. 6:6. “My Spirit shall not always strive with man, for that he also is flesh; yet his days shall be 120 years.” It is as much as to say, that it is not fit that this day of trial and opportunity should last always to obstinate, perverse sinners, It is fit some bounds should be set to my striving and waiting on such as abuse the day of my patience; and that merciful means and gracious calls should not be continued, without limits, to them that trample all means and mercies under-foot, and turn a deaf ear to all calls and invitations, and treat them with constant contempt.

Therefore I will fix a certain limit; I will set their bounds to 120 years; when, if they repent not, I will put an end to all their lives, and with their lives shall be an end of my striving and waiting. This, which in Genesis is called God’s Spirit striving, is by the apostle Peter expressed by the waiting long-suffering of God; 1 Peter 3:20. But, according to the doctrine we are opposing, instead of God’s striving and using means to bring those wicked men to repentance, and waiting in the use of striving and endeavours years, or to the end of their lives, and no longer; he has gone on still since that, for above 4000 years, striving with them in the use of more powerful means to bring them to repentance, and waiting on them, and will continue to do so for so long a time afterwards, that the time is often called everlasting, and represented as enduring for ever and ever. 9. Those words of Christ, “I must work the works of him that sent me while it is day, the night cometh wherein no man can work,” John 9:4. prove that there is no other day of trial after this life. Christ having - undertaken for us, and taken on him our nature, and appearing in the form of a servant, and standing as our surety and representative, had a great work appointed him of God to do in this life for eternity. He could not obtain eternal life and happiness for himself any other way, than by doing that work in this life, which was the time of his probation for eternity, as well as ours. And therefore his words imply as much as if he had said, I must do that work which God has appointed me to do for eternity, that great service which must be done, as I would be eternally happy, now while the day of life lasts, which is the only day appointed for the trial of man’s faithfulness in the service of God, in order to his being accepted to eternal rewards. Death is coming, which will be the setting of the sun, and the end of this day; after which no work will remain, nothing to be done that will be of any significance in order to the obtaining of the recompense of eternal felicity. 10. And doubtless to the same purpose is that in Ecclesiastes “Whatsoever thy hand findeth to do, do it with thy might for there is no work,” (or no man can work,) “nor device, nor knowledge, nor wisdom in the grave, whither thou goest.” As much as to say, after this life, nothing can be done, nothing invented or devised, in order to your happiness; no wisdom or art will serve you to any such purpose, if you neglect the time of the present life, It is unreasonable to suppose the wise man means only that we should in this life do all that we can in temporal concerns, and to promote our temporal interest, and that nothing can be done towards this after this life: not only as this would be an observation of very little importance, it being as flat and impertinent as if he had said, whatever your hand finds to do this year, do it with your might; for nothing that you do or devise the next year, will signify any thing to promote your interest and happiness this year: but also because the wise man himself, in the conclusion of this book, informs us, that his drift through the whole book is, to induce us to do a spiritual work; to fear God and keep his commandments, in order, not to happiness in this life, (which he tells us throughout the book is never to be expected,) but in order to a future happiness and retribution in consequence of a judgment to come; chap. 12:13, 14. “Let us hear the conclusion of the whole matter; Fear God, and keep his commandments:

For this is the whole” (i.e. the whole business, the whole concern)” of man.

For God will bring every work into judgment, whether it be good, or whether it be evil.” 11. If the wicked in hell are in a state of trial, under severe chastisement, as means in order to their repentance and obtaining the benefit of God’s favour in eternal rewards, then they are in a state of such freedom as makes them moral agents, and the proper subjects of judgment and retribution.

Then those terrible chastisements are made use of as the most powerful means of all, more efficacious than all the means used in this life which prove ineffectual, and which proving insufficient to overcome sinners’ obstinacy, and prevail with their hard hearts, God is compelled to relinquish them all, and have recourse to those torments as the last means, the most effectual and powerful. If the torments of hell are to last ages of ages, then it must be because sinners in hell all this while are obstinate; and though they are free agents as to this matter, yet they wilfully and perversely refuse, even under such great means, to repent, forsake their sins, and turn to God. It must be further supposed, that all this while they have the offers of immediate mercy and deliverance made to them, if they will comply. Now, if this be the case, and they shall go on in such wickedness, and continue in such extreme obstinacy and pertinaciousness, for so many ages, (as is supposed, by its being thought their torments shall be so long continued,) how desperately will their guilt be increased! How many thousand times more guilty at the end of the term, than at the beginning! And therefore they will be much the more proper objects of divine severity, deserving God’s wrath, and still a thousand times more severe or longer continued chastisements than the past; and therefore it is not reasonable to suppose, that all the damned should be delivered from misery, and received to God’s favour, and made the subjects of eternal salvation and glory at that time, when they are many thousand times more unworthy of it, more deserving of continuance in misery, than when they were first cast into hell. It is not likely that the infinitely wise God should so order the matter. And if their misery should be augmented, and still lengthened out much longer, to atone for their new contracted guilt; they must be supposed to continue impatient, till that second additional time of torment is ended at the end of which their guilt will still be risen higher and vastly increased beyond what it was before. And, at this rate, where can there be any - place for an end of their misery? 12. It further appears from what was observed above, that the sinner continuing obstinate in wickedness under such powerful means to reclaim him, for so long a time, will be so far from being more and more purged, or brought nearer to repentance, that he will be farther from it. Wickedness in his heart will be vastly established and increased. For, it may be laid down as aim axiom, that the longer men continue wilfully in wickedness, the more is the habit of sin established, and the more and more will the heart be hardened in it. Again, it may be laid down as another axiom, that the greater and more powerful the means are, that are used to bring men to reform and repent, which they resist, and are obstinate under, the more desperately are men hardened in sin, and the more the principle of it in the heart is confirmed. It may be laid down as a third axiom, that long continuance in perverse and obstinate rebellion against any particular kind of means, tends to render those particular means vain, ineffectual, and hopeless.

After the damned in hell have stood it out with such prodigious perverseness and stoutness, for ages of ages, in their rebellion and enmity against God, refusing to bow to his will under such constant, severe, mighty chastisements, attended all the while with offers of mercy, what a desperate degree of hardness of heart and fixed strength of habitual wickedness will they have contracted at last, and inconceivably farther will they be from a penitent, humble, and pure heart, than when first cast into hell I And if the torments should be lengthened out still longer, and also their impenitence, (as by the- supposition one will not end before the other does,) still the farther will the heart be from being purified. And so, at this rate, the torments will never at all answer their end, and must be lengthened out to all eternity. 13. Matthew 5:25,26. “Agree with thine adversary quickly, while thou art in the way with him; lest at any time the adversary deliver thee to the judge, and the judge deliver thee to the officer, and thou be cast into prison. Verily I say unto thee, Thou shalt not come out thence, till thou hast paid the uttermost farthing.” These words imply, that sinners are in the way with their adversary, having opportunity to be reconciled to him but for a short season, inasmuch as it is intimated, that they must agree with him quickly, or they shall cease to be in the way with him, or to have opportunity to obtain his favour any more. But, if they shall be continued in a state of probation after death to the end of the world, and after that for ages, how far, how very far, are these words of Christ from representing the matter as it is? 14. That some even in this world are utterly forsaken of God, and given up to their own hearts’ lusts, proves that these men never will be purified from their sins. That God should, in the future world, use great means to purify them, and fit them for eternal happiness and glory, in the enjoyment of himself, is not consistent with the supposition, that, after the use of great means and endeavours with them in this world, hue gives them up to sin, because of their incorrigibleness and perverse obstinate continuance in rebellion, under the use of those great means, and so leaves them to be desperately hardened in sin, and to goon and increase their guilt, and multiply transgressions to their utter ruin; which is agreeable to manifold representations of Scripture, This is not agreeable to the scheme of such as suppose, that God is all the while, before and after death, prosecuting the design of purifying and preparing them for eternal glory. Consider Psalm 92:7. “When the wicked spring as grass, and when all the workers of iniquity do flourish, it is that they shall be destroyed for ever.”

These places show, God has no merciful design with those whom he gives up to sun. 15. The apostle, in Hebrews 6:4-6. says, “It is impossible for those who were once enlightened, and have tasted of the heavenly gift, etc. if they fall away, to renew them again unto repentance, seeing they crucify to themselves the Son of God afresh, and put him to an, open shame,” etc.

The apostle speaks of their renovation to repentance, as never likely to ha pp en; for this reason, that they have proved irreclaimable under such great means to bring them to repentance, and have thereby so desperately hardened their hearts, and contracted such great guilt by sinning against such great light, and trampling on such great privileges. But if so, how much more unlikely still will it be, that they should ever be renewed to repentance, after they have gone on still more and more to harden their hearts by an obstinate, wilful continuance in sin, many thousand years longer, under much greater means; and have therefore done immensely more to establish the habit of sin, and increase the hardness of their hearts; and after their guilt is so vastly in- creased instead of being diminished! If it be impossible to bring them to repentance, after they have rebelled against such light and knowledge of Christ, and the things of another world, as they had in this life; how much more impossible is it, when added to this, they have had that infinitely greater and clearer knowledge and view of those things to be manifested at the day of judgment! Then they shall see Christ in the glory of his Father with all his holy angels; shall see his great majesty, and know the truth of his promises and threatenings, by sight and experience; and shall see all those ineffable manifestations of the glory of Christ, of his power, omniscience, strict inflexible justice, infinite holiness and purity, truth and faithfulness, and his infinite mercy to penitents. They shall then see the dreadful consequences of rebellion and wickedness, and the infinitely happy and glorious consequences of the contrary; and, even at this time, (on the supposition,) have the offers of mercy and deliverance from that dreadful misery, and the enjoyment of the favour of their great Judge, and participation of all the happiness and glory of the righteous which they shall see at his right hand, if then they will throw down the weapons of their rebellion, and repent, and comply with his will. But if they still, from the greatness of their enmity and perverseness, obstinately and wilfully refuse, yea, and continue still thus refusing, even after they have actually felt the terrible wrath of God, and are cast into the lake of fire; yea, after they have continued there many ages, all the while under offers of mercy on repentance; I say, if it be impossible to renew them to repentance, after their rebelling against and trampling on the light and knowledge, and means used with them in this world, so that it is not to be expected, because of the degree of hardness and guilt contracted by it; how much less is it to be expected at the day of judgment, after all this obstinacy manifested, and guilt contracted? If guilt be contracted by despising such means and advantages as the apostle has respect to in this life, that it may be compared to guilt that would be contracted by crucifying Christ afresh; how much more, when added to this, they shall so openly have despised Christ, when appearing to them in all the terrors, and glories, and love that shall be manifested at the day of judgment, in their immediate and most clear view, and all is offered to them, if they will but yield subjection to him; and their enmity shall have appeared so desperate as rather to choose that dreadful lake of fire, and shall have continued in their choice even after they have felt the severity of that torment without rest day or night for many ages? 16. That all shall not be finally purified and saved, manifest from Matthew 12:31,32. “ Wherefore I say unto you, All manner of sin and blasphemy shall be forgiven unto men; but the blasphemy against the Holy Ghost shall not be forgiven unto men. And whosoever speaketh a word against the Son of man, it shall be forgiven him; but whosoever speaketh against the Holy Ghost, it shall not be forgiven him, neither in this world, neither in the world to come.”-Also, Mark 3:28,29. “Verily I say unto you, All sins shall be forgiven unto the sons of men, and all blasphemies where with soever they shall blaspheme; but he that shall blaspheme against the Holy Ghost, hath never forgiveness, but is in danger of eternal damnation.” — And John 5:16. “If any man see his brother sin a sin which is not unto death, he shall ask, and he shall give him life for them that sin not unto death. There is a sin unto death; I do not say he shall pray for it.” From each of these places it is manifest, that he that is guilty of blasphemy against the Holy Ghost, shall surely be damned, without any deliverance from his punishment, or end to it. The various expressions that are used, serve much to certify and fix the import of others. In Matthew 12:31. it is said, “The blasphemy against the Holy Ghost shall not be forgiven unto men.” The negative is general, and equally respects all times. If this sin should be forgiven at a remote time, it would be as contrary to such a negative, as if it were forgiven immediately. But, to determine us that Christ has respect to all times, even the remotest, and that he means to deny that he shall be forgiven at any time whatsoever, in Mark it is said, “He shall never be forgiven; or, hath never forgiveness;” and, lest this never should be interpreted to mean, never as long as he lives, or never in this world, it is said in Matthew 12:32. “It shall not be forgiven him, neither in this world, nor in the world to come.”

And lest it should be said, that, although he never is forgiven, yet that does not hinder but that there may be an end to his punishment; because he may suffer all he deserves in suffering a temporal punishment, or punishment of a limited, long duration; and he that is acquitted in paying all his debt, is not said to be forgiven his debt: another expression is used in Mark, which shows that he shall ever suffer damnation, and never have deliverance from his misery, whether by forgiveness or without it. — “Hath never forgiveness, but is in danger of eternal damnation.” And the forementioned expressions, “He shall never be forgiven;” “He hath never forgiveness;” “shall not be forgiven in this world, nor the world to come,” show the meaning of the word eternal here, to be such as absolutely excludes any period, any time of favour, wherein condemnation and punishment shall have ceased. And what the apostle John says of those who commit the unpardonable sin, confirms the whole, and proves that he that has committed this sin remains under no dispensation of mercy, and that no favour is ever to be hoped for from God; and therefore it is not our duty to pray for such favour. “There is a sin unto death, I do not say he shall pray for it;” or, I give you no direction to pray for them that sin this sin unto death. 17. Thus it is evident, that all wicked men will not have an end to their damnation; but when it is said, they are in danger of eternal or everlasting damnation, the word eternal is to be understood in the strictest sense. The same terms are used concerning all impenitent sinners, that they shall be sentenced to eternal punishment, and shall go into everlasting punishment, etc. — That their worm dieth not, and the fire is not quenched; and they shall be tormented for ever and ever; and such terms are used after this world comes to an end; and also when they who have committed the unpardonable sin, and others, shall be sentenced all together to an everlasting fire, in the same terms. It is unreasonable to suppose that the punishment of some will he everlasting, in an infinitely different sense from others jointly sentenced; and that the duration of the punishment of one shall be perfectly as nothing, compared with the duration of the punishment of the other, infinitely less than a second to a million of ages. And it is unreasonable to suppose such a difference, also on this account, that there cannot be such a difference in the demerit of them that commit the unpardonable sin, and the demerit of the sins of all other wicked men, some of whom are exceedingly, and almost inconceivably, wicked. There cannot be a truly infinite difference in their guilt, as there must be a properly infinite difference between the dreadfulness of those torments that have an end, however long continued, and however great, and the torments of a truly and strictly everlasting fire. 18. If the damned in hell shall all finally be saved, they shall be saved without Christ, it is manifest, that Christ’s saving work will be at an end at the day of judgment; for, as Christ has a twofold office, that of the Saviour of the world, and the Judge of the world; so, the business of the latter office properly succeeds the former. It is not fit, in the nature of things, that he should come into the world and appear openly in the character of universal Judge, to decide men’s state — in, consequence of the trial there has been for making their state better by salvation — till that trial is over, and all its effects completed, when no more is to be hoped as to altering their state for the better by his salvation. Therefore Christ, at his first coming, appeared in order to save men from condemnation and a sentence of eternal misery; and not to Judge them; as he tells us, “If any man hear my words and believe not, I judge him not: for I came, not to judge the world, but to save the world.”( John 12:47.)

See also chap. 3:17. and 8:15. But the great business he will come upon at his second coming, as is abundantly declared, is to judge the world. And it is also exceedingly plain, that Christ’s saving work will be at an end at the day of judgment; because we read, 2 Corinthians 15, that at the end of the world he will deliver up his kingdom; he will resign his commission: which proves, that the work of salvation, which is the design of it, will be at an end, when all his enemies, all that rejected him, and would not have him to rule over them, and so have failed of his salvation, shall be made his footstool, shall be condemned and destroyed. Instead of being the heirs of salvation, he shall come in flaming fire to take vengeance on them that know not God, and obey not the gospel of Jesus Christ, who shall be punished with everlasting destruction, etc. When he shall come to be glorified in his saints, and admired in all them that believe; 2 Thessalonians 1:8-10. 19. If the damned, after they have suffered awhile, are to be delivered, and to have eternal life; then the present dispensation of grace and life to the fallen children of men, that was introduced by Christ and his apostles, is not the last; but another is to be introduced after this has proved unprofitable and ineffectual. But, that a new dispensation of grace should thus be introduced, because that which was brought in by Christ and his apostles, proves weak and unprofitable through men’s corruption, and there appears to be need of one which shall be more effectual, is not agreeable to the Scripture. For this dispensation is spoken of as the last and most perfect, wherein perfection was reached, Hebrews 7:19. “For the law made nothing perfect, but the bringing in of a better hope did.” And chap. 11:40. “ God having provided some better thing for us, that they without us should not be made perfect.” The ancient dispensation is spoken of as that which God found fault with, in proving ineffectual through the corruption of men; and so he introduced a new administration, that should not be liable to exception, and therefore should not wax old, or be ever liable to vanish away and give place to another. Hebrews 8:6, to the end.

So he speaks of the things of that ancient dispensation, as things which were liable to be shaken and removed; but of the things of the new dispensation then introduced, as those that could not be shaken, but should remain for ever; Hebrews 12:25, to the end; and 2 Corinthians 3:11. The dispensation of the New Testament is often spoken of in the prophecies of the Old Testament as an everlasting dispensation; Jeremiah 31:31,32. chap. 32:40. Isaiah 61:8. Ezekiel 37:26. 20. To suppose that, after all the means of grace that are used in this world, Moses and the prophets, Christ and the gospel, the warnings of God’s word, and the exhibitions of glorious gospel grace, have been despised and obstinately withstood, so as to make the case desperate as to their success, God has other means in reserve, to be used afterwards to make men holy, that will be more powerful, and shall be effectual; is not agreeable to Scripture. Particularly, Luke 16:27, to the end: “Then he said, I pray thee therefore, father, that thou wouldst send him to my father’s house: for I have five brethren; that he may testify to them, lest they also come into this place of torment. Abraham saith unto him, They have Moses and the prophets, let them hear them. And he said, Nay, father Abraham, but if one went unto them from the dead, they will repent. And he said unto him, If they hear not Moses and the prophets, neither will they be persuaded though one rose from the dead.” And this is especially manifest, from Revelation 22:10-12. “And he saith unto me, Seal not the sayings of the prophecy of this book: for the time is at hand. He that is unjust, let him be unjust still; and he that is filthy, let him be filthy still. And behold I come quickly, and my reward is with me, to give every man according as his works shall be.”

