King James Bible Adam Clarke Bible Commentary Martin Luther's Writings Wesley's Sermons and Commentary Neurosemantics Audio / Video Bible Evolution Cruncher Creation Science Vincent New Testament Word Studies KJV Audio Bible Family videogames Christian author Godrules.NET Main Page Add to Favorites Godrules.NET Main Page




Bad Advertisement?

Are you a Christian?

Online Store:
  • Visit Our Store

  • STRONG'S SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY - PART 5


    PREVIOUS CHAPTER - NEXT CHAPTER - HELP - FB - TWITTER - GR VIDEOS - GR FORUMS - GR YOUTUBE    



    ANTHROPOLOGY, OR THE DOCTRINE OF MAN CHAPTER 1.

    PRELIMINARY.

    I. MAN A CREATION OF GOD AND A CHILD OF GOD.

    The fact of man’s creation is declared in Genesis 1:27 — “And God created man in his own image, in the image of God created he him”; 2:7 — “And Jehovah God formed man of the dust of the ground, and breathed into his nostrils the breath of life; and man became a living soul.” (a) The Scriptures, on the one hand, negative the idea that man is the mere product of unreasoning natural forces. They refer his existence to a cause different from mere nature, namely, the creative act of God.

    Compare Hebrews 12:9 — “the Father of spirits”; Numbers 16:22 — “the God of the spirits of all flesh”; 27:16 — “Jehovah, the God of the spirits of all flesh”; Revelation 22:6 — “the God of the spirits of the prophets.” Bruce, The Providential Order, 25 — “Faith in God may remain intact, though we concede that man in all his characteristics, physical and psychical, is no exception to the universal law of growth, no breach in the continuity of the evolutionary process.” By “mere nature” we mean nature apart from God. Our previous treatment of the doctrine of creation in general has shown that the laws of nature are only the regular methods of God and that the conception of a nature apart from God is an irrational one. If the evolution of the lower creation cannot be explained without taking into account the originating agency of God, much less can the coming into being of man, the crown of all created things. Hudson, Divine Pedigree of Man: “Spirit in man is linked with, because derived from, God, who is spirit.” (b) But, on the other hand, the Scriptures do not disclose the method of man’s creation. Whether man’s physical system is or is not derived, by natural descent, from the lower animals, the record of creation does not inform us. As the command “Let the earth bring forth living creatures” ( Genesis 1:24) does not exclude the idea of mediate creation through natural generation. So the forming of man “of the dust of the ground” ( Genesis 2:7), does not in itself determine whether the creation of man’s body was mediate or immediate.

    We may believe that man sustained to the highest preceding brute the same relation which the multiplied bread and fish sustained to the five loaves and two fishes ( Matthew 14:19), or which the wine sustained to the water which was transformed at Cana ( John 2:7-10), or which the multiplied oil sustained to the original oil in the Old Testament miracle ( 2 Kings 4:1-7). The “dust,” before the breathing of the spirit into it, may have been animated dust. Natural means may have been used, so far as they would go. Sterrett Reason and Authority in Religion,39 — “Our heredity is from God, even though it be from lower forms of life, and our goal is also God, even though it be through imperfect manhood.”

    Evolution does not make the idea of a Creator superfluous, because evolution is only the method of God. It is perfectly consistent with a Scriptural doctrine of Creation. Man should emerge at the proper time, governed by different laws from the brute creation yet growing out of the brute, just as the foundation of a house built of stone is perfectly consistent with the wooden structure built upon it. All depends upon the plan. An atheistic and undesigning evolution cannot include man without excluding what Christianity regards as essential to man; see Griffith- Jones, Ascent through Christ, 43-73. But a theistic evolution can recognize the whole process of man’s creation a equally the work of nature and the work of God.

    Schurman, Agnosticism and Religion,42 — “You are not what you have come from, but what you have become.” Huxley said of the brutes: “Whether from them or not, man is assuredly not of them.” Pfleiderer, Philos. Religion, 1:289 — “The religious dignity of man rests after all upon what he is, not upon the mode and manner in which he has become what he is.” Because he came from a beast, it does not follow that he is a beast. Nor does the fact that man’s existence can be traced back to a brute ancestry furnish any proper reason why the brute should become man.

    Here is a teleology, which requires a divine Creator-ship.

    J. M. Bronson: “The theist must accept evolution if he would keep his argument for the existence of God from the unity of design in nature.

    Unless man is an end, he is an anomaly. The greatest argument for God is the fact that all animate nature is one vast and connected unity. Man has developed not from the ape but away from the ape. He was never anything but potential man. He did not, as man, come into being until he became a conscious moral agent.” This conscious moral nature, which we call personality, requires a divine Author, because it surpasses all the powers, which can be found in the animal creation. Romanes, Mental Evolution in Animals, tells us that: 1. Mollusca learn by experience. 2. Insects and spiders recognize offspring. 3. Fishes make mental association of objects by their similarity. 4. Reptiles recognize persons. 5. Hymenoptera, as bees and ants, communicate ideas. 6. Birds recognize pictorial representations and understand words. 7. Rodents, as rats and foxes, understand mechanisms 8. Monkeys and elephants learn to use tools. 9. Anthropoid apes and dogs have indefinite morality.

    But it is definite and not indefinite morality, which differences man from the brute. Drummond, in his Ascent of Man, concedes that man passed through a period when he resembled the ape more than any known animal, but at the same time declares that no anthropoid ape could develop into a man. The brute can be defined in terms of man, but man cannot be defined in terms of the brute. It is significant that in insanity the higher endowments of man disappear in an order precisely the reverse of that in which, according to the development theory, they have been acquired. The highest part of man totters first. The last added is first to suffer. Man moreover can transmit his own acquisitions to his posterity, as the brute cannot. Weismann, Heredity. 2:69 — “The evolution of music does not depend upon any increase of the musical faculty or any alteration in the inherent physical nature of man, but solely upon the power of transmitting the intellectual achievements of each generation to those which follow.

    This, more than anything, is the cause of the superiority of men over animals — this, and not merely human faculty, although it may be admitted that this latter is much higher than in animals.” To this utterance of Weismann we would add that human progress depends quite as much upon man’s power of reception as upon man’s power of transmission.

    Interpretation must equal expression and, in this interpretation of the past, man has a guarantee of the future that the brute does not possess. (c) Psychology, however, comes in to help our interpretation of Scripture.

    The radical differences between man’s soul and the principle of intelligence in the lower animals, show that which chiefly constitutes him, man could not have been derived, by any natural process. Man possesses selfconsciousness, general ideas, the moral sense and the power of selfdetermination and this shows development from the inferior creatures. We are compelled, then, to believe that God’s “breathing into man’s nostrils the breath of life” ( Genesis 2:7), though it was a mediate creation as presupposing existing material in the shape of animal forms, was yet an immediate creation in the sense that only a divine reinforcement of the process of life turned the animal into man. In other words, man came not from the brute, but through the brute and the same immanent God who had previously created the brute created also the man.

    Tennyson, In Memoriam, XLV — “The baby new to earth and sky, What time his tender palm is pressed Against the circle of the breast, Has never thought that ‘this is I’: But as he grows he gathers much, And learns the use of ‘I’ and ‘me,’ And finds ‘I am not what I see, And other than the things I touch.’ So rounds he to a separate mind From whence clear memory may begin, As thro’ the frame that binds him in His isolation grows defined.” Fichte called that the birthday of his child, when the child awoke to self-consciousness and said “I.” Memory goes back no further than language. Knowledge of the ego is objective, before it is subjective.

    The child at first speaks of himself in the third person: “Henry did so and so.” Hence most men do not remember what happened before their third year, though Samuel Miles Hopkins, Memoir, 20, remembered what must have happened when he was only 23 months old. Only a conscious person remembers, and he remembers only as his will exerts itself in attention.

    Jean Paul Richter, quoted in Ladd, Philosophy of Mind, 110 — “Never shall I forget the phenomenon in myself, never till now recited, when I stood by the birth of my own self-consciousness, the place and time of which are distinct in my memory. On a certain forenoon, I stood, a very young child, within the house door, and was looking out toward the woodpile, as in an instant the inner revelation ‘I am I,’ like lightning from heaven, flashed and stood brightly before me; in that moment I had seen myself as I, for the first time and forever.”

    Hoffding, Outlines of Psychology, 3 — “The beginning of conscious life is to be placed probably before birth… Sensations only faintly and dimly distinguished from the general feeling of vegetative comfort and discomfort. Still the experiences undergone before birth perhaps suffice to form the foundation of the consciousness of an external world.” Hill, Genetic Philosophy, 282, suggests that this early state, in which the child speaks of self in the third person and is devoid of self-consciousness, corresponds to the brute condition of the race, before it had reached selfconsciousness, attained language and become man. In the race, however, there was no heredity to predetermine self-consciousness — it was a new acquisition, marking transition to a superior order of being.

    Connecting these remarks with our present subject, we assert that no brute ever yet said, or thought, “I.” With this, then, we may begin a series of simple distinctions between man and the brute, so far as the immaterial principle in each is concerned. These are mainly compiled from writers hereafter mentioned. 1. The brute is conscious, but man is self-conscious. The brute does not objectify self. “If the pig could once say, ‘I am a pig,’ it would at once and thereby cease to be a pig.” The brute does not distinguish itself from its sensations. The brute has perception, but only the man has apperception, i.e., perception accompanied by reference of it to the self to which it belongs. 2. The brute has only percepts; man has also concepts. The brute knows white things, but not whiteness. It remembers things, but not thoughts.

    Man alone has the power of abstraction, i.e., the power of deriving abstract ideas from particular things or experiences. 3. Hence the brute has no language. “Language is the expression of general notions by symbols” (Harris). Words are the symbols of concepts.

    Where there are no concepts there can be no words. The parrot utters cries but “no parrot ever yet spoke a true word.” Since language is a sign, it presupposes the existence of an intellect capable of understanding the sign. In short, language is the effect of mind, not the cause of mind. See Mivart, in Brit. Quar.. Oct. 1881:154-172. “The ape’s tongue is eloquent in his own dispraise.” James, Psychology, 2:356 — “The notion of a sign as such, and the general purpose to apply it to everything, is the distinctive characteristic of man.” Why do not animals speak? Because they have nothing to say, i.e. , have no general ideas which words might express. 4. The brute forms no judgments, i.e., that, this is like that accompanied with belief. Hence there is no sense of the ridiculous and no laughter.

    James, Psychology, 2:360 “The brute does not associate ideas by similarity… Genius in man is the possession of this power of association in an extreme degree.” 5. The brute has no reasoning — no sense that this follows from that, accompanied by a feeling that the sequence is necessary. Association of ideas without judgement is the typical process of the brute mind, though not that of the mind of man. See Mind:402-409, 575-581. Man’s dreamlife is the best analogue to the mental life of the brute. 6. The brute has no general ideas or intuitions, as of space, time, substance, cause or right. Hence there is no generalizing and no proper experience or progress. There is no capacity for improvement in animals.

    The brute cannot be trained except in certain inferior matters of association, where independent judgment is not required.

    No animal makes tools, uses clothes, cooks food or breeds other animals for food. No hunter’s dog, however long its observation of its master, ever learned to put wood on a fire to keep itself from freezing. Even the rudest stone implements show a break in continuity and mark the introduction of man; see J. P. Cook, Credentials of Science,14. “The dog can see the printed page as well as a man can but no dog was ever taught to read a book. The animal cannot create in its own mind the thoughts of the writer.

    The physical in man, on the contrary, is only an aid to the spiritual.

    Education is a trained capacity to discern the inner meaning and deeper relations of things. So the universe is but a symbol and expression of spirit, a garment in which an invisible Power has robed his majesty and glory”; see S. S. Times, April 7, 1903. In man, mind first became supreme. 7. The brute has determination, but not self-determination. There is no freedom of choice, no conscious forming of a purpose and no selfmovement toward a predetermined end. The donkey is determined but not self-determined; he is the victim of heredity and environment; he acts only as he is acted upon. Harris, Philos. Basis of Theism, 537-554 — “Man, though implicated in nature through his bodily organization is in his personality supernatural. The brute is wholly submerged in nature. Man is like a ship in the sea — in it, yet above it — guiding his course, by observing the heavens, even against wind and current. A brute has no such power; it is in nature like a balloon, wholly immersed in air, and driven about by its currents, with no power of steering.” Calderwood, Philosophy of Evolution, chapter on Right and Wrong: “The grand distinction of human life is self-control in the field of action — control over all the animal impulses, so that these do not spontaneously and of themselves determine activity” [as they do in the brute]. By what Mivart calls a process of ‘ inverse anthropomorphism,” we clothe the brute with the attributes of freedom but it does not really possess them. Just as we do not transfer to God all our human imperfections, so we ought not to transfer all our human perfections to the brute, “reading our full selves in life of lower forms.” The brute has no power to choose between motives; it simply obeys motive. The necessitation philosophy, therefore, is a correct and excellent philosophy for the brute. In short, man’s power of initiative, his freewill, renders it impossible to explain his higher nature as a mere natural development from the inferior creatures. Even Huxley has said that, taking mind into the account, there is between man and the highest beasts an “enormous gulf,” a “divergence immeasurable” and “practically infinite.” 8. The brute has no conscience and no religious nature. No dog ever brought back to the butcher the meat it had stolen. “The aspen trembles without fear, and dogs skulk without guilt.” The dog mentioned by Darwin, whose behavior in presence of a newspaper moved by the wind seemed to testify to ‘a sense of the supernatural,’ was merely exhibiting the irritation due to the sense of an unknown future; see James, Will to Believe, 79. The bearing of flogged curs does not throw light upon the nature of conscience. If ethics is not hedonism, if moral obligation is not a refined utilitarianism, if the right is something distinct from the good we get out of it, then there must be a flaw in the theory that man’s conscience is simply a development of brute instincts. A reinforcement of brute life from the divine source of life must be postulated in order to account for the appearance of man. Upton. Hibbert Lectures, 165-167 — “Is the spirit of man derived from the soul of the animal? No, for neither one of these has self-existence. Both are a self-differentiation of God. The latter is simply God’s preparation for the former.” Calderwood, Evolution and Man’s Place in Nature, 337, speaks of “the impossibility of tracing the origin of man’s rational life to evolution from a lower life. There are no physical forces discoverable in nature sufficient to account for the appearance of this life.” Shaler, Interpretation of Nature, 186 — “Man’s place has been won by an entire change in the limitations of his psychic development. The old bondage of the mind to the body is swept away. In this new freedom we find the one dominant characteristic of man, the feature which entitles us to class him as an entirely new class of animal.”

    John Burroughs, Ways of Nature: “Animal life parallels human life at many points but it is in another plane. Something guides the lower animals but it is not thought; something restrains them but it is not judgment; they are provident without prudence; they are active without industry; they are skillful without practice; they are wise without knowledge; they are rational without reason; they are deceptive without guile. When they are joyful, they sing or they play; when they are distressed, they moan or they cry. Yet I do not suppose they experience the emotion of joy or sorrow, or anger or love, as we do, because these feelings in them do not involve reflection, memory and what we call the higher nature, as with us.” Their instinct is intelligence directed outward, never inward, as in man. They share with man the emotions of his animal nature, but not of his moral or aesthetic nature; they know no altruism, no moral code.” Mr. Burroughs maintains that we have no proof that animals in a state of nature can reflect, form abstract ideas, associate cause and effect. Animals, for instance, that store up food for the winter simply follow a provident instinct but do not take thought for the future, any more than does the tree that forms new buds for the coming season. He sums up his position as follows: “To attribute human motives and faculties to the animals is to caricature them. To put us in such relation to them that we feel their kinship, that we see their lives embossed in the same iron necessity as our own or that we see in their minds a humbler manifestation of the same psychic power and intelligence that culminates and is conscious of itself in man. That, I take it, is the true humanization.”

    We assent to all this except the ascription to human life of the same iron necessity that rules the animal creation. Man is man because his free will transcends the limitations of the brute.

    While we grant, then, that man is the last stage in the development of life and that he has a brute ancestry, we regard him also as the offspring of God. The same God who was the author of the brute became in due times the creator of man. Though man came through the brute, he did not come from the brute but from God, the Father off spirits and the author of all life. ådipus’ terrific oracle: “Mayst thou ne’er know the truth of what thou art!” might well be uttered to those who believe only in the brute origin of man. Pascal says it is dangerous to let man see too clearly that he on a level with the animals unless at the same time we show him his greatness.

    The doctrine that the brute is imperfect man is logically connected with the doctrine that man is a perfect brute. Thomas Carlyle: “If this brute philosophy is true, then man should go on all fours and not lay claim to the dignity of being moral.” G. F. Wright, Ant. and Origin of Human Race, lecture IX — “One or other of the lower animals may exhibit all the faculties used by a child of fifteen months. The difference may seem very little, but what there is, is very important. It is like the difference in direction in the early stages of two separating curves, which go on forever diverging. The probability is that both in his bodily and in his mental development, man appeared as a sport in nature and leaped at once in some single pair from the plane of irrational being to the possession of the higher powers that have ever since characterized him and dominated both his development and his history.”

    Scripture seems to teach the doctrine that man’s nature is the creation of God. Genesis 2:7 — “Jehovah God formed man of the dust of the ground and breathed into his nostrils the breath of life; and man became a living soul” — appears, says Hovey (State of the Impen. Dead, 14), “to distinguish the vital informing principle of human nature from its material part, pronouncing the former to be more directly from God, and more akin to hint, than the latter.” So in Zechariah 12:1 — “Jehovah who stretcheth forth the heavens and layeth the foundation of the earth and formeth the spirit of man within him” — the soul is recognized as distinct in nature from the body, and of a dignity and mind far beyond those of any material organism. Job 32:8 — “there is a spirit in man, and the breath of the Almighty giveth them understanding”; Ecclesiastes 12:7 — “the dust returneth to the earth as it was and the spirit returneth unto God who gave it.” A sober view of the similarities and differences between man and the lower animals may be found in Lloyd Morgan, Animal Life and Intelligence. See also Martineau, Types, 2:65, 140, and Study, 1:180; 2:9, 13, 184, 350; Hopkins, Outline Study of Man, 8:23; Chadbourne, Instinct, 187-211; Porter-Hum. Intellect, 384, 386, 397; Bascom, Science of Mind, 295-305; Mansel, Metaphysics, 49, 50; Princeton Rev., Jan. 1881:104-128; Henslow, in Nature, May 1, 1879:21, 22; Ferrier Remains, 2:39; Argyll, Unity of Nature, 117-119: Bibliotheca Sacra, 29:275-282; Max Muller. Lectures on Philos. of Language, no. 1, 2, 3; F. W. Robertson, Lectures on Genesis, 21, Le Conte, in Princeton Rev., May, 1884:236-261; Lindsay, Mind in Lower Animals; Romanes, Mental Evolution in Animals; Fiske, The Destiny of Man. (d) Comparative physiology, moreover, has, up to the present time, done nothing to forbid the extension of this doctrine to man’s body. No single instance has yet been adduced of the transformation of one animal species into another, either by natural or artificial selection; much less has it been demonstrated that the body of the brute has ever been developed into that of man. All evolution implies progress and reinforcement of life and is unintelligible except as the immanent God gives new impulses to the process. Apart from the direct agency of God, the view that man’s physical system is descended by natural generation from some ancestral simian form can be regarded only as an irrational hypothesis. Since the soul, then, is an immediate creation of God and the forming of man’s body is mentioned by the Scripture writer in direct connection with this creation of the spirit, man’s body was in this sense an immediate creation also.

    For the theory of natural selection, see Darwin, Origin of Species. 398- 424, and Descent of Man, 2:368-387; Huxley, Critiques and Addresses, 241-269, Man’s Place in Nature, 71-138. Lay Sermons, 323 and art.:

    Biology, in Encyclopedia Britannica, 9th ed.; Romanes, Scientific Evidences of Organic Evolution. The theory holds that, in the struggle for existence, the varieties best adapted to their surroundings succeed in maintaining and reproducing themselves, while the rest die out. Thus, by gradual change and improvement of lower into higher forms of life, man has been evolved. We grant that Darwin has disclosed one of the important features of God’s method. We concede the partial truth of his theory. We find it supported by the vertebrate structure and nervous organization which man has in common with the lower animals; by the facts of embryonic development, of rudimentary organs, of common diseases and remedies and of reversion to former types. But we refuse to regard natural selection as a complete explanation of the history of life and that for the following reasons: 1. It gives no account of the origin of substance, nor of the origin of variations. Darwinism simply says that round stones will roll down hill further than flat ones” (Gray, Natural Science and Religion). It accounts for the selection, not for the creation, of forms. “Natural selection originates nothing. It is a destructive, not a creative, principle. If we must idealize it as a positive force, we must think of it, not as the preserver of the fittest, but as the destroyer that follows ever in the wake of creation and devours the failures. It is the scavenger of creation, that takes out of the way forms which are not fit to live and reproduce themselves” (Johnson, on Theistic Evolution, in Andover Review, April, 1884:363- 381). Natural selection is only unintelligent repression. Darwin’s Origin of Species is in fact “not the Genesis, but the Exodus, of living forms.”

    Schurman: “The survival of the fittest does nothing to explain the arrival of the fittest”; see also DeVries, Species and Varieties, ad finem. Darwin himself acknowledged that “Our ignorance of the laws of variation is profound. The cause of each slight variation and of each monstrosity lies much more in the nature or constitution of the organism than in the nature of the surrounding conditions” (quoted by Mivart, Lessons from Nature, 280-301). Weismann has therefore modified the Darwinian theory by asserting that there would be no development unless there were a spontaneous, innate tendency to variation. In this innate tendency we see, not mere nature but the work of an Originating and superintending God.

    E. M. Caillard, in Contemp. Rev., Dec. 1893:873-881 — Spirit was the molding power, from the beginning, of those lower forms that would ultimately become man. Instead of the physical derivation of the soul, we propose the spiritual derivation of the body.” 2. Some of the most important forms appear suddenly in the geological record, without connecting links to unite them with the past. The first fishes are the Ganoid, large in size and advanced in type. There are no intermediate gradations between the ape and man. Huxley, in Man’s Place in Nature, 94, tells us that the lowest gorilla has a skull capacity of cubic inches, whereas the highest gorilla has 34.5. Over against this, the lowest man has a skull capacity of 62; though men with less than 65 are invariably idiotic; the highest man has 114. Professor Burt G. Wilder of Cornell University: The largest ape brain is only half as large as the smallest normal human.” Wallace, Darwinism. 458 — “The average human brain weighs 48 or 49 ounces; the average ape’s brain is only ounces.” The brain of Daniel Webster weighed. 53 ounces; but Dr. Bastian tells of an imbecile whose intellectual deficiency was congenital, yet whose brain weighed 55 ounces. Large heads do not always indicate great intellect. Professor Virchow points out that the Greeks, one of the most intellectual of nations, are also one of the smallest headed of all.

    Bain: “While the size of the brain increases in arithmetical proportion, intellectual range increases in geometrical proportion.”

    Respecting the Enghis and Neanderthal crania, Huxley says: “The fossil remains of man hitherto discovered do not seem to me to take us appreciably nearer to that lower pithecoid form by the modification of which he has probably become what he is. In vain have the links, which should bind man to the monkey, been sought. Not a single one is there to show. The so-called Protanthropos who should exhibit this link has not been found. None have been found that stood nearer the monkey than the men of today.” Huxley argues that the difference between man and the gorilla is smaller than that between the gorilla and some apes. If the gorilla and the apes constitute one family and have a common origin, may not man and the gorilla have a common ancestry also? We reply that the space between the lowest ape and the highest gorilla is filled in with numberless intermediate gradations. The space between the lowest man and the highest man is also filled in with many types that shade off one into the other. But the space between the highest gorilla and the lowest man is absolutely vacant; there are no intermediate types, no connecting links between the ape and man have yet been found.

    Professor Virchow has also very recently expressed his belief that no relics of any predecessor of man have yet been discovered. He said: “In my judgment, no skull hitherto discovered can be regarded as that of a predecessor of man. In the course of the last fifteen years we have had opportunities of examining skulls of all the various races of mankind — even of the most savage tribes and among them all no group has been observed differing in its essential characters from the general human type.

    Out of all the skulls found in the lake dwellings there is not one that lies outside the boundaries of our present population.” Dr. Eugene Dubois has discovered in the Post-Pliocene deposits of the island of Java the remains of a preeminently hominid anthropoid that he calls Pithecanthropus erectas. Its cranial capacity approaches the physiological minimum in man, and is double that of the gorilla. The thighbone is in form and dimensions the absolute analogue of that of man and gives evidence of having supported a habitually erect body. Dr. Dubois unhesitatingly places this extinct Javan ape as the intermediate form between man and the true anthropoid apes. Haeckel (in The Nation, Sept. 15, 1898) and Keane (in Man Past and Present, 3), regard the Pithecanthropus as a “missing link.” But “Nature” regards at as the remains of a human microcephalous idiot. In addition to all this, it deserves to be noticed that man does not degenerate as we travel back in time. “The Enghis skull, the contemporary of the mammoth and the cavebear, is as large as the average of to-day and might have belonged to a philosopher.” The monkey nearest to man in physical form is no more intelligent than the elephant or the bee. 3. There are certain facts which mere heredity cannot explain. Such for example as the origin of the working bee from the queen and the drone, neither of which produces honey. The working bee, moreover, does not transmit the honey making instinct to its posterity for it is sterile and childless. If man had descended from the conscienceless brute, we should expect him, when degraded, to revert to his primitive type. On the contrary, he does not revert to the brute, but dies out instead. The theory can give no explanation of beauty in the lowest forms of life, such as mollusks and diatoms. Darwin grants that this beauty must be of use to its possessor in order to be consistent with its origination through natural selection. But no such use has yet been shown for the creatures, which possess the beauty often live in the dark or have no eyes to see. So, too, the large brain of the savage is beyond his needs and is inconsistent with the principle of natural selection, which teaches that no organ can permanently attain a size not required by its needs and its environment.

    See Wallace, Natural Selection, 338-360. G. F. Wright, Man and the Glacial Epoch, 242-301 — “That man’s bodily organization is in some way a development front some extinct member of the animal kingdom allied to the anthropoid apes is scarcely any longer susceptible of doubt.

    He is certainly not descended from any existing species of anthropoid apes. When once mind became supreme, the bodily adjustment must have been rapid, if indeed it is not necessary to suppose that the bodily preparation for the highest mental faculties was instantaneous, or by what is called in nature a sport.” With this statement of Dr. Wright, we substantially agree and therefore differ from Shedd, when he says that there is just as much reason for supposing that monkeys are degenerate men, as that, men are improved monkeys. Shakespeare, Timon of Athens, 1:1:249, seems to have hinted the view of Dr. Shedd: “The strain of man’s bred out into baboon and monkey.” Bishop Wilberforce asked Huxley whether he was related to an ape on his grandfather’s or grandmother’s side. Huxley replied that he should prefer such a relationship to having for an ancestor a man who used his position as a minister of religion to ridicule truth, which he did not comprehend. “Mamma, am I descended from a monkey?” “I do not know, William, I never met any of your father’s people.” 4. No species is yet known to have been produced either by artificial or by natural selection. Huxley, Lay Sermons, 323 — “It is not absolutely proven that a group of animals having all the characters exhibited by species in nature has ever been originated by selection, whether artificial or natural.” Man’s Place in Nature, 107 — “Our acceptance of the Darwinian hypothesis must be provisional, so long as one link in the chain of evidence is wanting. So long as all the animals and plants certainly produced by selective breeding from a common stock are fertile with one another, that link will be wanting.” Huxley has more recently declared that the missing proof has been found in the descent of the modern horse with one toe, from Hipparion with two toes, Anchitherium with three and Orohippus with four. Even if this were demonstrated, we should still maintain that the only proper analogue was to be found in that artificial selection by which man produces new varieties. Natural selection can bring about no useful results and show no progress unless it is the method and revelation of a wise and designing mind. In other words, selection implies intelligence and will, and therefore, cannot be exclusively natural.

    Mivart, Man and Apes, 192 — “If it is inconceivable and impossible for man’s body to be developed or to exist without his informing soul, we conclude that, as no natural process accounts for the different kind of soul — one capable of articulately expressing general conceptions. No merely natural process can account for the origin of the body informed by it — a body to which such an intellectual faculty was so essentially and intimately related.” Thus, Mivart, who once considered that evolution could account for man’s body, now holds instead that it can account neither for man’s body nor for his soul and calls natural selection “a puerile hypothesis” (Lessons from Nature, 300; Essays and Criticisms,2:289-314). (e) While we concede, then, that man has a brute ancestry, we make two claims by way of qualification and explanation. First, that the laws of organic development, which have been followed in man’s origin, are only the methods of God and proves of his creator-ship. Secondly, that man, when he appears upon the scene, is no longer brute, but a self-conscious and self-determining being, made in the image of his Creator and capable of free moral decision between good and evil.

    Both man’s original creation and his new creation in regeneration are creations from within, rather than from without. In both cases, God builds the new upon the basis of the old. Man is not a product of blind forces, but is rather an emanation from that same divine life of which the brute was a lower manifestation. The fact that God used preexisting material does not prevent his authorship of the result. The wine in the miracle was not water because water had been used in the making of it, nor is man a brute because the brute has made some contributions to his creation.

    Professor John H. Strong: “Some who freely allow the presence and power of God in the age long process seem nevertheless not clearly to see that, in the final result of finished man, God successfully revealed himself.

    God’s work was never really or fully done; man was a compound of brute and man and a compound of two such elements could not be said to possess the qualities of either. God did not really succeed in bringing moral personality to birth. The evolution was incomplete; man is still on all fours; he cannot sin, because he was begotten of the brute. No fall and no regeneration are conceivable.

    We assert, on the contrary, that, though man came through the brute, lie did not come from the brute. He came from God, whose immanent life he reveals, whose image he reflects in a finished moral personality. Because God succeeded, a fall was possible. We can believe in the age long creation of evolution, provided only that this evolution completed itself.

    With that proviso, sin remains and the fall.” See also A. H. Strong, Christ in Creation, 163-180.

    An atheistic and non-teleological evolution is a reversion to the savage view of animals as brethren and to the heathen idea of a sphinx-man growing out of the brute. Darwin himself did not deny God’s authorship.

    He closes his first great book with the declaration that, with all its potencies was originally breathed life, “by the Creator, into the first forms of organic being. And in his letters he refers with evident satisfaction to Charles Kingsley’s finding nothing in the theory, which was inconsistent with an earnest Christian faith. It was not Darwin, but disciples like Hacekel, who put forward the theory as making the hypothesis of a Creator superfluous. We grant the principle of evolution, but we regard it as only the method of the divine intelligence. We must moreover consider it as preceded by an original creative act introducing vegetable and animal life and as supplemented by other creative acts at the introduction of man and at the incarnation of Christ. Chadwick, Old and New Unitarianism — “What seemed to wreck our faith in human nature [its origin from the brute] has been its grandest confirmation. For nothing argues the essential dignity of man more clearly than his triumph over the limitations of his brute inheritance, while the long way that he has come is prophecy of the moral heights undreamed of that await his tireless feet.” All this is true if we regard human nature, not as an undesigned result of atheistic evolution, but as the efflux and reflection of the divine personality. R. E.

    Thompson, in S. S. Times, Dec. 29, 1906 — “The greatest fact in heredity is our descent from God and the greatest fact in environment is his presence in human life at every point.”

    The atheistic conception of evolution is well satirized in the verse: “There was an ape in days that were earlier; Centuries passed and his hair became curlier; Centuries more and his thumb gave a twist, And he was a man and a Positivist.” That this conception is not a necessary conclusion of modern science is clear from the statements of Wallace, the author with Darwin of the theory of natural selection. Wallace believes that man’s body was developed from the brute, but he thinks there have been three breaks in continuity:1. the appearance of life,2. the appearance of sensation and consciousness and 3. the appearance of spirit. These seem to correspond to 1. vegetable, 2. animal and 3. human life. He thinks natural selection may account for man’s place in nature, but not for man’s place above nature, as a spiritual being. See Wallace, Darwinism, 445- 478 — “I fully accept Mr. Darwin’s conclusion as to the essential identity of man’s bodily structure with that of the higher mammillae and of his descent from some ancestral form common to man and the anthropoid apes.” But the conclusion that man’s higher faculties have also been derived from the lower animals “appears to me not to be supported by adequate evidence and to be directly opposed to many well ascertained facts” (461). The mathematical, the artistic and musical faculties are results, not causes, of advancement. They do not help in the struggle for existence and could not have been developed by natural selection. The introduction of life (vegetable), of consciousness (animal) and of higher faculty (human), point clearly to a world of spirit, to which the world of matter is subordinate 474-476). Man’s intellectual and moral faculties could not have been developed from the animal but must have had another origin and for this origin we can find an adequate cause only in the world of spirit.”