I think the meaning must be either, The time is quickly coming, when every man’s state will be fixed, in as much as I am quickly coming to judgment, to fix every man’s state unalterably, according as his work shall be; and after that there will be no alteration, nor any means or endeavours in order to it; but he that is unjust, let him be unjust still; and he that is filthy, let him be filthy still: and if this be the meaning, it makes it evident, that Christ will not immediately proceed to the use of the most powerful and effectual means of all, to change the state of the unjust and filthy, to purify them and make them holy, and fit them for eternal glory, with infallible success-Or, the meaning must be this, which seems to be much the most probable:

Christ having given this last revelation to his church to be added to the book of Scripture, with which the canon was to be shut up and sealed, by the instrumentality of the apostle John, who lived the longest of the apostles, and wrote this book after all the rest were dead; orders John, ver. 10. to publish this book, wherein such great future judgments are revealed as coming on the wicked, and such an affecting declaration of the future glory of the saints, to enforce the rest of God’s word and means of grace; and then intimates, that no more revelations are to be expected, no more instructions and warnings are to be added to the word of God, as the steady means of grace, any further to confirm and enforce the rest; and the next revelation that is to be expected, and that Christ will make of himself to the world, is to he his immediate appearance in judgment, to fix unalterably every man’s state according to his works, according to the improvement he shall have made of those past revelations, instructions, and warnings: and therefore, those that will not be purified by those means, are not to expect that better or other means will ever be used with them; but he that is unjust must remain so still, and he that is filthy must be filthy still, and hue that is righteous shall be righteous still, and he that is holy shall be holy still. Thus Christ takes leave of his church till his last coming, warning them to improve the means of grace they have, and informing them that they are never to have any other: q. d . They have Moses and the prophets; and, in the writings o-f the New Testament, they have more glorious, powerful, and efficacious revelations of me. Those writings I now finish and seal. Let them hear these, and make a good improvement of them; for these are the last means I shall ever use to change man’s state. This is inconsistent with his reserving his greatest and most powerful means, with a determined certain success, to be used after the day of judgment. 21. They who suppose the damned are made to suffer the torments of hell for their purification, suppose, that God is herein prosecuting his grand design of benevolence to his creatures; yea, benevolence to the sufferers; and that he does not use these severe means but from necessity for their good, because all gentle remedies prove ineffectual. Now it is unreasonable to suppose that God is under any necessity of inflicting such extreme torments upon them for so long a time, in order to their being brought to repentance; and that, 1. If we consider the nature of things: torments inflicted have no tendency to bring a wicked man to repentance directly and properly, if by repentance we mean an alteration of the disposition, and appetites, and taste of the mind. We know by experience, that pain inflicted for gratifying an appetite, may make men a raid to gratify the appetite; but they do not change the inclination, or destroy the appetite. They may make men willing to comply with external exercises, of which they have a distaste, and to which their heart, in its relish and inclinations, is averse; yet not from love to the things complied with, but from hatred of pain, and love of ease. So that the man complies in some sense; but his heart does not comply. He is only driven, and as it were forced; and an increase of pain alters not the nature of things. It may make a man more earnestly to desire freedom from pain; but still there is no more to be expected from it, than is in the tendency of pain, which is not to give a new nature, a new heart, or a new natural relish and disposition. It is not granted, that even long continued pains and practice will gradually raise an habitual love to virtue. The pains of the damned being great and long continued, may more and more convince them of the folly of their negligence and fearlessness in sin, and may make them willing to take some pains, but will not show them the beauty of holiness, or the odiousness of sin, so as to cause them to hate sin on its own account.

Can any one that considers human nature, especially of those that deny an innate, desperate wickedness of heart, (as the men that we have this controversy with generally do,) doubt in the least, whether, if a man should be in a furnace of fire for one day only, alive and full of quick sense, and should retain a full and lively remembrance of his misery, it would not be sufficient to make him wholly comply with all the pains and outward selfdenial requisite in order to an universal, external obedience to the precepts of the word of God, rather than have those torments renewed and committed for ages; and indeed rather than endure one more such day?

What pains would not such a man be willing to suffer? What labours could be too much? What would he not be willing to part with, in foregoing worldly wealth or pleasures? Would not the most covetous man, that had felt such a rod as this, be willing to part with all his treasures of silver and gold? and the most ambitious man be willing to live in a cottage or wilderness? the most voluptuous man to part with his pleasures? Would he need first to endure many ages of such torment, before he would be willing thus far to comply? It is against all principles of human nature to suppose it If he retains the remembrance of the torment, in a lively idea of it, it must unspeakably outweigh the most lively and affecting and attractive ideas of the good things of the world. The supposition, therefore, of his not being brought to compliance by less torment, is as unreasonable as to suppose, that a mote of dust would sink the scale, being put in a balance with a talent of lead, or with ten thousand talents. If the Most High compassionate these poor wretches, and has nothing but a kind and gracious design of infinite mercy and bounty towards them, why does he take such dreadful measures with them? Will no other do? Cannot infinite wisdom find out some gentler method to bring to pass the same design? If it be said, that no other can accomplish the effect, consistently with the freedom of will;-I answer, What means can be devised, having a greater tendency to drive men, and compel them to comply with the thing required, (if there be any such thing,) without acting freely, and as persons left to their own free choice, than such a rod not only held over, but used upon them in such an amazing manner, by an omnipotent hand? 2. It is apparent, from what has often come to pass, that God is in no necessity of making use of such dreadful and long-continued torments, in order to bring sinners to repentance. It is most unreasonable to suppose, that no sinners that ever were converted in this world, were, before their conversion, as wicked and as hard-hearted as some of those that have died impenitent; as Saul the persecutor, afterwards the apostle Paul, and some of the converts, in the 2nd chapter of Acts, who had had a hand in Christ’s crucifixion, and innumerable instances of persecutors and others, who have been brought to repentance since those days. Such were converted by gentler means than those pains of hell, in what the Scripture calls everlasting burnings; and that without any infringement of liberty necessary to their being moral agents. It would be unreasonable to suppose, that all those eighteen, on whom the tower of Siloam fell, were good men. But Christ would not have his hearers imagine they were worse than themselves; and yet intimates, that there was a possibility of their escaping future misery by repentance. 3. So far as pain and affliction are made use of to bring men to repentance, it is apparent God can make infinitely less severe chastisement effectual, together with such influences and assistances of his Spirit, as are not inconsistent with the persons’ moral agency in their forsaking sin and turning to God. And, if it should be said, that none of them had the habits of sin so confirmed, as all such as die in sin; I would answer, That this is very unreasonably supposed: and if it should be allowed, yet it cannot be pretended, that the difference of guilt and hard-heartedness is proportionable at all to the severity of the chastisement used for purgation. If no more than ten degrees of pain, or one year’s chastisement, be requisite for the overcoming of five degrees of strength of the habit of sin, one would think, that less than 100,000 degrees, or 100,000 years chastisement, should be sufficient to overcome ten degrees of strength of the same habit. 22. If the torments of hell are purifying pains, and are used by a God of universal benevolence towards his creatures, as necessary means for the purgation of the wicked from sin, and their being fitted for, and finally brought to, eternal happiness in the enjoyment of the love of God; then it will follow, that the damned in hell are still the objects of God’s mercy and kindness, and that in the torments they suffer, they are the subjects of a dispensation of grace and benevolence. All is for their good; all is the best kindness that can be done them, the most benevolent treatment they are capable of, in their state of mind; and, in all, God is but chastising them as a wise and loving father, with a grieved and compassionate heart, gives necessary chastisement to sons whom he loves, and whose good he seeks to the utmost; in all he does he is only prosecuting a design of infinite kindness and favour. And indeed, some of the chief of those who are in the scheme of purifying pains, expressly maintain, that, instead of being the fruits of vindictive justice, they are the effects of God s benevolence, not only to the system of intelligent creatures in general, but to the sufferers themselves. Now, how far are these things from being agreeable to the representation which is made of things in the Holy Scriptures?

The Scriptures represent the damned as thrown away of God; as things that are good for nothing; and which God makes no account of; Matthew 13:48. As dross, and not gold and silver, or any valuable metal; Psalm 119:119. “Thou puttest away all the wicked of the earth as dross.” So Ezekiel 22:18. Jeremiah 6:28-30. as salt that has lost its savour; as good for nothing but to be cast out and trodden under foot of men; as stubble that is left, and as the chaff thrown out to be scattered by the wind, and go whither that shall happen to carry it, instead of being gathered and laid up as that which is of any value. Psalm 1:4. Job 21:18. and 35:5. as that which shall be thrown away as wholly worthless, as chaff, and stubble, and tares; all which are thrown away as not worthy of any care to save them; yea, are thrown into the fire, to be burnt up as mere nuisances, as fit for nothing but to be destroyed, and therefore are cast into the fire to be destroyed and done with. Matthew 3:12. and 12:30. Job 21:18. as barren trees, trees that are good for nothing; and not only so, but cumberers of the ground; and as such, shall be cut down and cast into the fire. Matthew 3:10. and 7:19.

Luke 13:7. as barren branches in a vine, that are cut off and castaway; as good for nothing, and gathered and burned. John 15:6. as thrown out and purged away as the filth of the world. Thus, it is said, Job 20:7. “That the wicked shall perish for ever, as his own dung.” They are spoken of as those that shall be spued out of God’s mouth; as thrown into the lake if fire; as the great sink of all the filth of the creation; Revelation 21:8.” But the fearful, and unbelieving, and the abominable, and murderers, and whoremongers, and sorcerers, and idolaters, and all liars, shall have their share in the lake that burns with fire and brimstone.” As briers and thorns, that are not only wholly worthless in a field, but hurtful and pernicious; and are nigh unto cursing, whose end is to be burned; Hebrews 6: i.e. the husband man throws them into the fire, and so has done with them for ever. He does not still take care of them, in order to make them fruitful and flourishing plants in his garden of delights. The wicked, it is said, shall be driven from light into darkness, and chased out of the world; Job 18:18.

Instead of being heated by God with benevolence, chastening them with the compassion and kindness of a father, for their great and everlasting good, they, at that day, when God shall gather his children together, to make them experience the blessed fruits of the love of a heavenly Father, shall be shut out as dogs; Revelation 21:7,8. with chap. 22:14, 15. And are represented as vessels to dishonour, vessels of wrath, fit for nothing else, but to contain wrath and misery. They are spoken of as those that perish and lose their souls; that are lost; (2 Corinthians 4:4.) Those that lose themselves and are cast away; those that are destroyed, consumed, etc.- which representations do not agree with such as are under a dispensation of kindness, and the means of a physician, in order to their eternal life, health, and happiness, though the means are severe. When God, of old, by his prophets, denounced his terrible judgments against Jerusalem and the people of Israel, against Moab, Tyre, Egypt, Assyria, etc. which judgments, though long continued, were not designed to be perpetual; there were mixed with those awful denunciations, or added to them, promises or intimations of future mercy. But, when the Scripture speaks of God’s dealings with ungodly men in another would, there are nothing but declarations and denunciations of wrath and misery, and no intimations of mercy; no gentle terms used, no significations of divine pity, no exhortations to humiliation under God’s awful hand, or calls to seek his face and favour, and turn and repent. The account that the Scripture gives of the treatment that wicked men shall meet with after this life, is very inconsistent with the notion of their being from necessity subjected to harsh means of cure, and severe chastisement, with a benevolent, gracious design of their everlasting good; particularly the manner in which Christ will treat them at the day of judgment. He will bid the wicked depart from him as cursed. 23. We have no account of any invitations to accept of mercy; any counsels to repent, that they may speedily be delivered from this misery, But it is represented that then they shall be made his footstool. He shall triumph over them. He will trample upon them as men are wont to tread grapes in a wine-press, when they trample with all their might, to that very end that they may effectually crush them in pieces. He will tread them in his anger, and trample them in his fury, and, as he says, their blood shall be sprinkled on his garments, and he will stain all his raiment, Isaiah 63 at the beginning; Revelation 14:19,20. and chap. 19:15. in which last place it is said~ he treadeth the wine-press of the fierceness and wrath of Almighty God.

These things do not savour of chastening with compassion and benevolence, and as still prosecuting a design of love toward them, that he may in the end actually be their Saviour, and the means of their eternal glory. There is nothing in the account of the day of judgment, that looks as though saints had any love or pity for the wicked, on account of the terrible long-continued torments which they must suffer. Nor indeed will the accounts that are given admit of supposing any such thing. We have an account of their judging them, and being with Christ in condemning them, concurring in the sentence, wherein he bids them begone from him as cursed with devils into eternal fire; but no account of their praying for them, nor of their exhorting them to consider and repent.

They shall not be grieved, but rather rejoice at the glorious manifestations of God’s justice, holiness, and majesty, in their dreadful perdition, and shall triumph with Christ; Revelation 18:20. and 19 at the beginning, They shall be made Christ’s footstool, and so they shall be the footstool of the saints.

Psalm 68:23. “That thy foot may be dipped in the blood of thine enemies, and the tongue of thy dogs in the same.” If the damned were the objects of divine benevolence, and designed by God for the enjoyment of his eternal love, doubtless it would be required of all God’s children to love them, and to pity them, and pray for them, and seek their good; as here in this world it is required of them to love their enemies, to be kind to the evil and unjust; and to-pity and pray for the vilest of men, that were their own persecutors, because they ate the subjects of God’s mercy in many respects, and are fit objects of infinite divine mercy and love. If Christ, the head of all the church, pities the damned and seeks their good, doubtless his members ought to do so too. If the saints in heaven ought to pity the damned, as well as the saints on earth are obligated to pity the wicked that dwell here; doubtless their pity ought to be in some proportion to the greatness of the calamities of the objects of it, and the greatness of the number of those they see in misery. But if they had pity and sympathizing grief in such measure as this, for so many ages, what an alloy would it be to their happiness I God is represented as whetting his glittering sword, bending his bow, and making ready his arrows on the string against wicked men, and lifting his hand to heaven, and swearing, that he will render vengeance to his enemies, and reward them that hate him, and make his arrows drunk with their blood, and that his sword shall devour their flesh.

Deuteronomy 32:40,41,42. and Psalm 7:11,12,13. Certainly this is the language and conduct of an enemy, not of a friend, or of a compassionate chastising father. 24. The degree of misery and torment that shall be inflicted, is an evidence that God is not acting the part of benevolence and compassion, and only chastening from a kind and gracious principle and design. It is evident, that it is God’s manner, when he thus afflicts men for their good, and chastens them with compassion, to stay his rough wind in the day of his east wind; to correct in measure; to consider the frame of those that are corrected; to remember their weakness, and to consider how little they can bear. He turns away his anger, and does not stir up all his wrath. Psalm lxxviii. 37, 38, 39. Isaiah 27:8. Jeremiah 30:11. and 46:28. And it is his manner, in the midst even of the severest afflictions, to order some mitigating circumstances, and to mix some mercy. But the misery of the damned is represented as unmixed. The wine of the wrath of God is poured out without mixture into the cup of his indignation, that they may be tormented with fire and brimstone in the presence of the holy angels, and in the presence of the Lamb; and the smoke of their torment shall ascend up for ever and ever, and they have no rest day nor night. Revelation 14:10,11, They are tormented in a flame that burns within them, as well as round ahout them, and they shall be denied so much as a drop of water to cool their tongues. And God’s wrath shall be inflicted in suich a manner, as to show his wrath, and make his strength known on the vessels of wrath, and which shall be punished with everlasting destruction, answerable to that glory of Christ’s power in which hue shall appear at the day of judgment, when he shall come in the glory of his Father, with power and great glory, in flaming fire, to take vengeance on them that know not God, and obey not the gospel. Can any imagine, that in all this God is only correcting from love, and that the subjects of these inflictions are some of those happy ones whom God corrects in order to teach them out of his law? whom he makes sore, and bindeth up? Job 5:17,18. Psalm 64:12. Theme is nothing in Scripture that looks as if the damned were under the use of means to bring them to repentance. It is apparent that God’s manner is, when he afflicts men to bring to repentance by affliction, to join instructions, admonitions, and arguments to persuade.

But if we judge by scripture representations of the state of the damned, they are left destitute of all these things.- There are no prophets, or ministers, or good men, to admonish them, to reason and expostulate with them, or to set them good examples. There is a perfect separation made betwixt all the righteous and the wicked by a great gulf; so that- there can be no passing from one to the other. They are left wholly to the company of devils, and others like them. When the rich man in hell cries to his father Abraham, begging a drop of water, he denies his request; and adds no exhortation to repentance. Wisdonn is abundantly represented in the book of Proverbs, as counselling, warning, calling, inviting, and expostulating with such as are under means for the obtaining wisdom, and as waiting upon them in the use of means, that they may turn at her reproof. But as to such as are obstinate under these means of grace and calls of wisdom, till the time of their punishment comes, it is represented, that their fear shall come as desolation, and destruction as a whirlwind; that distress and anguish shall come upon them; and that then it will be in vain for them to seek wisdom: that if they seek her early, they shall not find her, and if they call upon her, shine will not hear; but instead of this, will laugh at their calamity, and mock when their fear cometh: which certainly does not consist with the idea that the God of wisdom is still striving with them, and using means, in a benevolent and compassionate manner, to bring them to seek and embrace wisdom; still offering wisdom with all her unspeakable benefits, if they will hearken to her voice and comply with her counsel. is wisdom then actually using the most powerful and effectual means to bring them to this happiness, even such as shall surely be successful, though they have obstinately refused all others, and when wisdom called, they heretofore refused, when shine stretched forth her hand, they dud not regard? Is he still most effectually acting the part of a friend, to deliver them from their distress and anguish, instead of laughing at their calamity?

Proverbs 1 latter end. This declaration of wisdom, if it ever be -fulfilled at all, will surely be fulfilled most completely and perfectly at the time appointed for obstinate sinners to receive their most perfect and complete punishment.

If all mankind, even such as live and die in their wickedness, are and ever will line the objects of Christ’s goodwill and mercy, and those whose eternal happiness hue desires and seeks; then surely he would pray for all: but Christ declares that there are some that he prays not for. John 17:9. “I pray for them: I pray not for the world, but for them which thou hast given me; for they are thine.” Compared with ver 14. “The world hath hated them, because they are not of the world, even as I am not of the world.”

Ver. 25. “The world hath not known thee, but I have known thee; and these have known that thou hast sent me;” and ver. 20. “ Neither pray I for these alone, but for them also which shall believe on me through their word.” By this it appears that Christ prayed for all that should ever be true believers. — But he prayed not for those who should not be brought by the word of the apostles, and such means of grace as are used in this world, to believe in him, and should continue notwithstanding not to know God, and in enmity against true holiness or Christianity. These were such as Christ prayed not for.

CHAPTER - OF ENDLESS MISERY. 25. If sin and misery, and the second death, are to continue and prevail for so long a time after the day of judgment, with respect to great multitudes that Christ will finally save and deliver from those things, having perfectly conquered and abolished them; then how can the Scriptures truly represent, that all enemies shall be put under his feet at the end of the world, and that the last enemy that shall be destroyed is death; and that then, having perfectly subdued all his enemies, he shall resign up the kingdom to the Father, and he himself be subject to the Father? as in 1 Corinthians 15:20-28. The time of Christ’s victory over death will be at the general resurrection and day of judgment, as is evident by ver. 54. with the foregoing context. The chief enemies that Christ came to destroy, with regard to such as should be saved, and be of his church, were sin and misery, or death consisting in sin, and death consisting in suffering the second death, unspeakably the greatest enemy that came by sin, infinitely more terrible than temporal death. But if the notion I am opposing be true, these greatest and worst enemies, instead of being subdued, shall have their principal reign afterwards, for many ages at least; viz, sin in the sad effect and consequence of it, men’s misery; and God shall have his strongest conflict with those enemies afterward that is, shall strive against them in the use of the most powerful means . 26. There is a great evidence, that the devil is not the subject of any dispensation of divine mercy and kindness, and that God is prosecuting no design of infinite goodness towards him, and that his pains are not purifying pains. It is manifest, that, instead of any influence of his torments to bring him nearer to repentance, he has been from the beginning of his damnation, constantly, with all his might, exerting himself in prosecuting his wickedness, his violent, most haughty, and malignant opposition to God and man; fighting especially with peculiar virulence against Christ and his church; opposing with all his might, every thing that is good; seeking the destruction and misery of all mankind, with boundless and insatiable cruelty; on which account he is called Satan, the adversary, and Abaddon, and Apollyon, the destroyer. He is represented as a roaring lion, seeking whom he may devour, a viper, the old serpent, the great red dragon, red on account of his bloody cruel nature. He is said to be a murderer from the beginning. He has murdered all mankind, has murdered their souls as well as their bodies. He was the murderer of Jesus Christ, by instigating Judas and his crucifiers. He has most cruelly shed the blood of an innumerable multitude of the children of God. He is emphatically called the evil one, that wicked one, etc. He is a liar, and the father of lies, and the father of all the sin and wickedness that is, or ever has been, in the world. He is the spirit that worketh in the children of disobedience; 2 Corinthians 4:3,4, It is said, that he that committeth sin is of the devil; for the devil sinneth from the beginning. And all wicked men are spoken of as his children. He has set up himself as God of this world, in opposition to the true God, and has erected a vast kingdom over the nations; and is constantly carrying on a war with the utmost earnestness, subtlety, malice, and venom, against Jesus Christ, and all his holy and gracious designs; maintaining a kingdom of darkness, wickedness, and misery, in opposition to Christ’s kingdom of light, holiness, and peace; and thus will continue to do till the end of the world, as appears by scripture prophecies. 27. And God’s dealings with him are infinitely far from being those of a friend, kindly seeking his infinite good, and designing nothing else in the end, but to make him eternally happy in love and favour, and blessed union with him. God is represented every where as acting the part of an enemy to him, that seeks and designs nothing in the final event but his destruction.

The grand work of God’s providence, which he is prosecuting from the beginning to the end of the world, viz. the work of redemption, is against him, to bruise or break in pieces his head, to cast him like lightning from heaven, from that height of power and dominion to which he has exalted himself; to tread him under-foot and to cause his people to trample and bruise, or crush him under-foot and gloriously to triumph over him. Christ, when he conquered him, made a show of him openly, triumphing ever him.

And it is evident, that, as it will be with the devil in this respect, so it will be with the wicked. This is reasonable to suppose. from what the Scripture represents of the relation wicked men stand in to the devil as his children, servants, subjects, instruments, and his property and possession. They are all ranked together with him in one kingdom, in one interest, and one company. And many of them are the great ministers of his kingdom, and to whom he has committed authority; such as the beast and false prophet that we read of in the Revelation. Now, how reasonable and natural is it to suppose, that those who are thus united should have their portion and lot together! As Christ’s disciples, subjects, followers, soldiers, children, instruments, and faithful ministers, shall have their part with him in his eternal glory; so we may reasonably believe, that the devil’s disciples, followers, subjects, soldiers in his army, his children, instruments, and ministers of his kingdom, should have their part with him, and not that such an infinite difference should be made between them, that the punishment of the one should be eternal, and that of the other but temporal, and therefore infinitely less, infinitely disproportionate; so that the proportion between the punishment of the latter, and that of the former, is as nothing, infinitely less than an unit to a million of millions. This is unreasonable to be supposed in itself, as the difference of guilt and wickedness cannot be so great, but must he infinitely far from it; especially, considering the aggravations of the wickedness of a great part of damned men, as committed against Christ, and gospel grace and love; which exceeding great aggravation the sin of the devils never had. 28. As the devil’s ministers, servants and instruments, of the angelic nature, those that are called the devil’s angels, shall have their part with him; for the like reason we may well suppose, h is servants, and instruments of the human nature, will share with him. And not only is this reasonable in itself, but the Scripture plainly teaches us that it shall be so. In Revelation 19:20. it Is said, “ The beast and the false prophet were both cast alive into the lake of fire burning with brimstone.” So it is said, chap. 20:10. “The devil that deceived them was cast into the lake of fire and brimstone, where the beast and false prophet are, and shall be tormented day and night for ever and ever — thus expressing both the kind of misery and the duration. Just in the same manner it is said concerning the followers of the beast. It is said, chap. 14:9, 10, 11. “Saying with a loud voice, If any man worship the beast, etc.-the same shall be tormented with fire and brimstone, and the smoke of their torment ascendeth up for ever and ever, and they have no rest day nor night.”-And chap. 21:8. of wicked men in general, it is said, they shall have their part in the lake which burneth with fire and brimstone.-So we find in Christ’s description of the day of judgment, the wicked are sentenced to everlasting fire prepared for the devil and his angels. By which it appears. most plainly, that they share with the devil in suffering misery of the same kind, and also share with him in suffering misery of the same everlasting continuance. And, indeed, not only would the punishment infinitely differ as to quantity and duration, if the punishment of the devils was to be eternal, and of wicked men only temporal; but, if this were known, it would, as it were, infinitely differ in kind. The one suffering God’s hatred and mere vengeance, infictions that have no pity or kindness in them; the other, the fruit of his mercy and love, and infinitely kind intention: the one attended with absolute despair, and a black and dismal sinking prospect of misery, absolutely endless; the other with the light of hope, and a supporting prospect, not only of an end to their misery, but of an eternal unspeakable happiness to follow. According to the notion which I am opposing, the judgment that shall take place at the end of the world, will be so far from being the last judgment, or any proper judgment to settle all things in their final state, that it will, with respect to the wicked, be no more than the judgment of a physician, whether more sharp and powerful remedies must not be applied in order to the relief of sinners, and the cure of their disease, which, if not cured, will make them eternally miserable! 29. It is evident, that the future misery of the wicked in hell is not come to an end, and to be succeeded by eternal happiness; and that their misery is not subservient to their happiness, because the Scripture plainly signifies, concerning those that die in their sins, that they have all the good and comfort in this life that ever is designed for them. Luke 6:24. “Woe unto you that are rich, for ye have received your consolation.” Luke 16:25. “Son, remember that thou in thy lifetime receivedst thy good things.”

Psalm 17:13,14. “Deliver my soul from the wicked — from the men of the world which have their portion in this life, and whose belly thou fillest with thy hid treasure.” 30. According to the opinion I am now opposing, God will surely at the last deliver all the damned from their misery, and make them happy. So that God will see to it, that the purifying torments shall certainly at last have their effect, to turn them from sin. Now, how can this consist with God’s treating them as moral agents, and their acting from the freedom of their own wills, in the affair of their turning from sin, and becoming morally pure and virtuous, according to the notions of freedom and moral agency which now prevail, and are strenuously maintained by some of the chief assertors of this opinion concerning hell torments; which notion of freedom implies contingence, and is wholly inconsistent with the necessity of the event? If after all the torments used to bring sinners to repentance, the consequence aimed at, viz. their turning from sin to virtue, be not necessary, but it shall still remain a contingent event, whether there ever will be any such consequence of those severe, long-continued chastisements, or no; then, how can it be determined, that this will surely be the consequence? How can it be a thing infallible, that such a consequence of means used will follow, when at the same time, it is not a consequence any way necessarily connected with the means used, it being only a thing contingent whether it will follow or not? If God has determined absolutely to make them all pure and happy, and yet their purity and happiness depend on the freedom of their will; then here is an absolute, divine decree, consistent with the freedom of men’s will, which is a doctrine utterly rejected by the generality of that sort of men who deny the eternity of hell torments. If it be said, that God has not absolutely determined the duration or measure of their torments, but intends to continue them till they do repent, or to try lesser torments first, and, if these do not answer, to increase them till they are effectual, determining that he will raise or continue them till the effect shall finally and infallibly follow; that is the same thing as to necessitate the effect. And here is necessity in such a case, as much as when a founder puts a piece of metal into a furnace, with a resolution to melt it, and if continuing it there a little while will not dissolve it, that he will keep it there till it does dissolve; and if, by reason of its peculiar hardness, an ordinary degree of heat of the furnace will not be effectual, that he will increase the vehemence of the heat, till the effect shall certainly follow. 31. If any should maintain this scheme of temporary future punishments, vis, that the torments in hell are not purifying pains, and that the damned are not in a state of trial with regard to any expected admission to eternal happiness, and that therefore they are not the proper objects of divine benevolence; that the dispensation they are under, is not truly a dispensation of mercy, but that their torments are properly penal pains, wherein God displays his vindictive justice; that they shall suffer misery to such a degree, and for so long a time, as their obstinate wickedness in this world deserves; and that indeed they shall be miserable a very long time, so long, that it is often figuratively spoken of in Scripture as being everlasting, and that then they shall be annihilated: On this I would observe, that there is nothing got by such a scheme; no relief from the arguments taken from Scripture, for the proper eternity of future punishment. For, if it be owned, that Scripture expressions denote a punishment that is properly eternal, but that it is in no other sense properly so, than as the annihilation, or state of non-existence, to which the wicked shall return, will be eternal; and that this eternal annihilation is that death which is so often threatened for sin, perishing, for ever, everlasting destruction, being lost, utterly consumed, etc, and that the fire of he.! is called eternal fire, in the same sense that the eternal fire which consumed the cities of Sodom and Gomorrha is called eternal fire, Jude 7. because it utterly consumed those cities, that they might never be built more; and that this fire is called that which cannot be quenched, or at least not until it has destroyed them that are cast into it.-lf this be all that these expressions denote, then they do not at all signify the length of the torments, or long continuance of their misery; so that the supposition of the length of their torments is brought in without any necessity, the Scripture saying nothing of it, having no respect to it, when it speaks of their everlasting punishments; and it answers the scripture expressions as well, to suppose that they shall be annihilated. immediately, without any long pains, provided the annihilation be everlasting. 32. If any should suppose, that the torments of the damned in hell are properly penal, and in execution of penal justice, but yet that they are neither eternal, nor shall end in annihilation, but shall be continued till justice is satisfied, and they have truly suffered as much as they deserve, whereby their punishment shall be so long as to be called everlasting, but that then they shall be delivered, and finally be the subjects of everlasting happiness; and that therefore they shall not in the mean time be in a state of trial, nor will be waited upon in order to repentance, nor will their torments be used as means to bring them to it; for that the term and measure of their punishment shall be fixed, from which they shall not be delivered on repentance, or any terms or conditions whatsoever, until justice is satisfied:

I would observe, in answer to this, that if it be so, the damned, while under their suffering, are either answerable for the wickedness that is acted by them while in that state, or may properly be the subjects of a judicial proceeding for it, or not, the former be supposed, then it will follow, that they must have another state of suffering and punishment, after the ages of their suffering for the sins of this life, are ended. And it cannot be supposed, that this second period of suffering will be shorter than the first: for the first is only for the sins committed during a short life, often represented in Scripture, for its shortness, to be a dream, a tale that is told, a blast of wind, a vapour, a span, a moment, etc. But the time of punishment is always represented as exceeding long, called everlasting; represented as enduring for ever and ever, as having no end, etc. If the sins of a moment must be followed with such punishment, then, doubtless, the sins of those endless ages must be followed with another second period of suffering, much longer. For it must be supposed, that the damned continue sinning all the time of their punishment; for none can rationally imagine that God would hold them under such extreme torments, and terrible manifestations and executions of his wrath, after they have thoroughly repented, and turned from sin, and are become pure and holy, and conformed to God, and so have left off sinning. And if they continue in sin during this state of punishment, with assurance that God still has a great benevolence for them, even so as to intend finally to make them everlastingly happy in the enjoyment of his love, then their sin must he attended with great aggravation; as they will have the evil and ill desert of sin set before them in the most affecting manner, in their dreadful sufferings for it, attended besides with evidence that God is infinitely benevolent towards them, and intends to bestow infinite blessings upon them.-But, if this first long period of punishment must be followed with a second as long, or longer; for the same reason, the second must be followed by a third, as long, or longer than that; and so the third must be followed by a fourth, and so in infinitum; and, at this rate, there never can be an end of their misery. So this scheme overthrows itself. 33. And if the damned are not answerable for the wickedness they commit during their state of punishment, then we must suppose that, during the whole of their long and, as it were, eternal state of punishment, they are given up of God to the most unrestrained wickedness, having this to consider, that how far soever they go in the allowed exercises and manifestations, of their malice and rage against God and Christ, saints and angels, and their fellow damned spirits, they have nothing to fear from it, it will be never the worse; and surely, continuing in such unrestrained wickedness, for such duration, must most desperately confirm the habit of sin, must increase the root and fountain of it in the heart. Now, how unreasonable is it to suppose, that God would thus deal with such as were objects of his infinite kindness, and the appointed subjects of the unspeakable and endless fruits of his love, in a state of perfect holiness and purity, and conformity to and union with himself; thus to give them up beforehand to unrestrained malignity against himself, and every kind of hellish wickedness, as it were infinitely to increase the fountain of sin in the heart, and the strength of the principle and habit!. Now, how incongruous is it to suppose, with regard to those for whom God has great benevolence, and designs eternal favour, that he would lay them under a necessity of extreme, unbounded hatred of him, blasphemy and rage against him, for so many ages; such necessity as should exclude all liberty of their own in the case! If God intends not only punishment, but purification, by these torments; on this supposition, instead of their being purified, they must be set at an infinitely greater distance from purification. And if God intends them for a second time of probation, in order to their being brought to repentance and the love of God after their punishment is finished; then how can it be certain beforehand, that they shall finally be happy, as is supposed? How can it be certain they will not fail in their second trial, or in their third, if there he a third? Yea, how much more likely that they will fail of truly turning in heart from sin to the love of God, in their second trial, if there be any proper trial in the case, after their hearts have been so much more brought under the power of a strong habit of sin and enmity to God!

If the habit proved so strong in this life, that the most powerful means and mighty inducements of the gospel would not prevail, so that God was, as it were, under a necessity of cutting them down and dealing thus severely with them; how much less likely will it be, that they will be prevailed upon to hove God and the ways of virtue, after their hearts are set at so much greater distance from those things! Yea, unless we suppose a divine interposition of almighty, efficacious power, to change the heart in the time of this second trial, we may be sure that, under these circumstances, the heart will not turn to love God. 34. And besides, if they are laid under such a necessity of hating and blaspheming God, for so many ages, in the manner that has been spoken of, how extremely incongruous is such an imagination, that God would lay those he intended for the eternal bounty and blessedness of dear children, under such circumstances, that they must necessarily hate him, and with devilish fury curse and blaspheme him for innumerable ages, and yet never have cause, even when they are delivered and made happy in God’s love, to condemn themselves for it, though they see the infinite hatefulness and unreasonableness of it, because God laid them under such a necessity, that they could use no liberty of their own in the case? I leave it for all to judge, whether God’s thus ordering things with regard to such as, from great benevolence, he intended for eternal happiness in a most blessed union with himself; be credible. 35. The same disposition and habit of mind, and manner of viewing things, is indeed the main ground of the cavils of many of the modern freethinkers; and modish writers, against the extremity and eternity of hell torments, if relied upon, would cause them to be dissatisfied with almost any thing that is very uncomfortable in a future punishment, so much as the enduring of the pain that is occasioned by the thrusting of a thorn under the nail of the finger, for a whole year together, day and night, without any rest, or the least intermission or abatement. There are innumerable calamities that come to pass in this world, through the permission and ordination of Divine Providence, against which (were it not that they are what we see with our eyes, and are universally known and incontestable facts) this cavilling, unbelieving spirit would strongly object; and, if they were only proposed in theory as matters of faith, would be opposed as exceedingly inconsistent with the moral perfections of God; and the opinions of such as asserted them would be cried out against, as in numberless ways contrary to God’s wisdom, his justice, goodness, mercy, etc. — such as, the innumerable calamities that have happened to poor innocent children, through the merciless cruelty of barbarous enemies their being gradually roasted to death, shrieking and crying for their fathers and mothers; the extreme pains they sometimes are tormented with, by terrible diseases which they suffer; the calamities that have many times been brought on whole cities, while besieged, and when taken by merciless soldiers, destroying all, men, women, and children, without any pity; the extreme miseries which have been suffered by millions of innocent persons, of all ages, sexes, and conditions, in times of persecution, when there has been no refuge to be found on earth; yea, those things that come to pass universally, of which all mankind are the subjects, in temporal death, which is so dreadful to nature.

CHAPTER - CONCERNING THE DIVINE DECREES IN GENERAL, AND ELECTION IN PARTICULAR 1. Whether God has decreed all things that ever came to pass or not, all that own the being of a God own that he knows all things beforehand.

Now, it is self-evident, that if he knows all things beforehand, he either doth approve of them, or he doth not approve of them; that is, he either is willing they should be, or he is not willing they should be. But to will that they should be, is to decree them. 2. The Arminians ridicule the distinction between the secret and revealed will of God, or, more properly expressed, the distinction between the decree and law of God; because we say he may decree one thing, and command another. And so, they argue, we hold a contrariety in God, as if one will of his contradicted another, however, if they will call this a contradiction of wills, we know that there is such a thing; so that it is the greatest absurdity to dispute about it. We and they know it was God’s secret will, that Abraham should not sacrifice his son Isaac; but yet his command was, that he should do it. We know that God willed, that Pharaoh’s heart should be hardened; and yet that the hardness of his heart was sin. We know that God willed the Egyptians should hate God’s people: Psalm 105:25. “ He turned their heart to hate his people, and deal subtlely with his servants.” We know that it was God’s will, that Absalom should lie with David’s wives; 2 Samuel 12:2. “ Thus saith the Lord, I will raise up this evil against thee, out of thine own house; and I will take thy wives before thine eyes, and give them unto thy neighbour; and he shall lie with thy wives in the sight of this sun. For thou didst it secretly; but I will do this thing before all Israel, and before the sun.” We know that God willed that Jeroboam and the ten tribes should rebel. The same may be said of the plunder of the Babylonians; and other instances might be given. The Scripture plainly tells us, that God wills to harden some men, Romans 9:18. That he willed that Christ should be killed by men, etc. 3. It is most certain, that if there are any things so contingent, that there is an equal possibility of their being or not being, so that they may be, or they may not be; God foreknows from all eternity that they may be, and also that they may not be. All will grant that we need no revelation to teach us this. And furthermore, if God knows all things that are to come to pass, he also foreknows whether those contingent things are come to pass or no, at the same time that they are contingent, and that they may or may not come to pass. But what a contradiction is it to say, that God knows a thing will come to pass, and yet at the same time knows that it is contingent whether it will come to pass or no; that is, he certainly knows it will come to pass, and yet certainly knows it may not come to pass! What a contradiction is it to say, that God certainly foreknew that Judas would betray his Master, or Peter deny him, and yet certainly knew that it might be otherwise, or certainly knew that he might be deceived! I suppose it will be acknowledged by all, that for God certainly y to know a thing will be, and yet certainly to know that it may not be, is the same thing as certainly to know that he may be deceived. I suppose it will also be acknowledged, that certainly to know a thing, and also at the same time to know that we may be deceived in it, is the same thing as certainly to know it, and certainly to know that we are uncertain of it, or that we do not certainly know it; and that it is the same thing as certainly to know it, and not certainly to know it at the same time; which we leave to be considered, whether it be not a contradiction. 4. The meaning of the word absolute, when used about the decrees, wants to be stated. It is commonly said, God decrees nothing upon a foresight of any thing in the creature; as this, they say, argues imperfection in God; and so it does, taken in the sense that they commonly intend it. But nobody, I believe, will deny but that God decrees many things that he would not have’ decreed, if he had not foreknown and foredetermined such and such other things. What we mean, we completely express thus — That God decrees all things harmoniously, and in excellent order, one thing harmonizes with another, and there is such a relation between all the decrees, as makes the most excellent order. Thus God decrees rain in drought, because he decrees the earnest prayers of his people; or thus, he decrees the prayers of his people, because he decrees rain. I acknowledge, to say, God decrees a thing because, is an improper way of speaking; but not more improper than all our other ways of speaking about God. God decrees the latter event, because of the former, no more, than he decrees the former, because of the latter. But this is what we mean-When God decrees to give the blessing of rain, he decrees the prayers of his people; and when he decrees the prayers of his people for rain, he very commonly decrees rain; and thereby there is harmony between these two decrees, of rain and the prayers of God’s people. Thus also, when he decrees diligence and industry, he decrees riches and prosperity; when he decrees prudence, he often decrees success; when he decrees striving, then he often decrees the obtaining the kingdom of heaven when he decrees the preaching of the gospel, then he decrees the bringing home of souls to Christ; when he decrees good natural faculties, diligence, and good advantages, then he decrees learning when he decrees summer, then he decrees the growing of plants; when he decrees conformity to his Son, then he decrees calling when he decrees calling, then he decrees justification; and when he decrees justification, then he decrees everlasting glory. Titus, all the decrees of God are harmonious; and this is all that can he said for or against absolute or conditional decrees. But this I say, it is as improper to make one decree a condition of another, as to make the other a condition of that but there is a harmony between both. 5. It cannot be any injustice in God to determine who is certainly to sin, and so certainly to be damned. For, if we suppose this impossibility, that God had not determined any thing things would happen as fatally as they do now - For as to such an absolute contingency, which they attribute to man’s will, calling it the sovereignty of the will; if they mean, by this sovereignty of will, that a man can will as he wills, it is perfect nonsense, and the same as if they should spend abundance of time and ins, and be very hot, at proving, that a man can will when he doth will; that is, that it is possible for that to be, which is. But if they mean, that there is a perfect contingency in the will of man, that is, that it happens merely by chance that a man wills such a thing, and not another, it is an impossibility and contradiction, that a thing should be without any cause or reason, and when there was every way as much cause why it should not have been.