    Wallace, Natural Selection, 338 — “The average cranial capacity of the lowest savage is probably not less than five-sixths of that of the highest civilized races. The brain of the anthropoid apes scarcely amounts to onethird of that of man, in both cases taking the average or the proportions may be represented by the following figures: anthropoid apes, 10, savages, 26, civilized man, 32.” Ibid., 360 — “The inference I would draw from this class of phenomena is, that a superior intelligence has guided the development of man in a definite direction and for a special purpose, just as man guides the development of many animal and vegetable forms. The controlling action of a higher intelligence is a necessary part of the laws of nature, just as the action of all surrounding organisms is one of the agencies in organic development, else the laws which govern the material universe are insufficient for the production of man.” Sir Wm. Thompson: “That man could be evolved out of inferior animals is the wildest dream of materialism, a pure assumption which offends me alike by its folly and by its arrogance.” Hartmann, in his Anthropoid Apes, 302-306, while not despairing of “the possibility of discovering the true link between the world of man and mammals,” declares that, “that purely hypothetical being, the common ancestor of man and apes, is still to be found.” “Man cannot have descended from any of the fossil species which have hitherto come to our notice, nor yet from any of the species of apes now extant.” See Dana, Amer. Journ. Science and Arts, 1876:251, and Geology, 603, 604; Lotze, Mikrokosmos, vol. I, bk. 3, chap. 1; Mivart, Genesis of Species, 202-222, 259-307; Man and Apes, 88, 149-192; Lessons from Nature. 128-242, 280-301, The Cat, and Encyclop. Britannica, art.: Apes; Quatrefages, Natural History of Man, 64-87; Bp. Temple, Bampton Lect., 1884:161-189; Dawson, Story of the Earth and Man, 32l — 329; Duke of Argyll, Primeval Man, 38-75; Asa Gray, Natural Science and Religion; Schmid, Theories of Darwin, 115-140; Carpenter, Mental Physiology, 59; McIlvaine, Wisdom of Holy Scripture, 55-86; Bible Commentary, 1:43; Martensen, Dogmatics, 136; Le Conte, in Princeton Rev., Nov. 1878:776-803; Zockler Urgeschichte, 81-105; Shedd, Dogmatic Theology, 1:499-515. Also, see this Compendium, pages 392, 393. (f) The truth that man is the offspring of God implies the correlative truth of a common divine Fatherhood. God is Father of all men, in that he originates and sustains them as personal beings like in nature to himself.

    Even toward sinners God holds this natural relation of Father. It is his fatherly love, indeed, which provides the atonement. Thus the demands of holiness are met and the prodigal is restored to the privileges of son-ship, which have been forfeited by transgression. This natural Fatherhood, therefore, does not exclude, but prepares the way for God’s special Fatherhood toward those who have been regenerated by his Spirit and who have believed on his Son. Indeed, since all God’s creations take place in and through Christ, there is a natural and physical son-ship of all men, by virtue of their relation to Christ, the eternal Son, which antedates and prepares the way for the spiritual son-ship of those who join themselves to him by faith. Man’s natural son-ship underlies the history of the fall and qualifies the doctrine of Sin.

    Texts referring to God’s natural and common Fatherhood are: Malachi 2:10 — “Have we not all one father [Abraham]? hath not one God created us?” Luke 3:38 — “Adam, the son of God”; 15:11-32 — the parable of the prodigal son, in which the father is father even before the prodigal returns; John 3:16 — “God so loved the world, that he gave his only begotten Son”; John 15:6 — “If a man abide not in me, he is cast forth as a branch, and is withered and they gather them, and cast them into the fire, and they are burned”. These words imply a natural union of all men with Christ. Otherwise, they would teach that those who are spiritually united to him can perish everlastingly. Acts 17:28 — “For we are also his offspring” — words addressed by Paul to a heathen audience; Colossians 1:16,17 — “in him were all things created... and in him all things consist;” Hebrews 12:9 — “the Father of spirits.” Fatherhood, in this larger sense, implies 1. origination; 2. Impart of life; 3. Sustentation; 4. Likeness in faculties and powers; 5. Government; 6. Care; 7. Love.

    In all these respects God is the Father of all men, and his fatherly love is both preserving and atoning. God’s natural fatherhood is mediated by Christ, through whom all things were made, and in whom all things, even humanity, consist. We are naturally children of God, as we were created in Christ; we are spiritually sons of God, as we have been created anew in Christ Jesus. G. W. Northrop: “God never becomes Father to any men or class of men; he only becomes a reconciled and complacent Father to those who become ethically like him. Men are not sons in the full ideal sense until they comport themselves as sons of God.” Chapman, Jesus Christ and the Present Age, 39 — “While God is the Father of all men, all men are not the children of God: in other words, God always realizes completely the idea of Father to every man but the majority of men realize only partially the idea of son-ship.”

    Texts referring to the special Fatherhood of grace are: John 1:12, — “as many as received him, to them gave he the right to become children of God, even to them that believe on his name, who were born, not of blood, nor of the will of the flesh, nor of the will of man, but of God”; Romans 8:14 — “for as many as are led by the Spirit of God, these are sons of God”; 15 — “ye received the spirit of adoption, whereby we cry, Abba, Father”; 2 Corinthians 6:17 — “Come ye out from among them, and be ye separate, saith the Lord, and touch no unclean thing, and I will receive you, and will be to you a Father, and ye shall be to me sons and daughters, saith the Lord Almighty”; Ephesians 1:5,6 — “having foreordained us unto adoption as sons through Jesus Christ unto himself”; 3:14, 15 — “the Father, from whom every family [margin ‘fatherhood’] in heaven and on earth is named” ( = every race an among angels or men — so Meyer, Romans. 158, 159); Galatians 3:26 — “for ye are all sons of God, through faith, in Christ Jesus”. 4:6 — “And because ye are sons, God sent forth the Spirit of his Son into our hearts, crying, Abba, Father”; 1 John 3:1,2 — “Behold what manner of love the Father hath bestowed upon us, that we should be called children of God and such we are… Beloved, now are we children of God.” The son-ship of the race is only rudimentary. The actual realization of son-ship is possible only through Christ. Galatians 4:1-7 intimates a universal son-ship but a son-ship in which the child “differeth nothing from a bondservant though he is lord of all,” and needs still to “receive the adoption of sons.” Simon, Reconciliation, 81 — “It is one thing to be a father, another to discharge all the fatherly functions. Human fathers sometimes fail to behave like fathers for reasons lying solely in themselves or sometimes because of hindrances in the conduct or character of their children. No father can normally discharge his fatherly functions toward children who are unchildlike. So even the rebellious son is a son, but he does not act like a son.” Because all men are naturally sons of God, it does not follow that all men will be saved. Many who are naturally sons of God are not spiritually sons of God; they are only “servants” who “abide not in the house forever” ( John 8:35). God is their Father, but they have yet to “become” his children ( Matthew 5:45).

    The controversy between those who maintain and those who deny that God is the Father of all men is merely nonsensical. God is physically and naturally the Father of all men; he is morally and spiritually the Father only of those who have been renewed by his Spirit. All men are sons of God in a lower sense by virtue of their natural union with Christ; only those are sons of God in the higher sense who have joined themselves by faith to Christ in a spiritual union. We can therefore assent to much that is said by those who deny time universal divine fatherhood, as, for example, C. M. Mead, in Am. Jour. Theology, July, 1897:577-600, who maintains that son-ship consists in spiritual kinship with God, and who quotes, in support of this view, John 8:41-44 — “If God were your Father, ye would love me… Ye are of your father, the devil” = the Fatherhood of God is not universal; Matthew 5:44,45 — “Love your enemies… in order that ye may become sons of your Father who is in heaven”; John 1:12 — “as many as received him, to them gave he the right to become children of God, even to them that believe on his name. Gordon, Ministry of the Spirit, 103 — “That God has created all men does not constitute them his sons in the evangelical sense of the word. The son-ship on which the New Testament dwells so constantly is based solely on the experience of the new birth. The doctrine of universal son-ship rests either on a daring denial or a daring assumption — the denial of the universal fall of man through sin, or the assumption of the universal regeneration of man through the Spirit. In either case the teaching belongs to ‘another gospel’ ( Galatians 1:7), the recompense of whose preaching is not a beatitude, but an anathema’ ( Galatians 1:8).”

    But we can also agree with much that is urged by the opposite party, as for example, Wendt, Teaching of Jesus, I:193 — “God does not become the Father, but is the heavenly Father, even of those who become his sons.

    This Fatherhood of God, instead of the kingship, which was the dominant idea of the Jews, Jesus made the primary doctrine. The relation is ethical, not the Fatherhood of mere origination and, therefore, only those who live aright are true sons of God. 209 — Mere kingship, or exaltation above the world, led to Pharisaic legal servitude and external ceremony and to Alexandrian philosophical speculation. The Fatherhood apprehended and announced by Jesus was essentially a relation of love and holiness.” A. H.

    Bradford, Age of Faith, 116-120 — “There is something sacred in humanity but systems of theology once began with the essential and natural worthlessness of man. If there is no Fatherhood, then selfishness is logical but Fatherhood carries with it identity of nature between the parent and the child. Therefore every laborer is of the nature of God and he who has the nature of God cannot be treated like the products of factory and field. All the children of God are by nature partakers of the life of God.

    They are called ‘children of wrath’ ( Ephesians 2:3), or ‘of perdition’ ( John 17:12), only to indicate that their proper relations and duties have been violated. Love for man is dependent on something worthy of love and that is found in man’s essential divinity.” We object to this last statement, as attributing to man at the beginning what can come to him only through grace. Man was indeed created in Christ ( Colossians 1:16) and was a son, of God by virtue of his union with Christ ( Luke 3:38; John 15:6). But since man has sinned and has renounced his sonship, it can be restored and realized, in a moral and spiritual sense, only through the atoning work of Christ and the regenerating work of the Holy Spirit. ( Ephesians 2:10 — “created in Christ Jesus for good works”; Pet. 1:4 — “his precious and exceeding great promises; that through these ye may become partakers of the divine nature”).

    Many who deny the universal Fatherhood of God refuse to carry their doctrine to its logical extreme. To be consistent they should forbid the unconverted to offer the Lord’s Prayer or even to pray at all. A mother who did not believe God to be the Father of all actually said: “My children are not converted, and if I were to teach them the Lord’s Prayer, I must teach them to say: ‘Our Father who art in hell’; for they are only children of the devil.” Papers on the question: Is God the Father of all Men? are to be found in the Proceedings of the Baptist Congress, 1896:106-186. Among these the essay of F. H. Rowley asserts God’s universal Fatherhood upon the grounds: 1. Man is created in the image of God; 2. God’s fatherly treatment of man, especially in the life of Christ among men; 3. God’s universal claim on man for his filial love and trust 4. Only God’s Fatherhood makes incarnation possible, for this implies oneness of nature between God and man. To these we may add. 5. The atoning death of Christ could be efficacious only upon the ground of a common nature in Christ and in humanity; and 6. The regenerating work of the Holy Spirit is intelligible only as the restoration of a filial relation which was native to man, but which his sin had put into abeyance. For denial that God is Father to any but the regenerate, see Candlish, Fatherhood of God; Wright, Fatherhood of God.

    For advocacy of the universal Fatherhood, see Crawford, Fatherhood of God: Lidgett, Fatherhood of God.

    II. UNITY OF THE HUMAN RACE.

    (a) The Scriptures teach that the whole human race is descended from a single pair. Genesis 1:27,28 — “And God created man in his own image, in the image of God created he him: male and female created he them. And God blessed them: and God said unto them, Be fruitful, and multiply, and replenish the earth, and subdue it”; 2:7 — “And Jehovah God formed man of the dust of the ground, and breathed into his nostrils the breath of life; and man became a living soul”; 22 — “and the rib, which Jehovah God had taken from the man, made he a woman, and brought her unto the man”; 3:20 — “And the man called his wife’s name Eve; because she was the mother of all living” = even Eve is traced back to Adam; 9:19 — “These three were the sons of Noah; and of these was the whole earth overspread.” Mason, Faith of the Gospel. 110 — “Logically, it seems easier to account for the divergence of what was at first one, than for the union of what was at first heterogeneous.” (b) This truth lies at the foundation of Paul’s doctrine of the organic unity of mankind in the first transgression and of the provision of salvation for the race in Christ Romans 5:12 — “Therefore, as through one man sin entered into the world, and death through sin; and so death passed unto all men, for that all sinned”; 19 — “For as through the one man’s disobedience the many were made sinners, even so through the obedience of the one shall the many be made righteous”; 1 Corinthians 15:21,22 — “For since by man came death, by man came also the resurrection of the dead. For as in Adam all die, so also in Christ shall all be made alive” Hebrews 2:16 — “for verily not of angels doth he take hold, but he taketh hold of the seed of Abraham.” One of the most eminent ethnologists and anthropologists, Prof. D. G. Brinton, said not long before his death that all scientific research and teaching tended to the conviction that mankind has descended from one pair. (c) This descent of humanity from a single pair also constitutes the ground of man’s obligation of natural brotherhood to every member of the race. Acts 17:26 — “he made of one every nation of men to dwell on all the face of the earth” — here the Revelations Vers. omits the word ‘blood” (“made of one blood” — Authorized Version). The word to be supplied is possibly “father,” but more probably “body”; cf. Hebrews 2:11 — “for both he that sanctifeth and they that are sanctified are all of one [father or body]: for which cause he is not ashamed to call them brethren saying, I will declare thy name unto my brethren, In the midst of the congregation will I sing thy praise.”

    Winchell, in his Preadamites, has recently revived the theory broached in 1655 by Peyrerius, that there were men before Adam: “Adam is descended from a black race — not the black races from Adam.” Adam is simply “the remotest ancestor to whom the Jews could trace their lineage.

    The derivation of Adam from an older human stock is essentially the creation of Adam.” Winchell does not deny the unity of the race or the retroactive effect of the atonement upon those who lived before Adam; he simply denies that Adam was the first man. 297 — He “regards the Adamic stock as derived from an older and humbler human type,” originally as low in the scale as the present Australian savages.

    Although this theory furnishes a plausible explanation of certain Biblical facts, such as the marriage of Cain ( Genesis 4:17), Cain’s fear that men would slay him ( Genesis 4:14), and the distinction between “the sons of God” and “the daughters of men” ( Genesis 6:1,2). it treats the Mosaic narrative as legendary rather than historical. Shem, Ham, and Japheth, it is intimated, may have lived hundreds of years apart from one another (409). Upon this view, Eve could not be “the mother of all living” ( Genesis 3:20), nor could the transgression of Adam be the cause and beginning of condemnation to the whole race ( Romans 5:12,19). As to Cain’s fear of other families who might take vengeance upon him, we must remember that we do not know how many children were born to Adam between Cain and Abel, what the ages of Cain and Abel were or whether Cain feared only those that were then living. As to Cain’s marriage, we must remember that even if Cain married into another family, his wife, upon any hypothesis of the unity of the race, must have been descended from some other original Cain that married his sister.

    See Keil and Delitzsch, Coon, on Pentateuch, 1:116 — “The marriage of brothers and sisters was inevitable in the case of children of the first man in case the human race was actually to descend from a single pair. This may therefore be justified in the face of the Mosaic prohibition of such marriages, on the ground that the sons and daughters of Adam represented not merely the family but the genus. It was not till after the rise of several families that the bonds of fraternal and conjugal love became distinct from one another and assumed fixed and mutually exclusive forms, the violation of which is sin.” Prof. W. H. Green: “ Genesis 20:12 shows that Sarah was Abraham’s half-sister; the regulations subsequently ordained in the Mosaic Law were not then in force.” G. H. Darwin, son of Charles Darwin, has shown that marriage between cousins is harmless where there is difference of temperament between the parties. Modern paleontology makes it probable that at the beginning of the race there was greater differentiation of brothers and sisters in the same family than obtains in later times. See Ebrard, Dogmatik, 1:275. For criticism of the doctrine that there were men before Adam, see Methodist Quar. Rev., April, 1881:205-231; Presb. Rev., 1881:440-444.

    The Scripture statements are corroborated by considerations drawn from history and science. Four arguments may be briefly mentioned: 1. The argument from history.

    So far as the history of nations and tribes in both hemispheres can be traced, the evidence points to a common origin and ancestry in central Asia.

    The European nations are acknowledged to have come, in successive waves of migration, from Asia. Modern ethnologists generally agree that the Indian races of America are derived from Mongoloid sources in Eastern Asia, either through Polynesia or by way of the Aleutian Islands.

    Bunsen, Philos. of Universal History, 2:112 — the Asiatic origin of all the North American Indians “is as fully proved as the unity of family among themselves.” Mason Origins of Invention, 361 — “Before the time of Columbus, the Polynesians made canoe voyages from Tahiti to Hawaii, a distance of 2300 miles.” Keane, Man Past and Present, 1-15, 349-440, treats of the American Aborigines under two primitive types: Longheads from Europe and Roundheads from Asia. The human race, he claims, originated in Indo-Malaysia and spread thence by migration over the globe. The Pleistocene man peopled the world from one center. The primary groups were evolved each in its special habitat, but all sprang from a Pleistocene precursor 100,000 years ago. W. T. Lopp, missionary to the Eskimos, at Port Clarence, Alaska, on the American side of Bering Strait, writes under date of August 31, 1892: “No thaws during the winter, and ice blocked in the Strait even though this has always been doubted by whalers. Eskimos have told them that they sometimes crossed the Strait on ice but they have never believed them. Last February and March our Eskimos had a tobacco famine. Two parties (five men) went with dogsleds to East Cape on the Siberian coast, and traded some beaver, otter and marten skins for Russian tobacco and returned safely. It is only during an occasional winter that they can do this. But every summer they make several trips in their big forty feet long wolf-skin boats. These observations may throw some light upon the origin of the prehistoric races of America.”

    Tylor, Primitive Culture, 1:48 — “The semi-civilized nations of Java and Sumatra are found in possession of a civilization which at first glance shows itself to have been borrowed from Hindu and Moslem sources.”

    See also Sir Henry Rawlinson, quoted in Burgess, Antiquity and Unity of the Race, 156, 157; Smyth, Unity of Human Races 223-236; Pickering, Races of Man, Introduction, synopsis, and page 316; Guyot, Earth an) Mans 298-334; Quatrefages, Natural History of Man, and Unite de l’Esp’ce Humaine, Godron, Unite de l’Esp’ce Humaine, 2:412 sq . Per contra, however, see Prof. A. H. Sayce: “All the evidence now tends to show that the districts in the neighborhood of the Baltic were those from which the Aryan languages first radiated. This is where the race or races that spoke them originally dwelt. The Aryan invaders of Northwestern India could only have been a late and distant offshoot of the primitive stock, speedily absorbed into the earlier population of the country as they advanced southward. To speak of ‘our Indian brethren’ is as absurd and false as to claim relationship with the Negroes of the United States because they now use an Aryan language.” Scribner, Where Did Life Begin? has lately adduced arguments to prove that life on the earth originated at the North Pole, and Prof. Asa Gray favors this view; see his Darwiniana, 205, and Scientific Papers, 2:152; so also Warren, Paradise Found; and Wieland, in Am. Journal of Science, Dec. 1903:401430. Dr. J. L. Wort man, in Yale Alumni Weekly, Jan. 14, 1903:129 — “The appearance of all these primates in North America was very abrupt at the beginning of the second stage of the Eocene. It is a striking coincidence that approximately the same forms appear in beds of exactly corresponding age in Europe. Nor does this synchronism stop with the apes. It applies to nearly all the other types of Eocene mammillae in the Northern Hemisphere and to the accompanying flora as well. These facts can be explained only on the hypothesis that there was a common center from which these plants and animals were distributed. Considering further that the present continental masses were essentially the same in the Eocene time as now and that the North Polar region then enjoyed a subtropical climate. As is abundantly proved by fossil plants, we are forced to the conclusion that this common center of dispersion lay approximately within the Arctic Circle. The origin of the human species did not take place on the Western Hemisphere.” 2. The argument from language.

    Comparative philology points to a common origin of all the more important languages and furnishes no evidence that the less important are not also so derived.

    On Sanskrit as a connecting link between the Indo-Germanic languages, see Max Muller, Science of Language, 1:146-165, 3:26-342, who claims that all languages pass through the three stages: monosyllabic, agglutinative and inflectional. Nothing necessitates the admission of different independent beginnings for either the material or the formal elements of the Turanian, Semitic, and Aryan branches of speech. The changes of language are often rapid. Latin becomes the Romance language and Saxon and Norman are united into English in three centuries. The Chinese may have departed from their primitive abodes while their language was yet monosyllabic.

    G. J. Romanes. Life and Letters, 195 — “Children are the constructors of all languages, as distinguished from language.” Instance Helen Keller’s sudden acquisition of language and uttering publicly a long piece only three weeks after she first began to imitate the motions of the lips. G. F.

    Wright. Man and the Glacial Period, 242-301 — Recent investigations show that children, when from any cause isolated at an early age, will often produce at once a language de novo. Thus it would appear by no means improbable that various languages in America, and perhaps the earliest languages of the world, may have arisen in a short time where conditions were such that a family of small children could have maintained existence when for any cause deprived of parental and other fostering care. Two or three thousand years of prehistoric time is perhaps all that would be required to produce the diversification of languages which appears at the dawn of history. The prehistoric stage of Europe ended less than a thousand years before the Christian Era.” In a people whose speech has not been fixed by being committed to writing, baby talk is a great source of linguistic corruption and the changes are exceedingly rapid. Humboldt took down the vocabulary of a South American tribe and after fifteen years of absence, found their speech so changed as to seem a different language.

    Zockler, in Jahrbuch far deutsche Theologie, 8:68 sq., denies the progress from lower methods of speech to higher and declares the most highly developed inflectional languages to be the oldest and most widespread.

    Inferior languages are a degeneration from a higher state of culture. In the development of the Indo-Germanic languages (such as the French and the English),we have instances of change from more full and luxuriant expression to that which is monosyllabic or agglutinative. Pott, Die Verschiedenheiten der menschlichen Rassen, also opposes the theory of Max Muller. 202, 242. Pott calls attention to the fact that the Australian languages show unmistakable similarity to the languages of Eastern and Southern Asia, although the physical characteristics of these tribes are far different from the Asiatic.

    On the old Egyptian language as a connecting link between the Indo- European and the Semitic tongues, see Bunsen, Egypt’s Place, 1: preface, 10; also see Farrar. Origin of Language, 213. Like the old Egyptian, the Berber and the Touareg are Semitic in parts of their vocabulary, while yet they are Aryan in grammar. So the Tibetan and Burmese stand between the Indo-European languages, on the one hand, and the monosyllabic languages, as of China, on the other. A French philologist claims now to have interpreted the Yh-King , the oldest and most unintelligible monumental writing of the Chinese. By regarding it as a corruption of the old Assyrian or Accadian cuneiform characters, and as resembling the syllabaries, vocabularies, and bilingual tablets in the ruined libraries of Assyria and Babylon. See Terrien de Lacouperie, The Oldest Book of the Chinese and its Authors and The Languages of China before the Chinese, 11, note; he holds to “the derivation of the Chinese civilization from the old Chaldæo-Babylonian focus of culture by the medium of Susiana.” See also Sayce, in Contemp. Rev., Jan. 1884:934-936; also, The Monist, Oct. 1906:562-593, on The Ideograms of the Chinese and the Central American Calendars. The evidence goes to show that the Chinese came into China from Susiana in the 23d century before Christ. Initial G wears down in time into a Y sound. Many words which begin with V in Chinese are found in Accadian beginning with G, as Chinese Ye, ‘night,’ is in Accadian Ge, ‘night.’ The order of development seems to be: 1. picture writing; 2. syllabic writing; 3. alphabetic writing.

    In a similar manner, there is evidence that the Egyptian Pharaohs were immigrants from another land, namely, Babylonia. Hommel derives the hieroglyphics of the Egyptians from the pictures out of which the cuneiform characters developed and he shows that the elements of the Egyptian language itself are contained in that mixed speech of Babylonia, which originated in the fusion of Sumerians and Semites. The Osiris of Egypt is the Asari of the Sumerians. Burial in brick tombs in the first two Egyptian dynasties is a survival from Babylonia, as are also the sealcylinders impressed on clay. On the relations between Aryan and Semitic languages, see Renouf, Hibbert Lectures, 55-6l; Murray, Origin and Growth of the Psalm s, 7; Bib. Sac.. 1870:162; 1876:352-380; 1879:674- 706. See also Pezzi, Aryan Philology, 1%; Sayce, Principles of Comp.

    Philology, 132-174; Whitney, art, on Comp. Philology in Encyclopedia Britannica, also Life and Growth of Language, 269, and Study of Language, 307, 308 — “Language affords certain indications of doubtful value, which, taken along with certain other ethnological considerations, also of questionable pertinence, furnish ground for suspecting an ultimate relationship. That more thorough comprehension of the history of Semitic speech will enable us to determine this ultimate relationship, may perhaps be looked for with hope, though it is not to be expected with confidence.”

    See also Smyth, Unity of Human Races, 190-222; Smith’s Bib.

    Dictionary, art.: Confusion of Tongues.

    We regard the facts as, on the whole, favoring an opposite conclusion from that in Hastings’s Bible Dictionary, art.: Flood: “The diversity of the human race and of language alike makes it improbable that men were derived from a single pair.” E. G. Robinson: “The only trustworthy argument for the unity of the race is derived from comparative philology.

    If it should be established that one of the three families of speech was more ancient than the others, and the source of the others, the argument would be unanswerable. Coloration of the skin seems to lie back of climatic influences. We believe in the unity of the race because in this there are the fewest difficulties. We would not know how else to interpret Paul in Romans 5.” Max Muller has said that the fountain head of modern philology as of modern freedom and international law is the change wrought by Christianity, superseding the narrow national conception of patriotism by the recognition of all the nations and races as members of one great human family. 3. The argument from psychology.

    The existence, among all families of mankind, of common mental and moral characteristics, as evinced in common maxims, tendencies and capacities, in the prevalence of similar traditions, and in the universal applicability of one philosophy and religion, is most easily explained upon the theory of a common origin.

    Fashioning of the world and man, of a primeval garden, an original innocence and happiness, a tree of knowledge, a serpent, a temptation and fall, a division of time into weeks, a flood and sacrifice are all widely prevalent traditions. It is possible, if not probable, that certain myths, common to many nations, may have been handed down from a time when the families of the race had not yet separated. See Zockler, in Jahrbuch fur deutsche Theologie, 8:71-90; Max Muller, Science of Language, 2:444-455; Prichard, Nat. Hist. of Man, 2:657-714; Smyth, Unity of Human Races, 236-240; Hodge, Systematic Theology, 2:77-91; Gladstone, Juventus Mundi. 4. The argument from physiology.

    A. It is the common judgment of comparative physiologists that man constitutes but a single species. The differences, which exist between the various families of mankind, are to be regarded as varieties of this species.

    In proof of these statements we urge (a) the numberless intermediate gradations which connect the so-called races with each other. (b) The essential identity of all races in cranial, osteopathy, and dental characteristics and (c) the fertility of unions between individuals of the most diverse types and the continuous fertility of the offspring of such unions.

    Huxley, Critiques and Addresses, 163 — “It may be safely affirmed that, even if the differences between men are specific, they are so small that the assumption of more than one primitive stock for all is altogether superfluous. We may admit that Negroes and Australians are distinct species, yet be the strictest monogenists, and even believe in Adam and Eve as the primeval parents of mankind, i.e., on Darwin’s hypothesis”.

    Origin of Species, 113 — “I am one of those who believe that at present there is no evidence whatever for saying that mankind sprang originally from more than a single pair. I must say that I cannot see any good ground whatever, or any tenable evidence for believing that there is more than one species of man.” Owen, quoted by Burgess, Ant, and Unity of Race, 185 — “Man forms but one species and differences are but indications of varieties. These variations merge into each other by easy gradations.” Alex von Humboldt: “The different races of men are forms of one sole species — they are not different species of a genus.”

    Quatrefages, in Revue d. deux Mondes, Dee. 1860:814 — “If one places himself exclusively upon the plane of the natural sciences, it is impossible not to conclude in favor of the monogenist doctrine.” Wagner, quoted in Bibliotheca Sacra, 19:607 — “Species = the collective total of individuals which are capable of producing one with another an uninterruptedly fertile progeny.” Pickering, Races of Man, 316 — “There is no middle ground between the admission of eleven distinct species in the human family and their reduction to one. The latter opinion implies a central point of origin.”

    There is an impossibility of deciding how many races there are, if we once allow that there is more than one. While Pickering would say eleven, Agassiz says eight, Morton twenty-two, and Burke sixty-five. Modern science all tends to the derivation of each family from a single germ.

    Other common characteristics of all races of men, in addition to those mentioned in the text are the duration of pregnancy, the normal temperature of the body, the mean frequency of the pulse, the liability to the same diseases. Meehan, State Botanist of Pennsylvania, maintains that hybrid vegetable products are no more sterile than are ordinary plants (Independent, Aug. 21, 1884).

    E. B. Tylor, art.: Anthropology, in Encyclopedia Britannica: “On the whole it may be asserted that the doctrine of the unity of mankind now stands on a firmer basis than in previous ages.” Darwin, Animals and Plants under Domestication, 1:39 — “From the resemblance in several countries of the half domesticated dogs to the wild species still living there, from the facility with which they can be crossed together, from even half tamed animals being so much valued by savages, and from the other circumstances previously remarked on which favor domestication, it is highly probable that the domestic dogs of the world have descended from two good species of wolf (viz., Canis lupus and Canis latrans), and from two or three other doubtful species of wolves (namely, the European, Indian and North American forms); from at least one or two South American canine species; from several races or species of the Jackal and perhaps from one or more extinct species.” Dr. E. M. Moore tried unsuccessfully to produce offspring by pairing a Newfoundland dog and a wolf-like dog from Canada. He only proved anew the repugnance of even slightly separated species toward one another.

    B. Unity of species is presumptive evidence of unity of origin Oneness of origin furnishes the simplest explanation of specific uniformity, if indeed the very conception of species does not imply the repetition and reproduction of a primordial type-idea impressed at its creation upon an individual empowered to transmit this type-idea to its successors Dana, quoted in Burgess, Antiq. and Unity of Race, 185, 186 — “In the ascending scale of animals, the number of species in any genus diminishes as we rise, and should by analogy be smallest at the head of the series.

    Among mammals, the higher genera have few species and the highest group next to man, the orang-outan, has only eight and these constitute but two genera. Analogy requires that man should have preeminence and should constitute only one.” 194 — “A species corresponds to a specific amount or condition of concentrated force defined in the act or law of creation. The species in any particular ease began its existence when the first germ cell or individual was created. When individuals multiply from generation to generation, it is but a repetition of the primordial type-idea.

    The specific is based on a numerical unity, the species being nothing else than an enlargement of the individual.” For full statement of Dana’s view, see Bibliotheca Sacra, Oct. 1857:862-866. On the idea of species, see also Shedd, Dogmatic Theology, 2:63-74. (a) To this view is opposed the theory, propounded by Agassiz, of different centers of creation, and of different types of humanity corresponding to the varying fauna and flora of each. But this theory makes the plural origin of man an exception in creation. Science points rather to a single origin of each species, whether vegetable or animal. If man be, as this theory grants, a single species, he should be, by the same rule, restricted to one continent in his origin. This theory, moreover, applies an unproved hypothesis with regard to the distribution of organized beings in general to the very being whose whole nature and history show conclusively that he is an exception to such a general rule, if one exists.

    Since man can adapt himself to all climes and conditions, the theory of separate centers of creation is, in his case, gratuitous and unnecessary.