Wherefore, seeing things do unavoidably go fatally and necessarily, what injustice is it in the Supreme Being, seeing it is a contradiction that it should be otherwise, to decree that they should be as they are! 6. Contingency, as it is holden by some, is at the same time contradicted by themselves, if they hold foreknowledge. This is all that follows from an absolute, unconditional, irreversible decree, that it is impossible but that the things decreed should be. The same exactly follows from foreknowledge, that it is absolutely impossible but that the thing certainly foreknown should precisely come to pass.

If it will universally hold, that none can have absolutely perfect and complete happiness, at the same time that any thing is otherwise than he desires at that time it should be; so thus, if it be true, that he has not absolute, perfect, infinite, and all possible happiness now, who has not now all that he wills to have now; then God, if any thing is now otherwise than he wills to have it now, is not now absolutely, perfectly, and infinitely happy. If God is infinitely happy now, then every thing is now as God would have it to be now; if every thing, then those things that are contrary to his commands. If so, it is not ridiculous to say, that things which are contrary to God’s commands, are yet in a sense agreeable to his will?

Again, let it be considered, whether it be not certainly true, that every one that can with infinite ease have a thing done, and yet will not have it done, wills it not; that is, whether or no he that wills not to have a thing done, properly wills not to have a thing done. For example, let the thing be this, that Judas should be faithful to his Lord; whether it be not true, that if God could with infinite ease have it done as he would, but would not have it done as he could, if he would, it be not proper to say, that God would not have it be, that Judas should be faithful to his Lord. 7. They say, to what purpose are praying, and striving, and attending on means, if a I was irreversibly determined by God before? But, to say that all was determined before these prayers and strivings, is a very wrong way of speaking, and begets those ideas in the mind, which correspond with no realities with respect to God. The decrees of our everlasting state were not before our prayers and strivings for these are as much present with God from all eternity, as they are the moment they are present with us. They are present as part of his decrees, or rather as the same; and they did as really exist in eternity, with respect to God, as they exist in time, and as much at one time as another. Therefore, we can no more fairly argue, that these will be in vain, because God has foredetermined all things, than we can, that they would be in vain if they existed as soon as the decree, for so they do, in as much as they are a part of it. 8. That we should say, that God has decreed every action of men, yea, every action that is sinful, and every circumstance of those actions; that he predetermines that they shall be in every respect as they afterwards are; that he determines that there shall be such actions, and just so sinful as they are; and yet that God does not decree the actions that are sinful, as sin, but decrees them as good, is really consistent. For we do not mean by decreeing an action as sinful, the same as decreeing an action so that it shah be sinful; but by decreeing an action as sinful, I mean decreeing it for the sake of the sinfulness of the action. God decrees that they shall be sinful, for the sake of the good that he causes to arise from the sinfulness thereof; whereas man decrees them for the sake of the evil that is in them- 9. When a distinction is made between God’s revealed will and his secret will, or his will of command and decree, will is certainly in that distinction taken in two senses. His will of decree, is not his will in the same sense as his will of command is. Therefore, it is no difficulty at all to suppose, that the one may be otherwise than the other: his wall in both senses is his inclination. But when we say he wills virtue, or loves virtue, or the happiness of his creature; thereby is intended, that virtue, or the creature’s happiness, absolutely and simply considered, is agreeable to the inclination of his nature. His will of decree is, his inclination to a thing, not as to that thing absolutely and simply, but with respect to the universality of things, that have been, are, or shall be So God, though he hates a thing as it is simply, may incline to it with reference to the universality of things.

Though be hates sin in itself, yet be may will to permit it, for the greater promotion of holiness in this universality, including all things, and at all times. So, though he has no inclination to a creature’s misery, considered absolutely, yet he may will it, for the greater promotion of happiness in this universality. God inclines to excellency, which is harmony, but yet he may incline to stiffer that which is unharmonious in itself, for the promotion of universal harmony, or for the promoting of the harmony that there is in the universality, and making it shine the brighter. And thus it must needs be, and no hypothesis whatsoever will relieve a man, but that he must own these two wills of God. For all must own, that God sometimes wills not to hinder the breach of his own commands, because he does not in fact hinder it. He wills to permit sin, it is evident, because he does permit it. None will say that God himself does what he does not will to do. But you will say, God wills to permit sin, as he wills the creature should be left to his freedom; and if he should hinder it, he would offer violence to the nature of his own creature. I answer, this comes nevertheless to the very thing that I say. You say, God does not will sin absolutely; but rather than alter the law of nature and the nature of free agents, he wills it. He wills what is contrary to excellency in some particulars, for the sake of a more general excellency and order. So that this scheme of the Arminians does not help the matter. 10, It is a proper and excellent thing for infinite glory to shine forth; and for the same reason, it is proper that the shining forth of God’s glory should be complete; that as, that all parts of his glory should shine forth, that every beauty should be proportionably effulgent, that the beholder may have a proper notion of God. It is not proper that one glory should be exceedingly manifested, and another not at all; for then the effulgence would not answer the reality. For the same reason it is not proper that one should be manifested exceedingly, and another but very little, It is highly proper that the effulgent glory of God should answer his real excellency; that the splendor should be answerable to the real and essential glory, for the same reason that it is proper and excellent for God to glorify himself at all. Thus it is necessary, that God’s awful majesty, his authority and dreadful greatness, justice, and holiness, should be manifested. But this could not he, unless sin and punishment had been decreed; so that the shining forth of God’s glory would be very imperfect, both because these parts of divine glory would not shine forth as the others do, and also the glory of his goodness, love, and holiness would be faint without them; nay, they could scarcely shine forth at all. If it were not right that God should decree and permit and punish sin, there could be no manifestation of God’s holiness in hatred of sin, or in showing any preference, in his providence, of godliness before it. There would he no manifestation of God’s grace or true goodness, if there was no sin to be pardoned, no misery to be saved from. How much howsoever he bestowed, his goodness would not be so much prized and admired, and the sense of it not so great, as we have elsewhere shown. We little consider how much the sense of good is heightened by the sense of evil, both moral and natural. And as it is necessary that there should be evil, because the display of the glory of God could not but be imperfect and incomplete without it, so evil is necessary, in order to the highest happiness of the creature, and the completeness of that communication of God, for which he made the world; because the creature’s happiness consists in the knowledge of God, and sense of his love. And if the knowledge of him be imperfect, the happiness of the creature must be proportionably imperfect; and the happiness of the creature would be imperfect upon another account also; for, as we have said, the sense of good is comparatively dull and flat, without the knowledge of evil. 11. It is owned, that God did choose men to eternal life, upon a foresight of their faith. But then, here is the question, whether God decreed that faith, and chose them that they should believe. 12. The sin of crucifying Christ being foreordained of God in his decree, and ordered in his providence, of which we have abundant evidence front the nature of the thing, and from the great ends God had to accomplish by means of this wicked act of crucifying Christ; it being, as it were, the cause of all the decrees, the greatest of all decreed events, and that on which all other decreed events depend as their main foundation; being the main thing in that greatest work of God, the work of redemption, which is the end of all other works; and it being so much prophesied of, and so plainly spoken of, as being done according to the determinate counsel and foreknowledge of God; I say, seeing we have such evidence that this sin is foreordained iii God’s decrees, and ordered in providence, and it being, as it were, the head sin, and representative of the sin of men in general; hence is a clear argument, that all the sins of men are foreordained and ordered by a wise Providence. 13. it is objected against the absolute decrees respecting the future actions of men, and especially the unbelief of sinners, and their rejection of the gospel, that this does not consist with the sincerity of God’s calls and invitations to such sinners; as he has willed, in ‘his eternal secret decree, that they should never accept of those invitations. To which I answer, that there is that in God, respecting the acceptance and compliance of sinners, which God knows will never he, and which he has decreed never to cause to be, in which, though it be not just the same with our desiring and wishing for that which will never come to pass, yet there is nothing wanting but what would imply imperfection in the case. There is all in God that is good, and perfect, and excellent in our desires and wishes for the conversion and salvation of wicked men. As, for instance, there is a love to holiness, absolutely considered, or an agreeableness of holiness to his nature and will; or, in other words, to his natural inclination. The holiness and happiness of the creature, absolutely considered, are things that he loves. These things are infinitely more agreeable to his nature than to ours.

There is all in God that belongs to our desire of the holiness and happiness of unconverted men and reprobates, excepting what implies imperfection.

All that is consistent with infinite knowledge, wisdom, power, selfsufficience, infinite happiness, and immutability. Therefore, there is no reason that his absolute prescience, or his wise determination and ordering what is future, should hinder his expressing this disposition of his nature, in like manner as we are wont to express such a disposition in ourselves, viz. by calls and invitations, and the like.

The disagreeableness of the wickedness and misery of the creature, absolutely considered, to the nature of God, is all that is good in pious and holy men’s lamenting the past misery and wickedness of men. Their lamenting these, is good no farther than it proceeds from the disagreeableness of those things to their holy and good nature. This is also all that is good in wishing for the future holiness and happiness of men.

And there is nothing wanting in God, in order to his having such desires and such lamentings, but imperfection; and nothing is in the way of his having them, but infinite perfection; and therefore it properly, naturally, and necessarily came to pass, that when God, in the manner of existence, came down from his infinite perfection, and accommodated himself to our nature and manner, by being made man, as he was, in the person of Jesus Christ, he really desired the conversion and salvation of reprobates, and lamented their obstinacy and misery; as when he beheld the city Jerusalem, and wept over it, saying, O Jerusalem,” etc. In the like manner, when he comes down from his infinite perfection, though not in the manner of being, but in the manner of manifestation, and accommodates himself to our nature and manner, in the manner of expression, it is equally natural and proper that he should express himself’ as though he desired the conversion and salvation of reprobates, and lamented their obstinacy and misery. 14. Maxim 1. There is no such thing truly as any pain, or grief, or trouble in God.

Maxim 2. Hence it follows that there is no such thing as any real disappointment in God, or his being really crossed in his will, or things going contrary to his will; because, according to the notion of will, to have one’s will, is agreeable and pleasing; for it is the notion of being pleased or suited, to have things as we will them be; and so, on the other hand, to have things contrary to one’s will, is disagreeable, troublesome, or uncomfortable. “He is in one mind, and who can turn him? And what his soul desireth, that he doth.” (Job 23:13.)

In the first place, I hay this down, which I suppose none will deny, that as to God’s own actions, God decrees them, or purposes them beforehand.

For none will be so absurd as to say that God acts without intentions, or without designing to act, or that he forbears to act, without intending to forbear. 2ndly, That whatsoever God intends or purposes, he intends and purposes from all eternity, and that there are no new purposes or intentions in God. For, if God sometimes begins to intend what he did not intend before, then two things will follow. 1. That God is not omniscient, If God sometimes begins to design what he did not design before, it must of necessity be fur want of knowledge, or for want of knowing things before as be knows them now, for want of having exactly the same views of things. If God begins to intend what he did not before intend, it must be because he now sees reasons to intend it, that he did not see before; or that he has something new, objected to his understanding, to influence him. 2. If God begins to intend or purpose things that he did not intend before, then God is certainly mutable, and then he must, in his own mind and will, be liable to succession and change; for wherever there are new things, there is succession and change.

Therefore, I shall take these two things for positions granted and supposed in this controversy, viz. that as to God’s own actions and forbearings to act, he decrees and purposes them beforehand; and that whatsoever God designs or purposes, he purposes from all eternity, and thus decrees from all eternity all his own actions and forbearings to act.

Coroll. Hence God decrees from all eternity, to permit all the evil that ever he does permit; because God’s permitting is God’s forbearing to act or to prevent. 15. It can be made evident by reason, that nothing can come to pass but what it is the will and pleasure of God should come to pass. This may be argued from the infinite happiness of God. For every being had rather things should go according to his will, than not; because, if he had not rather, then it is not his will, It is a contradiction to say, he wills it, and yet does not choose it, or had not rather it should be so than not. But, if God had rather things should be according to his will than not, then, if a thing fall out otherwise than he hath willed, he meets with a cross; because, on this supposition, he had rather it should have been otherwise and therefore he would have been better pleased if the thing had been otherwise. It is contrary to what he choose, and therefore it is of necessity that he must be displeased. It is of necessity that every being should be pleased, when a thing is as he chooses, or had rather it should be. It is a contradiction to suppose otherwise. For it is the very notion of being please, to have things agreeable to one’s pleasure! For the very same reason, every being is crossed, or it is unpleasing to him, when a thing is, that he chose, and had rather should not have been, For it is the very notion of a thing’s being cross or unpleasing to any, that it is contrary to his pleasure.

But if God can meet with crosses and things unpleasing to him, then he is not perfectly and unchangeably happy. For wherever there is any unpleasedness or unpleasantness, it must, of necessity, in a degree diminish the happiness of the subject. Where there is any cross to a being’s choice, there is something contrary to happiness. Wherever there is any unpleasedness, there is something contrary to pleasure, and which consequently diminishes pleasure. It is impossible any thing should be plainer than this. 16. The commands and prohibitions of God are only significations of our duty and of his nature. It is acknowledged that sin is, in itself considered, infinitely contrary to God’s nature; but it does not follow, but that it may; be the pleasure of God to hermit it, for the sake of the good that he will bring out of it. God can bring such good out of that, which in itself is contrary to his nature, and which, in itself considered, he abhors, as may be very agreeable to his nature, and when sin- is spoken of as contrary to the will of God, it is contrary to his will considered only as in itself As man commits it, it is contrary to God’s will; for men act in committing it with a view to that which is evil. But as God permits it, it is not contrary to God’s will; for God in permitting it has respect to the great good that he will make it an occasion of. If God respected sin as man respects it in committing it, it would be exceedingly contrary to his will hut considered as God decrees to permit it, it is not contrary to God’s will. To give an instance — The crucifying of Christ was a great sin; and as man committed it, it was exceedingly hateful and highly provoking to God. Yet upon many great considerations it was the will of God that it should be done. Will any body say that it was not the will of God that Christ should be crucified? “For to do whatsoever thy hand and thy counsel determined before to be done.” (Acts 4:28.)

I7. Sin is an evil, yet the futurition of sin, or that sin should be future, is not an evil thing. Evil is an evil thing, and yet it may be a good thing that evil should be in the world. There is certainly a difference between the thing itself existing, and its being an evil thing that ever it came into existence.

As for instance, it might be an evil thing to crucify Christ, but yet it was a good thing that the crucifying of Christ came to pass. As men’s act, it was evil, but as God ordered it, it was good. Who will deny but that it may be so, that evil’s coming to pass may he an occasion of greater good than it is an evil, and so of there being more good in the whole, than if that evil had not come to pass? And if so, then it is a good thing that that evil comes to pass. When we say the thing is an evil thing in itself, then we mean that it is evil, considering it only within its own bounds, But when we say that it is a good thing that ever it came to pass, then we consider the thing as a thing among events, or as one thing belonging to the series of events, and as related to the rest of the series. If a man should say, that it was a good thing that ever it happened that Joseph’s brethren sold him into Egypt, or that it was a good thing that ever it came to pass that Pope Leo X. sent put indulgencies for the commission of future sins, nobody would understand a man thus expressing himself, as justifying these acts.

It implies no contradiction to suppose that an act may be an evil act, and yet that it is a good thing that such an act should come to pass. A man may have been a bad man, and yet it may be a good thing that there has been such a man. This implies no contradiction; because it implies no contradiction to suppose that there being such a man may be an occasion of there being more good in the whole, than there would have been otherwise. So it no more imp lies a contradiction to suppose that an action may be an action, and yet that it may be a good thing that there has been such an action. God’s commands, and calls, and counsels, do imply another thing, viz. that it is our duty to do these things; and though they may he our duty, yet it may be certain beforehand that we shall not do them.

And if there be any difficulty in this, the same difficulty will attend the scheme of the Arminians; for they allow that God permits sin. Therefore, as he permits it, it cannot be contrary to his will. For if it were contrary to his will as he permits it, then it would be contrary to his will to permit it; for that is the same thing. But nobody will say that God permits sin, when it is against his will to permit it; for this is would be to make him act involuntarily, or against his own will. 18. “The wrath of man shall praise thee, and the remainder of wrath shalt thou restrain.” Psalm 76:10. If God restrains sin when he pleases; and when he permits it, permits it for the sake of some good that it will be an occasion of, and does actually restrain in all other cases; it is evident that when he permits it, it is his will that it should come to pass for the sake of the good that it will be an occasion of. If he permits it for the sake of that good, then he does not permit it merely because be would infringe on the creature’s liberty in restraining it; as is further evident because he does restrain it when that good is not in view. If it be his will to permit it to come to pass, for the sake of the good that its coming. to pass will be an occasion of; then it is his will to permit it, that by its coming to pass he may obtain that good; and therefore it must necessarily be his will that it should come to pass, that be may obtain that good. If he permits it, that, by its coming to pass, he may obtain a certain good, then his proximate end in permitting it, is, that it may come to pass. And if he wills the means for the sake of the end he therein wills the end. If God wills to permit a thing that it may come to pass, then he wills that it should come to pass. This is selfevident.

But, if he wills to permit it to come to pass, that by its coming to pass he may obtain some end, then he wills to permit it that it should come to pass. For to will to permit a thing to come to pass, that by its coming to pass good may be obtained, is exactly the same thing as to will to permit it to come to pass, that it may come to pass, and so the end may be attained.

To will to permit a thing to come to pass, that he may obtain some end by its coming to pass, and yet to be unwilling that it should come to pass, certainly implies a contradiction.

If the foundation of that distinction that there is between one man and another, whereby one is a good man, and another a wicked man, be God’s pleasure, and his causation; then God has absolutely elected the particular persons that are to be godly. For, by supposition, it is owing to his determination. Matthew 11:25-27. “At that time, Jesus answered and said, I thank thee, O Father, Lord of heaven and earth, because thou hast laid these things from the wise and prudent, and hast revealed them unto babes.

Even so, Father, for so it seemed good in thy sight. All things are delivered unto me of my Father; and no man knoweth the Son, but the Father; neither knoweth any man the Father, save the Son, and he to whomsoever the Son will reveal him,” 19. It may be argued from the infinite power and wisdom of God, that nothing can come to pass, but that it must be agreeable to the will and pleasure of God that it should come to pass. For, as was observed before, every being had rather things should be according to his will, than not.

Therefore, if things be not according to his will, it must be for want of power. It cannot be for want of will, by supposition. It must therefore be for want of sufficiency. It must be either because he cannot have it so, or cannot have it so without some difficulty, or some inconvenience; or all may be expressed in a word, viz. that he wants sufficiency to have things as he wishes. But this cannot be the case of a being of infinite power and infinite wisdom. If he has infinite power and wisdom, he can order all things to be just as he wills: and he can order it with perfect and infinite ease, or without the least difficulty or inconveniency. Two things lie before him, both equally within his power, either to order the matter to be, or not to order it to be; and both of them are equally easy to him. One is as little trouble to him as the other; as to easiness or trouble, they are perfectly equal. It is as easy for him to order it, as not to order it. Therefore, his determination, whether it be ordering it, or not ordering it, must be a certain sign of his will in the case. If he does order it to be, this is a sign that his will is that it should be. And if he does not order it to be, but suffers it not to be, that is as sure a sign that he wills that it should not be- So that, however the thing is, it is a sure sign that it is the will of God that it should be as it is.

To this, nothing can be objected, unless that it is not for want of will, nor want of power in God, that things be not as he would have them, but because the nature of the subject will not allow of it. But how can this be to the purpose, when the nature of the subject itself is of God, and is wholly within his power, is altogether the fruit of his mere will? And cannot a God of infinite wisdom and infinite power cause the natures of things to be such, and order them so after they are caused, as to have things as he chooses, or without his will’s being crossed, and things so coming to pass that he had rather have them otherwise? As, for instance, God foresaw who would comply with the terms of salvation, and who would not: and he could have forborne to give being to such as he foresaw would not comply, if, upon some consideration it was not his pleasure that there should be some who should not comply with the terms of salvation.

Objectors may say, God cannot always prevent men’s sins, unless he act contrary to the free nature of the subject, or without destroying men’s liberty, But will they deny, that an omnipotent and infinitely wise God could not possibly invent, and set before men, such strong motives to obedience, and have kept them before them in such a manner, as should have influenced all mankind to continue in their obedience, as the elect angels have done, without destroying their liberty? God will order it so, that the saints and angels in heaven never will sin: and does it therefore follow, that their liberty is destroyed, and that they are not free, but forced in their actions? Does it follow, that they are turned into blocks, as the Arminians say the Calvinist doctrines turn men? 20. God decrees all the good that ever comes to pass; and therefore there certainly will come to pass no more good, than he has absolutely decreed to cause; and there certainly and infallibly will no more believe, no more be godly, and no snore be saved, than God has decreed that he will cause to believe, and cause to be godly, and will save. 21, The foreknowledge of God will necessarily infer a decree: for God could not foreknow that things would be unless he had decreed they should be; and that because things would not be future, unless h had decreed they should be, if God, from all eternity, knew that such and such things were future, then they were future; and consequently the proposition was from all eternity true, that such a thing, at such a time, would be. And it is as much impossible that a thing should be future without some reason of its being future, as that it should actually be, without some reason why it is. It is as perfectly unreasonable to suppose, that this proposition should be true, viz. such a thing will be, or is to be, without a reason why it is true; as it is that this proposition should be true, such a thing actually is, or has been without some reason why that is true, or why that thing exists, For, as the being ‘of the thing is not in its own nature necessary, so that proposition that was true before, viz. that it shall be, is not in its own nature a necessary truths. And therefore I draw this consequence, that if there must lie some reason of the futurition of the thing, or why the thing is future this can be no other than Cods decree, or the truth of the proposition, that such a thing will be, has been determined by God. For the truth of the proposition is determined by the supposition. My meaning is, that it does not remain a question: hut the matter is decided, whether the proposition shall be true or not, The thing, in its own nature, is not necessary, but only possible; and therefore, it is not of itself that it is future; it is not of itself in a state of futurition, if I may so speak but only its a state of possibility; and there must be some cause to bring it out of a state of mere possibility, into a state of futurition. This must be God only; for there was no other being by supposition existing. And though other things ate future, yet it will not be sufficient to say, that the futurition of other things is the cause of the futurition of this. And it is owing only to him, that is the first being, and that exists necessarily, and of himself, that all other things, that are not in their own nature necessary, or necessarily future, but merely possible, are brought out of that state of mere possibility, into a state of futurition, to he certainly future. Here is an effect already done, viz. the rendering that which in its own nature is only possible, lobe certainly future, so that it can be certainly known to be future: and there must be something already existing that must have caused this effect. What so ever is not of itself, or by the necessity of its own nature is an effect of something else, But that such a thing should be future by supposition, is not of itself or by necessity of its own nature If things that appertain to the creature, or things that come to pass in time, be not future of themselves and of their own nature, then they are future because God makes them to be future. This is exceedingly evident; for there is nothing else at all beside God and things that come to pass in time. And therefore, if things that come to pass in time have not the reason of their own futurition in themselves, it must be in God.

But if you say, that the ground or reason of their futurition is in the things themselves, then things are future prior to any decree, or their futurition is antecedent in nature of any decree of God. And then, to what purpose is any decree of God? For, according to this supposition, God’s decreeing does not make any thing future, or not future; because it was future prior to his decree. His decreeing or appointing that any thing shall be, or shall not be, does not alter the case. It is not about to be, or about not to be, any thing the more for God’s decreeing it. According to this supposition, God has no freedom or choice in decreeing or appointing any thing, It is not at his choice what shall be future, and what not no, not in one thing. For the futurition of things is by this supposition antecedent in nature to Isis choice; so that his choosing or refusing does not alter the case. The things in themselves are future, and his decreeing cannot make them not future; for they cannot be future and not future at the same time: neither can it make them future, because they are future already: so that they who thus plead for man’s liberty, advance principles which destroy the freedom of God himself, It is allowed that things are future before they come to pass; because God foreknows them, Either things are future antecedently to God’s decree and independently of it, or they are not. If they are not future antecedently to, and independently of; God’s decree, then they are made so by his decree; there is no medium. But if they are so antecedently to his decree, then the above-mentioned absurdity will follow, viz. that God has no power by his decree to make any thing future or not future He has no choice in the case. And if it be already decided, something must have decided it; for, as has been already shown, it is not true without a reason why it is true. And if something has determined or decided the truths of it, it must be God that has decided it, or something else. It cannot be chance or mere accident: that is contrary to every rational supposition. For it is to be supposed, that there is some reason for it, and that something does decide it. If there be any thing that comes to pass by mere accident, that comes to pass of itself without any reason. If it be not chance therefore that has decided it, it must be God or the creature. It cannot be the creature as actually existing: for, by supposition, it is determined from all eternity before any creature exists. Therefore, if it he any thing in the creature that decides it in any way, it must be only the futurition of that thing in the creature. But this brings us to the absurdity and contradiction, that the same thing is both the cause and the effect of itself. The very effect, the cause of which we are seeking, is the futurition of the thing; and if this futurition be the cause of that effect it is the cause of itself. 22. The first objection of the Arminians is, that the divine decree infringes on the creature’s liberty. In answer to this objection, we may observe some things to show what is the truse notion of liberty, and the absurdity of their notion of liberty. Their nation of liberty is, that there is a sovereignty in the will, and that the will determines itself, so that its determination to choose or refuse this or that, is primarily within itself; which description of liberty implies a self-contradiction. For it supposes the will, in its first act, choosing or refusing to be deter mined by itself; which implies that there is an antecedent act of the will to that first act, determining that act. For, if the will determines its own first act, then there must be an act of the will before that first act, (for that determining is acting,) which is a contradiction. There can he no fallacy its this; for we know that if the will determines its owls act, it does not determine it without acting. Therefore, here is this contradiction, viz. that there is an act of the will before the first act. There is an act of the will determining what it shall choose, before the first act of choice; which is as much as to say, that there is an act of volition before the first act of volition. For the will’s determining what it will choose, is choosing. The will’s determining what it will will, is willing.

So that according to this notion of liberty, the will must choose before it chooses, in order to determine what it will choose. If the will determines itself, it is certain that one act must determine another. If the will determines its own choice, then it must determine by a foregoing act what it will choose. If the will determines its own act, then an antecedent act determines the consequent; for that determining is acting. The will cannot determine without acting. Therefore I inquire what determines that first act of the will, viz, its determination of its own act? It must be answered, according to their scheme, that it is the will by a foregoing act. Here, again, we have the same contradiction, viz, that the first act of the will is determined by an act that is before that first act. If the will determines itself, or determines its own choice, the meaning of it must be, if there be any meaning belonging to it, that the will determines how it will choose; and that it chooses according to that, its own determination how to choose, or is directed in choosing by that its own determination. But then I would inquire, whether that first determination, that directs the choice, be not itself an act or a volition; and if so, I would inquire what determines that act. Is it another determination still prior to that in the order of nature?

Then I would inquire, what determines the first act or determination of all?

If the will, in its acts of willing or choosing, determines or directs itself how to choose, then there is something done by the will prior to its act of choosing that is determined, viz, its determining or directing itself how to choose. This act determining or directing, must be something besides or distinct from the choice determined or directed, and must be prior in order of nature to it. Here are two acts of the will, one the cause of the other, viz. the act of the will directing and determining, and the act or choice directed or determined. Now, I inquire, what determines that first act of the will determining or directing, to determine and direct as it does? If it be said, the will determines itself in that; then that supposes there is another act of the will prior to that, directing and determining that act, which is contrary to the supposition. And if it was not, still the question would recur, what determines that first determining act of the will? If the will determines itself, one of these three things must be meant, viz. 1. That that very same act of the will determines itself. But this is as absurd as to say that something makes itself; and it supposes it to be before it is. For the act of determining is as much prior to the thing determined, as the act of making is before the thing made. Or, 2. The meaning must be, that the will determines its own act, by some other act that is prior to it in order of nature; which implies that the will acts before its first act. Or, 3 . The meaning must be, that the faculty, considered at the same time as perfectly without act, determines its own consequent act; which is to talk without a meaning, and is a great absurdity. To suppose that the faculty, remaining at the same time perfectly without act, can determine any thing, is a plain contradiction; for determining is acting. And besides, if the will does determine itself, that power of determining itself does not argue any freedom, unless it he by an act of the will, or unless that determination be itself an act of choice. For what freedom or liberty is there in the will’s determining itself, without an act of choice in determining, whereby it may choose which way it will determine itself? So that those that suppose the will has a power of self-determination, must suppose that that very determination. is an act of the will, or an act of choice, or else it does not at all help them out in what they would, viz. the liberty of the will. But if that very determination how to act, be itself an act of choice, then the question returns, what determines this act of choice.

Also, the foreknowledge of God contradicts their notion of liberty as much, and in every respect in the same manner as a decree. For they do not pretend that decree contradicts liberty any otherwise, than as it infers that it is beforehand certain that the thing will come to pass, and that it is impossible but that it should be, as the decree makes an indissoluble connexion beforehand between the subject and predicate of the proposition, that such a thing shall be. A decree infers no other necessity than that. And God’s foreknowledge does infer the same to all intents and purposes. For if from all eternity God foreknew that such a thing would be, then the event was infallibly certain beforehand, and that proposition was true from all eternity, that such a thing would be;’ and therefore there was an indissoluble connexion beforehand between the subject and predicate of that proposition. If the proposition was true beforehand, the subject and predicate of it were connected beforehand. And therefore it follows from hence, that it is utterly impossible that it should not prove true, and that, for this reason, that it is utterly impossible that a thing should be true, and not true, at the same time. 23. The same kind of infallible certainty, that the thing will come to pass, or impossibility but that it should come to pass, that they object against, must necessarily be inferred another way, whether we hold the thing to be any way decreed or not. For it has been shown before, and I suppose none will deny, that God from all eternity decrees his own actions. Therefore he from all eternity decrees every punishment that he ever has inflicted, or will inflict. So that it is impossible, by their own reasoning, but that the punishment should come to pass. And if it be impossible but that the punishment should come to pass, then it is equally impossible but that the sin should come to pass. For if it be possible that the sin should not come to pass, and yet impossible but that the punishment should come to pass, then it is impossible but that God should punish that sin which may never be. 24. For God certainly to know that a thing will be, that possibly may he, and possibly may not be, implies a contradiction, if possibly it may he otherwise, then how can God know certainly that it will be? If it possibly may be otherwise, then he knows it possibly may be otherwise; and that it is inconsistent with his certainly knowing that it will not be otherwise. if God certainly knows it will be, and yet it may possibly be otherwise, then it may possibly happen to be otherwise than God certainly knows it will be. If so, then it may possibly happen that God may be mistaken in his judgment, when he certainly knows; for it is supposed that it is possible that it should be otherwise titan he judges. For that it should be otherwise than he judges, and that he should be mistaken, are the same thing. How unfair therefore is it in those that hold the foreknowledge of God, to insist upon this objection from human liberty, against the decrees, when their scheme is attended with the same difficulty, exactly in the same manner! 25. Their other objection is, that God’s decrees make God the author of sin. I answer, that there is no more necessity of supposing God the author of sin, on this scheme, than on the other. For if we suppose pose, according to my doctrine, that God has determine, from all eternity, the number and persons of those that shall perform the condition of the covenant of grace; in order to support this doctrine, there is no need of maintaining any more concerning God’s decreeing sin, than this, viz. that God has decreed that he will permit all the sin that ever comes to pass, and that upon his permitting it, it will certainly come to pass. And they hold the same thing; for they hold that God does determine beforehand to permit all the sin that does come to pass; and that he certainly knows that if he docs permit it, it will come to pass. I say, they in their scheme allow both these; they allow God does permit all the sin to come to pass, that ever does come to pass; and those that allow the foreknowledge of God, do also allow the other thing, viz, that he knows concerning all the sin that ever does really come to pass, that it will come to pass upon his permitting it.

So that if this be making God the author of sin, they make him so in the very same way that they charge us with doing it. 26. One objection of theirs against God’s decreeing or ordering, in any sense, that sin should come to pass, is, that man cannot do this without making himself sinful, and, in some measure, guilty of the sin, and that therefore God cannot. To this I answer, that the same Objection lies against their own scheme two ways: 1. Because they own that God does permit sin, and that he determines to permit before hand, and that he knows, with respect to all sin that ever is committed, that upon his permitting it, it will come to pass; and we hold no other. 2. Their Objection is, that what is a sin in men, is a sin in God; and therefore, in any sense to decree sin, would be a sin. But if this Objection be good, it is as strong against God’s permission of sin, which they allow; for it would be a sill in men to permit sin. We ought not to permit or suffer it where we have an opportunity to hinder it; and we cannot permit it without making ourselves in some measure guilty. Yet they allow that God does permit sin; and that his permitting it does not make him guilty of it. Why must the argument from men to God be stronger in the other case than in this? 27. They say, that we ought to begin in religion, with the perfections of God, and make these a rule to interpret Scripture. ans. 1. If this be the best rule, I ask, why is it not as good a rule to argue from these perfections of God, his omniscience, infinite happiness, infinite wisdom and power, as his other attributes that they argue from? If it be not as good a rule to argue from these as those, it must be because they are not so certain, or because it is not so certain that he is possessed of these perfections. But this they will not maintain; for his moral perfect ions are proved no otherwise than by arguing from his natural perfections; and therefore the latter must be equally certain with the former. What we prove another thing by, must at least be as certain as it makes the thing proved by it. If an absolute and universal decree does infer a seeming inconsistence with some of God’s moral perfections, they must confess the contrary to have a seeming inconsistence with the natural perfections of God.

Again, 2ndly, They lay it down for a rule, to embrace no doctrine which they by their own reason cannot reconcile with the moral perfections of God. But I would show the unreasonableness of this rule. For, 1. If this be a good rule, then it always was so. Let us then see what will follow. We shall then, 2ndly, have reason to conclude every thing to be really inconsistent with God’s moral perfections, that we cannot reconcile with his moral perfections; for if we had not reason to conclude that it is inconsistent, then we have no reason to conclude that it is not true. But if this be true, that we have reason to conclude every thing is inconsistent with God’s moral perfections which we cannot reconcile with those perfections, then David had reason to conclude that some things that he saw take place, in fact were inconsistent with God’s moral perfections, for he could not reconcile them with those perfections, Psalm 73 And Job had cause to come to the same conclusion concerning some events in his day. 3. If it be a good rule, that we must conclude that to be inconsistent with the divine perfections, that we cannot reconcile with, or, which is the same thing, that we cannot see how it is consistent with, tbose perfections, then it must be because we have reason to conclude that it cannot happen that our reason cannot see bow it can be, and then it will follow that we must reject the doctrine of the Trinity, the incarnation of the Son of God, etc.

The Scripture itself supposes that there are some things in the Scripture that men may not be able to reconcile with God’s moral perfections. See Romans 9:19. “Why doth be yet find fault? For who hath resisted his will?”

And the apostle doth not answer the objection, by showing us how to reconcile it with the moral perfections of God, but by representing the arrogancy of quarrelling with revealed doctrines under such a pretence, and not considering the infinite distance between God and us. “ Nay, but who art thou, O man, that repliest against God?” And God answered Job after the same manner. God rebuked him for darkening counsel by words without knowledge, and answered him, only by declaring and manifesting to him the infinite distance between God and him; so letting him know, that it became him humbly to submit to God, and acknowledge his justice even in those things that were difficult to his reason; and that without solving his difficulties any other way than by making him sensible of the weakness of his own understanding. 28. If there be no election, then it is not God that makes men to differ, expressly contrary to Scripture. No man ought to praise God for that happiness that he has above other men, or for that distinction that is between him and other men, that he is holy and that he is saved; when they are not holy and not saved. The saints in heaven, when they look on the devils in hell, have no occasion to praise God on account of the difference between them. Some of the ill consequences of the Arminian doctrines are, that it robs God of the greater part of the glory of his grace, and takes away a principal motive to love and praise him, and exalts man to God’s room, and ascribes the glory to self, that belongs to God alone. Romans 11:7. “The election hath obtained, and the rest were blinded.” That by the election here is not meant the Gentiles, but the elect part of the Jews, is most apparent by the context. Such Arminians who allow, that some only are elected, and not all that are saved, but none that are reprobated, overthrow hereby their own main objection against reprobation, viz. that God offers salvation to all, and encourages them to seek it, which, say they, would he inconsistent with God’s truth, if he had absolutely determined not to save them; for they will not deny that those that are elected whilst ungodly, are warned of God to beware of eternal damnation, and to avoid such and such things, lest the’,’ should be damned. But for God to warn men to beware of damnation, though he has absolutely determined that they shall not be damned, is exactly parallel with his exhorting men to seek salvation, thought he has actually determined that they shall not be saved. 29. That election is not from a foresight of works, or conditional, as depending on the condition of man’s will, is evident by 2 Timothy 1:9. “Who hath saved us, and called us with a holy calling, not according to our works, but according to his own purpose and grace, which was given us in Christ Jesus before the world began.” Philippians 2:13. “For it is God that worketh in you, both to will and to do of his own good pleasure.” Romans 9:15,16. “I will have mercy on whom I will have mercy, and will have compassion on whom I will have compassion. So then, it is not of him that willeth, nor of him that runneth, but of God that showeth mercy.” Men’s labours and endeavours themselves are from God 1 Corinthians 15:10.”