    Agassiz’s view was first published in an essay on the Provinces of the Animal World in Nott and Gliddon’s Types of Mankind, a book gotten up in the interest of slavery. Agassiz held to eight distinct centers of creation, and to eight corresponding types of humanity — the Arctic, the Mongolian, the European, the American, the Negro, the Hottentot, the Malay, and the Australian. Agassiz regarded Adam as the ancestor only of the white race, yet like Peyrerius and Winchell are held that man in all his various races constitutes but one species.

    The whole tendency of recent science, however, has been adverse to the doctrine of separate centers of creation, even in the case of animal and vegetable life. In temperate North America there are two hundred and seven species of quadrupeds, of which only eight, and these polar animals are found in the north of Europe or Asia. If North America be an instance of a separate center of creation for its peculiar species, why should God create the same species of man in eight different localities? This would make man an exception in creation. There is, moreover, no need of creating man in many separate localities; for, unlike the polar bears and the Norwegian firs, which cannot live at the equator, man can adapt himself to the most varied climates and conditions. For replies to Agassiz, see Bibliotheca Sacra, 19:607-632; Princeton Rev., 1862:435-464. (b) It is objected, moreover, that the diversities of size, color, and physical conformation, among the various families of mankind, are inconsistent with the theory of a common origin. But we reply that these diversities are of a superficial character, and can be accounted for by corresponding diversities of condition and environment. Changes, which have been observed and recorded within historic time, show that the differences alluded to, may be the result of slowly accumulated divergences from one and the same original and ancestral type. The difficulty in the case, moreover, is greatly relieved when we remember (1) that the period dining which these divergences have arisen is by no means limited to six thousand years (see note on the antiquity of the race, pages 224-226). (2) That, since species in general exhibit their greatest power of divergence into varieties immediately after their first introduction, all the varieties of the human species may have presented themselves in men’s earliest history.

    Instances of physiological change as the result of new conditions: The Irish driven by the English two centuries ago from Armagh and the south of Down, have become prognathous like the Australians. The inhabitants of New England have descended from the English, yet they have already a physical type of their own. The Indians of North America, or at least certain tribes of them, have permanently altered the shape of the skull by bandaging the head in infancy. The Sikhs of India, since the establishment of B·ba N·nak’s religion (A.D.1500) and their consequent advance in civilization, have changed to a longer head and more regular features, so that they are now distinguished greatly from their neighbors, the Afghans, Tibetans, Hindus. The Ostiak Savages have become the Magyar nobility of Hungary. The Turks in Europe are, in cranial shape, greatly in advance of the Turks in Asia from whom they descended. The Jews are confessedly of one ancestry yet we have among them the light-haired Jews of Poland, the dark Jews of Spain and the Ethiopian Jews of the Nile Valley. The Portuguese who settled in the East Indies in the 16th century are now as dark in complexion as the Hindus themselves. Africans become lighter in complexion as they go up from the alluvial riverbanks to higher land, or from the coast and on the contrary the coast tribes which drive out the Negroes of the interior and take their territory end by becoming Negroes themselves. See, for many of the above facts, Burgess, Antiquity and Unity of the Race, 195-202.

    Hall, the paleontologist of New York, first hinted of the law of originally greater plasticity, mentioned in the text. It is accepted and defined by Dawson. Story of the Earth and Man, 300 — “A new law is coming into view; that species, when first introduced have an innate power of expansion, which enables them rapidly to extend themselves to the limit of their geographical range and also to reach the limit of their divergence into races. This limit once reached, these races run on in parallel lines until they one by one run out and disappear. According to this law the most aberrant races of men might be developed in a few centuries, after which divergence would cease, and the several lines of variation would remain permanent, at least so long as the conditions under which they originated remained.” See the similar view of Von Baer in Schmid, Theories of Darwin, 55, note. Joseph Cook: Variability is a lessening quantity; the tendency to change is greatest at the first, but, like the rate of motion of a stone thrown upward, it lessens every moment after. Ruskin, Seven Lamps, 125 — “The life of a nation is usually, like the flow of a lava stream, first bright and fierce, then languid and covered, at last advancing only by the tumbling over and over of its frozen blocks.” Renouf, Hibbert Lectures, 54 — “The further back we go into antiquity, the more closely does the Egyptian type approach the European.” Rawlinson says that Negroes are not represented in the Egyptian monuments before 1500 BC The influence of climate is very great, especially in the savage state.

    In May, 1891, there died in San Francisco the son of an interpreter at the Merchants’ Exchange. He was 21 years of age. Three years before his death his clear skin was his chief claim to manly beauty. He was attacked by “Addison’s disease,” a gradual darkening of the color of the surface of the body. At the time of his death his skin was as dark as that of a fullblooded Negro. His name was George L. Sturtevant. Ratzel, History of Mankind, 1:9, 10 — As there is only one species of man, “the reunion into one real whole of the parts which have diverged after the fashion of sports” is said to be “the unconscious ultimate aim of all the movements”, which have taken place since man began his wanderings. “With Humboldt we can only hold fast to the external unity of the race.” See Sir Wm. Hunter, The Indian Empire, 223, 410; Encyclopedia Britannica 12:808; 20:110; Zockler, Urgeschichte, 109-132, and in Jahrbuch fur deutsche Theologie, 8:51-71; Prichard, Researches, 5:547-552, and Nat. Hist. of Man, 2:644-656: Duke of Argyll, Primeval Man. 96-108; Smith, Unity of Human Races, 255-283; Morris Conflict of Science and Religion, 325- 385; Rawlinson, in Journ. Christ. Philosophy, April, 1883:359.

    III. ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF HUMAN NATURE.

    1. The Dichotomous Theory.

    Man has a two-fold nature — on the one hand material, on the other hand immaterial. He consists of body and of spirit or soul. That there are two, and only two, elements in man’s being, is a fact to which consciousness testifies. This testimony is confirmed by Scripture, in which the prevailing representation of man’s constitution is that of dichotomy.

    Dichotomous, from diJca , ‘in two,’ and te>mnw , ‘to cut,’ = composed of two parts. Man is as conscious that his immaterial part is a unity, as that his body is a unity. He knows two, and only two, parts of his being — body and soul. So man is the true Janus (Martensen), Mr. Facing-bothways (Bunyan). That the Scriptures favor dichotomy will appear by considering: (a) The record of man’s creation ( Genesis 2:7), in which, as a result of the in-breathing of the divine Spirit, the body becomes possessed and vitalized by a single principle — the living soul. Genesis 2:7 — “And Jehovah God formed man of the dust of the ground, and breathed into his nostrils the breath of life; and man became a living soul. Here it is not said that man was first a living soul, and that then God breathed into him a spirit; but that God in-breathed spirit, and man became a living soul = God’s life took possession of clay and as a result, man had a soul. Cf. Job 27:3 — “For my life is yet whole i) n me. And the spirit of God is in my nostrils”; 32:8 — “there is a spirit in man, And the breath of the Almighty giveth them understanding”; 33:4 — “The Spirit of God bath made me, And the breath of the Almighty giveth me life.” (b) Passages in which the human soul, or spirit, is distinguished, both from the divine Spirit from whom it proceeded, and from the body which it inhabits: Numbers 16:22 — “O God, the God of the spirits of all flesh”; Zechariah 12:1 — “Jehovah, who… formeth the spirit of man within him”; 1 Corinthians 2:11 — “the spirit of the man which is in him… the Spirit of God”; Hebrews 12:9 — “the Father of spirits.” The passages just mentioned distinguish the spirit of man from the Spirit of God. The following distinguish the soul, or spirit, of man from the body which it inhabits: Genesis 25:18 — “it came to pass, as her soul was departing (for she died)”; 1 Kings 17:21 — “Jehovah my God, I pray thee, let this child’s soul come into him again”; Ecclesiastes 12:7 — “the dust returneth to the earth as it was, and the spirit returneth unto God who gave it”; James 2:26 — “the body apart from the spirit is dead.”

    The first class of passages refutes pantheism; the second refutes materialism. (c) The interchangeable use of the terms ‘soul’ and ‘spirit.’ Genesis 41:8 — “his spirit was troubled” cf. Psalm 42:6 — “my soul is cast down within me.” John 12:27 — ‘‘Now is my soul troubled”; cf. 13:21 — “he was troubled in the spirit.” Matthew 20:28 — “to give his life yuch>n a ransom for many”; cf. 27:50 — “yielded up his spirit pneu~ma ”; Hebrews 12:23 — “spirits of just men made perfect”; cf., Revelation 6:9 — “I saw underneath the altar the souls of them that had been slain for the word of God,” In these passages ‘spirit” and ‘soul” seem to be used interchangeably. (d) The mention of body and soul (or spirit) as together constituting the whole man: Matthew 10:28 — “able to destroy both soul and body in hell”; Corinthians 5:3 — “absent in body but present in spirit”; 3 John 2 — “I pray that thou mayest prosper and be in health, even as thy soul prospereth.” These texts imply that body and soul (or spirit), together constitute the whole man.

    For advocacy of the dichotomous theory, see Goodwin. in Journ. Society Bib. Exegesis, 1881:73-86; Godet, Bib. Studies of the OT, 32; Oehler, Theology of the OT, 1:219; Hahn, Bib. Theol. NT, 390 sq.; Schmid, Bib.

    Theology NT, 503; Weiss, Bib. Theology NT, 214; Luthardt.

    Compendium der Dogmatik, 112-113; Hofmann, Schriftbeweis, 1:294- 298; Kahnis, Dogmatik, 1:549; 3:249; Harless, Com. on Ephesians, 4:23, and Christian Ethics, 22; Thomasius, Christi Person und Werk, 1:164- 168; lodge, in Princeton Review, 1865:116, and Systematic Theol., 2:47- 51; Ebrard, Dogmatik, 1:261-263; Wm. H. Hodge, in Presb. and Ref.

    Rev., Apl. 1897. 2. The Trichotomous Theory.

    Side by side with this common representation of human nature as consisting of two parts, are found passages which at first sight appear to favor trichotomy. It must be acknowledged that pneu~ma (spirit) and yuch> (soul), although often used interchangeably, and always designating the same indivisible substance, are sometimes employed as contrasted terms.

    In this more accurate use, yuch> denotes man’s immaterial part in its inferior powers and activities; as yuch> man is a conscious individual and, in common with the brute creation, has an animal life, together with appetite, imagination, memory, and understanding. Pneu~ma , on the other hand, denotes man’s immaterial part in its higher capacities and faculties; as pneu~ma , man is a being related to God, and possessing powers of reason, conscience, and free will, which difference him from the brute creation and constitute him responsible and immortal.

    In the following texts, spirit and soul are distinguished from each other: 1 Thess. 5:23 — “And the God of peace himself sanctify you wholly; and may your spirit and soul and body be preserved entire, without blame at the coming of our Lord Jesus Christ”; Hebrews 4:13 — “For the word of God is living, and active and sharper than any two-edged sword, and piercing even to the dividing of soul and spirit of both joints and marrow, and quick to discern the thoughts and intents of heart” Compare 1 Corinthians 2:14 — “Now the natural [psychical’] man receiveth not the things of the Spirit of God”; 15:44 — “It is sown a natural [Gr. ‘psychical’] body; it is raised a spiritual body. If there is a natural [Gr. ‘psychical’] body, there is also a spiritual body”; Ephesians 4:23 — “that ye be renewed in the spirit of your mind”; Jude 19 — “sensual [Gr. ‘psychical’], having not the Spirit.”

    For the proper interpretation of these texts, see note on the next page.

    Among those who cite them as proofs of the trichotomous theory (trichotomous, from tri>ca, in three parts.’ and te>mnw , ‘to cut,’ composed of three parts, i.e., spirit, soul, and body) may be mentioned Olshausen, Opuscula, 134. and Com. on 1Thess.,5:23; Beck, Biblische Seelenehre, 31; Delitzsch, Biblical Psychology, 117, 118; Goschel, in Herzog, Realencyclopadie, art.: Seele; also, art, by Auberlen: Geist des Menschen; Cremer, NT Lexicon, on pneu~ma and yuch> ; Usteri, Paulin, Lehrbegriff, 384 sq.; Neander, Planting and Training, 394; Van Oosterzee, Christian Dogmatics, 365, 366; Boardman, in Bap. Quarterly, 1:177, 325, 428; Heard, Tripartite Nature of Man, 62-114; Ellicott, Destiny of the Creature, 106-125.

    The element of truth in trichotomy is simply this, that man has a triad of endowment, in virtue of which the single soul has relations to matter, to self and to God. The trichotomous theory, however, as it is ordinarily defined, endangers the unity and immateriality of our higher nature, by holding that man consists of three substances, or three component parts body, soul and spirit and that soul and spirit are as distinct from each other as are soul and body.

    The advocates of this view differ among themselves as to the nature of the yuch> and its relation to the other elements of our being; some (as Delitzsch) holding that the yuch> is an efflux of the pneu~ma , distinct in substance, but not in essence, even as the divine Word is distinct from God, while yet he is God; others (as Goschel) regarding the yuch> , not as a distinct substance, but as a resultant of the union of the pneu~ma and the sw~ma. Still others (as Cremer) hold the yuch> to be the subject of the personal life whose principle is the pneu~ma. Heard, Tripartite Nature of Man, 103 — “God is the Creator ex traduce of the animal and intellectual part of every man but not so with the spirit. It proceeds from God, not by creation, but by emanation.”

    We regard the trichotomous theory as untenable, not only for the reasons already urged in proof of the dichotomous theory, but from the following additional considerations: (a) Pneu~ma, as well as yuch> , is used of the brute creation. Ecclesiastes 3:21 — “Who knoweth the spirit of man whether it goeth [margin ‘that goeth’] upward, and the spirit of the beast, whether it goeth [margin ‘that goeth’] downward to the earth?” Revelation 16:3 — “And the second poured out his bowl into the sea; and it became blood, as of a dead man; and every living soul died, even the things that were in the sea” = the fish. (b) Yuch> is ascribed to Jehovah. Amos 6:8 — “The Lord Jehovah hath sworn by himself” (lit. ‘by his soul,’ LXX ejauto>n ); Isaiah 42:1 — “my chosen in whom my soul delighteth”; Jeremiah 9:9 — “Shall I not visit them for these things? saith Jehovah; shall not my soul be avenged?” Hebrews 10:38 — “my righteous one shall live by faith: And if he shrink back, my soul hath no pleasure in him.” (c) The disembodied dead are called yucai> .

    Revelations 6:9 — “I saw underneath the altar the souls of them that had been slain for the word of God”; cf . 20:4 — “souls of them that had been beheaded.” (d) The highest exercises of religion are attributed to the yuch> . Mark 12:30 — “thou shalt love the Lord thy God… with all thy soul”; Luke 1:46 — “My soul doth magnify the Lord”; Genesis 6:18, — “the hope set before us: which we have as an anchor of the soul”; James 1:21 — “the implanted word, which is able to save your souls.” (e) To lose this yuch> is to lose all. Mark 8:36,37 — “For what doth it profit a man, to gain the whole world, and forfeit his life [or ‘soul, yuch> ]? For what should a man give in exchange for his life [or ‘soul,’ yuch> ]?” (f) The passages chiefly relied upon as supporting trichotomy may be better explained upon the view already indicated, that soul and spirit are not two distinct substances or parts, but that they designate the immaterial principle from different points of view. 1 Thess. 5:23 — “may your spirit and soul and body be preserved entire” This is not a scientific enumeration of the constituent parts of human nature, but a comprehensive sketch of that nature in its chief relations. Compare Mark 12:30 — “thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and with all thy soul, and with all thy mind, and with all thy strength” — where none would think of finding proof of a fourfold division of human nature. On 1Thess. 5:23, see Riggenbach (in Lange’s Com.), and Commentary of Prof. W. A. Stevens. Hebrews 4:12 — “piercing even to the dividing of soul and spirit of both joints and marrow” = not the dividing of soul from spirit or of Joints from marrow, but rather the piercing of the soul and of the spirit, even to their very joints and marrow; i.e., to the very depths of the spiritual nature. On Hebrews 4:12, see Ebrard (in Olshausen’s Com.), and Lunemann (in Meyer’s Com.); also Tholuck, Com. in loco . Jude 19 — “sensual, having not the Spirit” (yucikoi>, pneu~ma mh< e]contev ) — even though pneu~ma = the human spirit, need not mean that there is no spirit existing, but only that the spirit is torpid and inoperative — as we say of a weak man: ‘he has no mind,’ or of an unprincipled man: ‘he has no conscience’; so Alford; see Nitzsch, Christian Doctrine, 202. But pneu~ma here probably = the divine pneu~ma . Meyer takes this view, and the Revised Version capitalizes the word “Spirit.” See Goodwin, Soc. Bib. Exegesis, 1881:85 — “The distinction between yuch> and pneu~ma is a functional and not a substantial, distinction.” Moule, Outlines of Christian Doctrine, 161, — “Soul = spirit organized, Inseparably linked with the body; spirit = man’s inner being considered as God’s gift. Soul — man’s inner being viewed as his own; spirit = man’s inner being viewed as from God. They are not separate elements.” See Lightfoot, Essay on St. Paul and Seneca, appended to his Com. on Philippians, on the influence of the ethical language of Stoicism on the NT writers. Martineau, Seat of Authority, — “The difference between man and his companion creatures on this earth is not that his instinctive life is less than theirs, for in truth it goes far beyond them. In him it acts in the presence and under the eye of other powers, which transform it and by giving to it vision as well as light takes its blindness away. He is let into his own secrets.”

    We conclude that the immaterial part of man, viewed as an individual and conscious life, capable of possessing and animating a physical organism, is called yuch> . Viewed as a rational and moral agent, susceptible of divine influence and indwelling, this same immaterial part is called pneu~ma The pneu~ma , then, is man’s nature looking God-ward, and capable of receiving and manifesting the Pneu~ma a[gion ; the yuch> is man’s nature looking earthward and touching the world of sense. The pneu~ma is man’s higher part as related to spiritual realities or as capable of such relation; the yuch> is man’s higher part, as related to the body, or as capable of such relation.

    Man’s being is therefore not trichotomous but dichotomous, and his immaterial part, while possessing duality of powers, has unity of substance.

    Man’s nature is not a three-storied house, but a two-storied house, with windows in the upper story looking in two directions — toward earth and toward heaven. The lower story is the physical part of us, or the body.

    But man’s “upper story” has two aspects because there is an outlook toward things below, and a skylight through which to see the stars. “Soul” says Hovey, “is spirit as modified by union with the body.” Is man then the same in kind with the brute but different in degree? No, man is different in kind though possessed of certain powers, which the brute has.

    The frog is not a magnified sensitive plant, though his nerves automatically respond to irritation. The animal is different in kind from the vegetable, though he has some of the same powers, which the vegetable has. God’s powers include man’s but man is not of the same substance with God, nor could man be enlarged or developed into God. So man’s powers include those of the brute, but the brute is not of the same substance with man, nor could he be enlarged or developed into man.

    Potter, Human Intellect, 39 — “The spirit of man, in addition to its higher endowments, may also possess the lower powers which vitalize dead matter into a human body.” It does not follow that the soul of the animal or plant is capable of man’s higher functions or developments or that the subjection of man’s spirit to body, in the present life, disproves his immortality. Porter continues: “That the soul begins to exist as a vital force, does not require that it should always exist as such a force or in connection with a material body. Should it require another such body, it may have the power to create it for itself, as it has formed the one it first inhabited. The soul may have already formed a body and may hold it ready for occupation and use as soon as it sloughs off the one which connects it with the earth.”

    Harris, Philos. Basis of Theism, 547 — “Brutes may have organic life and sensitivity, and yet remain submerged in nature. It is not life and sensitivity that lift man above nature, but it is the distinctive characteristic of personality.” Parkhurst. The Pattern in the Mount, 17-30, on Proverbs 20:27 — “The spirit of man is the lamp of Jehovah” — not necessarily lighted, but capable of being lighted, and intended to be lighted, by the touch of the divine flame. Cf. Matthew 6:22,23 — “The lamp of the body… If therefore the light that is in thee be darkness, how great is the darkness.”

    Schleiermacher, Christliche Glaube, 2 :487 — “We think of the spirit as soul, only when in the body, so that we cannot speak of an immortality of the soul, in the proper sense, without bodily life.” The doctrine of the spiritual body is therefore the complement to the doctrine of the immortality of the soul. A. A. Hodge, Pop. Lectures, 221 — “By soul we mean only one thing, i.e. , an incarnate spirit, a spirit with a body. Thus we never speak of the souls of angels. They are pure spirits, having no bodies.” Lisle, Evolution of Spiritual Man, 72 — “The animal is the foundation of the spiritual; it is what the cellar is to the house; it is the base of supplies.” Ladd, Philosophy of Mind, 371-378 — “Trichotomy is absolutely untenable on grounds of psychological science. Man’s reason, or the spirit that is in man, is not to be regarded as a sort of Mansard roof, built on to one building in a block, all the dwellings in which are otherwise substantially alike. On the contrary, in every set of characteristics, from those called lowest to those pronounced highest, the soul of man differences itself from the soul of any species of animals. The highest has also the lowest. All must be assigned to one subject” This view of the soul and spirit as different aspects of the same spiritual principle furnishes a refutation of six important errors: (a) That of the Gnostics, who held that the pneu~ma is part of the divine essence and therefore is incapable of sin. (b) That of the Apollinarians, who taught that Christ’s humanity embraced only sw~ma and yuch>, while his divine nature furnished the pneu~ma. (c) That of the Semi-Pelagians, who excepted the human pneu~ma from the dominion of original sin. (d) That of Placeus, who held that only God directly created the pneu~ma (see our section on Theories of Imputation). (e) That of Julius Muller, who held that the yuch> comes to us from Adam, but that our pneu~ma was corrupted in a previous state of being (see page 490). (f) That of the Annihilationists, who hold that man at his creation had a divine element breathed into him, which he lost by sin, and which he recovers only in regeneration; so that only when he has this pneu~ma restored by virtue of his union with Christ does man become immortal, death being to the sinner a complete extinction of being.

    Tacitus might almost be understood to be a trichotomist when he writes: “Si ut sapientibus placuit, non extinguuntur cum corpore magnæ animæ.”

    Trichotomy allies itself readily with materialism. Many trichotomists hold that man can exist without a pneu~ma , but that the sw~ma and the yuch> by themselves are mere matter, and are incapable of eternal existence.

    Trichotomy, however, when it speaks of the pneu~ma as the divine principle in man, seems to savor of emanation or of pantheism. A modern English poet describes the glad and winsome child as “A silver stream, Breaking with laughter from the lake divine, Whence all things flow.”

    Another poet, Robert Browning, in his Death in the Desert, 107, describes body, soul, and spirit, as “What does, what knows, what is — three souls, one man.”

    The Eastern Church generally held to trichotomy, and is best represented by John of Damascus (11:12) who speaks of the soul as the sensuous lifeprinciple which takes up the spirit — the spirit being an efflux from God.

    The Western church, on the other hand, generally held to dichotomy, and is best represented by Anselm: “Constat homo, ex duabus naturis, ex natura animæ et ex natura carnis.”

    Luther has been quoted upon both sides of the controversy: by Delitzsch, Bib. Psych., 460-462, as trichotomous and as making the Mosaic tabernacle with its three divisions an image of the tripartite man. “The first division,” he says, “was called the Holy of Holies, since God dwelt there, and there was no light therein. The next was denominated the holy place, for within it stood a candlestick with seven branches and lamps.

    The third was called the atrium or court; this was under the broad heaven, and was open to the light of the sun. A regenerate man is depicted in this figure. His spirit is the Holy of Holies, God’s dwelling place, in the darkness of faith, without a light, for he believes what he neither sees nor feels nor comprehends. The psyche of that man is the holy place, whose seven lights represent the various powers of understanding, the perception and knowledge of material and visible things. His body is the atrium or court, which is open to everybody, so that all can see how he acts and lives.”

    Thomasius, however, in his Christi Person und Werk, 1:164-168, quotes from Luther the following statement, which is clearly dichotomous: “The first part, the spirit is the highest, deepest, noblest part of man. By it he is fitted to comprehend eternal things, and it is, in short, the house in which dwell faith and the word of God. The other, the soul, is this same spirit, according to nature, but yet in another soft of activity, namely, in this, that it animates the body and works through it; and it is its method not to grasp things incomprehensible, but only what reason can search out, know, and measure.” Thomasius himself says: “Trichotomy, I hold with Meyer, is not sustained in the Scripture.” Neander, sometimes spoken of as a trichotomist, says that spirit is soul in its elevated and normal relation to God and divine things; yuch> is that same soul in its relation to the sensuous and perhaps sinful things of this world. Godet, Bib. Studies of OT, 32 — “Spirit = the breath of God, considered as independent of the body: soul = that same breath, in so far as it gives life to the body.” The doctrine we have advocated, moreover, in contrast with the heathen view, puts honor upon man’s body, as proceeding from the hand of God and as therefore originally pure ( Genesis 1:31 — “And God saw everything that he had made, and, behold, it was very good”); as intended to be the dwelling place of the divine Spirit ( 1 Corinthians 6:19 — “know ye not that your body is a temple of the Holy Spirit which is in you, which ye have from God?”); and as containing the germ of the heavenly body ( Corinthians 15:44 — “it is sown a natural body; it is raised a spiritual body”; Romans 8:11 — “shall give life also to your mortal bodies through his Spirit that dwelleth in you” — here many ancient authorities read “because of his Spirit that dwelleth in you” dia> to< ejnoikou~n pneu~ma ). Birks, in his Difficulties of Belief, suggests that man, unlike angels, may have been provided with a fleshly body, (1) to objectify sin, and (2) to enable Christ to unite himself to the race, in order to save it.

    IV. ORIGIN OF THE SOUL.

    Three theories with regard to this subject have divided opinion: 1. The Theory of Pre-existence.

    First, Plato, Philo, and Origen held the view that the in order to explain the soul’s possession of ideas not derived from sense; by the second, to account for its imprisonment in the body; by the third, to justify the disparity of conditions in which men enter the world. We concern ourselves, however, only with the forms, which the view has assumed in modern times. Kant and Julius Muller in Germany, and Edward Beecher in America, have advocated it, upon the ground that the inborn depravity of the human will can be explained only by supposing a personal act of selfdetermination in a previous, or timeless, state of being.

    The truth at the basis of the theory of pre-existence is simply the ideal existence of the soul, before birth, in the mind of God — that is, God’s foreknowledge of it. The intuitive ideas, of which the soul finds itself in possession, such as space, time, cause, substance, right, God, are evolved from itself; in other words, man is so constituted that he perceives these truths upon proper occasions or conditions. The apparent recollection that we have seen at some past time a landscape, which we know to be now for the first time before us. This is an illusory putting together of fragmentary concepts or a mistaking of a part for the whole; we have seen something like a part of the landscape. We fancy that we have seen this landscape and the whole of it. Our recollection of a past event or scene is one whole, but this one idea may have an indefinite number of subordinate ideas existing within it. The sight of something, which is similar to one of these parts, suggests the past whole. Coleridge: “The great jaw of the imagination that likeness in part tends to become likeness of the whole.”

    Augustine hinted that this illusion of memory may have played an important part in developing the belief in metempsychosis.

    Other explanations are those of William James, in his Psychology: The brain tracts excited by the event proper, and those excited in its recall, are different. Baldwin, Psychology, 263, 264: We may remember what we have seen in a dream, or there may be a revival of ancestral or race experiences. Still others suggest that the two hemispheres of the brain act asynchronously; self-consciousness or apperception is distinguished from perception; divorce, from fatigue, of the processes of sensation and perception, causes paramnesia. Sully, Illusions, 280, speaks of an organic or atavistic memory: “May it not happen that by the law of hereditary transmission… ancient experiences will now and then reflect themselves in our mental life, and so give rise to apparently personal recollections?”

    Letson, The Crowd, believes that the mob is atavistic and that it bases its action upon inherited impulses: “The inherited reflexes are atavistic memories” (quoted in Colegrove, Memory, 204).

    Plato held that intuitive ideas are reminiscences of things learned in a previous state of being. He regarded the body as the grave of the soul and urged the fact that the soul had knowledge before it entered the body, as proof that the soul would have knowledge after it left the body, that is, would be immortal. See Plato, Meno, 82-85, Phædo, 72-75, Phædrus, 245-250, Republic, 5:460 and 10:614. Alexander, Theories of the Will, 36, 37 — “Plato represents pre-existent souls as having set before them a choice of virtue. The choice is free, but it will determine the destiny of each soul. Not God, but he who chooses, is responsible for his choice.

    After making their choice, the souls go to the fates that spin the threads of their destiny, and it is thenceforth irreversible. As Christian theology teaches that man was free but lost his freedom by the fall of Adam. So Plato affirms that the pre-existent soul is free until it has chosen its lot in life.” See Introductions to the above mentioned works of Plato in Jowett’s translation. Philo held that all souls are emanations from God, and that those who allowed themselves, unlike the angels, to be attracted by matter, are punished for this fall by imprisonment in the body, which corrupts them, and from which they must break loose. See Philo, De Gigantibus, Pfeiffer’s ed., 2:360-364. Origen accounted for disparity of conditions at birth by the differences in the conduct of these same souls in a previous state. God’s justice at the first made all souls equal; condition here corresponds to the degree of previous guilt. Matthew 20:3 — “others standing in the market place idle” = souls not yet brought into the world. The Talmudists regarded all souls as created at once in the beginning and as kept like grains of corn in God’s granary, until the time should come for joining each to its appointed body. See Origen, De Anima, 7; peri< ajrcw~n, ii:9:6; cf. i:1:2, 4, 18; 4:36. Origen’s view was condemned at the Synod of Constantinople, 538. Many of the preceding facts and references are taken from Bruch, Lehre der Praexistenz, translated in Bib. Sac.. 20:681-783.

    For modern advocates of the theory, see Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, sec. 15; Religion in. d, Grenzen d. bl. Vernunft, 26, 27; Julius Muller, Doctrine of Sin, 2:357-401; Edward Beecher, Conflict of Ages. The idea of pre-existence has appeared to a notable extent in modern poetry. See Vaughan, The Retreate (1621); Wordsworth, Intimations of Immortality in Early Childhood; Tennyson, Two Voices, stanzas 105-119, and Early Sonnets, 25 — “As when with downcast eyes we muse and brood, And ebb into a former life, or seem To lapse far back in some confused dream To states of mystical similitude: If one but speaks or hems or stirs his chair, Ever the wonder waxeth more and more, So that we say ‘All this hath been before, All this hath been, I know not when or where.’ So, friend, when first I looked upon your face, Our thought gave answer each to each, so true — Opposed mirrors each reflecting each — That though I knew not in what time or place, Methought that I had often met with you, And either lived in either’s heart and speech.” Robert Browning, La Saisiaz, and Christina: “Ages past the soul existed; Here an age ‘tis resting merely And hence fleets again for ages.” Rossetti, House of Life: “I have been here before, But when or how I cannot tell; I know the grass beyond the door, The sweet, keen smell, The sighing sound, the lights along the shore. You have been mine before, How long ago I may not know; But just when, at that swallow’s soar, Your neck turned so, Some veil did fall — I knew it all of yore”; quoted in Colegrove, Memory, 103- 106, who holds the phenomenon due to false induction and interpretation.

    Briggs, School, College and Character, 95 — “Some of us remember the days when we were on earth for time first time;” — which reminds us of the boy who remembered sitting in a corner before he was born amid crying for fear he would be a girl. A mere notable illustration is that found in the Life of Sir Walter Scott, by Lockhart, his son-in-law, 8:274 — “Yesterday, at dinner time, I was strangely haunted by what I would call the sense of pre-existence, viz., a confused idea that nothing that passed was said for the first time — that the same topics had been discussed and the same persons had started the same opinions on them. It is true there might have been some ground for recollections, considering that three at least of the company were old friends and had kept much company together But the sensation was so strong as to resemble what is called a mirage in the desert, or a calenture on board of ship, when lakes are seen in the desert and sylvan landscapes in the sea. It was very distressing yesterday and brought to mind the fancies of Bishop Berkeley about an ideal world. There was a vile sense of want of reality in all I did and said… I drank several glasses of wine, but these only aggravated the disorder. I did not find the in vino veritas of the philosophers.”