But by the grace of God, I am what I am; and his grace, which was bestowed upon me, was not in vain; but I laboured more abundantly than they all. Yet not I, but the grace of God which was with me.” 30. God decrees all things, and even all sins. Acts 2:23. “Him, being delivered by the determinate counsel and foreknowledge of God, ye have taken, and by wicked hands have crucified and slain;” 4:28. “For to do whatsoever thy hand and thy counsel determined before to be done.” If the thing meant, be only that Christ’s sufferings should come to pass by some means or other; I answer, they could not come to pass but by sin. For contempt and disgrace was one thing he was to suffer. Even the free actions of men are subject to God’s disposal. Proverbs 21:1. “The king’s heart is in the hand of the Lord; he turneth it as the rivers of water, whithersoever it pleaseth him.” See Jeremiah 52:3. “For through the anger of the Lord it came to pass in Jerusalem and Judah, till he had cast them out from his presence, that Zedekiah rebelled against the king of Babylon.”

The not complying with the terms of the covenant of grace is decreed, Peter 2:8. “ A stone of stumbling and a rock of offence to them that stumble at the word, being disobedient, whereunto also they were appointed.” What man determines, never comes to pass, unless God determines it, Lamentations 3:37. “ Who is he that saith, and it cometh to pass, and the Lord commandeth it not?” By commanding is here meant willing; and God is elsewhere said to speak, and it was done; to command, and it stood fast. God determines the limits of men’s lives, This is exceeding evident. Job 7:1. “ Is there not an appointed time to man upon earth? Are not his days also like the days of a hireling? ‘Days of a hireling’ signify an appointed, certain, limited time as Isaiah 16:14. and 21:16. If the limits of men’s lives are determined, men’s free actions must be determined, and even their sins; for their lives often depend on such acts.

See also Job 14:5. 31. If God does not know all things, then his knowledge may increase, he may gain, and may grow wiser as he grows older. He may discover new things, and may draw consequences from them And he may be mistaken: if he does not know, he may guess wrong: if he does not know, he has no infallible judgment; for an infallible judgment is knowledge. An if he may be mistaken, he may order matters wrong; he may be frustrated; his measures may be broken. For, doubtless, in things that are uncertain, he orders things according to what appears most probable, or else he fails in prudence. But in so ordering things, his measures may be broken. And then the greater part of the great events, viz, events among rational creatures, would be uncertain to him. For the greater part of them depend on men’s free actions. That he does foreknow, is evident by his predicting and foretelling events, and even the sins of men, as Judas’s sin. If he did not foreknow, he might change his will as he altered hits views. Now, it is especially with respect to God’s will and purposes, that he is said its Scripture not to be changeable. Having thus proved the foreknowledge of God, and the greater part of Arminians not denying it, I shall hereafter make it for granted, and shall argue against those only that allow it. If he did not foreknow and might be disappointed, he might repent. 32. They say, as God’s power extends only to all things possible, so God’s knowledge only extends to all things knowable.

Ans. Things impossible, or contradictions, are not things; but events that come to pass, are things God’s power does extend to all things, otherwise it would not be infinite. So neither is the knowledge of God infinite, unless God knows all things. To suppose that God cannot do things impossible, does not suppose that God’s power can be increased. But to suppose that God does not know men’s free actions, does suppose that God’s knowledge may be increased. To suppose that God’s decrees are conditional, in the sense of the Arminians, or that they depend, as they suppose, on a foresight of something that shall come to pass in time, is to suppose that something that first begins to be in time, is the cause of something that has been from all eternity, which is absurd; for nothing can be a cause of that existence, which is before the existence of that cause.

What an absurdity is it, to suppose that that existence which is an effect, is effected by a cause, when that cause that effects it, is not, or has no being!

If it he answered, that it is not the actual existence of the thing, that is the reason or cause of the decree, but the foresight of the existence; and the foresight of the existence may be at the same time with the decree, and before it, in the order of nature, though the existence itself is not and that it is not properly the actual existence of the thing foreseen, that is the cause of the decree, but the existence of it in the divine foreknowledge. I reply, that this does not help the difficulty at all, but only puts it a step further off; for still, by their scheme, the foreknowledge depends on the future actual existence; so that the actual existence is the cause of the divine foreknowledge, which is infinite ages before it. And it is a great absurdity to suppose this effect to flow from this cause, before the existence of the cause. And whatever is said, the absurdity will occur, unless we suppose that the divine decree is the ground of the futurition of the event, and also the ground of the foreknowledge of it. Then the cause is before the effect; but otherwise the effect is before the cause. 33. If God absolutely determined that Christ’s death should have success in gathering a church to him, it will follow that there was a number absolutely elected, or that God had determined some should surely be saved. If God determined that some should surely] be saved, that implies that he had determined that he would see to it, that some should perform the conditions of salvation and he saved; or, which is the same thing, that he would cause that they should be surely saved. But this cannot be, without fixing on the persons beforehand. For the cause is before the effect. There is no such thing as God’s resolving absolutely beforehand that he would save some, and yet not determining who they should be, before they were actually saved; or that he should see to it, that there should be in a number the requisites of salvation, and yet not determine who, till they actually have the requisites of salvation. But God had absolutely determined that some should be saved, yea, a great number, after Christ’s death; and had determined it beforehand. Because he had absolutely promised it; Isaiah 49:6. and 53:10. See in Psalm 72. and other places in the Psalm, and Titus 2:14. God, having absolutely purposed this before Christ’s death, must either have then determined the persons, or resolved that he would hereafter determine the persons; at least, if he saw there was need of it, and saw that they did not come in of themselves. But this latter supposition, if we allow it, overthrows the Arminian scheme. It shows that such a predetermination, or absolute election, is not inconsistent with God’s perfections, or the nature of the gospel-constitution, or God’s government of the world, and his promise of reward to the believing and obedient, and the design of gospel offers and commands, as the Arminians suppose. If God has absolutely determined to save some certain persons, then, doubtless, he has in like manner determined concerning all that are to be saved. God’s promising, supposes not only that the thing is future, but that God will do it. If it be left to chance, or man’s contingent will, and the event happen right, God is never the truer. He performs not his promise; he takes no effectual care about it; it is not he that promised, that performs.

That thing, or rather nothing, called fortune, orders all.-Concerning the absurdity of supposing that it was not absolutely determined beforehand, what success there should be of Christ’s death; see Polhill’s Spec. Theolog. in Christ, p 165-171.

It is pretended, at the antecedent certainty of any sin’s being committed, seeing that it is attended with necessity, takes away all liberty, and makes warnings and exhortations to avoid sin, a mere illusion. To this I would bring the instance of Peter. Christ told him, that he should surely deny him thrice that night, before the cock should crow twice. And yet, after that, Christ exhorted all his disciples to watch and pray, that they might not fall into temptation; and directs, that he who had no sword, should sell his garment and buy one. 34. How evident is it, that God sets up that to be sought after as a reward of virtue, and the fruit of our endeavours, which yet has determined shall never come to pass! As, 1 Samuel 13:13. “ And Samuel said unto Saul, Thou hast done foolishly thou hast not kept the commandment of the Lord thy God, which he commanded thee. For now would the Lord have established thy kingdom upon Israel for ever.” It is evident that God had long before decreed, that the kingdom of Israel should be established in the tribe of Judah. Luke 22:22. “ The Son of man goeth as it was determined, [Matthew 26:2 h. and Mark 14:21. as it is written of him,] but woe unto that man by whom the Son of man is betrayed.” As it was determined as this passage is not liable to the ambiguities which some have apprehended in Acts 2:23. and 4:28. (which yet seem on the whole to be parallel to it in their most natural construction,) I look upon it as an evident proof, that those things are in the language of Scripture said to be determined or decreed, (or exactly bounded and marked out by God, as the word ... most naturally signifies,) which he sees will in fact happen in consequence of his volitions, without any necessitating agency, as well as those events of which he is properly the author; and, as Beza expresses it, “Qui sequitur deum emendate sane loquitur, we nee not fear falling into any impropriety of speech, when we use the language which God has taught.” Doddridge in loc. 35. As to the decrees of election, see Psalm 65:4. Blessed is the man whom thou choosest, and causest to approach unto thee. that he mav dwell in thy courts we shall be satisfied with the goodness of thy house, even of thy holy temple.” Isaiah 41:9. “ Thou whom I have taken from the ends of the earth, and called thee from the chief men thereof, and said unto thee, Thou art my servant; I have chosen thee, and not cast thee away.” Matthew 20:16. “ So the last shall be first, and the first last; for many he called, but few chosen.” Chap. 22:14. “For many are called, but few are chosen.”

Chap. 24:24. “For there shall arise false Christs and false prophets, and shall show great signs and wonders; in so much that, if it were possible, they shall deceive the very elect.” John 6:37-46. “All that the Father giveth me, shall come to me; and him that cometh to me I will in no wise cast out,” etc. Chap. 10:3, 4, and ver. 11, and 14-17. ver. 26-30. “To him the porter openeth, and the sheep hear his voice; and he calleth his own sheep by name, and leadeth them out. And when he putteth forth his own sheep, he goeth before them, and the sheep follow him, for they know his voice. I am the good Shepherd; and know my sheep, and am known of mine.

Therefore doth my Father love me; because I lay down my life, that I might take it again. But ye believe not, because ye are not of my sheep, as I said unto you,” etc. Chap. 17:6-20. “I have manifested thy name unto the men thou gayest me out of the world: thine they were, and thou gayest them me; and they have kept thy word, etc. Neither pray I for these alone; but for them also which shall believe on me through their word.” Acts 18:10.”

For I am with thee, and no man shall set on thee, to hurt thee: for I have much people in this city.” As to reprobation, see Matthew 11:20-27. “Then began he to upbraid the cities wherein most of his mighty works were done, because they repented not, &e. Even so, Father, for so it seemed good in thy sight. All things are delivered unto me of my Father; and no man knoweth the Son, but the Father; neither knoweth any man the Father, save the Son, and he to whomsoever the Son will reveal him.” John 6:44-46. “ No man can come to me, except the Father which hath sent me draw him: and I will raise him up at the last day, etc. Not that any man hath seen the Lord, save he which is of God, be hath seen the Father.” Chap. 8:47. “He that is of God, heareth God’s words: ye therefore hear them not, because ye are not of God.” Chap. 10:26. “But ye believe not, because you are not of my sheep, as I said unto you.” Chap. 17:9-13. “I pray for them: I pray not for the world, but for them which thou hast given me; for they are thine,” etc. 1 Thessalonians 5:9. “ For God hath not appointed us to wrath, but to obtain salvation by our Lord Jesus Christ.” 1 Peter 2:8. “And a stone of stumbling, and a rock of offence, even to them which stumble at the word, being disobedient: whereunto also they were appointed.” Jude 4. “ For there are certain men crept in unawares, who were before of old ordained to this condemnation, turning the grace of God into lasciviousness.” 1 John 4:6. “We are of God. He that knoweth God, heareth us; he that is not of God, heareth not us. Hereby know we the spirit of truth, and the spirit of error.” Revelation 3:8. “1 know thy works: behold, I have set before thee an open door, and no man can shut it: for thou hast a little strength, and hast kept my word, and hast not denied my name.” Chap. 20:12-15. “And I saw the dead, small and great, stand before God; and the books were opened: and another book was opened, which is the book of life: and the dead were judged out of those things which were written in the books, according to their works. And whosoever was not found written in the book of life, was cast into the lake of fire.” John 12:37-41. “But though he had done so many miracles before them, yet they believed not on him. Because that Esaias said, he hath blinded their eyes, and hardened their heart, that they should not see with their eyes, etc.

These things said Esaias, when he saw his glory and spake of him.”

Romans 9:6,7,8. 11-14, 16-19. ver. 21-24. ver. 27, 29, 33. “Not as though the word of God hath taken none effect. For they are not all Israel, which are of Israel: neither because they are the seed of Abraham, are they all children: but, in Isaac shall thy seed be called. That is, they which are the children of the flesh, these are not the children of God; but the children of the promise are counted for the seed. For the children, being not yet born, neither having done any good or evil, that the purpose of God according to election might stand, not of works, but of him that calleth, it was said, The elder shall serve the younger, etc. What shall we say then? Is there unrighteousness with God? God forbid. So then, it is not of him that willeth, nor of him that runneth, but of God that showeth mercy, etc. Thou will say then unto me, Why doth he yet find fault? For who hath resisted his will? Hath not the potter power over the clay, of the same lump to make one vessel unto honour, and another to dishonour? etc. Even us whom he hath called, not of the Jews only, but also of the Gentiles. Esaias also crieth concerning Israel, Though the number of the children of Israel be as the sand of the sea, a remnant shall be saved: And as Esaias said before, Except the Lord of Sabaoth had left us a seed, we had been as Sodom, and been made like unto Gomorrha. As it is written, Behold, I lay in Sion a stumbling-stone, and a rock of offence. And whosoever believeth on him shall not be ashamed.” And chap. 11:1-6. ver. 7-11. ver. 15, 17, 19- 23. ver. 32, 36. “1 say then, bath God cast away his people? God forbid.

For I also am an Israelite, of the seed of Abraham, of the tribe of Benjamin, etc. Even so then at this present time also there is a remnant according to the election of grace. And if by grace, then is it no more of works: otherwise grace is no more grace. But if it be of works, then is it no more grace: otherwise work is no more work. What then? Israel hath not obtained that which he seeketh for; but the election hath obtained it, and the rest were blinded. God hath given them the spirit of slumber, eyes that they should not see, and ears that they should not hear, unto this day. Let their table be made a snare, and a trap, and a stumbling. block, and a recompence unto them, etc. And if some of the branches be broken off, and thou, being a wild olivetree, wert grafted in among them, and with them partakest of the root and fatness of the olive-tree; thou will say then, The branches were broken off, that I might be grafted in, &e, And they also, if they abide not in unbelief, shall he grafted in: for God is able to graft them in again. For God hath concluded them all in unbelief, that he might have mercy upon all. For of him, and through him and to him, are all things: to whom be glory for ever. Amen.” 36. All that is intended when we say that God decrees all that comes to pass, is, that all events are subject to the disposals of Providence, or that God orders all things in Isis providence; and that he intended from eternity to order all things in providence, and intended to order them as he does.

Election does not signify only something common to professing Christians, Matthew 20:16. “Many are called, but few are chosen.” Matthew 24:31. “He shall send forth his angels, and gather together his elect.” 37. God’s foreknowledge appears from this, that God has foretold that there should be some good men, as the Arminians themselves allow.

Stebbiug, in his Treatise concerning the Operations of the Holy Spirit, p. 237, second edition, says as follows: “So long as a man may be certain that those things will come to pass which God hath foretold, he may be certain, that God’s g race will prevail in multitudes of men before the end of all things. For by divers predictions in holy writ we are assured, that when Christ shall come to judgment, there will be some who shall be changed, and put on immortality.” 38. The Scriptures, in teaching us this doctrine, are guilty of no bard imposition on our understanding of a doctrine contrary to reason. If they bad taught the contrary doctrine, it would have been much more contrary to reason, and a much greater temptation to persons of diligent and thorough consideration, to doubt of the divinity of the Scripture. 39. Concerning the decreeing of sin, see Acts 3:17,18. with Acts 13:27. “And now, brethren, I wot that through ignorance ye did it, as did also your rulers. But those things which God before had showed by the mouth of all his prophets, that Christ should suffer, he hath so fulfilled.”-” F or they that dwell at Jerusalem, and their rulers, because they knew him not, nor yet the voices of the prophets which are read every sabbath-day, they have fulfilled them in condemning him.” 40. It is objected, that this is a speculative point. So might they say, Jesus’s being the Messiah, is a speculative point. 41. If God’s inviting or commanding a person to do a thing when be, in his decree, has ordained t at it shall be otherwise, argues insincerity in the command or invitation, the insincerity must be in this, viz, that he commands a thing to be done when his end in commanding is not, that the thing may be done; which cannot be his end; because he knows certainly at the time that he commands it, that it will not be. But it is certain, that God’s commanding a thing to be done, which he certainly knows at the time will not be done, is no evidence of insincerity in God in commanding.

For thus God commanded Pharaoh to let the people go: and yet he knew he would not obey, as he says at the same time that he orders the command to be given him, Exodus 3:18,19. “And thou shalt come, thou and the elders of Israel, unto the king of Egypt, and you shall say unto him, The Lord God of the Hebrews hath met with us; and now let us go, we beseech thee, three days’ journey into the wilderness, that we may sacrifice to the Lord our God: and I am sure that the king of Egypt will not let you go; no, not by a mighty hand.” See also chap. 4:21, 22, 23. and chap. 7:1-7.; see also chap. 9:16. compared with Romans 9:17. 42. It is impossible for an infinitely wise and good being to do otherwuse, than to choose what he sees on the whole to he best. And certainly reason requires us to suppose, that of all possible events with respect to sin, and the conversion and salvation of particular persons, it is better that one of those possible and opposite events should come to pass than another; and therefore, an infinitely wise and good being must choose accordingly. What God permits, he decrees to permit. If it is no blemish to God to permit sin, then it is no blemish to him to purpose or initend to permit it. And if he be omniscient, and does designedly permit that sin which actually comes to pass, then he designedly permits that sin, knowing, if he permits it, it will actually come to pass. And this is an effectual permission, and all that we plead for. What, then, do our adversaries quarrel with us for? And why do they pretend that we charge God with being the author of sin? There is a way of drawing consequences from Scripture, that begs the question. As the Arminians say, there are many more texts plainly against election, than seem to be for it, viz. those texts that represent, that general offers of salvation are made, as though it were left to men’s choice, whether they will be saved or no. But that is begging the question. For the question very much consists in these things, whether an absolute decree be inconsistent with man’s liberty, and so with a generah offer of salvation, etc. 43. Concerning the Arminian notion of election, that when the apostles speak of election, they only mean that by which the professing Christians in those days were distinguished from others, as the nation of Israel of old was; this is unreasonable, according to their own principles. For if they were elected, and that was the reason why they so far embraced the gospel, as to become Christians rather titan others, then, on Arminian principles, no thanks were due to them for embracing the gospel; neither were others, who continued openly to reject the gospel, to blame; and it was in vain to use any means to persuade any to join with the christian church; nor were any to blame for not doing it, or to he praised for doing it, etc. Besides, their principles render vain all endeavours to spread the gospel. For the gospel will certainly be spread to all nations that are elected; and all such shall have the offers of the gospel, whether they take any care of the matter or no. 44. Dr. Whitby, to make out his scheme, makes the word election signify two entirely different things; one, election to a common faith of Christianity; another, a conditional election to salvation. But every one must be sensible of the unreasonableness of such shifting and varying, and turning into all shapes, to evade the force of Scripture. 45, It is evident the apostle, in Romans 9 has not only respect to God’s sovereignty in the election and preterition of nations, because he illustrates his meaning by the instance of a particular person, viz. Pharaoh. The exercise of t.he sovereignty that he speaks of, appears by the express words of the apostle about vessels of mercy aid vessels of wrath, vessels of honour and vessels of dishonour. But the vessels of mercy, he speaks of as prepared to glory. They, it is plain, are those that shall be saved, and the vessels of wrath are those that perish. He speaks of those that shall be saved, ver. 27. “A remnant shall be saved.” What is there that God does decree, accord ing to the scheme of the Arminians, so as to make it in any measure consistent with itself? He does not decree any of the great events of the world of mankind, (which are the principal events, and those to which all others are subordinated,) because these depend on men’s free will. He does not absolutely decree any events wherein the welfare of men is concerned; for if he does, then these things, according to their scheme, cannot be the subject of prayer. For according to them, it is absurd to seek or pray for things, which we do not know but that God has absolutely decreed and fixed before. We do not know but that he has determined absolutely and unfrustrably from eternity, that they shall not he; and then, by their scheme, we cannot pray in faith for them. See Whitby, p. 177, etc.

And if God does not decree and order those events beforehand, then what becomes of the providence of God; and what room is there for prayer, if there be no providence? Prayer is shut out this way also. According to them, we cannot reasonably pray for the accomplishment of things that are already fixed, before our prayers; for then our prayers alter nothing, and what, say they, signifies it for us to pray?