    To the theory of pre-existence we urge the following objections: (a) It is not only wholly without support from Scripture, but it directly contradicts the Mosaic account of man’s creation in the image of God, and Paul’s description of all evil and death in the human race as the result of Adam’s sin. Genesis 1:27 — “And God created man in his own image, in the image of God created he him”; 31 — “And God saw everything that he had made, and, behold, it was very good.” Romans 5:12 — “Therefore, as through one man sin entered into the world, and death through sin; and so death passed unto all men, for that all sinned.” The theory of pre-existence would still leave it doubtful whether all men are sinners, or whether God assembles only sinners upon the earth. (b) If the soul in this pre-existent state was conscious and personal it is inexplicable that we should have no remembrance of such pre-existence, and of so important a decision in that previous condition of being. If the soul was yet unconscious and impersonal, the theory fails to show how a moral act involving consequences so vast could have been performed at all.

    Christ remembered his pre-existent state so why should not we? There is every reason to believe that in the future state we shall remember our present existence; why should we not now remember the past state from which we came? It may be objected that Augustinians hold to a sin of the race in Adam — a sin which none of Adam’s descendants can remember.

    But we reply that no Augustinian holds to a personal existence of each member of the race in Adam, and therefore no Augustinian needs to account for lack of memory of Adam’s sin. The advocate of pre-existence, however, does hold to a personal existence of each soul in a previous state, and therefore needs to account for our lack of memory of it. (c) The view sheds no light either upon the origin of sin, or upon Gods justice in dealing with it, since it throws back the first transgression to a state of being in which there was no flesh to tempt, and then represents God as putting the fallen into sensuous conditions in the highest degree unfavorable to their restoration.

    This theory only increases the difficulty of explaining the origin of sin, by pushing back its beginning to a state of which we know less than we do of the present. To say that the soul in that previous state was only potentially conscious and personal, is to deny any real probation, and to throw the blame of sin on God the Creator. Pfleiderer, Philos. of Religion, 1:228 — “In modern times, the philosophers Kant, Schelling and Schopenhauer have explained the bad from an intelligible act of freedom, which (according to Schelling and Schopenhauer) also at the same time effectuates the temporal existence and condition of the individual soul.

    But what are we to think of as meant by such a mystical deed or act through which the subject of it first comes into existence? Is it not this, that perhaps under this singular disguise there to conceal the simple thought that the origin of the bad lies not so much in a doing of the individual freedom as rather in the rise of it. That is to say, in the process of development through which the natural man becomes a moral man and the merely potentially rational man becomes an actually rational man?” (d) While this theory accounts for inborn spiritual sin, such as pride and enmity to God, it gives no explanation of inherited sensual sin, which it holds to have come from Adam and the guilt of which must logically be denied.

    While certain forms of the pre-existence theory are exposed to the last objection indicated in the text, Julius Muller claims that his own view escapes it; see Doctrine of Sin, 2:393. His theory, he says, “would contradict Holy Scripture if it derived inborn sinfulness solely from this extra-temporal act of the individual, without recognizing in this sinfulness the element of hereditary depravity in the sphere of the natural life, and its connection with the sin of our first parents.” Muller, whose trichotomy here determines his whole subsequent scheme, holds only the pneu~ma to have thus fallen in a pre-existent state. The yuch> comes, with the body, from Adam. The tempter only brought man’s latent perversity of will into open transgression. Sinfulness, as hereditary, does not involve guilt, but the hereditary principle is the “medium through which the transcendent self-perversion of the spiritual nature of man is transmitted to his whole temporal mode of being.” While man is born guilty as to his, pneu~ma , for the reason that this pneu~ma sinned in a pre-existent state, he is also born guilty as to his yuch> , because this was one with the first man in his transgression.

    Even upon the most favorable statement of Muller’s view, we fall to see how it can consist with the organic unity of the race for in that which chiefly constitutes us men — the pneu~ma — we are as distinct and separate creations as are the angels. We also fail to see how, upon this view, Christ can be said to take our nature; or, if he takes it, how it can be without sin. See Ernesti, Ursprung der Sunde, 2:1-247; Frohschammer, Ursprung der Seele, 11-17: Philippi, Glaubenslehre, 3:92-122; Bruch, Lehre der Praexistenz, translated in Bib.Sac.,20:68l — 733. Also Bibliotheca Sacra, 11:186-191; 12:156; 17:419-427; 20:447; Kahnis, Dogmatik, 3:250 — “This doctrine is inconsistent with the indisputable fact that the souls of children are like those of the parents; and it ignores the connection of the individual with the race.” 2. The Creation Theory.

    This view was held by Aristotle, Jerome, and Pelagius, and in modern times has been advocated by most of the Roman Catholic and Reformed theologians. It regards the soul of each human being as immediately created by God and joined to the body either at conception, at birth, or at some time between these two. Referring to God as the Creator of the human spirit together with the fact that there is a marked individuality in the child, the advocates of the theory urge in its favor certain texts of Scripture. This cannot be explained as a mere reproduction of the qualities existing in the parents.

    Creationism, as ordinarily held, regards only the body as propagated from past generations. Creationists who hold to trichotomy would say, however, that the animal soul, the yuch> , is propagated with the body, while the highest part of man, the pneu~ma , is in each case a direct creation of God, — the pneu~ma not being created, as the advocates of pre-existence believe, ages before the body, but rather at the time that the body assumes its distinct individuality.

    Aristotle (De Anima) first gives definite expression to this view. Jerome speaks of God as “making souls daily.” The scholastics followed Aristotle and through the influence of the Reformed church creationism has been the prevailing opinion for the last two hundred years. Among its best representatives are Turretin, Inst., 5:13 (vol.1:425); Hodge, Systematic Theology,2:65-76; Martensen, Dogmatics, 141-148; Liddon, Elements of Religion, 99-106. Certain Reformed theologians have defined very exactly God’s method of creation. Polanus (5:31:1) says that God breathes the soul into the boys forty days and into the girls eighty days after conception. Goschel (in Herzog, Encyclop., art.: Seele) holds that while dichotomy leads to traducianism, trichotomy allies itself to that form of creationism which regards the pneu~ma as a direct creation of God, but the yuch> as propagated with the body. To the latter answers the family name; to the former the Christian name. Shall we count George Macdonald as a believer in Pre-existence or in Creationism, when he writes in his Baby’s Catechism: “Where did you come from, baby dear? Out of the everywhere into here. Where did you get your eyes so blue? Out of the sky, as I came through. Where did you get that little tear? I found it waiting when I got here. Where did you get that pearly ear? God spoke, and it came out to hear. How did they all just come to be you? God thought about me, and so I grew.”

    Creationism is untenable for the following reasons: (a) The passages adduced in its support may with equal propriety be regarded as expressing God’s mediate agency in the origination of human souls while the general tenor of Scripture, as well as its representations of God as the author of man’s body, favor this latter interpretation.

    Passages commonly relied upon by creationists are the following: Ecclesiastes 12:7 — “the spirit returneth unto God who gave it”; Isaiah 57:16 — “the souls that I have made”; Zechariah 12:1 — “Jehovah … who formeth the spirit of man within him”; Hebrews 12:9 — “the Father of spirits.” But God is with equal clearness declared to be the former of man’s body: see <19D913> Psalm 139:13,14 — “thou didst form my inward parts: Thou dust cover me [margin ‘knit me together’] in my mother’s womb. I will give thanks unto thee; for I am fearfully and wonderfully made: Wonderful are thy works”; Jeremiah 1:5 — “I formed thee in the belly.” Yet we do not hesitate to interpret these latter passages as expressive of mediate, not immediate, Creatorship. God works through natural laws of generation and development so far as the production of man’s body is concerned. None of the passages first mentioned forbid us to suppose that he works through these same natural laws in the production of the soul. The truth in creationism is the presence and operation of God in all-natural processes. A transcendent God manifests himself in all physical begetting. Shakespeare: “There ‘s a divinity that shapes our ends, Rough hew them how we will.” Pfleiderer, Grundriss, 112 — “Creationism, which emphasizes the divine origin of man, is entirely compatible with Traducianism, which emphasizes the mediation of natural agencies. So for the race as a whole, its origin in a creative activity of God is quite consistent with its being a product of natural evolution.” (b) Creationism regards the earthly father as begetting only the body of his child, certainly as not the father of the child’s highest part. This makes the beast to possess nobler powers of propagation than man does; for the beast multiplies himself after his own image.

    The new physiology properly views the soul, not as something added from without, but as the animating principle of the body from the beginning and as having a determining influence upon its whole development. That children are like their parents, in intellectual and spiritual as well as in physical respects, is a fact of which the creation theory gives no proper explanation. Mason, Faith of the Gospel, 115 — “The love of parents to children and of children to parents protests against the doctrine that only the body is propagated.” Aubrey Moore, Science and the Faith, 207, quoted in Contemp. Rev., Dec. l893:876 — “Instead of the physical derivation of the soul, we stand for the spiritual derivation of the body.”

    We would amend this statement by saying that we stand for the spiritual derivation of both soul and body, natural law being only the operation of spirit, human and divine. (c) The individuality of the child, even in the most extreme cases, as in the sudden rise from obscure families and surroundings of marked men like Luther, may be better explained by supposing a law of variation impressed upon the species at its beginning. This is a law whose operation is foreseen and supervised by God.

    The differences of the child from the parent are often exaggerated; men are generally more the product of their ancestry and of their time than we are accustomed to think. Dickens made angelic children to be born of depraved parents and to grow up in the slums. But this writing belongs to a past generation, when the facts of heredity were unrecognized. George Eliot’s school is nearer the truth. Although she exaggerates the doctrine of heredity in turn, until all ideas of free will and all hopes of escaping our fate vanish. Shaler, Interpretation of Nature, 78, 90 — “Separate motives, handed down from generation to generation, sometimes remaining latent for great periods, to become suddenly manifested under conditions the nature of which is not discernible. Conflict of inheritances [from different ancestors] may lead to the institution of variety.”

    Sometimes, in spite of George Eliot, a lily grows out of a stagnant pool and how shall we explain the fact? We must remember that the paternal and the maternal elements are themselves unlike and the union of the two may well produce a third in some respects unlike either as, when two chemical elements unite, the product differs from either of the constituents. We must remember also that nature is one factor and nurture is another and that the latter is often as potent as the former (see Galton, Inquiries into Human Faculty, 77-81). Environment determines to a large extent both the fact and the degree of development. Genius is often another name for Providence. Yet before all and beyond all we must recognize a manifold wisdom of God, which in the very organization of species impresses upon it a law of variation. At proper times and under proper conditions the old is modified in the line of progress and advance to something higher. Dante, Purgatory, canto vii — “Rarely into the branches of the tree Doth human worth mount up; and so ordains He that bestows it, that as his free gift It may be called.” Pompilia, the noblest character in Robert Browning’s Ring and the Book, came of “a bad lot.”

    Geo. A. Gordon, Christ of Today, 123-126 — “It is mockery to account for Abraham Lincoln and Robert Burns and William Shakespeare upon naked principles of heredity and environment… All intelligence and all high character are transcendent, and have their source in the mind and heart of God. It is in the range of Christ’s transcendence of his earthly conditions that we note the complete uniqueness of his person.” (d) This theory, if it allows that the soul is originally possessed of depraved tendencies, makes God the direct author of moral evil. If it holds the soul to have been created pure, it makes God indirectly the author of moral evil, by teaching that he puts this pure soul into a body which will inevitably corrupt it.

    The decisive argument against creationism is this one, that it makes God the author of moral evil. See Kahnis, Dogmatik, 3:250 — “Creationism rests upon a justly antiquated dualism between soul and body and is irreconcilable with the sinful condition of the human soul. The truth in the doctrine is just this only, that generation can bring forth an immortal human life only according to the power imparted by God’s word and with the special cooperation of God himself.” The difficulty of supposing that God immediately creates a pure soul, only to put it into a body that will infallibly corrupt it — “sicut vinum in vase acetoso” — has led many of the most thoughtful Reformed theologians to modify the creation doctrine by combining it with traducianism.

    Rothe, Dogmatik, 1:249-251, holds to creationism in a wider sense — a union of the paternal and maternal elements under the express and determining efficiency of God. Ebrard, Dogmatik, 1:327-332, regards the soul as newly created yet by a process of mediate creation according to law, which he calls ‘metaphysical generation.’ Dorner, System of Doctrine, 3:56, says that the individual is not simply a manifestation of the species. God applies to the origination of every single man, a special creative thought and act of will yet he does this through the species. It is creation by law or else the child would be not a continuation of the old species, but the establishment of a new one. So in speaking of the human soul of Christ, Dorner says (3:340-349) that the soul itself does not owe its origin to Mary nor to the species, but to the creative act of God. This soul appropriates to itself from Mary’s body the elements of a human form, purifying them in the process so far as is consistent with the beginning of a life yet subject to development and human weakness.

    Bowne, Metaphysics, 500 — “The laws of heredity must be viewed simply as descriptions of a fact and never as its explanation. Not as if ancestors passed on something to posterity, but solely because of the inner consistency of the divine action” are children like their parents. We cannot regard either of these mediating views as self-consistent or intelligible. We pass on therefore to consider the Traducian theory, which we believe more fully to meet the requirements of Scripture and of reason. For further discussion of creationism, see Frohschammer, Ursprung der Seele, 18-58; Alger, Doctrine of a Future Life, 1-17. 3. The Traducian Theory.

    This view was propounded by Tertullian and was implicitly held by Augustine. In modern times it has been the prevailing opinion of the Lutheran Church. It holds that the human race was immediately created in Adam, and, as respects both body and soul, was propagated from him by natural generation and all souls since Adam being only mediately created by God, as the upholder of the laws of propagation which were originally established by him.

    Tertullian, De Anima: “Tradux peccati, tradux animæ.” Gregory of Nyssa: “Man being one, consisting of soul and body, the common beginning of his constitution must be supposed also one so that he may not be both older and younger than himself. In him, which is bodily being first and the other coming after” (quoted in Crippen, Hist. of Christ.

    Doct., 80). Augustine, De Pec. Mer. et Rem., 3:7 — “In Adam all sinned, at the time when in his nature all were still that one man”; De Civ. Dei. 13:14 — “For we all were in that one man, when we all were that one man. The form in which we each should live was not as yet individually created and distributed to us, but there already existed the seminal nature from which we were propagated.” Augustine, indeed, wavered in his statements with regard to the origin of the soul, apparently fearing that an explicit and pronounced traducianism might involve materialistic consequences; yet, as logically lying at the basis of his doctrine of original sin. Traducianism came to be the ruling view of the Lutheran reformers.

    In his Table Talk, Luther says: “The reproduction of mankind is a great marvel and mystery. Had God consulted me in the matter, I should have advised him to continue the generation of the species by fashioning them out of clay, in the way Adam was fashioned. I should have counseled him also to let the sun remain always suspended over the earth, like a great lamp, maintaining perpetual light and heat.”

    Traducianism holds that man, as a species, was created in Adam. In Adam, the substance of humanity was yet undistributed. We derive our immaterial as well as our material being, by natural laws of propagation, from Adam — each individual man after Adam possessing a part of the substance that was originated in his. Sexual reproduction has for its purpose the keeping of variations within limit. Every marriage tends to bring back the individual type to that of the species. The offspring represents not one of the parents but both. And, as each of these parents represents two grandparents, the offspring really represents the whole race. Without this conjugation the individual peculiarities would reproduce themselves in divergent lines like the shot from a shotgun.

    Fission needs to be supplemented by conjugation. The use of sexual reproduction is to preserve the average individual in the face of a progressive tendency to variation. In asexual reproduction the offspring start on deviating lines and never mix their qualities with those of their mates. Sexual reproduction makes the individual the type of the species and gives solidarity to the race. See Maupas quoted by Newman Smith, Place of Death in Evolution, 19-22.

    John Milton, in his Christian Doctrine, is a Traducian. He has no faith is the notion of a soul separate from and inhabiting the body. He believes in a certain corporate of the soul. Mind and thought are rooted in the bodily organism. Soul was not in breathed after the body was formed. The breathing of God into man’s nostrils was only the quickening impulse to that which already had life. God does not create souls every day. Man is a body and soul or a soul-body and he transmits himself as such. Harris, Moral Evolution, 171 — The individual man has a great number of ancestors as well as a great number of descendants. He is the central point of an hourglass or a strait between two seas which widen out behind and before. How then shall we escape the conclusion that the human race was most numerous at the beginning? We must remember that other children have the same great grandparents with ourselves; that there have been inter-marriages and that, after all, the generations run on in parallel lines, that the lines spread a little in some countries and periods, and narrow a little in other countries and periods. It is like a wall covered with paper in diamond pattern. The lines diverge and converge, but the figures are parallel. See Shedd Dogm. Theol 2:7-94, Hist. Doctrine, 2:1-26, Discourses and Essays, 259; Baird, Elohim Revealed, 137-151, 335-384; Edwards, Works, 2:483; Hopkins, Works, 1:289; Birks, Difficulties of Belief, 161; Delitzsch, Bib. Psych., 128-142; Frohschammer, Ursprung der Seele, 59-224.

    With regard to this view we remark: (a) It seems best to accord with Scripture, which represents God as creating the species in Adam ( Genesis 1:27), and as increasing and perpetuating it through secondary agencies (1:28; cf. 22). Only once is breathed into man’s nostril the breath of life (2:7, cf. 22; 1 Corinthians 11:8. Genesis 4:1; 5:3; 46:26; cf. Acts 17:21-26; Hebrews 7:10), and after man’s formation ceases from his work of creation ( Genesis 2:2). Genesis 1:27 — “And God created man in his own image, in the image of God created he him: male and female created he them”; 28 — “And God blessed them: and God said unto them, Be fruitful, and multiply, and replenish the earth” cf. 22 — of the brute creation: “And God blessed them, saying, Be fruitful, and multiply, and fill the waters in the seas, and let birds multiply on the earth.” ( Genesis 2:7 — “And Jehovah God formed man of the dust of the ground, and breathed into his nostrils the breath of life; and man became a living soul”; cf. 22 — “and the rib which Jehovah God had taken from the man, made he a woman, and brought her unto the man”; 1 Corinthians 11:8 — “For the man is not of the woman; but the woman of the man” ejx ajnro>v . Genesis 4:1 — “Eve … bare Cain”; 5:3 — Adam begat a son… Seth”; 46:26 — “All the souls that came with Jacob into Egypt, that came out of his loins: Acts 17:26 — “he made of one [‘father’ or ‘body’] every nation of men”; Hebrews 7:10 — Levi was yet in the loins of his father, when Melchizedek met him”; Genesis 2:2 — “And on the seventh day God finished his work which he had made.” and he rested on the seventh day from all his work which he had made.” Shedd, Dogmatic Theology, 2:19- 29, adduces also John 1:13; 3:6; Romans 1:13; 5:12; Corinthians 15:22; Ephesians 2:3; Hebrews 12:9; <19D915> Psalm 139:15,16. Only Adam had the right to be a creationist. Westcott, Com, on Hebrews, 114 — “Levi paying tithes in Abraham implies that descendants are included in the ancestor so far that his acts have force for them. Physically, at least, the dead so rules the living. The individual is not a completely self-centered being. He is member in a body. So far traducianism is true. But, if this were all, man would be merely result of the past and would have no individual responsibility. There is an element not derived from birth, though it may follow upon it. Recognition of individuality is the truth in creationism. Power of vision follows upon preparation of an organ of vision, modified by the latter but not created by it. So we have the social unity of the race, plus the personal responsibility of the individual, the influence of common thoughts plus the power of great men, the foundation of hope plus the condition of judgment.” (b) It is favored by the analogy of vegetable and animal life, in which increase of numbers is secured, not by a multiplicity of immediate creations, but by the natural derivation of new individuals from a parent stock. A derivation of the human soul from its parents no more implies a materialistic view of the soul and its endless division and subdivision, than the similar derivation of the brute proves the principle of intelligence in the lower animals to be wholly material.

    God’s method is not the method of endless miracle. God works in nature through second causes. God does not create a new vital principle at the beginning of existence of each separate apple and of each separate dog.

    Each of these is the result of a self-multiplying force, implanted once for all in the first of its race. To say, with Moxom (Baptist Review, 1881:278) that God is the immediate author of each new individual, is to deny second causes and to merge nature in God. The whole tendency of modern science is in the opposite direction. Nor is there any good reason for making the origin of the individual human soul an exception to the general rule. Augustine wavered in his traducianism because he feared the inference that the soul is divided and subdivided, that is, that it is composed of parts and is therefore material in its nature. But it does not follow that all separation is material separation. We do not, indeed, know how the soul is propagated. But we know that animal life is propagated and still that it is not material, nor composed of parts. The fact that the soul is not material, nor composed of parts, is no reason why it may not be propagated also.

    It is well to remember that substance does not necessarily imply either extension or figure . Substantia is simply that which stands under, underlies, supports or in other words, that which is the ground of phenomena. The propagation of mind therefore does not involve any dividing up, or splitting off, as if the mind were a material mass. Flame is propagated but division and subdivision do not propagate it. Professor Ladd, a creationist together with Lotze, whom he quotes, even though he repudiates the idea that the mind is susceptible of division. See Ladd, Philosophy of Mind, 206, 359-366 — “The mind comes from nowhere, for it never was, as mind, in space, is not now in space, and cannot be conceived of as coming and going in space. Mind is a growth so parents do not transmit their minds to their offspring. The child’s mind does not exist before it acts. Its activities are its existence.” So we might say that flame has no existence before it acts. Yet it may owe its existence to a preceding time. The Indian proverb is: “No lotus without a stem.” Hall Caine, in his novel The Manxman, tells us that the Deemster of the Isle of Man had two sons. These two sons were as unlike each other as are the inside and the outside of a bowl. But the bowl was old Deemster himself.

    Hartley Coleridge inherited his father’s imperious desire for stimulants and with it his inability to resist their temptation. (c) We derive our being from our human ancestry. The observed transmission not merely of physical but of mental and spiritual characteristics in families and races and, especially, the uniformly evil moral tendencies and dispositions, which all men possess from their birth, are proof of that in soul as well as in body.

    Galton, in his Hereditary Genius and Inquiries into Human Faculty, furnishes abundant proof of the transmission of mental and spiritual characteristics from father to son. Illustrations, in the case of families, are the American Adams’s, the English George’s, the French Bourbons, the German Bach’s. Illustrations, in the case of races, are the Indians, the Negroes, the Chinese, the Jews. Hawthorne represented the introspection and the conscience of Puritan New England. Emerson had a minister among his ancestry either on the paternal or the maternal side back eight generations. Every man is “a chip of the old block.” “A man is an omnibus, in which all his ancestors are seated” (O. W. Holmes). Variation is one of the properties of living things and the other is transmission. “On a dissecting table, in the membranes of a newborn infant’s body, can be seen ‘the drunkard’s tinge.’ The blotches on his grandchild’s cheeks furnish a mirror to the old debauchee. Heredity is God’s visiting of sin to the third and fourth generations.” On heredity and depravity, see Phelps; in Bibliotheca Sacra, Apr. 1884:254 — “When every molecule in the paternal brain bears the shape of a point of interrogation, it would border on the miraculous if we should find the exclamation sign of faith in the brain cells of the child.”

    Robert G. Ingersoll said that most great men have great mothers and that most great women have great fathers. Most of the great are like mountains, with the valley of ancestors on one side and the depression of posterity on the other. Hawthorne’s House of the Seven Gables illustrates the principle of heredity. But in his Marble Faun and Transformation, Hawthorne unwisely intimates that sin is a necessity to virtue, a background or condition of good. Dryden, Absalom and Ahithophel. 1:156 — “Great wits are sure to madness near allied, And thin partitions do their bounds divide.” Lombroso, The Man of Genius, maintains that genius is a mental disease allied to epileptiform mania or the dementia of cranks. If this were so, we should infer that civilization is the result of insanity and that, so soon as Napoleons, Dantes and Newtons manifest themselves, they should be confined in Genius Asylums. Robert Browning, Hohenstiel-Schwangau, comes nearer the truth: “A solitary great man’s worth the world. God takes the business into his own hands At such time: Who creates the novel flower Contrives to guard and give it breathing room… ‘Tis the great Gardener grafts the excellence On wildings, where he will.” (d) The Traducian doctrine embraces and acknowledges the element of truth, which gives plausibility to the creation view. Traducianism, properly defined, admits a divine concurrence throughout the whole development of the human species. This allows, under the guidance of a superintending Providence, special improvements in type at the birth of marked men, similar to those, which we may suppose to have occurred in the introduction of new varieties in the animal creation.

    Page-Roberts, Oxford university Sermons: “It is no more unjust that man should inherit evil tendencies, than that he should inherit good. To make the former impossible is to make the latter impossible. To object to the law of heredity, is to object to God’s ordinance of society and to say that God should have made men, like the angels, a company and not a race.”

    The common moral characteristics of the race can only be accounted for upon the Scriptural view that “that which is born of the flesh is flesh ‘( John 3:6). Since propagation is a propagation of soul, as well as body, we see that to beget children under improper conditions is a crime and that fúticide is murder. Haeckel, Evolution of Man, 2:3 — “The human embryo passes through the whole course of its development in forty weeks. Each man is really older by this period than is usually assumed. When, for example, a child is said to be nine and a quarter years old, he is really ten years old.” Is this the reason why Hebrews call a child a year old at birth? President Edwards prayed for his children and his children’s children to the end of time and President Woolsey congratulated himself that he was one of the inheritors of those prayers. H. V. Emerson: “How can a man get away from his ancestors?” Men of genius should select their ancestors with great care. When begin the instruction of a child? A hundred years before he is born. A lady whose children were noisy and troublesome said to a Quaker relative that she wished she could get a good Quaker governess for them, to teach them the quiet ways of the Society of Friends. “It would not do them that service,” was the reply; “they should have been rocked in a Quaker cradle, if they were to learn Quakerly ways.”

    Galton, Natural Inheritance, 104 — “The child inherits partly from his parents, partly from his ancestry. In every population that intermarries freely, when the genealogy of any man is traced far backwards, his ancestry will be found to consist of such varied elements that they are indistinguishable from the sample taken at haphazard from the general population. Galton speaks of the tendency of peculiarities to revert to the general type and says that a man’s brother is twice as nearly related to him as his father is and nine times as nearly as his cousin is. The mean stature of any particular class of men will be the same as that of the race.

    In other words, it will be mediocre. This tells heavily against the full hereditary transmission of any rare and valuable gift, as only a few of the many children would resemble their parents.” We may add to these thoughts of Galton that Christ himself, as respects his merely human ancestry, was not so much son of Mary, as he was Son of man.

    Brooks, Foundations of Zoology, 144-167 — In an investigated case, “in seven and a half generations the maximum ancestry for one person is 382, or for three persons 1146. The names of 452 of them, or nearly half, are recorded, and these 452 named ancestors are not 452 distinct persons, but only 149, many of them, in the remote generations, being common ancestors of all three in many lines. If the lines of descent from the unrecorded ancestors were inter-related in the same way, as they would surely be in and stable community, the total ancestry of these three persons for seven and a half generations would be 378 persons instead of 1146. The descendants of many died out. All the members of a species descend from a few ancestors in a remote generation and these few are the common ancestors of all. Extinction of family names is very common. We must seek in the modern world and not in the remote past for an explanation of that diversity among individuals which passes under the name of variation. The genealogy of a species is not a tree, but a slender thread of very few strands, a little frayed at the near end, but of immeasurable length. A fringe of loose ends all along the thread may represent the animals which having no descendants are now as if they had never been. Each of the strands at the near end is important as a possible of union between the thread of the past and that of the distant future.”

    Weismann, Heredity, 270, 272, 380, 384, denies Brooks’s theory that the male element represents the principle of variation. He finds the cause of variation in the union of elements from the two parents. Each child unites the hereditary tendencies of two parents and so must be different from either. The third generation is a compromise between four different hereditary tendencies. Brooks finds the cause of variation in sexual reproduction, but he bases his theory upon the transmission of acquired characters. Weismann denies this transmission by saying that the male germ cell does not play a different part from that of the female in the construction of the embryo. Children inherit quite as much from the father as from the mother. Like twins are conceived from the same egg cell. No two germ cells contain exactly the same combination of hereditary tendencies. Changes in environment and organism affect posterity, not directly, but only through other changes produced in its germinal matter.

    Hence efforts to reach high food cannot directly produce the giraffe. See Dawson, Modern Ideas of Evolution, 235-239; Bradford, Heredity and Christian Problems; Ribot, Heredity; Woods, Heredity in Royalty. On organic unity in connection with realism, see Hodge, in Princeton Rev., Jan. 1865:125-135; Dabney, Theology, 317-321.

    V. THE MORAL NATURE OF MAN.

    By the moral nature of man we mean those powers which fit him for right or wrong action. These powers are intellect, sensibility and will, together with that peculiar power of discrimination and impulsion, which we call conscience. In order to moral action, man has intellect or reason, to discern the difference between right and wrong, the sensibility to be moved by each of these and the free will to do the one or the other. Intellect, sensibility and will are man’s three faculties. In connection with these faculties there is a sort of activity which involves them all and without which there can be no moral action, namely, the activity of conscience. Conscience applies the moral law to particular cases in our personal experience and proclaims that law as binding upon us. Only a rational and sentient being can be truly moral yet it does not come within our province to treat of man’s intellect or sensibility in general. We speak here only of Conscience and of Will. 1. Conscience.

    A. Conscience an accompanying knowledge. As already intimated, conscience is not a separate faculty, like intellect, sensibility and will, but rather a mode in which these faculties act. Like consciousness, conscience is an accompanying knowledge. Conscience is a knowing of self (including our acts and states) in connection with a moral standard or law. Adding now the element of feeling, we may say that conscience is man’s consciousness of his own moral relations, together with a peculiar feeling in view of them. It thus involves the combined action of the intellect and of the sensibility, and that in view of a certain class of objects, viz.: right and wrong.

    There is no separate ethical faculty any more than there is a separate or aesthetic faculty. Conscience is like taste: it has to do with moral being and relations, as taste has to do with aesthetic being and relations. But the ethical judgment and impulse are, like the aesthetic judgment and impulse, the mode in which intellect, sensibility and will act with reference to a certain class of objects. Conscience deals with the right, as taste deals with the beautiful. Consciousness (con and scio) is a con knowing. It is a knowing of our thoughts, desires and volition in connection with a knowing of the self that has these thoughts, desires and volition.

    Conscience is a con knowing. It is a knowing of our moral acts and states in connection with a knowing of same moral standard or law which is conceived of as our true self and therefore as having authority over us.

    Ladd, Philosophy of Mind, 183-185 — “The condemnation of self involves self-diremption, double consciousness. Without it Kant’s categorical imperative is impossible. The one self lays down the law to the other self, judges it, threatens it. This is what is meant, when the apostle says: ‘It is no more I that do it but sin that dwelleth in me’ ( Romans 7:17)” B. Conscience discriminative and impulsive. But we need to define more narrowly both the intellectual and the emotional elements in conscience. As respects the intellectual element, we may say that conscience is a power of judgment and it declares our acts or states to conform, or not to conform, to law. It declares the acts or states which conform to be obligatory or those, which do not conform, to be forbidden. In other words, conscience judges: (1) this is right (or, wrong); (2) I ought (or, I ought not). In connection with this latter judgment, there comes into view the emotional element of conscience when we feel the claim of duty; there is an inner sense that the wrong must not be done. Thus conscience is (1) discriminative and (2) impulsive.

    Robinson, Principles and Practice of Morality, 173 — “The one distinctive function of conscience is that of authoritative self-judgments in the conscious presence of a supreme Personality to whom we as persons feel ourselves accountable. It is this twofold personal element in every judgment of conscience, viz., the conscious self-judgment in the presence of the all-judging Deity. This has led such writers as Bain, Spencer and Stephen to attempt to explain the origin and authority of conscience as the product of parental training and social environment. Conscience is not prudential nor advisory nor executive, but solely judicial. Conscience is the moral reason pronouncing upon moral actions. Consciousness furnishes law and conscience pronounces judgments by saying: Thou shalt, Thou shalt not. Every man must obey his conscience; if it is not enlightened, that is his outlook. The callusing of conscience in this life is already a penal infliction.” S. S. Times, Apl. 5, 1902:185 — “Doing as well as we know how is not enough, unless we know just what is right and then do that. God never tells us merely to do our best or according to our knowledge. It is our duty to know what is right, and then to do it.

    Ignorantia legis neminem excusat. We have responsibility for knowing preliminary to doing.”

    C. Conscience distinguished from other mental processes. The nature and office of conscience will be still more clearly perceived, if we distinguish it from other processes and operations with which it is too often confounded.

    Conscience is a term that has been used by various writers to designate either one or all of the following: 1. Moral intuition, which is the intuitive perception of the difference between right and wrong, as opposite moral categories. 2. Accepted law, which is the application of the intuitive idea to general classes of actions and the declaration that these classes of actions are right or wrong, apart from our individual relation to them. This accepted law is the complex product of (a) the intuitive idea, (b) the logical intelligence, (c) experiences of utility, (d) influences of society and education, and (e) positive divine revelation. 3. Judgment is the application of this accepted law to individual and concrete cases in our own experience and pronouncing our own acts or states either past, present or prospective, to be right or wrong. 4. Command is the authoritative declaration of obligation to do the right, or forbear from doing the wrong together with an impulse of the sensibility away from the one and toward the other. 5. Remorse or approval is moral sentiment either of approbation or disapprobation, in view of past acts or states, regarded as wrong or right. 6. Fear or hope is instinctive disposition of disobedience to expect punishment and of obedience to expect reward.

    Ladd, Philos. of Conduct,70 — “The feeling of the ought is primary, essential, unique; the judgments as to what one ought are the results of environment, education and reflection.” The sentiment of justice is not an inheritance of civilized man alone. No Indian was ever robbed of his lands or had his government allowance stolen from him who was not as keenly conscious of the wrong as in like circumstances we could conceive that a philosopher would be. The oughtness of the ought is certainly intuitive, the whyness of the ought (conformity to God) is possibly intuitive also and the whatness of the ought is less certainly intuitive. Cutler, Beginnings of Ethics, 163, 164 — “Intuition tells us that we are obliged. Why we are obliged and what we are obliged to, we must learn elsewhere.” Obligation = that which is binding on a man, ought is something owed and duty is something due. The intuitive notion of duty (intellect) is matched by the sense of obligation (feeling).

    Bixby, Crisis in Morals, 203, 270 — “All men have a sense of right — of right to life and, contemporaneously perhaps but certainly afterwards, of right to personal property. And my right implies duty in my neighbor to respect it. Then the sense of right becomes objective and impersonal. My neighbor’s duty to me implies my duty to him. I put myself in his place.”

    Bowne, Principles of Ethics, 156, 188 — “First, the feeling of obligation, the idea of a right and a wrong with corresponding duties, is universal.

    Secondly, there is a very general agreement in the formal principles of action and, largely in the virtues also, such as benevolence, justice and gratitude. Whether we owe anything to our neighbor has never been a real question. The practical trouble has always lain in the other question: Who is my neighbor? Thirdly, the specific contents of the moral ideal are not fixed, but the direction in which the ideal lies is generally discernible. We have in ethics the same fact as in intellect — a potentially infallible standard with manifold errors in its apprehension and application.

    Lucretius held that degradation and paralysis of the moral nature result from religion. Many claim, on the other hand, that without religion morals would disappear from the earth.”

    Robinson, Princ. and Prac. of Morality, 173 — “Fear of an omnipotent will is very different from remorse in view of the nature of the supreme Being whose law we have violated.” A duty is to be settled in accordance with the standard of absolute right, not as public sentiment would dictate.

    A man must be ready to do right in spite of what everybody thinks. Just as the decisions of a judge are for the time binding on all good citizens, so the decisions of Conscience, as relatively binding, must always be obeyed.

    They are presumptively right and they are the only present guides of action. Yet man’s present state of sin makes it quite possible that the decisions which are relatively right may be absolutely wrong. It is not enough to take one’s time from the watch; the watch may go wrong. There is a prior duty of regulating the watch by astronomical standards. Bishop Gore: “Man’s first duty is, not to follow his conscience, but to enlighten his conscience.” Lowell says that the Scythians used to eat their grandfathers out of humanity. Paine, Ethnic Trinities, 300 — “Nothing is so stubborn or so fanatical as a wrongly instructed conscience, as Paul showed in his own case by his own confession” ( Acts 26:9 — “I verily thought with myself that I ought to do many things contrary to the name of Jesus of Nazareth”).

    D. Conscience the moral judiciary of the soul. From what has been previously said, it is evident that only items 3 and 4 are properly included under the term conscience. Conscience is the moral judiciary of the soul or the power within of judgment and command. Conscience must judge according to the law given to it, and therefore, since the moral standard accepted by the reason may be imperfect, its decisions, while relatively just, may be absolutely unjust. Items 1 and 2 belong to the moral reason but not to conscience proper. Hence the duty of enlightening and cultivating the moral reason so that conscience may have a proper standard of judgment.

    Items 5 and 6 belong to the sphere of moral sentiment and not to conscience proper. The office of conscience is to “bear witness” ( Romans 2:15).

    In Romans 2:15 “they show the work of the law written in their hearts, their conscience hearing witness therewith, and their thoughts one with another accusing or else excusing them”. We have conscience clearly distinguished both from the law and the perception of law on the one hand and from the moral sentiments of approbation and disapprobation on the other. Conscience does not furnish the law but it bears witness with the law, which is furnished by other sources. It is not “that power of mind by which moral law is discovered to each individual” (Calderwood, Moral Philosophy, 77), nor can we speak of “Conscience, the Law” (as Whewell does in his Elements of Morality, 1:259-266). Conscience is not the law book in the courtroom but it is the judge, whose business is not to make law but to decide cases according to the law given to him.

    As conscience does not legislate, so it is not retributive; as it is not the law book, so it is not the sheriff. We say, indeed, in popular language, that conscience scourges or chastises but it is only in the sense in which we say that the judge punishes — i.e., through the sheriff. The moral sentiments are the sheriff; they carry out the decisions of conscience, or the judge, but they are not themselves conscience, any more than the sheriff is the judge.

    Only this doctrine, that conscience does not discover law, can explain on the one hand the fact that men are bound to follow their consciences, and on the other hand the fact that their consciences so greatly differ as to what is right or wrong in particular cases. The truth is, that conscience is uniform and infallible, in the sense that it always decides rightly according to the law given it. Men’s decisions vary only because the moral reason has presented to the conscience different standards by which to judge.

    Conscience can be educated only in the sense of acquiring greater facility and quickness in making its decisions. Education has its chief effect, not upon the conscience but upon the moral reason in rectifying its erroneous or imperfect standards of judgment. Give conscience a right law by which to judge, and its decisions will be uniform, and absolutely as well as relatively just. We are bound, not only to “follow our conscience,” but also to have a right conscience to follow and to follow it, not as one follows the beast he drives but as the soldier follows his commander.

    Robert J. Burdette: Following conscience as a guide is like following one’s nose. It is important to get the nose pointed right before it is safe to follow it. A man can keep the approval of his own conscience in very much the same way that he can keep directly behind his nose and go wrong all the time.”

    Conscience is the con knowing of a particular act or state, as coming under the law accepted by the reason as to right and wrong and the judgment of conscience subsumes this act or state under that general standard. Conscience cannot include the law and cannot itself be the law because reason only knows, never con-knows. Reason says scio ; only judgment says conscio.

    This view enables us to reconcile the intuitive theories and the empirical theories of morals. Each has its element of truth. The original sense of right and wrong is intuitive for no education could over impart the idea of the difference between right and wrong to one who had it not. But what classes of things are right or wrong, we learn by the exercise of our logical intelligence, in connection with experiences of utility, influences of society and tradition, and positive divine revelation. Thus our moral reason, through a combination of intuition and education, of internal and external information as to general principles of right and wrong, furnishes the standard according to which conscience may judge the particular cases, which come before it.

    This moral reason may become depraved by sin, so that the light becomes darkness ( Matthew 6:22,23) and conscience has only a perverse standard by which to judge. The “weak’ conscience ( 1 Corinthians 8:12) is one whose standard of judgment is yet imperfect; the conscience “branded” (Revelations Vers.) or “seared” (A.V.) “as with a hot iron” ( 1 Timothy 4:2) is one whose standard has been wholly perverted by practical disobedience. The word and the Spirit of God are the chief agencies in rectifying our standards of judgment and so of enabling conscience to make absolutely right decisions. God can so unite the soul to Christ, that it becomes partaker on the one hand of his satisfaction to justice and is thus “sprinkled from an evil conscience” ( Hebrews 10:22). On the other hand of his sanctifying power and is thus enabled in certain respects to obey God’s command and to speak of a “good conscience” ( 1 Peter 3:16 — of single act 3:21 — of state) instead of an “evil conscience” ( Hebrews 10:22) or a conscience “defiled” ( Titus 1:15) by sin. Here the “good conscience” is the conscience, which has been, obeyed by the will, and the “evil conscience” the conscience which has been disobeyed with the result, in the first case, of approval from the moral sentiments and, in the second case, of disapproval.

    E. Conscience in its relation to God as the lawgiver. Since conscience, in the proper sense, gives uniform and infallible judgment that the right is supremely obligatory and that the wrong must be forborne at every cost, it can be called an echo of God’s voice, and an indication in man of that which his own true being requires.

    Conscience has sometimes been described as the voice of God in the soul or as the personal presence and influence of God himself. But we must not identify conscience with God. D. W. Faunce: “Conscience is not God for it is only a part of one’s self. To buildup a religion about one’s own conscience, as if it were God, is only a refined selfishness; a worship of one part of one’s self by another part of one’s self.” In The Excursion, Wordsworth speaks of conscience as “God’s most intimate presence in the soul and his most perfect image in the world.” But in his Ode to Duty he more directly writes: “Stern daughter of the voice of God! O Duty if that name thou love, Who art a light to guide, a rod To check the erring and reprove, Thou who art victory and law When empty terrors overawe, From vain temptations dost set free And calm the weary strife of frail humanity!” Here is an allusion to the Hebrew Bath Kol. “The Jews say that the Holy Spirit spoke during the Tabernacle by Urim and Thummim, under the first Temple by the Prophets, and under the second Temple by the Bath Kol. It is a divine intimation as inferior to the oracular voice proceeding from the mercy seat as a daughter is supposed to be inferior to her mother. It is also used in the sense of a conscience giving approval. In this case it is the echo of the voice of God in those who by obeying hear” (Hershon’s Talmudic Miscellany, 2, note). This phrase, “the echo of God’s voice,” is a correct description of conscience, and Wordsworth probably had it in mind when he spoke of duty as “the daughter of the voice of God.” Robert Browning describes conscience as “the great beacon light God sets in all… The worst man upon earth… knows in his conscience more Of what right is, than arrives at births In the best man’s acts that we bow before.” Jackson James Martineau, 134 — The sense of obligation is “a piercing ray of the great Orb of souls.” On Wordsworth’s conception of conscience, see A. H. Strong, Great Poets, 365-368.

    Since the activity of the immanent God reveals itself in the normal operations of our own faculties, conscience might be also regarded as man’s true self over against the false self which we have set up against it.

    Theodore Parker defines conscience as” our consciousness of the conscience of God.” In his fourth year, says Chadwick, his biographer (pages 12, 13, 185), young Theodore saw a little spotted tortoise and lifted his hand to strike. All at once something checked his arm, and a voice within said clear and loud: “It is wrong.” He asked his mother what it was that told him it was wrong.

    She wiped a tear from her eye with her apron, and taking him in her arms said: “Some men call it conscience, but I prefer to call it the voice of God in the soul of man. If you listen and obey it, then it will speak clearer and clearer, and will always guide you right but if you turn a deaf ear and disobey, then it will fade out little by little, and will leave you all in the dark and without a guide. Your life depends on your hearing this little voice.” R. T. Smith, Man’s Knowledge of Man and of God, 87, 171 — “Man has conscience, as he has talents. Conscience, no more than talent, makes him good. He is good, only as he follows conscience and uses talent… The relation between the terms consciousness and conscience, which are in fact but forms of the same word, testifies to the fact that it is in the action of conscience that man’s consciousness of himself is chiefly experienced.”

    The conscience of the regenerate man may have such right standards and its decisions may be followed by such uniformly right action, that its voice, though it is not itself God’s voice, is yet the very echo of God’s voice. The renewed conscience may take up into itself and may express the witness of the Holy Spirit. ( Romans 9:1 — “I say the truth in Christ, I lie not, my conscience bearing witness with me in the Holy Spirit”; cf . 8:16 — “the Spirit himself beareth witness with our spirit, that we are children of God”). But even when conscience judges according to imperfect standards and is imperfectly obeyed by the will, there is spontaneity in its utterances and sovereignty in its commands. It declares that whatever is right must be done. The imperative of conscience is a “categorical imperative” (Kant). It is independent of the human will. Even when disobeyed, it still asserts its authority. Before conscience, every other impulse and affection of man’s nature is called to bow.

    F. Conscience in its relation to God as holy. Conscience is not an original authority. It points to something higher than it does. The “authority of conscience is simply the authority of the moral law, or rather, the authority of the personal God, of whose nature the law is but a transcript.

    Conscience, therefore, with its continual and supreme demand that the right should he done, furnishes the host witness to man of the existence of a personal God and of the supremacy of holiness in him in whose image we are made.

    In knowing self in connection with moral law, man not only gets his best knowledge of self, but his best knowledge of that other self opposite to him, namely, God. Gordon, Christ of Today, 236 — “The conscience is the true Jacob’s ladder, set in the heart of the individual and reaching unto heaven and upon it the angels of self-reproach and self-approval ascend and descend.” This is of course true if we confine our thoughts to the mandatory element in revelation. There is a higher knowledge of God, which is given only in grace. Jacob’s ladder symbolizes the Christ who publishes the gospel but the law, and not only the law but the gospel.

    Dewey, Psychology, 344 — “Conscience is intuitive, not in the sense that it enunciates universal laws and principles, for it lays down no laws.

    Conscience is a name for the experience of personality that any given act is in harmony or in discord with a truly realized personality.” Because obedience to the dictates of conscience is always relatively right, Kant could say: “an erring conscience is a chimæra.” But because the law accepted by conscience may be absolutely wrong, conscience may in its decisions greatly err from the truth. S. S. Times: “Saul before his conversion was a conscientious wrong doer. His spirit and character was commendable, while his conduct was reprehensible.” We prefer to say that Saul’s zeal for the law was zeal to make the law subservient to his own pride and honor.

    Horace Bushnell said that the first requirement of a great ministry is a great conscience. He did not mean the punitive, inhibitory conscience merely, but rather the discovering, arousing, inspiring conscience, that sees at once the great things to be done and moves toward them with a shout and a song. This unbiased and pure conscience is inseparable from the sense of its relation to God and to God’s holiness. Shakespeare, Henry VI, 2d Part, 3:2 — “What stronger breastplate than a heart untainted?

    Thrice is he armed that hath his quarrel just; And he but naked, though locked up in steel, Whose conscience with injustice is corrupted.” Huxley, in his lecture at Oxford in 1893, admits and even insists that ethical practice must be and should hem opposition to evolution; the methods of evolution do not account for ethical man and his ethical progress.

    Morality is not a product of the same methods by which lower orders have advanced in perfection of organization, namely, by the struggle for existence and survival of the fittest. Human progress is moral, it is in freedom, it is under the law of love and it is different in kind from physical evolution. James Russell Lowell: “In vain we call old notions fudge, And bend our conscience to our dealing: The Ten Commandments will not budge, And stealing will continue stealing.”

    R. T. Smith, Man’s Knowledge of Man and of God, 161 — “Conscience lives in human nature like a rightful king, whose claim can never be forgotten by his people. Even though they dethrone and misuse him and whose presence, on the seat of judgment, can he alone make the nation to be at peace with itself.” Seth, Ethical Principles, 424 — “The Kantian theory of autonomy does not tell the whole story of the moral life. Its unyielding Ought, its categorical Imperative, issues not merely from the depths of our own nature but from the heart of the universe itself. We are self-legislative but we re-enact the law already enacted by God; we recognize rather than constitute the law of our own being. The moral law is an echo within our own souls of the voice of the Eternal “whose offspring we are ( Acts 17:28).”

    Schenkel, Christliche Dogmatik, 1:135-155 — “The conscience is the organ by which the human spirit finds God in itself and so becomes aware of itself in him. Only in conscience is man conscious of himself as eternal, as distinct from God and yet as normally bound to be determined wholly by God. When we subject ourselves wholly to God, conscience gives us peace. When we surrender to the world the allegiance due only to God, conscience brings remorse. In this latter case we become aware that while God is in us, we are no longer in God. Religion is exchanged for ethics, the relation of communion for the relation of separation. In conscience alone man distinguishes himself absolutely from the brute. Man does not make conscience, but conscience makes man. Conscience feels every separation from God as an injury to self. Faith is the relating of the selfconsciousness to the God-consciousness, the becoming sure of our own personality and in the absolute personality of God. Only in faith does conscience come to itself. But by sin this faith-consciousness may be turned into law-consciousness. Faith affirms God in us; law affirms God outside of us.” Schenkel differs from Schleiermacher in holding that religion is not feeling but conscience, and that it is not a sense of dependence on the world, but a sense of dependence on God. Conscience recognizes a God distinct from the universe, a moral God, and so makes an unmoral religion impossible.

    Hopkins, Outline Study of Man, 283-285, Moral Science,49, Law of Love,41 — “Conscience is the moral consciousness of man in view of his own actions as related to moral law. It is a double knowledge of self and of the law. Conscience is not the whole of the moral nature. It presupposes the moral reason, which recognizes the moral law and affirms its universal obligation for all moral beings. It is the office of conscience to bring man into personal relation to this law. It sets up a tribunal within him by which he by which his own actions are judged judges his own actions. Not conscience, but the moral reason, judges of the conduct of others. This last is science but not conscience .

    Peabody, Moral Philos., 41-60 — “Conscience not a source but a means of knowledge analogous to consciousness, a judicial faculty that judges according to the law before it. Verdict (verum dictum) always relatively rights although, by the absolute standard of right, it may be wrong. Like all perceptive faculties, educated by use (not by Increase of knowledge only, for man may act worse, the more knowledge he has). For absolutely right decisions, conscience is dependent upon knowledge. To recognize conscience as legislator (as well as judge), is to fail to recognize any objective standard of right.” The Two Consciences, 40, 47 — “Conscience the Law, and Conscience the Witness. The latter is the true and proper Conscience.”

    H. B. Smith, System of Christ. Theology, 178-191 — “The unity of conscience is not in its being one faculty or in its performing one function, but in its having one object, its relation to one idea, viz., right. The term ‘conscience’ no more designates a special faculty than the term ‘religion’ does (or than the ‘aesthetic sense’). The existence of conscience proves a moral law above us; it leads logically to a Moral Governor; it implies an essential distinction between right and wrong, an immutable morality and yet needs to be enlightened. Men may be conscientious in iniquity but conscience is not righteousness. This may only show the greatness of the depravity, having conscience, and yet ever disobeying it.”

    On the New Testament passages with regard to conscience, see Hofmann, Lehre von dem Gewissen, 30-38; Kahler, Das Gewissen, 225-293. For the view that conscience is primarily the cognitive or intuitive power of the soul, see Calderwood, Moral Philosophy, 77; Alexander, Moral Science,20; McCosh, Div. Govt., 297-312; Talbot, Ethical Prolegomena, in Bap.

    Quar., July, 1877:257-274; Park, Discourses, 260-296; Whewell, Elements of Morality, 1:259-266. On the whole subject of conscience, see Mansel, Metaphysics, 158-170; Martineau, Religion and Materialism, — “The discovery of duty is as distinctly relative to an objective Righteousness as the perception of form to an external space”; also Types, 2:27-30 — “We first judge ourselves; then others”; 53, 54, 74, 103 — “Subjective morals are as absurd as subjective Mathematics.” The best brief treatment of the whole subject is that of E. G. Robinson, Principles and Practice of Morality, 26-78. See also Wayland, Moral Science,49; Harless, Christian Ethics, 45, 60; H. N. Day, Science of Ethics, 17; Janet, Theory of Morale, 264, 348; Kant, Metaphysic of Ethics, 62; cf. Schwegler, Hist. Philosophy, 233; Haven, Mor. Philos., 41; Fairchild, Mor. Philos., 75; Gregory, Christian Ethics, 71; Passavant, Das Gewissen; Wm. Schmid, Das Gewissen. 2. Will .

    A. Will defined. Will be the soul’s power to choose between motives and to direct its subsequent activity according to the motive thus chosen. In other words, the soul has the power to choose both an end and the means to attain it. The choice of an ultimate end we call immanent preference; the choice of means we call executive volition.

    In this definition we part company with Jonathan Edwards, Freedom of the Will, in Works, vol. 2. He regards the will as the soul’s power to act according to motive, i.e., to act out its nature, but he denies the soul’s power to choose between motives, i.e., to initiate a course of action contrary to the motive which has been previously dominant. Hence he is unable to explain how a holy being, like Satan or Adam, could ever fall. If man has no power to change motives, to break with the past, to begin a new course of action, he has no more freedom than the brute. The younger Edwards (Works, 1:483) show what his father’s doctrine of the will implies, when he says: “Beasts therefore, according to the measure of their intelligence, are as free as men. Intelligence, and not liberty, is the only thing wanting to constitute them moral agents.” Yet Jonathon Edwards, determinist as he was, in his sermon on Pressing into the Kingdom of God (Works, 4:381), urges the use of means, and appeals to the sinner as if he had the power of choosing between the motives of self and of God. He was unconsciously making a powerful appeal to the will and the human will responded in prolonged and might efforts; see Allen, Jonathan Edwards, 109.

    For references, and additional statements with regard to the will and its freedom, see chapter on Decrees, pages 361, 362, and article by A. H.

    Strong, in Baptist Review, 1883:219-242, and reprinted in Philosophy and Religion, 114-128. In the remarks upon the Decrees, we have intimated our rejection of the Armenian liberty of indifference, or the doctrine that the will can act without motive. See this doctrine advocated in Peabody, Moral Philosophy, 1-9. But we also reject the theory of determinism propounded by Jonathan Edwards (Freedom of the Will, in Works, vol. 2). This, as we have before remarked, identifies sensibility with the will, regards affections as the efficient causes of volition and speaks of the connection between motive and action as a necessary one.

    Hazard, Man a creative First Cause, and the Will, 407 — “Edwards gives to the controlling cause of volition in the past the name of motive. He treats the inclination as a motive, but he also makes inclination synonymous with choice and will, which would make will to be only the soul willing and therefore, the cause of its own act.” For objections to the Armenian theory, see H. B. Smith, Review of Whedon, in Faith and Philosophy, 359-399; McCosh, Divine government, 263-318, esp. 312; E.

    G. Robinson, Principles and Practice of Morality, 109-137; Shedd, Dogmatic Theology, 2:115-147.

    James, Psychology, 1:139 — “Consciousness is primarily a selecting agency.” 2:393 — “Man possesses all the instincts of animals, and a great many more besides. Reason, per se , can inhibit no impulses; the only thing that can neutralize an impulse is an impulse the other way. Reason may however make an inference which will excite the imagination to let loose the impulse the other way.” 549 — “Ideal or moral action is action in the line of the greatest resistance.” 562 — “Effort of attention is the essential phenomenon of will.” 567 — “The terminus of the psychological process is volition. It is the point to which the will is directly applied is always an idea.” 568 — “Though attention is the first thing in volition, express consent to the reality of what is attended to is an additional and distinct phenomenon. We say not only that it is a reality but we also say: “Let it be a reality.” 571 — “Are the duration and intensity of this effort fixed functions of the object or are they not? We answer, no, and so we maintain freedom of the will.” 584 — “The soul presents nothing, creates nothing and is at the mercy of Material forces for all possibilities. By reinforcing one and checking others, it figures not as an epiphenomenon but as something from which the play gets moral support.” Alexander, Theories of the Will, 201-214, finds in Reid’s Active Powers of the Human Mind the most adequate empirical defense of indetermination.

    B. Will and other faculties. (a) We accept the threefold division of human faculties into intellect, sensibility and will. (b) Intellect is the soul knowing, sensibility is the soul feeling (desires, affections) and will is the soul choosing (end or means). (c) In every act of the soul, all the faculties act. Knowing involves feeling and willing and willing involves knowing and feeling. (d) Logically, each latter faculty involves the preceding action of the former; the soul must know before feeling and it must know and feel before willing. (e) Yet since knowing and feeling are activities, neither of these is possible without willing.

    Socrates to theætetus: “It would be a singular thing, my lad, if each of us was, as it were, a wooden horse, and within us were seated many separate senses. For manifestly these senses unite into one nature, call it the soul or what you will. And it is with this central form, through the organs of sense, that we perceive sensible objects.” Dewey, Psychology, 21 — “Knowledge and feeling are partial aspects of the self, and hence more or less abstract, while will is complete, comprehending both aspects. While the universal element is knowledge, the individual element is feeling and the relation which connects them into one concrete content is will.” 364 — “There is conflict of desires or motives. Deliberation is the comparison of desires; choice is the decision in favor of one. This desire is then the strongest because the sole force of the self is thrown into it.” 411 — “The man determines himself by setting up either good or evil as a motive to himself, and he sets up either, as he will have himself be. There is no thought without will, for thought implies inhibition.” Ribot, Diseases of the Will, 73, cites the case of Coleridge, and his lack of power to inhibit scattering and useless ideas; 114 — “Volition plunges its roots into the profoundest depths of the individual and beyond the individual into the species and into all species.”

    As God is not mere nature but originating force, so man is chiefly will.

    Every other act of the soul has will as an element. Wundt: “Jedes Denken ist ein Wollen.” There is no perception, and there is no thought without attention and attention is an act of the will. Hegelians and absolute idealists like Bradely (see Mind, July 1886), deny that attention is an active function of the self. They regard it as a necessary consequence of the more interesting character of preceding ideas. Thus all power to alter character is denied to the agent. This is an exact reversal of the facts of consciousness, and it would leave no will in God or man. T. H. Green says that the self makes the motives by identifying itself with one solicitation of desire rather an another, but that the self has no power of alternative choice in this identifying itself with one solicitation of desire rather than another; see Upton, Hibbert Lectures, 310. James Seth, Freedom of Ethical Postulate: “The only hope of finding a place for real free will is in another than the Human, empirical or psychological account of the moral person or self. Hegel and Green bring will again under the law of necessity but personality is ultimate. Absolute uniformity is entirely unproved. We contend of a power of free and incalculable initiation in the self and this it is necessary to maintain in the interests of morality.” Without will to attend to pertinent Material and to reject the impertinent, we can have no science , without will to select and combine the elements of imagination, we can have no art and without will to choose between evil and good, we can have no morality . Ælfric, AD900: “The verb ‘to will’ has no imperative, for that the will must be always free.”

    C. Will and permanent states. (a) Though every act of the soul involves the action of all the faculties, yet in any particular action one faculty may be more prominent that the others.

    So we speak of acts of intellect, of affection, of will. (b) This predominant action of any single faculty produces effects upon the other faculties associated with it. The action of will gives a direction to the intellect and to the affections, as well as a permanent bent to the will itself. (c) Each faculty, therefore, has its permanent states as well as its transient acts and the will may originate these states. Hence we speak of voluntary affections and may with equal propriety speak of voluntary opinions. These permanent voluntary states we denominate character.

    I “makeup” my mind. Ladd, Philosophy of Conduct, 152 — I will the influential ideas, feelings and desires, rather than allow these ideas, feelings and desires to influence — not to say, determine me.” All men can say with Robert Browning’s Paracelsus: “I have subdued my life to the one purpose Whereto I ordained it.” “Sow an act, and you reap a habit; sow a habit, and you reap a character; sow a character, and you reap a destiny.” Tito, in George Eliot’s Romola, and Markheim in R. L.

    Stevenson’s story of that name, are instances of the gradual and almost imperceptible fixation in evil ways which results from seemingly slight original decisions of the will. See art, on Tito Melema, by Julia H.

    Gulliver, In New World, Dec. 1895:688 — “Sin lies in the choice of the ideas that shall frequent the moral life, rather than of the actions that shall form the outward life. The pivotal point of the moral life is the intent involved in attention. Sin consists, not only in the motive, but in the making of the motive.” By every decision of the will in which we turn our thought either toward or away from an object of desire, we set nervetracts in operation, upon which thought may hereafter more or less easily travel. “Nothing makes an inroad, without making a road.” By slight efforts of attention to truth which we know ought to influence us, we may “make level in the desert a highway for our God”( Isaiah 48:3), or render the soul a hard trodden ground impervious to “the word of the kingdom” ( Matthew 13:19).

    The word “character” meant originally the mark of the engraver’s tool upon the metal or the stone. It came then to signify the collective result of the engraver’s work. The use of the word in morals implies that every thought and act is chiseling itself into the imperishable substance of the soul. J. S. Mill: “A character is a completely fashioned will.” We may talk therefore of a “generic volition” (Dewey). There is a permanent bent of the will toward good or toward evil. Reputation is man’s shadow, sometimes longer, sometimes shorter, than he is. Character, on the other hand, is the man’s true self — “what a man is in the dark” (Dwight L.

    Moody). In this sense, “purpose is the autograph of mind.” Duke of Wellington: “Habit a second nature? Habit is ten times nature!” When Macbeth says: “If ‘t were done when ‘t is done, Then ‘t were well ‘t were done quickly,” the trouble is that when ‘t is done, it is only begun. Robert Dale Owen gives us the fundamental principle of socialism in the maxim: “A man’s character is made for him, not by him.” Hence he would change man’s diet or his environment, as a means of forming man’s character.

    But Jesus teaches that what defiles comes not from without but from within ( Matthew 15:18), because character is the result of will, the maxim of Heraclitus is true: h+qov ajnqrw>pw| dai>mwn = man’s character is his destiny. On habit, see James, Psychology, 1:122-127.

    D. Will and motives. (a) The permanent states just mentioned, when they have been once determined also influence the will. Internal views and dispositions and not simply external presentations, constitute the strength of motives. (b) These motives often conflict, and though the soul never acts without motive, it does not withstanding choose between motives and so determines the end toward which it will direct its activities. (c) Motives are not causes, which compel the will, but influences, which persuade it. The power of these motives however is proportioned to the strength of will, which has entered into them and has made them what they are. “Incentives comes from the souls self: the rest avail not.” The same wind may drive two ships in opposite directions, according as they set their sails. The same external presentation may result in George Washington’s refusing and Benedict Arnold’s accepting the bribe to betray his country.

    Richard Lovelace of Canterbury: “Stone walls do not a prison make, Nor iron bars a cage; Minds innocent and quiet take That for a hermitage.”

    Jonathan Edwards made motives to be efficient causes when they are only final causes. We must not interpret motive as if it were locomotive, it is always a man’s fault when he becomes a drunkard: drink never takes to a man; the man takes to drink. Men who deny demerit are ready enough to claim merit. They hold others responsible, if not themselves. Bowne: “Pure arbitrariness and pure necessity are alike incompatible with reason.

    There must be a law of reason in the mind with which volition cannot tamper and there must also be the power to determine ourselves accordingly.” Bowne, Principles of Ethics, 135 — “If necessity is a universal thing, then the belief in freedom is also necessary. All grant freedom of thought, so that it is only executive freedom that is deeded.”

    Bowne, Theory of Thought and Knowledge, 209-244 — “Every system of philosophy must invoke freedom for the solution of the problem of error or make shipwreck of reason itself. Our faculties are made for truth, but they maybe carelessly used, or willfully misused and thus error is born.

    We need not only laws of thought but self-control in accordance with them.”

    The will, in choosing between motives, chooses with a motive, namely, the motive chosen. Fairbairn, Philos. Christian Religion,76 — “While motives may be necessary, they need not necessitate. The will selects motives but motives do not select the will. Heredity and environment do not cancel freedom; they only condition it. Thought is transcendence as regards the phenomena of space; will is transcendence as regards the phenomena of time; this double transcendence involves the complete supernatural character of man.” New World, 1892:152 — “It is not the character, but the self that has the character, to which the ultimate moral decision is due.” William Ernest Henly, Poems, 119 — “It Matters not how strait the gate, How charged with punishments the scroll, I am the master of my fate, I am the captain of my soul.”

    Julius Muller, Doctrine of Sin, 2:54 — “A being is free, in so far as the inner center of its life, from which it acts, is conditioned by selfdetermination.