Dr. Whitby insists upon it, that we cannot pray in faith for the salvation of others, if we do not know that Christ died intentionally for their saluation. 46. To Dr. Whitby’s observation, that the apostle speaks of churches, as though they were all elect, I answer, he speaks from a judgment of charity, as Dr. Whitby himself observes, p. 460. God foreknows the elect, as God is said to know those that are his own sheep from strangers; as Christ is said not to know the workers of iniquity, that is, he owns them. not. In the same sense, God is said to know the elect from all eternity; that is, he knew them as a man knows his own things. He acknowledged them from eternity. He owns them as his children. Reprobates he did not know; they were strangers to God from all eternity. If God ever determined, in the general, that some of mankind should certainly be saved, and did not leave it altogether undetermined whether ever so much as one soul of all mankind should believe in Christ; it must be that he determined that some particular persons should certainly believe in him. For it is certain that if he has left it undetermined concerning this, and that, and the other person, whether ever he should believe or not, and so of every particular person in the world; then there is no necessity at all, that this, or that, or any particular person in the world, should ever be saved by Christ, for the matter of any determination of God’s. So that, though God sent his Son into the world, yet the matter was left altogether undetermined by God, whether ever any person should be saved by him, and there was all this ado about Christ’s birth, death, resurrection, ascension, and sitting at God’s right hand, when it was not as yet determined whether he should ever save one soul, or have any mediatorial kingdom at all. 47. It is most absurd to call such a conditional election as they talk of, by the name of election, seeing there is a necessary connexion between faith in Jesus Christ and eternal life. Those that believe in Christ, must be saved according to God’s inviolable constitution of things. What nonsense is it, therefore, to talk of choosing such to life from all eternity Out of the rest of mankind! A predestination of such to life is altogether useless and needless.

By faith in one that has satisfied for sin, the soul necessarily becomes free from sin. By faith in one that has bought eternal life for them, they have, of unavoidable consequence, a right to eternal life, Now, what sense is it to say, that God from all eternity, of his free grace, chose out those that he foresaw would have no guilt of sin, that they should not be punished for their guilt, as others were, when it is a contradiction to suppose that they can be punished for their guilt when they have none? For who can lay any thing to their charge, when it is Christ that has died? And what do they mean by an election of men to that which is, in its own nature, impossible that it should not be, whether they are elected to it or no; or by God’s choosing them that had a right to eternal life, that they should possess it?

What sense is it to say that a creditor chooses out those among his debtors to be free from debt, that owe him nothing? But if they say that election is only God’s determination, in the general, that all that believe shall be saved, in what sense can this be called election? They are not persons that are here chosen, but mankind is divided into two sorts, the one believing, and the other unbelieving, and God chooses the believing sort. It is not election of persons, but of qualifications. God does from all eternity choose to bestow eternal life upon those that have a right to it, rather than upon those who have a right to damnation. Is this all the election we have an account of in God’s word? Such a thing as election may well be allowed; for that there is such a thing as sovereign love, is certain; that is, love, not for any excellency, but merely God’s good pleasure. For whether it is proper to say that God from all eternity loved the elect or no, it is proper to say that God loved men after the fall, while sinners and enemies; for God so loved the world, that he gave his only-begotten Son to die. This was not for any goodness or excellency, but merely God’s good pleasure; for he would not love the fallen angels. 48. Christ is often spoken of in Scripture as being, by way of eminency, the elect or chosen of God. Isaiah 42:1. “Behold my servant whom I uphold, mine elect in whom my soul delighteth.” Luke 23:35. “If he be the Christ, the chosen of God.” 1 Peter 2:4. “A living stone, chosen of God, and precious.” Psalm 89:3. “I have made a covenant with my chosen:” ver. 19. “I have exalted one chosen out of the people.” Hence those persons in the Old Testament, that were the most remarkable types of Christ, were the subjects of a very remarkable election of God, by which they were designed to some peculiar honour of the prophetical, priestly, or kingly office. So Moses was called God’s chosen, in that wherein he was eminently a type of Christ, viz, as a prophet and ruler, and mediator for his people; Psalm 106:23. “Had not Moses, his chosen, stood before him in the breach.” So Aaron was constituted high priest by a remarkable election of God, as in Numbers 16:5. and 17:5. Deuteronomy 21:5. So David the king was the subject of a remarkable election; Psalm 78:68-72. “Moreover, he refused the tabernacle of Joseph, and chose not the tribe of Ephraim, but chose the tribe of Judah, the mount Sion which he loved; and he built his sanctuary like high palaces; like the earth which he hath established forever. He chose David also his servant, and took him from the sheepfolds, from following the ewes great with young he brought him to feed Jacob his people, and Israel his inheritance.” 1 Samuel 16:7-10.

The Lord hath not chosen this, neither hath the Lord chosen this; the Lord hath not chosen these.” Christ is the chosen of God, both as to Isis divine and human nature. As to his divine nature, he was chosen of God, though not to any addition to his essential glory or real happiness, which is infinite, yet to great declarative glory. As he is man, he is chosen of God to the highest degree of real glory and happiness of all creatures. As to both, he is chosen of God to the office and gloomy of the mediator between God and men, and the head of all the elect creation. His election, as it respects his divine nature, was for his worthiness and excellency and infinite amiableness in the sight of God, and perfect fitness for that which God chose him to, and his worthiness was the ground of his election. But his election, as it respects his human nature, was free and sovereign, not being for any worthiness, but his election was the foundation of his worthiness.

His election, as he is God, is a manifestation of God’s infinite wisdom. The wisdom of any being is discovered by the wise choice he makes; so the infinite wisdom of God is manifest in the wisdom of his choice when he chose his eternal Son, one so fir, upon all accounts, for the office of a mediator, when he only was fit, and when he was perfectly and infinitely fit; and yet his fitness was so difficult to be discerned, that none but one of infinite wisdom could discover it. His election, as he was man, was a manifestation of God’s sovereignty and. grace. God had determined to exalt one of the creatures so high, that he should be one person with God, and should have communion with God, and should have glory in all respects answerable; and so should be the head of all other elect creatures, that they might be united to God and glorified in him. And his sovereignty appears in the election of the man Jesus, various ways. It appears in choosing the species of creatures of which he should be, viz. the race of mankind, and not the angels, the superior species. God’s sovereignty alsoappears its choosing this creature of the seed of fallen creatures that were become ememies and rebels, abominable, miserable creatures. It appears in choosing that he should be of such a branch of mankind, in selecting the posterity of David, a mean person originally, and the youngest of the family. And as he was the seed of the woman, so his sovereignty appears in his being the seed of such particular women; as of Leah, the uncomely y wife of Jacob, whom her husband had not chosen; and Tamar a Camaamitess, and a harlot; and Rahab a harlot; and Ruth a Moabitess; and of Bathsheba, one that had committed adultery; and as he was the seed of many a mean person. And his sovereignty appears in the choice of that individual female of whom Christ was born.

It was owing to this election of God, that the man Jesus was not one of the corrupt race of mankind, so that his freedom from sin and damnation is owing to the free, sovereign, electing love of God in him, as well as in the rest of elect men. All holiness, all obedience and good works, and perseverance in him, was owing to the electing love of God, as well as in his elect members. And so his freedom from eternal damnation was owing to the free, electing love of God another way, viz, as it was owing to God’s electing love to him and his members, but to him in the first place, that he did not fail in that great and difficult work that he undertook; that he did nor fail under his extreme sufferings, and so eternally continue under them. For if he had failed; if his courage, resolution, and love had been conquered by Isis sufferings, he never could have been delivered from them; for then he would have failed in his obedience to God, and his love to God failing, and being overcome by sufferings, these sufferings would have failed of the nature of an acceptable sacrifice to God, and the infinite value of his sufferings would have failed, and so must be made up in infinite duration, to atone for his own deficiency. But God having chosen Christ, he could not fail in this work, and so was delivered from his sufferings, from the eternity of them, by the electing love of God, Justification and glorification were fruits of God’s foreknowledge and predestination in him, as well as in his elect members.

So that the man Christ Jesus has the eternal, electing love of God to him, to contemplate and admire, and to delight and rejoice his heart, as all his elect members have. He has it before him, as others have, eternally to praise God for his free and sovereign election of him, and to ascribe the praise of his freedom from eternal damnation, (which he, with his elect members, beholds, and has had a sense of, far beyond all the rest, and so has more cause of joy and praise for his deliverance from it,) and the praise of the glory he possesses, to that election. This election is not for Christ’s works or worthiness, for all his works and worthiness are the fruits of it.

God had power over this seed of the woman, to make it either a vessel to honour, or dishonour, as he had over the rest.

Christ is, by way of eminency, called The Elect of God. For though other elect men are by election distinguished from the greater part of mankind, yet they, in their election, have that which is common to thousands and millions; and though the elect angels are distinguished by election from the angels that fell, yet they are chosen among myriads of others; but this man, by his election, is vastly distinguished from all other creatures in heaven or earth; and Christ, in his election, is the head of election, and the pattern of all other election. Christ is the head of all elect creatures; and both angels and men are chosen in him in some sense, i.e. chosen to he in him. All elect men are said to be chosen in Christ, Ephesians 1:4. Election contains two things, viz, foreknowledge and predestination, which are distinguished in the 8th chapter of Romans. The one is choosing persons to be God’s, which is a foreknowing of them; and the other, a destining theta to be conformed to the image of his Son, both in holiness and blessedness. The elect ate chosen in him with respect to those two, in senses somewhat diverse. With respect to foreknowledge or foreknowing, we are chosen in him as God chose us, to be actually his in this way, viz. by being in Christ, or being members of his Son. This is the way that God determined we should actually become his. God chose Christ, and gave his elect people to him; and so, looking on them as his, owned them for Isis own. But by predestination, which is consequent on his foreknowledge, we ate elected in Christ, as we are elected in Isis election. For God having in foreknowledge given us to Christ, he thenceforward beheld us as members and parts of him; and so ordaining the head to glory, he therein ordained the members to glory. In destining Christ to eternal life, he destined all parts of Christ to it also. So that we are appointed to eternal life in Christ, being in Christ, his members from eternity. In his being appointed to life, we are appointed to life. So Christ’s election is the foundation of ours, as much as Isis justification and glorification are the foundation of ours. By election in Scripture is sometimes meant this latter part, viz. destination to conformity to Christ in life and glory, as 2 Thessalonians 2:13. “God from the beginning hath chosen you to salvation — “And it seems to be spoken of in this sense chiefly, in Ephesians 1:3,4,5. “Who hath blessed us with all spiritual blessings in heavenly places in Christ, according as he hath chosen us in him before the foundation of the would, that we should he holy and without blame before him in hove; having predestinated us to the adoption of children by Jesus Christ to himself, according to the good pleasure of his will.” 49. 2 Thessalonians 2:13 “But we are bound to give thanks alway to God for you, brethren, beloved of the Lord, because God hath from the beginning chosen you to salvation, through sanctification of the Spirit and belief of the truth.” Concerning this scripture I observe the following things: 1. The word translated chosen is a word that signifies to choose or pick out from many others. 2. That this choosing is given as a reason why those differ from others that believe not the truth, but have pleasure in unrighteousness, as an instance of the distinguishing grace of God; and therefore the apostle mentions their being chosen, their election as the ground of their sanctification by the Spirit and belief of the truth. 3. The apostle speaks of their being chosen to salvation, as a ground of their perseverance, or the reason why they never shall fall away, as others spoken of before, whereby they failed of salvation. See the preceding verses. Compare Hebrews 6:9. 4. They are spoken of as thus chosen from the beginning.

That place, Matthew 20:21-23. “Grant that these my two sons may sit, one on thy right hand, and the other on thy left, in thy kingdom; — it shall be given to them for whom it is prepared of my Father,” affords an invincible argument for particular, personal predestination.

It is an evidence that the apostle, in chap. 9 of Romans, has not respect solely to an election and dereliction of nations or public societies, that one instance which he produces to illustrate and confirm what he says, is the dereliction of a particular person, even Pharaoh, Romans 9:17. So it is an instance of God’s mercy to a particular person, even Moses. When he says to Moses, “I will have mercy on whom I will have mercy, and will have compassion on whom I will have compassion,” etc. the words cited were used by God on occasion of and with relation to his mercy to a particular person, even Moses; (see Exodus 33:19.) And the language in that verse and the next, is suited to particular persons; as, verse 16 and 18, and verses 22, 23. And the apostle shows plainly, verses 27, 29, that it is not an election of nations or publie societies, butt a distinction of some particular persons from others of the same society as it was a distinction of particular persons, in preserving some, when others were destroyed by Nebuchadnezzar’s armies; and in returning some from captivity, and leaving others. This was not a showing of mercy to one public society in distinction from another. So in chap. 10:4, 5. where the apostle plainly continues to speak of the same election, it was not by a national election, or election of any public society, that God distinguished the seven thousand that he had reserved, who had not bowed the knee to Baal.

John 6:37. “All that the Father hath given me shall come to me. And this is the Father’s will which sent me, that of all which he hath given me I should lose nothing, butt should raise it up again at the last day.”-” What is this being given to Christ to be raised up again to everlasting life, but the election of particular persons to salvation? And since it is the Father’s will, that of all that he has given to Christ, he should lose nothing this election must be so absolute as to insure their salvation.” Green’s Friendly Controversies.

It is plainly and abundantly taught in Scripture, that election is not of works. Romans 9:11. “That the purpose of God according to election might stand, not of works, but of him that calleth.” Verse 11. “Neither of them having done either good or evil.” And Romans 11:5,6. “ Even so at this present time also, there is a remnant according to the election of grace.

And if by grace, then it ms no mom-n of works; otherwise grace is no more grace. But if it be of works, then it is no more grace; otherwise work is no more work.” 2 Timothy 1:9. “ Who hath saved us, and called us with a holy calling, ‘not according to oar works, but according to his own purpose and grace, which was given us in Christ Jesus before the world began.”

How invincible a proof of the calvinistical doctrine of election is that place in Romans 11:5! “Even so then at this present time also, there is a remnant according to the election of grace.” Dr. Doddridge observes upon it, that some explain this of having chosen grace, 1:c. the gospel. But that turn is very unnatural, and neither suits the phrase, nor the connexion with the former clause, or with the next verse, where the apostle comments on his own words. 50. If God does not some way in his providence, and so in his predeterminations, order what the volitions of men shall be, he would be as dependent in governing the world, as a skilfuth mariner is in governing his ship, in passing over a turbulent, tempestuous ocean, where he meets constantly, and through the whole voyage, with things that agitate the ship, have great influence on the motions of it, and are so cross and grievous to him that he is obliged to accommodate himself in the best manner that he can. He meets with cross winds, violent tempests, strong currents, and gm- eat opposition from enemies; none of which things he has the disposal of, butt is forced to suffer. He only guides the ship, and, by his skill, turns that hither and thither, and steers it in such a manner as to avoid dangers, as well as the case will allow. 51. As that objection against the election which the apostle speaks of in his epistles, as an election by which such should be distinguished as should certainly be saved at last, viz. that many of those whom the apostle calls elect, chosen in Christ, etc. actually turned apostates; what Dr. Doddnidge observes in his note on Ephesians 1:4. may be a sufficient Answer. The apostle speaks of whole societies in general as consisting of saints and believers, because this was the predominant character; and he. had reason, in the judgment of charity, to believe the greater part were such; (compare Philippians 1:7.) Nor did be always judge it necessary to make exceptions iii reference to a few hypocrites who had crept in among them, any more than Christ judged it so to speak of Judas as excluded, when he mentions the twelve thrones of judgment on which the apostles should sit.” (Matn. 19:28.) 52. Many have a notion concerning some things in religion, and, in particular, concerning predestination, that if they be the truth, yet it is not best that they should be known. But many reasons may be offered against this notion. 53. What the devil did to afflict Job, was the exercise and fruit of his devilish disposition, and his acts therein were devilish. And vet it is most apparent, that those acts and effects of the ‘devil towards Job, were appointed by infinite wisdom for holy ends; but not accomplished by God any otherwise than by permission. 54. There were many absolute promises of old, that salvation should actually be accomplished, and that it should be of great extent, or extending to great multitudes of mankind; as, that “ the seed of the woman should bruise the serpent’s head.” “ In thee, and in thy seed, shall all the families of the earth be blessed.” Psalm 22:30. “A seed shall serve him, and it shall be accounted to the Lord for a generation.” Isaiah 53:10. “He shall see his seed.” Psalm 2:6. “ Ask of me, and I will give thee the heathen for thine inheritance,” etc. Psalm 110. “Sit thou at my right hand, till I make thine enemies thy footstool.” “ Thy people shall be willing in the day of thy power;” and innumerable others. And if there were absolute promises of this, then there were absolute purposes of it; for that which is sincerely, absolutely promised, is with an absolute purpose of fulfilling the promise.

But how can it be devised, that there should be an absolute, determinate, infallible, unchangeable purpose, that Christ should actually save vast multitudes of mankind and yet it be not absolutely purposed that he should save any one single person, but that with regard to every individual soul, this was left undetermined by God, to be determined by man’s contingent will, which might determine for salvation, or against it, there being nothing to render it impossible concerning any one, that his will would not finally determine against it? Observe, these prophecies are not merely predictions, but are of the nature of promises, and are often so called-” Which he hath promised by the mouth of all his holy prophets since the world began,” etc.

God takes care to fulfil his own promises; but, according to this scheme, it is not God that fulfils these promises; but men, left to themselves, to their contingent wills, fulfil them. Man’s will, which God does not determine, determines itself in exclusion of God.

All the promises of God are yea and amen, and God himself makes them so to be; he takes care of that matter. 55. Concerning that grand objection, that this doctrine supposes partiality in God, and is very dishonourable to him, being quite contrary to God’s extensive and universal benevolence to his creatures; it may be shown that the Arminian notions and principles in this matter, head directly to deism; and that on these principles, it is utterly impossible to answer Tindal’s objections against revealed religion, especially in his 14th chapter. Besides, unjustifiable partiality is not imputable to a sovereign distributing his favours, though ever so unequally, unless it be done unwisely, and so as to infringe the common good. 56. God has regard to conditions in his decrees, as he has regard to a wise order and connexion of things. Such us his wisdom in his decrees, and all his acts and operations, that if it were not for wise connexion that is regarded, many things would not be decreed. One part of the wise system of events would not have been decreed, unless the other parts had been decreed, etc. God in the decree of election is justly to be considered as decreeing the creature’s eternal happiness, antecedently to any foresight of good works, in a sense wherein he does not in reprobation decree the creature’s eternal misery, antecedently to any foresight of sin; because the being of sin is supposed in the first place in order to the decree of reprobation, which is, that God will glorify his vindictive justice; and the very notion of revenging justice, simply considered, supposes a fault to be revenged. But faith and good works are not supposed in the first place in order to the decree of election. The first things in order in this decree are, that God will communicate his happiness, and glorify his grace; (for these two seem to be co-ordinate;) but in neither of these are faith and good works supposed. For when God decrees, and seeks to communicate his own happiness in the creature’s happiness, the notion of this, simply considered, supposes or implies nothing of faith or good works; nor does the notion of grace, in itself, suppose any such thing. It does not necessarily follow from the very nature of grace, or God’s communicativeness of his own happiness, that there must be faith and good works. This is only a certain way of the appointment of God’s wisdom,, wherein he will bring men to partake of his grace. But yet God is far from having decreed damnation from a foresight of evil works, in the sense of the Arminians, as if God in this decree did properly depend on the creature’s sinful act, as an event, the coming to pass of which primarily depends on the creature’s determination; so that the creature’s determination in this decree may properly be looked upon as antecedent to God’s determination, and on which his determination is consequent and dependent. 58. What divines intend by prior and posterior in the affair of God’s decrees, is not that one is before another in the order of time, for all are from eternity; but that we must conceive the view or consideration of one decree to be before another, inasmuch as God decrees one thing out of respect to another decree that he has made; so that one decree must be conceived of as in some sort to be the ground of another, or that God decrees one because of another; or that he would not have decreed one, had he decreed that other. Now there are two ways in which divine decrees may be said to be in this sense prior one to another. h. When one thing decreed is the end of another, this must in some respect be conceived of as prior to that other. The good to be obtained is in some respect prior, in the consideration of him who decrees and disposes, to the means of obtaining it. 2. When one thing decreed is the ground on which the disposer goes, in seeking such an end by another thing decreed, as being the foundation of the capableness or fitness that there is in that other thing decreed, to obtain such an end. Thus the sinfulness of the reprobate is the ground on which God goes in determining to glorify his justice in the punishment of his sinfulness; because his sinfulness is the foundation of the possibility of obtaining that end by such means. His having sin is the foundation of both the fitness and possibility of justice being glorified in the punishment of his sin, and therefore the consideration of the being of sin in the subject, must in some respect be prior in the mind of the disposer, to the determination to glorify his justice in the punishment of sin. For the disposer must first consider the capableness and aptness of such means for such an end, before be determines them to such an end.