    It is not enough that the deciding agent in an act be the man himself, his own nature, and his distinctive character. In order to accountability, we must have more than this; we must prove that this, his distinctive nature and character springs from his own volition and that it is itself the product of freedom in moral development. Matthew 12:33 — “make the tree good, and its fruit good” — combines both. Acts depend upon nature but nature again depends upon the primary decisions of the will (“make the tree good”). Some determinism is not denied but it is partly limited [by the will’s remaining power of choice] and partly traced back to a former self-determining.” Ibid., 67 — “If freedom be the self-determining of the will from that which is undetermined, Determinism is found wanting, because in its most spiritual form, though it grants a self-determination of the will, it is only such a one as springs from a determinates already present; indifference is found wanting too, because while it maintains indetermination as presupposed in every act of will. It does not recognize an actual self-determining on the part of the will, which, though it be a self-determining, yet begets determination of character. We must, therefore, hold the doctrine of a conditional and limited freedom,” E. Will and contrary choice. (a) Though no act of pure will is possible, the soul may put forth single volition in a direction opposed to its previous ruling purpose and thus far man has the power of a contrary choice ( Romans 7:18 — “to will is present with me”). (b) But in so far as will has entered into and revealed itself in permanent states of intellect and sensibility and in a settled bent of the will itself, man cannot by a single act reverse his moral state, and in this respect has not the power of a contrary choice. (c) In this latter case he can change his character only indirectly, by turning his attention to considerations fitted to awaken opposite dispositions and by thus summoning up motives to an opposite course.

    There is no such thing as an act of pure will. Peters, Willenswelt, 126 — “Jedes Wollen ist ein Etwas wollen” — “all willing is a willing of something”; it has an object which the mind conceives, which awakens the sensibility and which the will strives to realize. Cause without alternative is not true cause. J. F. Watts: “We know causality only as we know will, i.e. , where of two possible causes it makes one actual. A cause may therefore have more than one certain effect. In the external Material world we cannot find cause , but only antecedent . To construct a theory of the will from a study of the Material universe is to seek the living among the dead. Will is power to make a decision, not to be made by decisions, to decide between motives and not to be determined by motives. Who conducts the trial between motives? Only the self.” While we agree with the above in its assertion of the certainty of nature’s sequences, we object to its attribution even to nature of anything like necessity. Since nature’s laws are merely the habits of God, God’s causality in nature is the regularity, not of necessity, but of freedom. We, too, are free at the strategic points. Automatic as most of our action is, there are times when we know ourselves to have power of initiative; when we put under our feet the motives, which have dominated us in the past or when we mark out new courses of action. In these critical times we assert our manhood; but for them, we would be no better than the beasts that perish. “Unless above himself he can erect himself, How mean a thing is man!”

    Will, with no remaining power of contrary choice, may be brute will, but it is not free will. We therefore deny the relevancy of Herbert Spencer’s argument, in his Data of Ethics, and in his Psychology, 2:503 — “Psychical changes either conform to law, or they do not. If they do not conform to law, no science of Psychology is possible. If they do conform to law, there cannot be any such thing as free will.” Spinoza also, in his Ethics, holds that the stone, as it falls, would if it were conscious think itself free, and with as much justice as man; for it is doing that to which its constitution leads it; but no more can be said for him. Fisher, Nature and Method of Revelation, xiii — “To try to collect the ‘data of ethics’ when there is no recognition of man as a personal agent, capable of freely originating the conduct and the state’s of will for which he is morally responsible, is labor lost.” Fisher, chapter on the Personality of God, in Grounds of Theistic and Christian Belief — “Self-determination, as the very term signifies, is attended with an irresistible conviction that the direction of the will is self-imparted… that the will is free. That is to say, it is, not constrained by causes exterior, which is fatalism — and not a mere spontaneity, confined to one path by force acting from within, which is determinism . It is immediately evident to every unsophisticated mind.

    We can initiate action by an efficiency, which is neither irresistibly controlled by motives, nor determined without any capacity of alternative action by proneness inherent in its nature. Motives have an influence, but influence is not to be confounded with causal efficiency.”

    Talbot, on Will and Free Will, Bap. Rev., July, 1582 — “Will is neither a power of unconditioned self-determination, which is not freedom but an aimless, irrational, fatalistic power nor pure spontaneity, which excludes from will all law but its own. It is rather a power of originating action — a power which is limited however by inborn dispositions, by acquired habits and convictions, by feelings and social relations.” Ernest Naville, in Rev. Chretienne, Jan. 1878:7 — “Our liberty does not consist in producing an action of which it is the only source. It consists in choosing between two preexistent impulses. It is choice , not creation , that is our destiny — a drop of water that can choose whether it will go into the Rhine or the Rhone. Gravity carries it down — it chooses only its direction. Impulses do not come from the will, but from the sensibility but free will chooses between these impulses.”

    Bowne, Metaphysics, 169 “Freedom is not a power of acting without, or apart from, motives but simply a power of choosing an end or law and of governing one’s self accordingly.” Porter, Moral Science, 77-111, Will has “not the power to choose without motive.” It “does not exclude motives to the contrary.” Volition “supposes that there are two or more objects between which election is made. It is an act of preference, and to prefer implies that one motive is chosen to the exclusion of another… to the conception and the act two motives at least are required.” Lyall, Intellect, Emotions, and Moral Nature, 581, 592 — “The will follows reasons, inducements but it is not caused . It obeys or acts under inducement, but it does so sovereignly. It exhibits the phenomena of activity, in relation to the very motive it obeys. It obeys it rather than another. It determines, in reference to it, that this is the very motive it will obey. There is undoubtedly this phenomenon exhibited: the will obeying but elective and active in its obedience. If it be asked how this is possible — how the will can be under the influence of motive and yet possess an intellectual activity, we reply that this is one of those ultimate phenomena which must be admitted while they cannot be explained.”

    F. Will and responsibility. (a) By repeated acts of will put forth in a given moral direction, the affections may become so confirmed in evil or in good as to make previously certain, though not necessary, the future good or evil action of the man. Thus, while the will is free, the man may be the “bondservant of sin” ( John 8:31-36) or the “servant of righteousness” ( Romans 6:15-23; cf. Hebrews 12-23 — “spirits of just men made perfect”). (b) Man is responsible for all effects of will, as well as for will itself. He is responsible for voluntary affections as well as for voluntary acts and for the intellectual views into which will entered. He is responsible as well for the acts of will by which these views have been formed in the past or are maintained in the present ( 1 Peter 3:5 — “wilfully forget”).

    Ladd, Philosophy of Knowledge, 415 — “The self stands between the two laws of Nature and of Conscience and, under perpetual limitations from both, exercises its choice. Thus it becomes more and more enslaved by the one or more and more free by habitually choosing to follow the other. Our conception of causality according to the laws of nature, and our conception of the other causality of freedom, are both derived from one and the same experience of the self. There arises a seeming antinomy only when we hypostatize each severally and apart from the other.” R. T.

    Smith, Man’s Knowledge of Man and of God,69 — “Making a will is significant. Here the action of will is limited by conditions: the amount of the testator’s property, the number of his relatives, the nature of the objects of bounty within his knowledge.”

    Harris, Philos. Basis of Theism, 349-407 — “Action without motives, or contrary to all motives, would be irrational action. Instead of being free, it would be like the convulsions of epilepsy. Motives = sensibilities. Motive is not cause ; it does not determine; it is only influence. Yet determination is always made under the influence of motives. Uniformity of action is not to be explained by law of uniform influence of motives but by character in the will. By its choice, will forms, in it, a character by actions in accordance with this choice, confirms and develops the character. Choice modifies sensibilities and so modifies motives. Volitional action expresses character but also forms and modifies it. Man may change his choice yet intellect, sensibility, motive, habit remain. Evil choice, having formed intellect and sensibility into accord with itself, must be a powerful hindrance to fundamental change by new and contrary choice and gives small ground to expect that man left to himself ever will make the change.

    After will has acquired character by choices, its determinations are not transitions from complete indetermination or indifference but are more or less expressions of character already formed. The theory that indifference is essential to freedom implies that will never acquires character; voluntary action is automatic; every act is disintegrated from every other; that character, if acquired, would be incompatible with freedom.

    Character is a choice yet a choice which persists, which modifies sensibility and intellect, and which influences subsequent determinations.”

    My freedom then is freedom within limitations. Heredity and environment, and above all the settled dispositions, which are the product of past acts of will, render a large part of human action practically automatic. The deterministic theory is valid for perhaps nine-tenths of human activity.

    Mason Faith of the Gospel, 118, 119 — “We naturally choose evil because of a bias toward it To act according to the perfection of nature would be true freedom and man has lost this. He recognizes that he is not his true self. It is only with difficulty that he works toward his true self again. By the fall of Adam, the will, which before was conditioned but free, is now not only conditioned but also enslaved. Nothing but the action of grace can free it.” Tennyson, In Memoriam, Introduction: “Our wills are ours, we know not how; Our wills are ours, to make them thine.”

    Studying the action of the sinful will alone, one might conclude that there is no such thing as freedom. Christian ethics, in distinction from naturalistic ethics, reveals most clearly the degradation of our nature, at the same time that it discloses the remedy in Christ: “If therefore the Son shall make you free, ye shall be free indeed” ( John 8:36).

    Mind, Oct. 1882:567 — “Kant seems to be in quest of the phantasmal freedom which is supposed to consist in the absence of determination by motives. The error of the determinists from which this idea is the recoil, involves an equal abstraction of the man from his thoughts, and interprets the relation between the two as an instance of the mechanical causality which exists between two things in nature. The point to be grasped in the controversy is that a man and his motives are one, and that consequently he is in every instance self-determined. Indetermination is tenable only if an ego can be found which is not an ego already determinate; but such an ego, though it may be logically distinguished and verbally expressed, is not a factor in psychology.” Morell, Mental Philosophy, 390 — “Motives determine the will, and so far the will is not free but the man governs the motives, allowing them a less or a greater power of influencing his life, and so far the man is a free agent.” Santayana: “A free man, because he is free, may make himself a slave but, once a slave, because he is a slave, he cannot make himself free.” Sidgwick, Method of Ethics, 51, 65 — “This almost overwhelming cumulative proof [of necessity] seems, however, more than balanced by a single argument on the other side: the immediate affirmation of consciousness in the moment of deliberate volition. It is impossible for me to think, at each moment, that my volition is completely determined by my formed character and the motives acting upon it. The opposite conviction is so strong as to be absolutely unshaken by the evidence brought against it. I cannot believe it to be illusory.”

    G. Inferences from this view of the will. (a) We can be responsible for the voluntary evil affections with which we are born and for the will’s inherited preference of selfishness, only upon the hypothesis that we originated these states of the affections and will, or had a part in originating them. Scripture furnishes this explanation, in its doctrine of Original Sin, or the doctrine of a common apostasy of the race in its first father and our derivation of a corrupted nature by natural generation from him. (b) While there remains to man, even in his present condition, a natural power of will by which he may put forth transient volition externally conformed to the divine law and so may, to a limited extent modify his character, it still remains true that the sinful bent of his affections is not directly under his control. This bent constitutes a motive to evil so constant, inveterate, and powerful, that it actually influences every member of the race to reaffirm his evil choice and renders necessary a special working of God’s Spirit upon his heart to ensure his salvation. Hence the Scripture doctrine of Regeneration.

    There is such a thing as “psychical automatism” (Ladd, Philos. Mind, 169). Mother: “Oscar, why can’t you be good’?” “Mamma, it makes me so tired!” The wayward four-year-old is a type of universal humanity.

    Men are born morally tired, though they have energy enough of other sorts. The man who sins may lose all freedom so that his soul becomes a seething mass of eructing evil. T. C. Chamberlaine ‘ Conditions may make choices run rigidly in one direction and give as fixed uniformity as in physical phenomena. Put before a million typical Americans the choice between a quarter and a dime and rigid uniformity of results can be safely predicted.” Yet Dr. Chamberlain not only grants but claims liberty of choice. Romanes, Mind and Motion, 155-160 — “Though volition is largely determined by other and external causes, it does not follow that they are determined necessity and this makes all the difference between the theories of will as bond or free. Their intrinsic character as first causes protects them from being coerced by these causes and therefore from becoming only the mere effects of them. The condition to the effective operation of a motive — as distinguished from a motor — is the acquiescence of the first cause upon whom that motive is operating.”

    Fichte: “If any one adopting the dogma of necessity should remain virtuous, we must seek the cause of his goodness elsewhere than in the innocuousness of his doctrine. Upon the supposition of free will alone can duty, virtue, and morality have any existence.” Lessing: “Kein Mensch muss mussen.” Delitzsch: “Der Mensch, wie er jetzt ist, ist wahlfrei, aber niehet machtfrei.”

    Kant regarded freedom as an exception to the law of natural causality.

    But this freedom is not phenomenal but noumenal, for causality is not a category or noumen. From this freedom we get our whole idea of personality, for personality is freedom of the whole soul from the mechanism of nature. Kant treated scornfully the determinism of Leibnitz.

    He said it was the freedom of a turnspit, which when once wound up directed its own movements, i.e. , was merely automatic. Compare with this the view of Baldwin, Psychology, Feeling and Will, 373 — “Free choice is a synthesis, the outcome of which is in every case conditioned upon its elements, but in no case caused by them. A logical inference is conditioned upon its premises, but is not caused by them. Both inference and choice express the nature of the conscious principle and the unique method of its life. The motives do not grow into volition nor does the volition stand apart from the motives. The motives are partial expressions, the volition is a total expression of the same existence. Freedom is the expression of one’s self conditioned by past choices and present environment.” Shakespeare, Hamlet, 3:4 — “Refrain tonight, And that shall lend a kind of easiness To the next abstinence: the next more easy:

    For use can almost change the stamp of nature, And either curb the devil or throw him out With wondrous potency.” 3:2 — “Purpose is but the slave to memory; Of violent birth but poor validity.” 4:7 — “That we would do, We should do when we would; for this would changes And hath abatements and delays as many As there are tongues, are hands, are accidents.” Goethe: “Von der Gewalt die alle Wesen bindet, Befreit der Mensch sich der sich uberwindet.”

    Scotus Novanticus (Prof. Laurie of Edinburgh), Ethica, 287 — “The chief good is fullness of life achieved through law by the action of will as reasons on sensibility. Immorality is the letting loose of feeling, in opposition to the idea and the law in it; it is individuality in opposition to personality. In immorality, will is defeated, the personality overcome and the subject will be as volitional as a dog is volitionally. The subject takes possession of the personality and uses it for its natural desires.”

    Maudsley, Physiology of Mind, 456, quotes Ribot, Diseases of the Will, 133 — “Will is not the cause of anything. It is like the verdict of a jury, which is an effect without being a cause. It is the highest force which nature has yet developed — the last consummate blossom of all her marvelous works.” Yet Maudsley argues that the mind itself has power to prevent insanity. This implies that there is an owner of the instrument endowed with power and responsibility to keep it in order. Man can do much, but God can do more.

    H. Special objections to the deterministic theory of the will. Determinism holds that man’s actions are uniformly determined by motives acting upon his character and that he has no power to change these motives or to act contrary to them. This denial that the will is free has serious and pernicious consequences in theology. On the one hand, it weakens even if it does not destroy man’s conviction with regard to responsibility, sin, guilt and retribution and so obscures the need of atonement. On the other hand, it weakens, if it does not destroy man’s faith in his own power as well as in God’s power of initiating action, and so obscures the possibility of atonement.

    Determinism is exemplified in Omar Kh·yy·m’s Rub·iyat: “With earth’s first clay they did the last man knead, And there of the last harvest sowed the seed; And the first morning of creation wrote What the last dawn of reckoning shall read.” William James, Will to Believe, 145-183, shows that determinism involves pessimism or subjectivism — good and evil are merely means of increasing knowledge. The result of subjectivism is in theology antinomianism, in literature romanticism, in practical life sensuality or sensualism, as in Rousseau, Renan and Zola. Hutton, review of Clifford in Contemp. Thoughts and Thinkers, 1:254 — “The determinist says there would be no moral quality in actions that did not express previous tendency, i.e., a man is responsible only for what he cannot help doing. No effort against the grain will be made by him who believes that his interior mechanism settles for him whether he shall make it or no.” Royce, World and Individual, 2:342 — “Your unique voices in the divine symphony are no more the voices of moral agents than are the stones of a mosaic.” The French monarch announced that all his subjects should be free to choose their own religion but he added that nobody should choose a different religion from the king’s. “Johnny, did you give your little sister the choice between those two apples?” “Yes, Mamma. I told her she could have the little one or none, and she chose the little one,” Hobson was always choose the last horse in the row. The bartender with revolver in hand met all criticisms upon the quality of his liquor with the remark: “You’ll drink that whisky, and you’ll like it too!”

    Balfour, Foundations of Belief 22 — “There must be implicitly present to primitive man the sense of freedom, since his fetichism largely consists in attributing to inanimate objects the spontaneity which he finds in himself.”

    Freedom does not contradict conservation of energy. Professor Lodge, in Nature, March 26, 1891 — “Although expenditure of energy is needed to increase the speed of Matter, none is needed to alter its direction. The rails that guide a train do not propel it nor do they retard it; they have no essential effect upon its energy but a guiding effect.” J. J. Murphy, Nat.

    Selection and Spir. Freedom, 170-203 — “Will does not create force but directs it. A very small force is able to guide the action of a great one, as in the steering of a modern steamship.” James Seth, in Philos. Rev., 3:285, 286 — “As life is not energy but a determiner of the paths of energy, so the will is a cause, in the sense that it controls and directs the channels which activity shall take.” See also James Seth, Ethical Principles, 345-388 and Freedom as Ethical Postulate, 9 — “The philosophical proof of freedom must be the demonstration of the inadequacy of the categories of science: its philosophical disproof must be the demonstration of the adequacy of such scientific categories.”

    Shadworth Hodgson: “Either liberty is true and then the categories are insufficient or the categories are sufficient and then liberty is a delusion.”

    Wagner is the composer of determinism; there is no freedom or guilt; action is the result of influence and environment; a mysterious fate rules all. Life: “The views upon heredity Of scientists remind one That, shape one’s conduct as one may, One’s future is behind one.”

    We trace willing in God back, not to motives and antecedents, but to his infinite personality. If man is made in God’s image, why we may not trace man’s willing also back, not to motives and antecedents, but to his finite personality? We speak of God’s fiat, but we may speak of man’s fiat also.

    Napoleon: “There shall be no Alps!” Dutch William III: “I may fall, but shall fight every ditch, and die in the last one!” When God energizes the will, it becomes indomitable. Philippians 4:13 — “I can do all things in him that strengtheneth me.” Dr. E. G. Robinson was theoretically a determinist and wrongly held that the highest conceivable freedom is to act out one’s own nature. He regarded the will as only the nature in movement. Will is self-determining, not in the sense that will determines the self but in the sense that self determines the will. The will cannot be compelled, for unless self-determined it is no longer will. Observation, history and logic, he thought, lead to necessitarianism. But consciousness, he conceded, testifies to freedom. Consciousness must be trusted, though we cannot reconcile the two. The will is as great a mystery as is the doctrine of the Trinity. Volition, he says, is often directly in the face of the current of a man’s life. Yet he held that we have no consciousness of the power of a contrary choice. Consciousness can testify only to what springs out of the moral nature, not to the moral nature itself.

    Lotze, Religionsphilosophie, section 61 — “An indeterminate choice is, of course, incomprehensible and inexplicable. If it were comprehensible and explicable by the human intellect, if, that is, it could be seen to follow necessarily from the preexisting conditions it, from the nature of the case, could not be a morally free choice at all. But we cannot comprehend any more how the mind can move the muscles nor how a moving stone can set another stone in motion nor how the Absolute calls into existence our individual selves.” Upton, Hibbert Lectures, 308-327, gives an able expose of the deterministic fallacies. He cites Martineau and Balfour in England, Renouvier and Fonsegrive in France, Edward Zeller, Kuno Fischer and Saarschmidt in Germany, and William James in America, as recent advocates of free will.

    Martineau, Study, 2:227 — “Is there not a Causal Self, over and above the Caused Self, or rather the Caused State and contents of the self left as a deposit from previous behavior? Absolute idealism, like Green’s, will not recognize the existence of this Causal Self”; Study of Religion, 2:195- 324, and especially 240 — “Where two or more rival preconceptions enter the field together, they cannot compare themselves inter se ; they need and meet a superior. It rests with the mind itself to decide. The decision will not be unmotivated for it will have its reasons. It will not be uncomfortable to the characteristics of the mind for it will express its preferences. None the less, it is issued by a free cause that elects from among the conditions and is not elected by them.” 241 — “So far from admitting that different effects cannot come from the same cause, I even venture on the paradox that nothing, which is limited to one effect, is a proper cause.” 309 — “Freedom, in the sense of option and will and as the power of deciding an alternative, has no place in the doctrines of the German schools.” 311 — “The whole illusion of Necessity springs from the attempt to fling out, for contemplation in the field of Nature, the creative new beginnings centered in personal subjects that transcend it.”

    See also H. B. Smith, System of Christ. Theol., 236-251; Mansel, Proleg.

    Log., 113-155, 270-278, and Metaphysics, 366; Gregory, Christian Ethics, 60; Abp. Manning, in Contem. Rev., Jan. 1871:468; Ward, Philos. of Theism, 1:287-352; 2:1-79, 274-349; Bp. Temple, Bampton Lect., 1884:69-96; Row, Man not a Machine, in Present Day Tracts, 5:no. 30; Richards, Lectures on Theology, 97-153; Solly, The Will, 167- 203; William James, The Dilemma of Determinism, in Unitarian Review, Sept. 1884, and in The Will to Besieve, 145-183; T. H. Green, Prolegomena to Ethics, 90-159; Upton, Hibbert Lectures 310; Bradley, in Mind, July, 1886; Bradford, Heredity and Christian Problems, 70-101; Illingworth, Divine Immanence. 220-254; Ladd, Philos. of Conduct, 133- 188. For Lotze’s view of the Will, see his Philos. of Religion, 95-106 and his Practical Philosophy, 35-50.

    CHAPTER 2. THE ORIGINAL STATE OF MAN.

    in determining man’s original state, we are wholly dependent upon Scripture. This represents human nature as coming from God’s hand, and therefore “very good” ( Genesis 1:31). It moreover draws a parallel between man’s first state and that of his restoration ( Colossians 3:10; Ephesians 4:24). In interpreting these passages, however, we are to remember the twofold danger; on the one hand of putting man so high, that no progress is conceivable and on the other hand of putting him so low that he could not fall. We shall the more easily avoid these dangers by distinguishing between the essentials and the incidents of man’s original state. Genesis 1:11 — “And God saw everything that he had made and behold, it was very good”; Colossians 3:13 — “the new man, that is being renewed unto knowledge after the image of him that created him”; Ephesians 4:24 — “The new man that after God hath been created in righteousness and holiness of truth.”

    Philippi, Glaubenslehre, 2:387-399 — “The original state must be (1) a contrast to sin, (2) a parallel to the state of restoration. Difficulties in the way of understanding it: (1) What lives in regeneration is something foreign to our present nature (“it is no longer I that live, but Christ liveth in me” — Galatians 2:20); but the original state was something native. (2) It was a state of childhood. We cannot fully enter into childhood, though we see it about us, and have ourselves been through it. The original state is yet more difficult to reproduce to reason. (3) Man’s external circumstances and his organization have suffered great changes, so that the present is no sign of the past. We must recur to the Scriptures, therefore, as well nigh our only guide.” John Caird, Fund. Ideas of Christianity, 1:164-195, points out that ideal perfection is to be looked for, not at the outset, but at the final stage of the spiritual life. If man were wholly finite, he would not know his finitude.

    Lord Bacon: “The sparkle of the purity of man’s first estate.” Calvin: “It was monstrous impiety that a son of the earth should not be satisfied with being made after the similitude of God, unless he could also he equal with him.” Prof. Hastings: “The truly natural is not the real but the ideal. Made in the image of God — between that beginning and the end stands God made in the image of man.” See the general subject of man’s original state, see Zocker, 3:283-290; Thomasius, Christi Person und Werk, 1:215-243: Ebrard, Dogmatik, 1:267-276; Van Oosterzee, Dogmatics, 374-375; Hodge, Systematic Theology, 2:92-116.

    I. ESSENTIALS OF MAN’S ORIGINAL STATE.

    These are summed up in the phrase “the image of God.” In God’s image man is said to have been created ( Genesis 1:26,27). In what did this image of God consist? We reply that it consisted in 1. Natural likeness to God, or personality, 2. Moral likeness to God, or holiness. Genesis 1:26,27 — “And God said, let us make man in our image, after our likeness… And God created man in his own image, in the image of God created he him.” It is of great importance to distinguish clearly between the two elements embraced in this image of God, the natural and the moral. By virtue of the first man possessed certain faculties (intellect, affection, will); by virtue of the second, he had right tendencies (bent, proclivity, disposition). By virtue of the first, he was invested with certain powers ; by virtue of the second, a certain direction was imparted to these powers. As created in the natural image of God, man had a moral nature; as created in the moral image of God, man had a holy character . The first gave him natural ability; the second gave him moral ability. The Greek Fathers emphasized the first element, or personality, the Latin Fathers emphasized the second element, or holiness. See Orr, God’s Image in Man.

    As the Logos, or divine Reason, Christ Jesus, dwells in humanity and constitutes the principle of its being, humanity shares with Christ in the image of God. That image is never wholly lost. It is completely restored in sinners when the Spirit of Christ gains control of their wills and they merge their life in his. To those who accused Jesus of blasphemy, he replied by quoting the words of Psalm 82:6 — “I said, ye are gods” — words spoken of imperfect earthly rulers. Thus, In John 10:14-36, Jesus, who constitutes the very essence of humanity, justifies his own claim to divinity by showing that even men who represent God are also in a minor sense “partakers of the divine nature” ( 2 Peter 1:4). Hence the many legends, in heathen religions, of the divine descent of man. Corinthians 11:3 — “the head of every man is Christ.” In every man, even the most degraded, there is an image of God to be brought out, as Michael Angelo saw the angel in the rough block of marble. This natural worth does not imply worthiness ; it implies only capacity for redemption. “The abysmal depths of personality,” which Tennyson speaks of, are sounded, as man goes down in thought successively from individual sins to sin of the heart and to race sin. But “the deeper depth is out of reach To all, O God, but the.” From this deeper depth, where man is rooted and grounded in God, rise aspirations for a better life but these are not due to the man himself, but to Christ, the immanent God, who ever works within him.

    Fanny J. Crosby: “Rescue the perishing, Care for the dying… Down in the human heart, crushed by the tempter, Feelings lie buried that grace can restore; Touched by a loving heart, wakened by kindness, Chords that were broken will vibrate once more.” 1. Natural likeness to God, or personality.

    Man was created a personal being, and was by this personality distinguished from the brute. By personality we mean the twofold power to know self as related to the world and to God and to determine self in view of moral ends. By virtue of this personality, man could at his creation choose which of the objects of his knowledge — self; the world, or God — should be the norm and center of his development. This natural likeness to God is inalienable and as constituting a capacity for redemption gives value to the life even of the unregenerate ( Genesis 9:6; 1 Corinthians 11:7; James 3:9).

    For definitions of personality, see notes on the Anthropological Argument, page 82; on Pantheism, pages 104, 105; on the Attributes, pages 253-254; and on the Person of Christ, in Part VI. Here we may content ourselves with the formula: Personality = self-consciousness + self-determination.

    Self-consciousness and self-determination, as distinguished from the consciousness and determination of the brute, involve all the higher mental and moral powers, which constitute us men. Conscience is but a mode of their activity. Notice that the term ‘image’ does not, in man, imply perfect representation. Only Christ is the “very image” of God ( Hebrews 1:3), the “image of the invisible God” ( Colossians 1:15 — on which see Lightfoot). Christ is the image of God absolutely and archetypal; man, only relatively and derivatively. But notice also that, since God is Spirit that man, made in God’s image, cannot be a Material thing. By virtue of his possession of this first possession of the image of God, namely, personality, Materialism is excluded.

    This first element of the divine image man can never lose until he ceases to be man. Even insanity can only obscure this natural image — it cannot destroy it. St. Bernard well said that it could not be burned out, even in hell. The lost piece of money ( Luke 15:8) still bore the image and superscription of the king, even though it did not know it and did not even knew that it was lost. Human nature is therefore to be reverenced and he who destroys human life is to be put to death: Genesis 9:6 — “for in the image of God made he man”; 1 Corinthians 11:7 — “a man indeed ought not to have his head veiled, forasmuch as he is the image and glory of God”; James 3:9 — even men whom we curse “are made after the likeness of God”; cf . Psalm 8:5 — “thou hast made him but little lower than God”; 1 Peter 2:17 — “Honor all men.” In the being of every man are continents, which no Columbus has ever yet discovered, depths of possible joy or sorrow, which no plummet has ever yet sounded.

    A whole heaven, a whole hell, may lie within the compass of his single soul. If we could see the meanest real Christian as he will he in the great hereafter, we should bow before him as John bowed before the angel in the Apocalypse, for we should not be able to distinguish him from God (Revelations 22:8, 9).

    Sir William Hamilton: “On earth there is nothing great but man; In man there Is nothing great but mind.” We accept this dictum only if “mind” can be understood to include man’s moral powers together with the right direction of those powers. Shakespeare, Hamlet, 2:2 — “What a piece of work is man! how noble in reason! how Infinite in faculty! in form and moving how express and admirable! in action how like an angel! in apprehension how like a god!” Pascal: “Man is greater than the universe; the universe may crush him, but it does not know that it crushes him.”

    Whiton, Gloria Patri, 94 — “God is not only the Giver but the Sharer of my life. My natural powers are that part of God’s power which is lodged with me in trust to keep and use.” Man can be an instrument of God, without being an agent of God. “Each man has his place and value as a reflection of God and of Christ. Like a letter in a word or a word in a sentence, he gets his meaning from his context but the sentence is meaningless without him; rays from the whole universe converge in him.”

    John Howe’s Living Temple shows the greatness of human nature in its first construction and even in its redo. Only a noble ship could make so great a wreck. Aristotle, Problem, sec. 30 — “No excellent soul is exempt from a mixture of madness.” Seneca, De Tranquillitate Animi, 15 — “There is no great genius without a tincture of madness.”

    Kant: “So act as to treat humanity, whether in thine own person or in that of any other, in every case as an end, and never as a means only.” If there is a divine element in every man, then we have no right to use a human being merely for our own pleasure or profit. In receiving him we receive Christ and in receiving Christ we receive him who sent Christ ( Matthew 10:40). Christ is the vine and all men are his natural branches, cutting themselves off only when they refuse to bear fruit and condemning themselves to the burning only because they destroy, so far as they can destroy, God’s image in them, all that makes them worth preserving ( John 15:1-6). Cicero: “Homo mortalis deus.” This possession of natural likeness to God, or personality, involves boundless possibilities of good or ill and it constitutes the natural foundation of the love for man, which is required of us by the law. Indeed it constitutes the reason why Christ should die. Man was worth redeeming. The woman, whose ring slipped from her finger and fell into the heap of mud in the gutter, bared her white arm and thrust her hand into the slimy mass until she found her ring. But she would not have done this if the ring had not contained a costly diamond. The lost piece of money, the lost sheep and the lost son were worth effort to seek and to save (Luke 15). But, on the other hand, it is folly when man, made in the image of God, “blinds himself with clay.” The man on shipboard, who playfully tossed up the diamond ring, which contained his whole fortune, at last to his distress tossed it overboard. There is a “merchandise of souls ( Revelation 18:13) and we must not juggle with them.

    Christ’s death for man, by showing the worth of humanity, has recreated ethics. “Plato defended infanticide as under certain circumstances permissible. Aristotle viewed slavery as founded in the nature of things.

    The reason assigned was the essential inferiority of nature on the part of the enslaved.” But the divine image in man makes these barbarities no longer possible to us. Christ sometimes hooked upon men with anger, but he never looked upon them with contempt. He taught the woman, he blessed the child, he cleansed the leper, and he raised the dead. His own death revealed the infinite worth of the meanest human soul and taught us to count all men as brethren for whose salvation we may well lay down our lives. George Washington answered the salute of his slave. Abraham Lincoln took off his hat to a Negro who gave him his blessing as he entered Richmond; but a lady who had been brought up under the old regime looked from a window upon the scene with unspeakable horror.

    Robert Burns, walking with a nobleman in Edinburgh, met an old towns- fellow from Ayr and stopped to talk with him. The nobleman, kept waiting, grew restive and afterward, reproved Burns for talking to a man with so bad a coat. Burns replied: “I was not talking to the coat — I was talking to the man.” Jean Ingelow: “The street and market place Grow holy ground: each face — Pale faces marked with care, Dark, toil-worn brows — grows fair. King’s children are all these, though want and sin Have marred their beauty, glorious within. We may not pass them but with reverent eye.” See Porter, Human Intellect 393, 394, 401; Wuttke, Christian Ethics, 2:42; Philippi, Glaubenslehre, 2:343, 2. Moral likeness to God , or holiness.

    In addition to the powers of self-consciousness and self-determination just mentioned, man was created with such a direction of the affections and the will, as constituted God the supreme ends of man’s being, and constituted man a finite reflection of God’s moral attributes. Since holiness is the fundamental attribute of God, this must of necessity, be the chief attribute of his image in the moral beings, of whom he creates. That original righteousness was essential to this image, is also distinctly taught in Scripture ( Ecclesiastes 7:29; Ephesians 4:24; Colossians 3:10).

    Besides the possession of natural powers, the image of God involves the possession of right moral tendencies. It is not enough to say that man was created in a state of innocence. The Scripture asserts that man had a righteousness like God’s: Ecclesiastes 7:29 — “God made man upright”; Ephesians 4:24 — “The new man, that after God hath been created in righteousness and holiness of truth” — here Meyer says: “kata< Qeo>n , ‘after God,’ i.e., ad exemplum Dei, after the pattern of God ( Galatians 4:28 — kata< Isaa>k ‘after Isaac’ = as Isaac was). This phrase makes the creation of the new man a parallel to that of our first parents, when were created after God’s image; they too, before sin came into existence through Adam, were sinless — ‘in righteousness and holiness of truth.’” On NT “truth” = rectitude, see Wendt, Teaching of Jesus, 1:257-260.

    Meyer refers also, as a parallel passage, to Colossians 3:10 — “the new man, that is being renewed unto knowledge after the image of him that created him.” Here the “knowledge” referred to is that knowledge of God, which is the source of all virtue, and which, is inseparable from holiness of heart. “Holiness has two sides or phases: (1) it is perception and knowledge and (2) it is inclination and feeling” (Shedd, Dogmatic Theology, 2:97). On Ephesians 4:24 and Colossians 3:10 the classical passages with regard to man’s original state, see also the Commentaries of DeWette, Ruckert, Ellicott, and compare Genesis 5:3 — “And Adam lived an hundred and thirty years and begat a son in his own likeness, after his image,” i.e., in his own sinful likeness, which is evidently contrasted with the “likeness of God” (verse 1) in which he himself had been created (An. Par. Bible). Corinthians 4:4 — “Christ, who is the image of God” — where the phrase “image of God” is not simply the natural , but also the moral image. Since Christ is the image of God primarily in his holiness, man’s creation in the image of God must have involved a holiness like Christ’s so far as such holiness could belong to a being yet untried, that is, so far as respects man’s tastes and dispositions prior to moral action. “Couldst thou in vision see Thyself the man God meant, Thou nevermore couldst be The man thou art — content.” Newly created man had right moral tendencies, as well as freedom from actual fault. Otherwise the communion with God described in Genesis would not have been possible.

    Goethe: “Unless the eye were sun-like, how could it see the sun?” Because a holy disposition accompanied man’s innocence, he was capable of obedience and was guilty when he sinned. The loss of this moral likeness to God was the chief calamity of the Fall. Man is now “the glory and the scandal of the universe.” He has defaced the image of God in his nature, even though that image, in its natural aspect, is ineffaceable (E. H.

    Johnson).

    The dignity of human nature consists not so much in what man is, as in what God meant him to be and in what God means him yet to become, when the lost image of God is restored by the union of man’s soul with Christ. Because of his future possibilities, the meanest of mankind is sacred. The great sin of the second table of the Decalogue is the sin of despising our fellow man. To cherish contempt for others can have its root only in idolatry of self and rebellion against God. Abraham Lincoln said well that “God must have liked common people — else he would not have made so many of them.” Regard for the image of God in man leads also to kind and reverent treatment even of these lower animals in which so many human characteristics are foreshadowed. Bradford, Heredity and Christian Problems, 166 — “The current philosophy says: The fittest will survive; let the rest die. The religion of Christ says: That maxim as applied to men is just, only as regards their characteristics, of which indeed only the fittest should survive. It does not and cannot apply to the men themselves since all men, being children of God, are supremely fit.

    The very fact that a human being is sick, weak, poor, outcast and a vagabond is the strongest possible appeal for effort toward his salvation.

    Let individuals look upon humanity from the point of view of Christ, and they will not be long in finding ways in which environment can be caused to work for righteousness.”

    This original righteousness, in which the image of God chiefly consisted of, is to be viewed: (a) Not as constituting the substance or essence of human nature — for in this case human nature would heave ceased to exist as soon as man sinned.

    Men every day change their tastes and loves, without changing the essence or substance of their being. When sin is called a “nature,” therefore (as by Shedd, in his Essay on” Sins Nature, and that Nature Guilt”), it in only in the sense of being something inborn (natura , from nascor ). Hereditary tastes may just as properly be denominated a “nature” as may the substance of one’s being. Moehler, the greatest modern Roman Catholic critic of Protestant doctrine, in his Symbolism, 58, 59, absurdly holds Luther to have taught that by the Fall, man lost his essential nature, and that another essence was substituted in its room. Luther, however, is only rhetorical when he says: “It is the nature of man to sin. Sin constitutes the essence of man; the nature of man since the Fall has become quite changed. Original sin is that very thing which is born of father and mother; the clay out of which we are formed is damnable. The fetus in the Maternal womb is sin; man as born of his father and mother, together with his whole essence and nature, is not only a sinner but sin itself.” (b) Nor as a gift from without, foreign to human nature and added to it after man’s creation — for man is said to have possessed the divine image by the fact of creation, and not by subsequent bestowal.

    As men, since Adam, are born with a sinful nature, that is, with tendencies away from God, so Adam was created with a holy nature, that is, with tendencies toward God. Moehler says: “God cannot give a man actions.” We reply: “No, but God can give man dispositions and he does this at the first creation, as well as at the new creation (regeneration).” (c) But rather, as an original direction or tendency of man’s affections and will, still accompanied by the power of evil choice differs from the perfected holiness of the saints, as instinctive affection and childlike innocence differ from the holiness that has been developed and confirmed by experience of temptation.

    Man’s original righteousness was not immutable or indefectible; there was still the possibility of sinning. Though the first man was fundamentally good, he still had the power of choosing evil. There was a bent of the affections and will toward God, but man was not yet confirmed in holiness. Man’s love for God was like the germinal filial affection in the child, not developed, yet sincere — “caritas puerilis, non virilis.” (d) As a moral disposition, moreover, which was propagated to Adam’s descendants, if it continued and which though lost to him and to them, if Adam sinned, would still leave man possessed of a natural likeness to God which made him susceptible of God’s redeeming grace.

    Hooker (Works, ed. Keble, 2:683) distinguishes between aptness and ability. The latter, men have lost; the former, they retain — else grace could not work in us, more than in the brutes. Hase: “Only enough likeness to God remained to remind man of what he had lost, and enable him to feel the hell of God’s forsaking.” Only God himself can restore the moral likeness to God. God secures this to men by making “the light of the gospel of the glory of Christ, who is the image of God… dawn upon them’’ ( 2 Corinthians 4:4). Pusey made Psalm 72:6 — “He will come down like rain upon the mown grass” — the image of a world hopelessly dead but with a hidden capacity for receiving life. Dr. Daggett: “Man is a ‘son of the morning’ ( Isaiah 14:12), fallen, yet arrested midway between heaven and hell, a prize between the powers of light and darkness.” See Edwards, Works, 2:19, 20, 381-390; Hopkins, Works, 1:162; Shedd, Hist. Doctrine, 2:50-66; Augustine, De Civitate Dei. 14:11.

    In the light of the preceding investigation, we may properly estimate two theories of man’s original state, which claim to be more Scriptural and reasonable:

    A. The image of God as including only personality.

    This theory denies that any positive determination to virtue inhered originally in man’s nature and regards man at the beginning as simply possessed of spiritual powers, perfectly adjusted to each other. This is the view of Schleiermacher, who is followed by Nitzsch, Julius Muller, and Hofmann.

    For the view here combated, see Schleiermacher, Christl. Glaube, sec. 60; Nitzsch, System of Christian Doctrine. 201; Julius Muller, Doct, of Sin, 2:113-133, 350-357; Hofmann, Schriftbeweis, 1:287-291; Bibliotheca Sacra, 7:409-425. Julius Muller’s theory of the Fall in a preexistent state makes it impossible for him to hold here that Adam was possessed of moral likeness to God. The origin of his view of the image of God renders it liable to suspicion. Pfleiderer, Grundriss, 313 — “The original state of man was that of childlike innocence or morally indifferent naturalness, which had in itself indeed the possibility (Anlage ) of ideal development, but in such a way that its realization could be reached only by struggle with its natural opposite. The image of God was already present in the original state, but only as the possibility (Anlage ) of real likeness to God — the endowment of reason which belonged to human personality. The reality of a spirit like that of God has appeared first in the second Adam and has become the principle of the kingdom of God.”

    Raymond (Theology, 2:43,132) is an American representative of the view that the image of God consists in mere personality: “The image of God in which man was created did not consist in an inclination and determination of the will to holiness.” This is maintained upon the ground that such a moral likeness to God would have rendered it impossible for man to fall — to which we reply that Adam’s righteousness was not immutable, and the basis of his will toward God did not render it impossible for him to sin. Motives do not compel the will, and Adam at least had a certain power of contrary choice. E. G. Robinson, Christ. Theology, 119-122, also maintains that the image of God signified only that personality which distinguished man from the brute. Christ, he says, carries forward human nature to a higher point, instead of merely restoring what is lost. “Very good” ( Genesis 1:31) does not imply moral perfection — this cannot be the result of creation, but only of discipline and will. Man’s original state was only one of untried innocence. Dr. Robinson is combating the view that the first man was at his creation possessed of a developed character. He distinguishes between character and the germs of character.

    These germs he grants that man possessed. And so he defines the image of God as a constitutional predisposition toward a course of right conduct.

    This is all the perfection, which we claim for the first man. We hold that this predisposition toward the good can properly be called character, since it is the germ from which all holy action springs.

    In addition to what has already been said in support of the opposite view, we may urge against this theory the following objections: (a) It is contrary to analogy, in making man the author of his own holiness; our sinful condition is not the product of our individual wills, nor is our subsequent condition of holiness the product of anything but God’s regenerating power.

    To hold that Adam was created undecided, would make man, as Philippi says, in the highest sense his own creator. But morally, as well as physically, man is God’s creature. In regeneration it is not sufficient for God to give power to decide for good; God must give new love also. If this be so in the new creation, God could give love in the first creation also. Holiness therefore can be created. Underived holiness is possible only in God; in its origin, it is given both to angels and men.” Therefore we pray: “Create in me a clean heart” ( Psalm 51:10); “Incline my heart unto thy testimonies” ( <19B936> Psalm 119:36). See Edwards, Eff. Grace, sec. 43-51; Kaftan, Dogmatik, 290 — “If Adam’s perfection was not a moral perfection, then his sin was no real moral corruption.” The animus of the theory we are combating seems to be an unwillingness to grant that man, either in his first creation or in his new creation, owes his holiness to God. (b) The knowledge of God in which man was originally created logically presupposes a direction toward God of man’s affections and will, since only the holy heart can leave any proper understanding of the God of holiness. “Ubi caritas, ibi claritas.” Man’s heart was originally filled with divine love and out of this comes the knowledge of God. We know God only as we love him and this love comes not from our own single volition. No one loves by command because no one can give himself love. In Adam, love was an inborn impulse, which he could affirm or deny. Compare Corinthians 8:3 — “if any man loveth God, the same [God] is known by him”; 1 John 4:8 — “He that loveth not knoweth not God.” See other Scripture references on pages 3, 4. (c) A likeness to God in mere personality, such as Satan also possesses, comes far short of answering the demands of the Scripture, in which the ethical conception of the divine nature so overshadows the merely natural.

    The image of God must not simply be an ability to be like God but actual likeness.

    God could never create an intelligent being evenly balanced between good and evil — “on the razor’s edge” or “on the fence.” The preacher, who took for his text “Adam, where art thou?” had for his first heading: “It is every man’s business to be somewhere.” for his second: “Some of you are where you ought not to be.” For his third: “Get where you ought to be, as soon as possible.” A simple capacity for good or evil is, as Augustine says, already sinful. A man who is neutral between good and evil is already a violator of that law, which requires likeness to God in the bent of his nature. Delitzsch, Bib. Psychol., 45-64 — “Personality is only the basis of the divine image — it is not the image itself.” Bledsoe says there can be no created virtue or viciousness. Whedon (On the Will, 388) objects to this, and says rather: “There can be no created moral desert, good or evil. Adam’s nature as created was pure and excellent, but there was nothing meritorious until he had freely and rightly exercised his will with full power to the contrary.” We add: Even then, there was nothing meritorious about it. For substance of these objections, see Philippi, Glaubenslehre, 2:346. Lessing said that the character of the Germans was to have no character. Goethe partook of this lack of cosmopolitan character. (Prof. Seely). Tennyson had Goethe in view when he wrote In The Palace of Art: “I sit apart, holding no form of creed, but contemplating all.” And Goethe in probably still alluded to in the words: “A glorious devil, large in heart and brain, That did love beauty only, Or if good, good only for its beauty”; see A. H. Strong, The Great Poets and their Theology, 331; Robert Browning. Christmas Eve: “The truth in God’s breast Lies trace for trace upon ours impressed: Though he is so aright, and we so dim, We are made in his image to witness him.”

    B. The image of God as consisting simply in man’s natural capacity for religion.

    This view, first elaborated by the scholastics, is the doctrine of the Roman Catholic Church. It distinguishes between the image and the likeness of God. The former ( µl,X, — Genesis 1:26) alone belonged to man’s nature at its creation. The latter ( tWmD] ) was the product of his own acts of obedience. In order that this obedience might be made easier and the consequent likeness to God more sure, a third element not belonging to man’s nature was added. Added was a supernatural gift of special grace, which acted as a curb upon the sensuous impulses, and brought them under the control of reason. Original righteousness was therefore not a natural endowment, but a joint product of man’s obedience and of God’s supernatural grace.

    Roman Catholicism holds that the white paper of man’s soul received two impressions instead of one. Protestantism sees no reason why both impressions should not leave been given at the beginning. Kaftan, in Am. Jour. Theology, 4:708, gives a good statement of the Roman Catholic view. It holds that the supreme good transcends the finite mind and its powers of comprehension. Even at the first it was beyond man’s created nature. The donum superadditum did not inwardly and personally belong to him. Now that he has lost it, he is entirely dependent on the church for truth and grace, he does not receive the truth because it is this and no other, but because the church tells him that it is the truth.

    The Roman Catholic doctrine may be roughly and pictorially stated as follows: As created, man was morally naked or devoid of positive righteousness (pura naturalia, or in puris naturalibus). By obedience he obtained as a reward from God (doum supernaturale, or superadditum) a suit of clothes or robe of righteousness to protect him so that he became clothed (vestitus). This suit of clothes, however, was a sort of magic spell of which he could be divested. The adversary attacked him and stripped him of his suit. After his sin he was one despoiled (spoliatus a nudo). But his condition after differed from his condition before the attack, only as a stripped man differs from a naked man (spoliatus a nudo). He was now only in the same state in which he was created, with the single exception of the weakness he might feel as the result of losing his customary clothing. He could still earn himself another suit — in fact, he could earn two or more, so as to sell, or give away, what he did not need for himself.

    The phrase in puris naturalibus describes the original state, as the phrase spoliatus a nudo describes the difference resulting from man’s sin.

    Many of the considerations already adduced apply equally as arguments against this view. We may say, however, with reference to certain features peculiar to the theory: (a) No such distinction can justly be drawn between the words µl,X, and tWmD] . The addition of the synonym simply strengthens the expression, and both together signify “the very image.” (b) Whatever is denoted by either or both of these words was bestowed open man in and by the fact of creation, and the additional hypothesis of a supernatural gift not originally belonging to man’s nature, but subsequently conferred, has no foundation either here or elsewhere in Scripture. Man is said to have been created in the image and likeness of God, not to have been afterwards endowed with either of them. (c) The concerted opposition between sense and reason which this theory supposes is inconsistent with the Scripture declaration that the work of God’s hands “was very good” ( Genesis 1:31) and transfers the blame of temptation and sin from man to God. To hold to a merely negative innocence, in which evil desire was only slumbering, is to make God author of sin by making him author of the constitution which rendered sin inevitable. (d) This theory directly contradicts Scripture by making the effect of the first sin to leave been a weakening but not a perversion of human nature, and the work of regeneration to be not a renewal of the affections but merely a strengthening of the natural powers. The theory regards that first sin as simply despoiling man of a special gift of grace and as putting him where he was when first created, still able to obey God and to cooperate with God for his own salvation. The Scripture, however, represents man since the fall as “dead through… trespasses and sins” ( Ephesians 2:1) as incapable of true obedience ( Romans 8:7 — “not subject to the law of God, neither indeed can it be”), and as needing to be “created in Christ Jesus for good works” ( Ephesians 2:10).

    At few points in Christian doctrine do we see more clearly than here the large results if error wields may ultimately spring from what might at first sight seem to be only a slight divergence from the truth. Augustine had rightly taught that in Adam the posse non-peccare was accompanied by a posse peccare and that for this reason man’s holy disposition needed the help of divine grace to preserve its integrity. But the scholastics wrongly added that this original disposition to righteousness was not the outflow if man’s nature as originally created, but was the gift of grace. As this later teaching, however, was by some disputed, the Council of Trent (sess. 5, cap. 1) left the Matter more indefinite, simply declaring man: “Sanctitatem et justitiam in qua constitutus fuerat , amisisse.” The Roman Catechism, however (1:2:19), explained the phrase “constitutus fuerat” by the words: “Tum originalis justitiæ admirabile donum addidit.” And Bellarmine (De Gratia, 2) says plainly: “Imago, quæ est ipsa natura mentis et voluntatis, a solo Deo fieri potuit; similitudo autem, quæ in virtute et probitate consistit, a nobis quoque Deo adjuvante perficitur.”… (5) “Integritas illa… non fuit naturalis ejus conditio, sed supernaturalis evectio… Addidisse homini donum quoddam insigne, justitiam videlicet originalem, qua veluti aureo quodam fræno pars inferior parti superiori subjecta contineretur.”

    Moehler (Symbolism, 21-35) holds that the religious faculty = the “image of God”; the pious exertion of this faculty = the “likeness of God.” He seems to favor the view that Adam received “this supernatural gift of a holy and blessed communion with God at a later period than his creation, i.e. , only when he had prepared himself for its reception and by his own efforts had rendered himself worthy of it.” He was created “just” and acceptable to God, even without communion with God or help from God.

    He became “holy” and enjoyed communion with God, only when God rewarded his obedience and bestowed the supernaturale donum . Although Moehler favors this view And claims that it is permitted by the standards, he also says that it is not definitely taught. The quotations from Bellarmine and the Roman Catechism above make it clear that it is the prevailing doctrine of the Roman Catholic Church, So, to quote the words of Shedd, “the Tridentine theology starts with Pelagianism and ends with Augustinianism. Created without character, God subsequently endows man with character. The Papal idea of creation differs from the Augustinian in that it involves imperfection. There is a disease and languor which require a subsequent and supernatural act to remedy.” The Augustinian and Protestant conception of man’s original state is far nobler than this. The ethical element is not a later addition, but is man’s true nature — essential to God’s idea of him. The normal and original condition of man (pura naturalia ) is one of grace and of the Spirit’s indwelling — hence, of direction toward God.

    From this original difference between Roman Catholic and Protestant doctrine with regard to man’s original state result diverging views as to sin and as to regeneration. The Protestant holds that, as man was possessed by creation of moral likeness to God, or holiness, so his sin robbed his nature of its integrity, deprived it of essential and concerted advantages and powers, and substituted for these a positive corruption and tendency to evil. Unpremeditated evil desire, or concupiscence, is original sin; as concerted love for God constituted man’s original righteousness. No man since the fall has original righteousness and it is man’s sin that he has it not. Since without love to God, no act, emotion, or thought of man can answer the demands of God’s law, the Scripture denies to fallen man all power of himself to know, think, feel, or do aright.

    His nature therefore needs a new creation, a resurrection from death, such as God only, by his mighty Spirit, can work and to this work of God man can contribute nothing, except as power is first given him by God himself.

    According to the Roman Catholic view, however since the image of God in which man was created included only man’s religious faculty, his sin can rob him only of what became subsequently and adventitiously his.

    Fallen man differs from unfallen only as spolidatus a nudo . He loses only a sort of magic spell, which leaves him still in possession of all his essential powers. Unpremeditated evil desire, or concupiscence, is not sin; this belonged to his nature even before he fell. His sin has therefore only put him back into the natural state of conflict and concupiscence, ordered by God in the concerted opposition of sense and reason. The sole qualification is this that, having made an evil decision, his will is weakened. “Man does not need resurrection from death, but rather a crutch to help his lameness, a tonic to reinforce his feebleness, a medicine to cure his sickness.” He is still able to turn to god and in regeneration the Holy Spirit simply awakens and strengthens the natural ability slumbering in the natural man. But even here, man must yield to the influence of the Holy Spirit and by uniting his power to the divine, regeneration is effected. In baptism the guilt of original sin is remitted, and everything called sin is taken away. No baptized person has any further process of regeneration to undergo. Man has not only strength to cooperate with God for his own salvation, but he may even go beyond the demands of the law and perform works of supererogation. The whole sacramental system of the Roman Catholic Church, with its salvation by works, its purgatorial fires, and its invocation of the saints, connects itself logically with this erroneous theory of man’s original state.

    See Dorner’s Augustinus, 116; Perrone, Prælectiones Theologiæ, 1:737- 748; Winer, Confessions, 79, 80; Dorner, History Protestant Theology 38, 39, and Glaubenslehre, 1:51; Vase Oosterzee, Dogmatics, 376; Cunningham, Historical Theology, 1:516-586; Shedd, Hist. Doctrine, 2:140-149.

    II. INCIDENTS OF MAN’S ORIGINAL STATE.

    1. Results of man’s possession of the divine image. (a) Reflection of this divine image in man’s physical form. Even in man’s body were typified those higher attributes which chiefly constituted his likeness to God. A gross perversion of this truth, however, is the view, which holds, upon the ground of Genesis 2:7 and 3:8, that the image of God consists in bodily resemblance to the Creator. In the first of these passages, it is not the divine image, but the body that is formed of dust, and into this body the soul that possesses the divine image is breathed. The second of these passages is to be interpreted by those other portions of the Pentateuch in which God is represented as free from all limitations of Matter ( Genesis 11:5; 18:15).

    The spirit represents the divine image immediately: the body mediately.

    The scholastics called the soul the image of God proprie; the body they call the image of God significative. Soul is the direct reflection of God; body is the reflection of that reflection. The os sublime manifests the dignity of the endowments within. Hence the word ‘upright,’ as applied to moral condition; one of the first impulses of the renewed man is to physical purity. Compare Ovid, Metaph., bk.1, Dryden’s transl.: “Thus while the mute creation downward bend Their sight, and to their earthly mother tend, Man looks aloft, and with erected eyes Beholds his own hereditary skies.” ( Anqrwpov from ajna>, a]nw> , suffix tra , and w=y , with reference to the upright posture.) Milton speaks of “the human face divine.” S. S. Times, July 28, 1900 — “Man is the only erect being among living creatures. He alone looks up naturally and without effort.

    He foregoes his birthright when he looks only at what is on a level with his eyes and occupies himself only with what lies in the plane of his own existence.”

    Bretschneider (Dogmatik, 1:682) regards the Scripture as teaching that the image of God consists in bodily resemblance to the Creator, but considers this as only the imperfect method of representation belonging to an early age. See Strauss, Glaubenslehre, 1:687. They refer to Genesis 2:7 — “And Jehovah God formed man of the dust of the ground”; 3:8 — “Jehovah God walking in the garden.” But see Genesis 11:5 — “And Jehovah came down to see the city and the tower, which the children of men builded”; Isaiah 66:1 — “Heaven is my throne, and the earth is my footstool”; 1 Kings 8:27 — “behold, heaven and the heaven of heavens cannot contain the.” On the Anthropomorphites, see Hagenbach, Hist. Doct., 1:103, 308,491. For answers to Bretschneider and Strauss, see Philippi, Glaubenslehre, 2:364. (b) Subjection of the sensuous impulses to the control of the spirit.

    Here we are to hold a middle ground between two extremes. On the one hand, the first man possessed a body and a spirit so fitted to each other that no conflict was felt between their several claims. On the other hand, this physical perfection was not final and absolute, but relative and provisional.

    There was still room for progress to a higher state of being ( Genesis 3:22).

    Sir Henry Watton’s Happy Life: “That man was free from servile bands Of hope to rise or fear to fall, Lord of himself if not of lands, And having nothing yet had all.” Here we hold to the úquale temperamentum . There was no disease, but rather the joy of abounding health. Labor was only a happy activity. God’s infinite creator-ship and fountainhead of being was typified in man’s powers of generation. But there was no concerted opposition of sense and reason, nor an imperfect physical nature with whose impulses reason was at war. With this moderate Scriptural doctrine, contrast the exaggerations of the fathers and of the scholastics.

    Augustine says that Adam’s reason was to our what the bird’s is to that of the tortoise; propagation in the unfallen state would have been without concupiscence, and the newborn child would have attained perfection at birth. Albertus Magnus thought the first man would have felt no pain even though he had been stoned with heavy stones. Scotus Erigena held that the male and female elements were yet undistinguished. Others called sexuality the first sin. Jacob Boehme regarded the intestinal canal, and all connected with it, as the consequence of the Fall. He had the fancy that the earth was transparent at the first and cast no shadow — sin, he thought, had made it opaque and dark; redemption would restore it to its first estate and make night a thing of the past. South, Sermons, 1:24, — “Man came into the world a philosopher… Aristotle was but the rubbish of an Adam.” Lyman Abbott tells us of a minister who assured his congregation that Adam was acquainted with the telephone. But God educates his children, as chemists educate their pupils, by putting them into the laboratory and letting them work. Scripture does not represent Adam as a walking encyclopedia, but as a being yet inexperienced; see Genesis 3:22 — “Behold, the man is become as one of us, to know good and evil”; 1 Corinthians 15:46 — “that is not first which is spiritual, but that which is natural; then that which is spiritual.” On this last text, see Expositor’s Greek Testament. (c) Dominion over the lower creation. Adam possessed an insight into nature analogous to that of susceptible childhood, and therefore was able to name and to rule the brute creation ( Genesis 2:19). Yet this native insight was capable of development into the higher knowledge of culture and science. From Genesis 1:26 (cf . Psalm 8:5-8) it has been erroneously inferred that the image of God in man consists in dominion over the brute creation and the natural world. But, in this verse, the words “let them have dominion” do not define the image of God, but indicate the result of possessing that image. To make the image of God consist in this dominion, would imply that only the divine omnipotence was shadowed forth in man. Genesis 2:19 — “Jehovah God formed every beast of the field, and every bird of the heavens; and brought them unto the man to see what he would call them”; 20 — “And the man gave names to all cattle”; Genesis 1:26 — “Let us make man in our image, after our likeness: and let them have dominion over the fish of the sea and over the birds of the heavens, and over the cattle”; cf . Psalm 8:5-8 — “thou hast made him but little lower than God, And crowned him with glory and honor.

    Thou makest him to have dominion over the works of thy hands; thou hast put all things under his feet: All sheep and oxen, Yea, and the beasts of the field.” Adam’s naming the animals implied insight into their nature; see Porter, Hum. Intellect, 393, 394, 401. On man’s original dominion over (1) self, (2) nature, (3) fellowman, see Hopkins, Scriptural Idea of Man, 105.

    Courage and a good conscience have a power over the brute creation, and unfallen man can well be supposed to have dominated creatures, which had no experience of human cruelty. Rarey tamed the wildest horses by his steadfast and fearless eye. In Paris a young woman was hypnotized and put into a den of lions. She had no fear of the lions and the lions paid not the slightest attention to her. The little daughter of an English officer in South Africa wandered away from camp and spent she night among lions. “Katrina,” her father said when he found her, “were you not afraid to be alone here?” “No, papa,” she replied, “the big dogs played with me and one of them lay here and kept me warm.” MacLaren, in S. S. Times, Dec. 28, 1893 — “The dominion overall creatures results from likeness to God. It is not then a mere right to use them for one’s own Material advantage, but a viceroy’s authority, which the holder is bound to employ for the honor of the true King.” This principle gives the warrant and the limit to vivisection and to the killing of the lower animals for food ( Genesis 9:2 3).

    Socinian writers generally hold the view that the image of God consisted simply in this dominion. Holding a low view of the nature of sin, they are naturally disinclined to believe that the fall has wrought any profound change in human nature. See their view stated in the Racovian Catechism, 21. It is held also by the Armenian Limborch Theol. Christ., ii, 24:2, 3, and 11. Upon the basis of this interpretation of Scripture, the Encratites held, with Peter Martyr, that women do not possess the divine image at all. (d) Communion with God. Our first parents enjoyed the divine presence and teaching ( Genesis 2:16). It would seem that God manifested himself to them in visible form ( Genesis 3:8). This companionship was both in kind and degree suited to their spiritual capacity, and by no means necessarily involved that perfected vision of God, which is possible to beings of confirmed and unchangeable holiness ( Matthew 5:8; John 3:2). Genesis 1:16 — “And Jehovah God commanded the man”; 3:8 — “And they heard the voice of Jehovah God walking in the garden in the cool of the day”; Matthew 5:8 — “Blessed are the pure in heart: for they shall see God”; 1 John 3:2 — “We know that if he shall be manifested, we shall be like him; for we shall see him even as he is”; Rev 22:4 — “and they shall see his face.” 2. Concomitants of man’s possession of the divine image. (a) Surroundings and society fitted to yield happiness and to assist a holy development of human nature (Eden and Eve). We append some recent theories with regard to the creation of Eve and the nature of Eden.

    Eden = pleasure, delight. Tennyson: “When high in Paradise By the four rivers the first roses blew.” Streams were necessary to the very existence of an oriental garden. Hopkins, Script. Idea of Man, 107 — “Man includes woman. Creation of a man without a woman would not have been the creation of man. Adam called her name Eve but God called their name Adam.” Matthew Henry: “Not out of his head to top him, nor out of his feet to be trampled on by him; but out of his side to be equal with him, under his arm to be protected by him and near his heart to be beloved.”

    Robert Burns says of nature: “her ‘prentice hand she tried on man, And then she made the lasses, O!” Stevens, Pauline Theology, 329 — “In the natural relations of the sexes there is a certain reciprocal dependence, since it is not only true that woman was made from man, but that man is born of woman ( 1 Corinthians 11:11,12).” Of the Elgin marbles Boswell asked: “Don’t you think them indecent?” Dr. Johnson replied: “No, sir; but your question is.” Man, who in the adult state possesses twelve pairs of ribs, is found in the embryonic state to have thirteen or fourteen. Dawson, Modern Ideas of Evolution, 148 — “Why does not the male man lack one rib? Because only the individual skeleton of Adam was affected by the taking of the rib… The unfinished vertebral arches or the skin fibrous layer may have produced a new individual by a process of budding or germination.”

    H. H. Bawden suggests that the account of Eve’s creation maybe the “pictorial summary” of an actual phylogenetic evolutionary process toy which the sexes were separated or isolated from a common hermaphroditic ancestor or ancestry. The mesodermic portion of the organism in which the urino-genital system has its origin develops later than the ectodermic or the endodermic portions. The word “rib” may designate this mesodermic portion. Bayard Taylor, John Godfrey’s Fortunes, 392, suggests that a genius is hermaphroditic, adding a male element to the woman and a female element to the man. Professor Loeb, Am. Journ. Physiology, Vol. III, no. 3, has found that in certain chemical solutions prepared in the laboratory, approximately the concentration of seawater, the unfertilized eggs of the sea urchin will mature without the intervention of the spermatozoa. Perfect embryos and normal individuals are produced under these conditions. He thinks it probable that similar parthenogenesis may be produced in higher types of being. In 1900 he achieved successful results on Annelids, though it is doubtful whether he produced anything more than normal larva. A European investigator who is also a Roman priest has criticized these results. Prof. Loeb wrote a rejoinder in which he expressed surprise that a representative of the Roman church did not heartily endorse his conclusions, since they afford a vindication of the doctrine of the Immaculate Conception.