Thus God must be conceived of, as first considering Adonibezek’s cruelty in cutting off the thumbs and great toes of threescore and ten kings, as that which was to be before he decreed to glorify his justice in punishing that cruelty by the cutting off his thumbs and great toes. For God, in this last decree, has respect to the fitness and aptness of his thumbs and great toes being cut off to glorify his justice. But this aptness depends on the nature of that sin that was punished. Therefore the disposer, in fixing on those means for this end, must be conceived of as having that sin in view. Not only must God be conceived of as having some end in consideration, before he determines the means in order to that end, but he must also be conceived of as having a consideration of the capableness or aptness of the means to obtain the end before he fixes on the means. Both these, in different respects, may be said to be prior to the means decreed to such an end in the mind of the disposer. Both, in different respects, are the ground or reason of the appointment of the means. The end is the ground or reason of the appointment of the means; and also the capacity and fitness of means to the end, is the ground or reason of this appointment to such an end. So both the sin of the reprobate, and also the glory of divine justice, may properly be said to be before the decree of damning the reprobate. The decree of damnation may properly be said, in different respects, to be because of both these; and that God would not have decreed the damnation of the sinner, had it not been for the respect he had both to the one and the other. Both may properly be considered as the ground of the decree of damnation. The view of the sinfulness of the reprobate must be in some respect prior in the decree, to God’s decree to glorify his justice in punishing their sinfulness. Because sinfulness is necessarily supposed as already existing in the decree of punishing sinfulness, and the decree of damnation being posterior to the consideration of the sin of men in this hatter respect, clears God of any injustice in such a decree. That which stands in the place of the ultimate end in a decree, i.e. that which is a mere end, and not a means to any thing further or higher, viz. the shining forth of God’s glory, and the communication of his goodness, must indeed be considered as prior in the consideration of the Supreme Disposer, to every tiling excepting the mere possibility of it. But this must in some respects be conceived of as prior to that, because possibility is necessarily supposed in his decree. But if we descend lower than the highest end; if we come down to other events decreed, that be not mete ends, but means to obtain that end, then we must necessarily bring in mote things, as in some respect prior, in the same manner as mere possibility is in this highest decree.

Because more things must necessarily be supposed en considered as existing in the decree, in order that those things which are decreed may reach the end for which they are decreed. More things must be supposed in order to a possibility of these things taking place as subordinate to their end; and therefore they stand in the same place, in these lower decrees, as absolute possibility does in the decree of the highest end. The vindictive justice of God is not to be considered as a mere or ultimate end, but as a means to that end. Indeed, God’s glorifying his justice, or rather his glorifying his holiness and greatness, has the place of a mere and ultimate end. But his glorifying his justice in punishing sin, (or in exercising vindictive justice, which is the same,) is not to be considered as a mere end, but a certain way or means of obtaining an end. Vindictive justice is not to be considered as a certain, distinct attribute to be glorified, but as a certain way and means for the glorifying an attribute. Every distinct way of God’s glorifying or exercising an attribute, might as well be called a distinct attribute as this. It is but giving a distinct name to it, and so we might multiply attributes without end. The considering of the glorifying of vindictive justice as a mere end, has led to great misrepresentations, and undue and unhappy expressions about the decree of reprobation- Hence the glorifying of God’s vindictive justice on such particular persons, has been considered as altogether prior its the decree to their sinfulness, yea, to their very beings Whereas it being only a means to an end, those things that are necessarily presupposed, in order to the fitness and possibility of this means of obtaining the end, must be conceived of as prior to it. Hence God’s decree of the eternal damnation of the reprobate is not to be conceived of as prior to the fall, yea, and to the very being of the persons, as the decree of the eternal glory of the elect is. For God’s glorifying his love, and communicating his goodness, stands in the place of a mere or ultimate end, and therefore is prior in the mind of the eternal Disposer to the very being of the subject, and to every thing but mere possibility. The goodness of God gives the being as well as the happiness of the creature, and does not presuppose it. Indeed, the glorifying of God’s mercy, as it presupposes the subject to be miserable, and the glorifying his grace, as it presupposes the subject to be sinful, unworthy, and ill deserving, are not to be conceived of as ultimate ends, but only as certain ways and means for the glorifying the exceeding abundance and overflowing fulness of God’s goodness and love; therefore these decrees are not to be considered as prior to the decree of the being and permission of the fall of the subject. And the decree of election, as it implies a decree of glorifying God’s mercy and grace, considers men as being cursed and fallen; because the very notion of such a decree supposes sin and misery. Hence we may learn, how much in the decree of predestination is to be considered as prior to the creation and fall of man, and how much as posterior; viz. that God’s decree to glorify his love and communicate his goodness, and to glorify his greatness and holiness, is to be, considered as prior to creation and the fall of man. And because the glory of God’s love, and the communication of his goodness, necessarily imply the happiness of the creature, and give both their being and happiness; hence the design to communicate and glorify his goodness and love eternally to a certain number, is to be considered as prior, in both those mentioned respects, to their being and fall. For such a design, in the notion of it, presupposes neither. But nothing in the decree of reprobation is to be looked upon as antecedent in one of those respects to man’s being and fall; but only that general decree that God will glorify his justice, or rather his holiness and greatness, which supposes neither their being nor sinfulness. But whatsoever there is in this decree of evil to particular subjects, it is to be considered as consequent on the decree of their creation, and permission of their fall. And indeed, although all that is in the decree of election, all that respects good to the subjects, be not posterior to the being and fall of men, yet both the decree of election and rejection or reprobation, as so styled, must be considered as consequent on the decrees concerning the creation and fall. For both these decrees have respect to that distinction or discrimination that is afterwards actually made amongst men in pursuance of these decrees. Hence effectual calling, being the proper execution of election, is sometimes in Scripture called election; and the rejection of men in time is called reprobation. Therefore the decrees of election and reprobation must be looked upon as beginning there, where the actual distinction begins, because distinction is implied in the notion of those decrees. And therefore, whatsoever is prior to this actual distinction, the foresight of it, and decree concerning it, or that state that was common, or wherein they were undistinguished, the foresight of that, or decree concerning it, must be considered, in some respect, as prior to the decree concerning the distinction. Because all that is before is supposed or looked upon as already put in the decree. For that is the decree, viz. to make such a distinction between those that were before in such a common state. And this is agreeable to the scripture representations of those decrees, John 15:19. “Ye are not of the world, but I have chosen you out of the world, therefore the world hateth you.” See also Ezekiel 16:1-8.

The decrees of God must be conceived of in the same order, and as antecedent to, and consequent on, one another, in the same manner, as God’s acts in the execution of those decrees. If this will not hold, with regard to those things that are the effects of those acts, yet certainly it will hold with respect to the acts themselves. They depend on one another, and are grounded on one another, in the sanie manner as the decrees that these are the execution of, and in no other. For, on the one hand, the decrees ‘of God are no other than his eternal doing what is done, acted, or executed by him in time. On the one hand,’ God’s acts themselves, in executing, can be conceived of no otherwise, than as decrees for a present effect. They are acts of God’s will. God brings things to pass only by acts of his will. He speaks, and it is done. - His will says, let it be, and it is. And this act of his will that now is, cannot be looked upon as really different from that act of will that was in him before, and from eternity, in decreeing that this thing should be at this time. It differs only relatively, Here is no new act of the will in God, but only the same acts of God’s will, which before, because the time was not come, respected future time; and so were called decrees.

But now the time being come, they respect present time, and so are not called by us decrees, but acts executing decrees. Yet they are evidently the same acts in God. Therefore those acts, in executing, must certainly be conceived of in the same order, and with the same dependence, as the decrees themselves. It may be in some measure illustrated by this-The decree of God, or the will of God decreeing events, may be represented as a straight line of infinite length, that runs through all past eternity, and terminates in the event. The last point in the line, is the act of God’s will in bringing the event to pass, and does not at all differ from all the other points throughout the infinite length of the line, in any other respect but this, that this last point is next to the event. This line may be represented as in motion, but yet always kept parallel to itself. The hither end of the line, by its motion, describes events in the order in which they come to pass; or at least represents God’s acts in bringing the events to pass, in their order and mutual dependence, antecedence, and consequence. By the motion of all the other points of the line, before the event or end of the line, in the whole infinite length of it, are represented the decrees in their order; which, because the line in all its motions is kept parallel to itself, is exactly the same with the order of the motions of the last point. For the motion of every point of the whole line, is in all respects just like the motions of that last point wherein the line terminates in the event; and the different parts of the motion of every point, are its every respect precisely in the same order.

And the maxim, that what is first in intention, is last in execution, does not in the least concern this matter. For, by last in execution, is meant only last in order of time, without any respect to the priority or posteriority that we are speaking of; and it does not at all -hinder, but that in God’s acts, in executing his decrees, one act is the ground or reason of another act, in the same manner precisely as the decree that related to it was the ground or reason of the other decree. The absolute independence of God no more argues against some of God’s decrees being grounded on decrees of some other things that should first come to pass, than it does against some of God’s acts in time, being grounded on some other antecedent acts of his. It is just the same with God’s acts in executing, as has been said already of his decreeing. In one respect, the end that is afterwards to be accomplished, is the ground of God’s acting; in another respect, something that is already accomplished, is the ground of his acting, as it is the ground of the fitness or capableness of the act to obtain the end. There is nothing but the ultimate end of all things, viz. God’s glory, and the communication of his goodness that is prior to all first acts in creating the world, in one respect, and mere possibility in another. But, with respect to after-acts, other ends are prior in one respect, and other preceding acts are prior in another, just as I have shown it to be with respect to God’s decrees. Now, this being established, it may help more clearly to illustrate, and fully to evince, what we have insisted on concerning the order of the decrees, and that God’s decrees of some things that are accomplished first in order of time, are also prior in the order, so as to be the proper ground and reason of other decrees. For, let us see how it is in God’s acts in executing his decrees. Will any deny, that God’s act in rewarding righteousness, is grounded on a foregoing act of his in giving righteousness? And that he regards righteousness in such a person, because he hath given righteousness to such a person; and that because this latter act necessarily supposes the former act foregoing? So, in like manner, God’s decree, in determining to reward righteousness, is grounded on an antecedent decree to give righteousness, because the former decree necessarily supposes the latter decree, and implies it in the very notion of it. So, who will deny, but that God’s act in punishing sin is grounded on what God hath antecedently done in permitting sin, or suffering it to be, because the former necessarily supposes the latter, and therefore that the actual permission of sun is prior, in the order of nature, to the punishment of it? So that whatever foregoing act of God is in any respect a ground and reason of another succeeding act, so far is both the act and decree of the act prior to both that other act and decree. It may be objected to this, that if so, the decree of bestowing salvation on an elect soul, is founded on the decree of bestowing faith on him; for God actually bestows salvation in some respect, because he has bestowed faith; and this would be to make the decree of election succeeding to the decree of giving faith, as well as that of reprobation consequent on the decree of permitting sin. To this I answer, that both God’s act, and also his decree of bestowing salvation on such a fallen creature, is in some respects grounded on God’s act and decree of giving faith, but in no wise as the decree or act of eternal punishing is grounded on sin, because punishment necessarily presupposes sin, so that it could not be without. But the decreeing and giving the happiness of the elect, is not so founded on faith. The case is very different For with respect to eternal punishment, it may be said that God would not, yea, could not, have decreed or executed it, had he not decreed and permitted sin; but it cannot be said, either that God could not, or would not, have decreed or bestowed the eternal happiness of the elect, unless hue had decreed and given faith.

Indeed, the salvation of an elect soul is, in this respect, grounded on the decree of giving faith as God’s decree of bestowing happiness on the elect in this particular way, as a fallen creature, and by the righteousness of Christ made his own, by being heartily received and closed with, is grounded on the decree of bestowing faith in Christ, because it presupposes it, as the act that answers to this decree does. But the decree of bestowing happiness in general, which we conceive of as antecedent to this act, presupposes no such thing; nor does just so much without any more in execution presuppose faith, or indeed the righteousness of Christ, or any act or suffering of a mediator, or even the fall of man. And the decree of God’s communicating his goodness to such a subject does not so much as presuppose the being of the subject, because it gives being. But there is no decree of evil to such a subject which can be conceived of as antecedent to a decree of punishment. For the first decree of evil or suffering, implies that in it. For there is no evil decreed for any other end, but the glory of God’s justice. Therefore the decree of the permission of sin is prior to all other things in the decree of reprobation. Due distinctions seem not to have been observed, in asserting that all the decrees of God are unconditional; which has occasioned difficulties in controversies about the decrees. There are no conditional decrees in this sense, viz. that decrees should depend on conditions of them, which in this decree, that depends on them as conditions, must be considered, like themselves, as yet undecreed.

But yet decrees may, in some sort, be conditions of decrees; so that it may be said, that God would not have decreed some things, had he not decreed others. 59. The Objection to the divine decrees will be, that according to this doctrine, God may do evil, that good may come of it.

ANS. I do not argue that God may commit evil, that good may come of it; but that he may will that evil should come to pass, and permit that it may come to pass, that good may come of it. It is in itself absolutely evil, for any being to commit evil that good may come of it; but it would be no evil, but good, even in a creature, to will that evil should come to pass, if he had wisdom sufficient to see certainly that good would come of it, or that more good would come to pass in that way than in any other. And the only reason why it would not be lawful for a creature to permit evil to come to pass, and that it would not be wise, or good and virtuous, in him so to do, is, that he has not perfect wisdom and sufficiency, so as to render it fit that such an affair should be trusted with him. In so doing he goes beyond his line; he goes out of his province; hue meddles with things too high for him.

It is every one’s duty to do things fit for him in his sphere, and commensurate to Isis power. God never intrusted this providence in the hands of creatures of finite understandings, nor is it proper that he should.

If a prince were of perfect and all-comprehensive wisdom and foresight, and he should see that an act of treason would be for the great advancement of the welfare of Isis kingdom, it might be wise and virtuous in him to will that such act of treason should come to pass; yea, it would be foolish and wrong it he did not; and, it would be prudent and wise in him not to restrain the traitor, but to let him alone to go in the way he chose.

And yet he might hate the treason at the same time, and he might properly also give forth laws at the same time, forbidding it upon pain of death, and might hold these laws in force against this traitor.

The Arminians themselves allow that God permits sin, and that if he permits it, it will come to pass So that the only difficulty about the act of the will that is in it, is that God should will evil to be, that good may come of it. But it is demonstrably true, that if God sees that good will come of it, and more good than otherwise, so that when the whole series of events is viewed by God, and all things balanced, the sum total of good with the evil is more than without it, all being subtracted that needs be subtracted, and added that is to be added: if the sum total of good thus considered, be greatest, greater than the sum in any other case, then it will follow that God, if he be a wise and holy being, must will it.

For if this sum total that has evil in it, when what the evil subtracts is subtracted, has yet the greatest good in in, then it is the best sum total, better than the other sum total that has no evil in it. But tf, all things considered, it be really the best, how can it be otherwise than that it should be chosen by an infinitely wise and good being, whose holiness and goodness consists in always choosing what is best? Which does it argue most, wisdom or folly, a good disposition or an evil one, when two things are set before a being, the one better and the other worse, to choose the worse, and refuse the better? 60. There is no inconsistency or contrariety between the decretive and preceptive will of God. It is very consistent to suppose that God may hate the thing itself, and vet will that it should come to pass. Yea, I do not fear to assert that time thing itself may he contrary to God’s will, and yet that it may be agreeable to his will that it should come to pass, because his will, in the one case, has not the same object with his will in the other case. To suppose God to have contrary wills towards the same object, is a contradiction; but it is not so, to suppose him to have contrary wills about different objects. The thing itself, and that the thing should come to pass, are different, as is evident; because it is possible that the one may be good and the other may be evil. The thing itself may be evil, and yet it may be a good thing that it should come to pass. It may be a good thing that an evil thing should come to pass; and oftentimes it most certainly and undeniably is so, and proves so. 61. Objectors to the doctrine of election may say. God cannot always preserve men from sinning, unless he destroys their liberty. But will they deny that an omnipotent, an infinitely wise God, could possibly invent and set before men such strong motives to obedience, and keep them before them in such a manner, as should influence them to continue in their obedience, as the elect angels have done, without destroying their liberty?

God will order it so that the saints and angels in heaven never will sin, and does it therefore follow that their liberty is destroyed, and that they are not free, but forced in their actions? Does it follow that they are turned into machines and blocks, as the Arminians say the Calvinistic doctrines turn men 62. To conclude this discourse; I wish the reader to consider the unreasonableness of rejecting plain revelations, because they are puzzling to our reason. There is no greater difficulty attending this doctrine than the contrary, nor so great. So that though the doctrine of the decrees be mysterious, and attended with difficulties, yet the opposite doctrine is in itself more mysterious, and attended with greater difficulties, and with contradictions to reason more evident, to one who thoroughly considers things; so that, even if the Scripture had made no revelation of it, we should have had reason to believe it. But since the Scripture is so abundant in declaring it, the unreasonableness of rejecting it appears the more glaring.

CHAPTER - CONCERNING EFFICACIOUS GRACE. 1. It is manifest that the Scripture supposes, that if ever men are turned from sin, God must undertake it, and he must be the doer of it; that it is his doing that must determine the matter; that all that others can do, will avail nothing, without his agency, This is manifest by such texts as these:

Jeremiah 31:18,19. “Turn thou me, and I shall be turned; Thou art the Lord my God. Surely after that I was turned, I repented; and after that I was instructed, I smote upon my thigh,” etc. Lamentations 5:21. “ Turn thou us unto thee, O lord, and we shall be turned. 2. According to Dr. Whitby’s notion of the assistance of the Spirit, the Spirit of God does nothing in the hearts or minds of men beyond the power of the devil; nothing but what the devil can do; and nothing showing any greater power in any respect, than the devil shows and exercises in his temptations. For he supposes that all that the Spirit of God does, is to bring moral motives and inducements to mind, and set them before the understanding, etc, It is possible that God may infuse grace, in some instances, into the minds of such persons as are striving to obtain it in the other way, though they may not observe it, and may not know that it is not obtained by gradual acquisition. But if a man has indeed sought it only in that way, and with as much dependence on himself, and with as much neglect of God in his endeavours and prayers, as such a doctrine naturally leads to, it is not very likely that he should obtain saving grace by the efficacious, mighty power of God.