    H. H. Bawden has reviewed Prof. Loeb’s work in the Psychological Review, Jan. 1900. JanÛsik has found segmentation in the unfertilized eggs of mammals. Prof. Loeb considers it possible that only the ions of the blood prevent the parthenogenetic origin of embryos in mammals, and thinks it not improbable that by a transitory change in these ions it will be possible to produce complete parthenogenesis in these higher types. Dr. Bawden goes on to say that “both parent and child are dependent upon a common source of energy. The universe is one great organism, and there is no inorganic or non-organic matter but differences only in degrees of organization. Sex is designed only secondarily for the perpetuation of species; primarily it is the bond or medium for the connection and interaction of the various parts of this great organism, for maintaining that degree of heterogeneity which is the prerequisite of a high degree of organization. By means of the growth of a lifetime I have become an essential part in a great organic system. What I call my individual personality represents simply the focusing, the flowering of the universe at one finite concrete points or center. Must not then my personality continue as long as that universal system continues? And is immortality conceivable if the soul is something shut up within itself, unshared and unique? Are not the many foci mutually interdependent, instead of mutually exclusive? We must not then conceive of an immortality which means the continued existence of an individual cut off from that social context which is really essential to his very nature.”

    J. H. Richardson suggests in the Standard, Sept. 10, 1901, that the first chapter of Genesis describes the creation of the spiritual part of man only or that part which was made in the image of God. The second chapter describes the creation of man’s body, the animal part, which may have been originated by a process of evolution. S. W. Howland, in Bibliotheca Sacra, Jan. 1903:121-128, supposes Adam and Eve to have been twins, joined by the ensiform cartilage or breastbone, as were the Siamese Chang and Eng. By violence or accident this cartilage was broken before it hardened into bone, and the two were separated until puberty. Then Adam saw Eve coming to him with a bone projecting from her side corresponding to the hollow in his own side, and said: “She is bone of my bone; she must have been taken from my side when I slept.” This tradition was handed down to his posterity. The Jews have a tradition that Adam was created double sexed and that the two sexes were afterwards separated. The Hindus say that may was at first of both sexes and he divided himself in order to people the earth. In the Zodiac of Dendera, Castor and Pollux appear as man and woman, and these twins, some say, were called Adam and Eve. The Coptic name for this sign is Pi Mahi , “the United.” Darwin, in the postscript to a letter to Lyell written as early as July 1850, tells his friend that he has “a pleasant genealogy for mankind.” He describes our remotest ancestor as “animal which breathed water, had a swim-bladder, a great swimming tail, an imperfect skull and was undoubtedly a hermaphrodite.”

    Matthew Arnold speaks of “the freshness of the early world.” Novalis says: “all philosophy begins in homesickness.” Shelly, Skylark: “We look before and after, And pine for what is not; Our sincerest laughter With some pain is fraught; Our sweetest songs are those That tell of saddest thought.” — “The golden conception of a Paradise is the poet’s guiding thought.” There is a universal feeling that we are not now in our natural state; that we are exiles from our true habitation. Keble, Groans of Nature: “Such thoughts, the wreck of Paradise, Through many a dreary age, Upbore whate’er of good or wise Yet lived bard or sage.” Poetry and music echo the longing for some possession lost. Jessica in Shakespeare’s merchant of Venice: “I am never merry when I hear sweet music.” All true poetry is forward looking or backward looking prophecy, as sculpture sets before us the original or the resurrection body. See Isaac Taylor, Hebrew Poetry, 94-101; Tyler, Theol of Greek Poets, 225, 226.

    Wellhausen, on the legend of a golden age, says: “it is the yearning song, which goes through all the peoples: having attained the historical civilization, they feel the worth of the goods, which they have sacrificed for it.” He regards the golden age as only an ideal image, like the millennial kingdom at the end. Man differs from the beast in this power to form ideals. His destination to God shows his descent from God. Hegel in a similar manner claimed that the Paradisaic condition is only an ideal conception underlying human development. But may not the traditions of the gardens of Brahma and of the Hesperides embody the world’s recollection of an historical fact, when man was free from external evil and possessed all that could minister to innocent joy? The “golden age” of the heathen was connected with the hope of restoration. So the use of the doctrine of man’s original state is to convince men of the high ideal once realized, properly belonging to man, now lost, and recoverable, not by man’s powers but only through God’s provision in Christ. For references in classic writers to a golden age, see Luthardt, Compendium, 115. He mentions the following: Hesiod, Works and Days, 109-208; Aratus, Phenom., 100-184; Plato, Tim., 233; Vergil, Ec., 4 Georgics, 7:135, Æneid, 8:314. (b) Provisions for the trying of man’s virtue. Since man was not yet in a state of confirmed holiness, but rather of simple childlike innocence, he could be made perfect only through temptation. Hence the “tree of the knowledge of good and evil” ( Genesis 2:9). The one slight command best tested the spirit of obedience. Temptation did not necessitate a fall.

    If resisted, it would strengthen virtue. In that case, the posse non peccare would have become the non posse peccare.

    Thomasius: “That evil is a necessary transition point to good, is Satan’s doctrine and philosophy.” The tree was mainly a tree of probation. It is right for a father to make his son’s title to his estate depend upon the performance of some filial duty, as Thaddeus Stevens made his son’s possession of property conditional upon his keeping the temperance pledge. Whether, besides this, the tree of knowledge was naturally hurtful or poisonous, we do not know. (c) Opportunity of securing physical immortality. The body of the first man was in itself mortal ( 1 Corinthians 15:45). Science shows that physical life involves decay and loss. But means were apparently provided for checking this decay and preserving the body’s youth. This means was the “tree of life” ( Genesis 2:9). If Adam had maintained his integrity, the body might have been developed and transfigured, without intervention of death. In other words, the posse non mori might have become a non posse mori The tree of life was symbolic of communion with God and of man’s dependence upon him. But this, only because it had a physical efficacy. It was sacramental and memorial to the soul, because it sustained the life of the body. Natural immortality without holiness would have been unending misery. Sinful man was therefore shut out from the tree of life, till he could be prepared for it by God’s righteousness. Redemption and resurrection not only restore that which was lost, but give what man was originally created to attain; 1 Corinthians 15:45 — “The first man Adam became a living soul. The last man Adam became a life giving spirit”; Revelation 22:14 — “Blessed are they that wash their robes, that they may have the right to come to the tree of life.”

    The conclusions we have thus reached with regard to the incidents of man’s original state are combated upon two distinct grounds: 1st . The facts bearing upon man’s prehistoric condition point to a development from primitive savagery to civilization. Among these acts may be mentioned the succession of implements and weapons from stone to bronze and iron, the polyandry and communal marriage systems of the lowest tribes and the relics of barbarous customs still prevailing among the most civilized.

    For the theory of an originally savage condition of man, see Sir john Lubbock, Prehistoric Times, and Origin of Civilization: “The primitive condition of mankind was one of utter barbarism.” L. H. Morgan, Ancient Society, divides human progress into three great periods, the savage, the barbarian, and the civilized. Each of the two former has three states, as follows:

    I. Savage:1. Lowest state, marked by attainment of speech and subsistence upon roots. 2. Middle state, marked by fish-food and fire. 3. Upper state, marked by use of the bow and hunting.

    II. Barbarian:1. Lower state, marked by invention and use of pottery. 2.

    Middle state, marked by use of domestic animals, maize and building stone. 3.

    Upper state, marked by invention and use of iron tools.

    III. Civilized man next appears, with the introduction of the phonetic alphabet and writing. J. S. Stuart-Glennie, Contemp. Rev., Dec. 1892:844, defines civilization as “enforced social organization, with written records, and hence intellectual development and social progress.”

    With regard to this view we remark: (a) It is based upon an insufficient induction of facts. History shows a law of degeneration supplementing and often counteracting the tendency to development. In the earliest times of which we have any record, we find nations in a high state of civilization. In the case of every nation whose history runs back of the Christian era — as for example, the Romans, the Greeks, the Egyptians — the subsequent progressions have been downward and no nation is known to have recovered from barbarism except as the result of influence from without.

    Lubbock seems to admit that cannibalism was not primeval; yet he shows a general tendency to take every brutal custom as a sample of man’s first state. And this, in state of the fact that many such customs have been the result of corruption. Bride catching, for example, could not possibly have been primeval, in the strict sense of that term. Tyler, Primitive Culture, 1:48, presents a far more moderate view. He favors a theory of development, but with degeneration “as a secondary action largely and deeply affecting the development of civilization.” So the Duke of Argyll, Unity of Nature: Civilization and savagery are both the results of evolutionary development but the one is a development in the upward, the latter in the downward direction. For this reason, neither civilization nor savagery can rationally be looked upon as the primitive condition of man.” Shedd, Dogmatic Theology, 1:467 — “As plausible an argument might be constructed out of the deterioration and degradation of some of the human family to prove that man may have evolved downward into an anthropoid ape, as that which has been constructed to prove that he lens been evolved upward from one.”

    Modern nations fall far short of the old Greek perception and expression of beauty. Modern Egyptians, Bushmen, Australians, are unquestionably degenerate races. See Lankester, Degeneration. The same is true of Italians and Spaniards, as well as of Turks. Abyssinians are now polygamists, though their ancestors were Christians and monogamists.

    The physical degeneration of portions of the population of Ireland is well known. See Mivart, Lessons from Nature, 146-160, who applies to the savage theory the tests of language, morals, and religion. He quotes Herbert Spencer as saying: “Probably most of them [savages], if not all of them, had ancestors in higher states and among their beliefs remain some which were evolved during those higher states. It is quite possible, and I believe highly probable, that retrogression has been as frequent as progression.” Spencer, however, denies that savagery is always caused by lapse from civilization.

    Bibliotheca Sacra, 6:715; 29:282 — “Man as a moral being does not tend to rise but to fall, and that with a geometric progress, except he be elevated and sustained by some force from without and above himself.

    While man once civilized may advance, yet moral ideas are apparently never developed from within.” Had savagery been man’s primitive condition, he never could have emerged. See Whately, Origin of Civilization, who maintains that man needed not only a divine Creator but also a divine Instructor. Seelye, Introduction To A Century of Dishonor, — “The first missionaries to the Indians in Canada took with them skilled laborers to teach the savages how to till their fields, to provide them with comfortable homes, clothing and food. But the Indians preferred their wigwams, skins, raw flesh and filth. Only as Christian influences taught the Indian his inner need, and how this was to be supplied, was he led to wish and work for the improvement of his outward condition and habits.

    Civilization does not reproduce itself. It must first be kindled and it can then be kept alive only by a power genuinely Christian.” So Wallace, in Nature, Sept. 7, 1876, vol. 14:408-412.

    Griffith-Jones, Ascent through Christ, 149-168, shows that evolution does not necessarily involve development as regards particular races. There is degeneration in all the organic orders. As regards man, he may be evolving in some directions while in others he has degenerated. Lidgett, Spir. Principle of the atonement, 245, speaks of “Prof. Clifford as pointing to the history of human progress and declaring that mankind is a risen and not a fallen race. There is no real contradiction between these two views. God has not let man go because man has rebelled against him.

    Where sin abounded, grace did much more abound.” The humanity which was created in Christ and which is upheld by his power has ever received reinforcements of its physical and mental life, in spite of its moral and spiritual deterioration. “Some shrimps, by the adjustment of their body parts, go onward to the higher structure of the lobsters and crabs while others, taking up the habit of dwelling in the gills of fishes, sink downward into a state closely resembling that of the worms.” Drummond, Ascent of Man: “When a boy’s kite comes down in our garden, we do not hold that it originally came from the clouds. So nations went up, before they came down. There is a national gravitation. The stick age preceded the stone age, but has been lost.” Tennyson: “Evolution ever climbing after some ideal good, And Reversion ever dragging Evolution in the mud.” Evolution often becomes devolution, if not devolution. A. J.

    Gordon, Ministry of the Spirit. 304 — “The Jordan is the fitting symbol of our natural life, rising in a lofty elevation and from pure springs, but plunging steadily down till it pours itself into that Dead Sea from which there is no outlet.” (b) Later investigations have rendered it probable that the stone age of some localities was contemporaneous with the bronze and iron ages of others. Certain tribes and nations, instead of making progress from one to the other, were never, so far back as we can trace them, without the knowledge and use of the metals. It is to be observed, moreover, that even without such knowledge and use man is not necessarily a barbarian, Though he may be a child.

    On the question whether the arts of civilization can be lost, see Arthur Mitchell, Past In the Present, 219: Rude art is often the debasement of a higher, instead of being the earlier; the rudest art in a nation may coexist with the highest; cave-life may accompany high civilization., where Burial of a cock for epilepsy and sacrifice of a bull, were until very recently extant; these are illustrations from modern Scotland. Certain arts have unquestionably been lost, as glassmaking and iron working in Assyria (see Mivart, referred to above). The most ancient men do not appear to have been inferior to the latest, either physically or intellectually. Rawlinson: “The explorers who have dug deep into the Mesopotamian mounds, and have ransacked the tombs of Egypt, have come upon no certain traces of savage man in those regions which a widespread tradition makes the cradle of the human race.” The Tyrolese peasants show that a rude people may be moral, and a very simple people maybe highly intelligent. See football, Recent Origin of Man, 386-449; Schliemann, Troy and her Remains, 274.

    Mason, Origins of Invention, 110, 124, 128 — “There is no evidence that a stone age ever existed in some regions. In Africa, Canada, and perhaps Michigan, the metal age was as old as the stone age.” An illustration of the Mathematical powers of the savage is given by hey. A. E. Hunt in an account of the native arithmetic of Murray Islands, Torres Straits. “Netat” (one) and “neis” (two) are the only numerals, higher numbers being described by combinations of these, as “neis-netat” for three, neis-ineis” for four, etc. or by reference to one of the fingers, elbows or other parts of the body. A total of thirty-one could be counted by the latter method. Beyond this all numbers were “many,” as this was the limit reached in counting before the introduction of English numerals, now in general use in the islands.

    Shaler, Interpretation of Nature, 171 — “It is commonly supposed that the direction of the movement [in the variation of species] is ever upward.

    The fact is on the contrary that in a large number of cases, perhaps in the aggregate in more than half, the change gives rise to a form which, by all the canons by which we determine relative rank, is to be regarded as regressive or degradable. Species, genera, families and orders have all, like the individuals of which they are composed, a period of decay in which the gain won by infinite toil and pains is altogether lost in the old age of the group.” Shaler goes on to say that in the matter of variation successes are to failures as 1 to 100,000 and if man be counted the solitary distinguished success, then the proportion is something like 1 to 100,000,000. No species that passes away is ever reinstated. If man were now to disappear, there is no reason to believe that by any process of change a similar creature would be evolved, however long the animal kingdom continued to exist. The use of these successive chances to produce man is inexplicable except upon the hypothesis of an infinite designing Wisdom. (c) The barbarous customs to which this view looks for support may better be explained as marks of broken down civilization than as relics of a primitive and universal savagery. Even if they indicated a former state of barbarism, that state might have been itself preceded by a condition of comparative culture.

    Mark Hopkins, in Princeton Revelations Sept, 1882:194 — “There is no cruel treatment of females among animals. If man came from the lower animals, then he cannot have been originally savage; for you find the most of this cruel treatment among savages.” Tyler instances “street Arabs.”

    He compares street Arabs to a ruined house, but savage tribes to a builder’s yard. See Duke of Argyll, Primeval Man, 129, 133; Bushnell, Nature and the Supernatural, 223; McLennan, Studies in Ancient History.

    Gulick, a Bibliotheca Sacra, July, 1892:517 — “Cannibalism and infanticide are unknown among the anthropoid apes. These must be the results of degradation. Pirates and slave traders are not men of low and abortive intelligence, but men of education who deliberately throw off all restraint and who use their powers for the destruction of society.”

    Keane, Man, Past and Present, 40, quotes Sir H. H. Johnston, an administrator who has had a wider experience of the natives of Africa than any man living says that “the tendency of the Negro, for several centuries past, has been an actual retrograde one — a return toward the savage and even the brute. If he had been cut off from the immigration of the Arab and the European, the purely Negroid races, left to themselves, so far from advancing towards a higher type of humanity, might have actually reverted by degrees to a type no longer human.” Ratzel’s History of Mankind: “We assign no great antiquity to Polynesian civilization. In New Zealand it is a matter of only some centuries back. In newly occupied territories, the development of the population began upon a higher level and then fell off. The Maoris’ decadence resulted In the rapid impoverishment of culture, and the character of the people became more savage and cruel. Captain Cook found objects of art worshiped by the descendants of those who produced them.”

    Recent researches have entirely discredited L. H. Morgan’s theory of an original brutal promiscuity of the human race. Ritchie, Darwin and Hegel, 6, note — “The theory of an original promiscuity is rendered extremely doubtful by the habits of many of the higher animals.” E. B. Tyler, in 19th Century, July. 1906 — “A sort of family life, lasting for the sake of the young, beyond a single pairing season, exists among the higher manlike apes. The male gorilla keeps watch and ward over his progeny.

    He is the ante-type of the house-father. The matriarchal system is a later device for political reasons, to bind together in peace and alliance tribes that would otherwise be hostile. But it is an artificial system introduced as a substitute for and in opposition to the natural paternal system. When the social pressure is removed, the maternalized husband emancipates himself, and paternalism begins.” Westermarck, History of Human Marriage: “Marriage and the family are thus intimately connected with one another; it is for the benefit of the young that male and female continue to live together. Marriage is therefore rooted in the family, rather than the family in marriage. There is not a shred of genuine evidence for the notion that promiscuity ever formed a general stage in the social history of mankind. Instead of belonging to the class of hypotheses which is scientifically permissible, the hypothesis of promiscuity has no real foundation, and is essentially unscientific.” Howard, history of matrimonial Institutions: “Marriage or pairing between one man and one woman, though the union be often transitory and the rule often violated, is the typical form of sexual union from the infancy of the human race.” (d) The well nigh universal tradition of a golden age of virtue and happiness may be most easily explained upon the Scripture view of an actual creation of the race in holiness and its subsequent apostasy.

    For references in classic writers to a golden age, see Luthardt, Compendium der Dogmatik, 115; Pfleiderer, Philos. Religion, 1:205 — “In Hesiod we have the legend of a golden age under the lordship of Chronos. When man was free from cares and toils, in untroubled youth and cheerfulness, with a superabundance of the gifts which the earth furnished of itself, the race was indeed not immortal, but it experienced death even as a soft sleep.” We may add that capacity for religious truth depends upon moral conditions. Very early races therefore have a purer faith than the later ones. Increasing depravity makes it harder for the later generations to exercise faith. The wisdom-literature may have been very early instead of very late, just as monotheistic ideas are clearer the further we go back. Bixby, Crisis in Morals, 171 — “Precisely because such tribes [Australian and African savages] have been deficient in average moral quality, have they failed to march upward on the road of civilization with the rest of mankind, and have fallen into these bog holes of savage degradation.” On petrified civilizations, see Henry George, Progress and Poverty, 433-439 — “The law of human progress, what is it but the moral law?” On retrogressive development in nature, see Weismann, Heredity, 2:1-30. But see also Mary E. Case, “Did the Romans Degenerate?” In Internat. Journ. Ethics, Jan. 1893:165-182, in which it is maintained that the Romans made constant advances rather.

    Henry Sumner Maine calls the Bible the most important single document in the history of sociology, because it exhibits authentically the early development of society from the family, through the tribe, into the nation — a progress learned only by glimpses, intervals and survivals of old usage in the literature of other nations. 2nd . That the religious history of mankind warrants us in inferring a necessary and universal law of progress. In accordance with which man passes from fetichism to polytheism and monotheism — this first theological stage, of which fetichism, polytheism, and monotheism are parts, being succeeded by the metaphysical stage and that in turn by the positive.

    This theory is propounded by Comte, in his Positive Philosophy English transl., 25, 26, 515-636 — “Each branch of our knowledge passes successively through three different theoretical conditions: the Theological or fictitious, the Metaphysical or abstract and the Scientific or positive.

    The first is the necessary point of departure of the human understanding and the third is its fixed and definite state. The second is merely a state of transition. In the theological state, the human mind, seeking the essential nature of beings, the first and final causes, the origin and purpose, of all effects — in short, absolute knowledge — supposes all phenomena to be produced by the immediate action of supernatural beings. In the metaphysical state, which is only a modification of the first, the mind supposes, instead of supernatural beings, abstract forces, veritable entities, that is, personified abstractions, inherent in all beings, and capable of producing all phenomena. What is called the explanation of phenomena is, in this stage, a mere reference of each to its proper entity.

    In the final, the positive state, the mind has given over the vain search after absolute notions, the origin and destination of the universe, and the causes of phenomena, and applies itself to the study of their laws — that is, their invariable relations of succession and resemblance. The theological system arrived at its highest perfection when it substituted the providential action of a single Being for the varied operations of numerous divinities. In the last stage of the metaphysical system, men substituted one great entity, Nature, as the cause of all phenomena, instead of the multitude of entities at first supposed. In the same way the ultimate perfection of the positive system would be to represent all phenomena as particular aspects of a single general fact — such as Gravitation, for instance.”

    This assumed law of progress, however, is contradicted by the following facts: (a) Not only did the monotheism of the Hebrews precede the great polytheistic systems of antiquity, but also even these heathen religions are purer from polytheistic elements, the further back we trace them so that the facts point to an original monotheistic basis for them all.

    The gradual deterioration of all religions, apart from special revelation and influence from God, is proof that the purely evolutionary theory is defective. The most natural supposition is that of a primitive revelation, which little by little receded from human memory. In Japan, Shinto was originally the worship of Heaven. The worship of the dead, the deification of the Mikado, etc. was a corruption and after growth. The Mikado’s ancestors, instead of coming from heaven, came from Korea. Shinto was originally a form of monotheism. Not one of the first emperors was deified after death. Apotheosis of the Mikados dated from the corruption of Shinto through the importation of Buddhism. Andrew Lang, in his Making of Religion, advocates primitive monotheism. T. G. Pinches, of the British Museum, 1894, declares that, as in the earliest Egyptian, so in the early Babylonian records, there is evidence of a primitive monotheism. Nevins, Demon-Possession, 170-173, quotes W. A. P. Martin, President of the Peking University, as follows: “China, India, Egypt and Greece all agree in the monotheistic type of their early religion. The Orphic Hymns, long before the advent of the popular divinities, celebrated the Pantheos , the universal God. The odes compiled by Confucius testify to the early worship of Shangte, the Supreme Ruler. The Vedas speak of ‘one unknown true Being, all-present, all-powerful, the Creator, Preserver and Destroyer of the Universe.’ And in Egypt, as late as the time of Plutarch, there were still vestiges of a monotheistic worship.”

    On the evidences of en original monotheism, see Max Muller, Chips, 1:337; Rawlinson, in Present Day Tracts. 2:no. 11; Legge, Religions of China, 8, 11; Diestel, in Jahrbuck fur deutsche Theologie, 1860, and vol. 5:669; Philip Smith, Anc. Hist. of East, 65, 195; Warren, on the Earliest Creed of Mankind, in the Methodist Quarterly Rev., Jan. 1884. (b) “There is no proof that the Indo-Germanic or Semitic stocks ever practiced fetich worship or were ever enslaved by the lowest types of mythological religion or ascended from them to somewhat higher” (Fisher).

    See Fisher, Essays on Supernat. Origin of Christianity, 545; Bartlett, Sources of History in the Pentateuch, 86-115. Herbert Spencer once held that fetichism was primordial. But he afterwards changed his mind, and said that the facts proved to be exactly the opposite when he had become better acquainted with the ideas of savages; see his Principles of Sociology, 1:343. Mr. Spencer finally traced the beginnings of religion to the worship of ancestors, but in China no ancestor has ever become a god; see Hill, Genetic Philosophy, 304-313. And unless man had an inborn sense of divinity, he could deify neither ancestors nor ghosts. Professor Hilprechet of Philadelphia says: “As the attempt has recently been made to trace the pure monotheism of Israel to Babylonian sources, I am bound to declare this an absolute impossibility on the basis of my fourteen year research in Babylonian cuneiform inscriptions. The faith of Israel’s chosen people is: ‘hear, O Israel: the Lord our God is one Lord.’ And this faith could never have proceeded from the Babylonian mountain of gods, that charnel-house full of corruption and dead men’s bones.” (c) Some of the earliest remains of man yet found show, by the burial of food and weapons with the dead, that there already existed the idea of spiritual beings and of a future state, and therefore a religion of a higher sort than fetichism.

    Idolatry proper regards the idol as the symbol and representative of a spiritual being who exists apart from the material object, though he manifests himself thorough it. Fetichism, however, identifies the divinity with the Material thing, and worships the stock or stone; spirit is not conceived of as existing apart from body. Belief in spiritual beings and a future state is therefore proof of a religion higher in kind than fetichism.

    See Lyell, Antiquity of Man, quoted in Dawson, Story of Earth and Man, 384; see also 368, 872, 386 — “Man’s capacities for degradation are commensurate with his capacities for improvement” (Dawson). Lyell, in his last edition, however, admits the evidence from the Aurignac cave to be doubtful. See art. by Dawkins, in Nature, 4:208. (d) The theory in question, in making theological thought a merely transient stage of mental evolution, ignores the fact that religion has its root in the intuitions and yearnings of the human soul, and that therefore no philosophical or scientific progress can ever abolish it. While the terms theological, metaphysical, and positive may properly mark the order in which the ideas of the individual and the race are acquired, positivism errs in holding that these three phases of thought are mutually exclusive; upon the rise of the later the earlier must of necessity become extinct.

    John Stuart Mill suggests that” personifying” would be a much better term than “theological” to designate the earliest effects to explain physical phenomena. On the fundamental principles of Positivism, see New Englander, 1873:323-386; Diman, Theistic Argument, 338 — “Three coexistent states are here confounded with three successive stages of human thought; three aspects of things with three epochs of time.

    Theology, metaphysics, and science must always exist side by side, for all positive science rests on metaphysical principles and theology lies behind both. All are as permanent as human reason itself” Martineau, Types, 1:487 — “Comte sets up medieval Christianity as the typical example of evolved monotheism and develops it out of the Greek and Roman polytheism which it overthrew and dissipated. But the religion of modern Europe notoriously does not descend from the same source as its civilization and is no continuation of the ancient culture; it comes rather from Hebrew sources. Essays, Philos. and Theol., 1:24, 62 — “The Jews were always a disobliging people; what business had they to be up so early in the morning, disturbing the house ever so long before M. Comte’s bell rang to prayers?” See also Gillett, God in Human Thought 1:17-23; Rawlinson, in Journ. Christ. Philos., April, 1883:353; Nineteenth Century, Oct. 1886:473-490.

    CHAPTER 3. SIN, OR MAN’S STATE OF APOSTASY.

    SECTION 1 — THE LAW OF GOD.

    As preliminary to a treatment of man’s state of apostasy, it becomes necessary to consider the nature of that law of God, the transgression of which is sin. We may best approach the subject by inquiring what is the true conception of

    I. LAW IN GENERAL.

    1. Law is an expression of will.

    The essential idea of law is that of a general expression of will enforced by power. It implies: (a) A lawgiver, or authoritative will. (b) Subjects, or beings upon whom this will terminates. (c) A general command or expression of this will. (d) A power, enforcing the command.

    These elements are found even in what we call natural law. The phrase ‘law of nature’ involves a self-contradiction, when used to denote a mode of action or an order of sequence behind which there is conceived to be no intelligent and ordaining will. Physics derives the term ‘law’ from jurisprudence, instead of jurisprudence deriving it from physics. It is first used of the relations of voluntary agents. Causation in our own wills enables us to see something besides mere antecedence and consequence in the world about us. Physical science, in her very use of the word ‘law,’ implicitly confesses that a supreme Will has set general rules, which center the processes of the universe.

    Wayland, Moral Science,1, unwisely defines law as “a mode of existence or order of sequence,” thus leaving out of his definition all reference to an ordaining will. He subsequently says that law presupposes an establisher but in his definition there is nothing to indicate this. We insist, on the other hand, that the term ‘law’ itself includes the idea of force and cause.

    The word ‘law’ is from ‘lay’ (German legen), something laid down; German Gesetz , from setzen , = something set or established; Greek no>mov , from ne>mw , = something assigned or apportioned; Latin lex , from lego, = something said or spoken.

    All these derivations show that man’s original conception of law is that of something proceeding from volition. Lewes, in his Problems of Life and Mind, says that the term ‘law’ is so suggestive of a giver and impresser of law, that it ought to be dropped, and the word ‘method’ substituted. The merit of Austin’s treatment of the subject is that he “rigorously limits the term ‘law’ to the commands of a superior”; see John Austin, Province of Jurisprudence, 1:88-98, 220-223. The defects of his treatment we shall note further on.

    J. S. Mill: “It is the custom, wherever they [scientific men] can trace regularity of any kind, to call the general proposition, which expresses the nature of that regularity, a law; as when in mathematics we speak of the law of the successive terms of a converging series. But the expression ‘law of nature’ is generally employed by scientific men with a sort of tacit reference to the original sense of the word ‘law’ namely, the expression of the will of a superior — the superior in this case being the Ruler of the universe.” Paley, Nat. Theology, chap. 1 — “It is a perversion of language to assign any law as the efficient operative cause of anything. A law presupposes an agent; this is only the mode according to which an agent proceeds; it implies a power, for it is the order according to which that power acts. Without this agent, without this power, which are both distinct from itself, the law does nothing.” “Quis custodiet ipsos custodes?” “Rules do not fulfill themselves, any more than a statute book can quell a riot” (Martineau, Types, 1:367).

    Charles Darwin got the suggestion of natural selection, not from the study of lower plants and animals, but from Malthus on Population; see his Life and Letters, Vol. I, autobiographical chapter. Ward, Naturalism and Agnosticism, 2:248-252 — “The conception of natural law rests upon the analogy of civil law.” Ladd, Philosophy of Knowledge, 333 — “Laws are only the more or less frequently repeated and uniform modes of the behavior of things.” Philosophy of Mind, 122 — “To be, to stand in relation, to be self-active, to act upon other being, to obey law, to be a cause, to be a permanent subject of states, to be the same today as yesterday, to be identical, to be one. All these and all similar conceptions, together with the proofs that they are valid for real beings, are affirmed of physical realities, or projected into them, only on a basis of selfknowledge, envisaging and affirming the reality of mind. Without psychological insight and philosophical training, such terms or their equivalents are meaningless in physics. And because writers on physics do not in general have this insight and this training, in spite of their utmost endeavors to treat physics as an empirical science without metaphysics, they flounder and blunder and contradict themselves hopelessly whenever they touch upon fundamental matters.” See President McGarvey’s Criticism on James Lane Allen’s Reign of Law: “It is not in the nature of law to reign. To reign is an act, which can be literally affirmed only of persons. A man may reign, a God may reign, a devil may reign but a law cannot reign. If a law could reign, we should have no gambling in New York and no open saloons on Sunday. There would be no false swearing in courts of justice, and no dishonesty in politics. It is men who reign in these matters — the judges, the grand jury, the sheriff and the police.

    They may reign according to law. Law cannot reign even over those who are appointed to execute the law.” 2. Law is a general expression of will.

    The characteristic of law is generality. It is addressed to substances or persons in classes. Special legislation is contrary to the true theory of law.

    When the Sultan of Zanzibar orders his barber to be beheaded because the latter has cut his master, this order is not properly a law. To be a law it must read: “Every barber who cuts his majesty shall thereupon be decapitated.” Einmal ist keinmal = “Once is no custom.” Dr. Schurman suggests that the word meal (MahI) means originally time (mal in einmal ). The measurement of time among ourselves is astronomical, among our earliest ancestors it was gastronomical, and the reduplication mealtime = the ding-dong of the dinner bell. The Shah of Persia once asked the Prince of Wales to have a man put to death in order that be might see the English method of execution. When the Prince told him that this was beyond his power, the Shah wished to know what was the use of being a king if he could not kill people at his pleasure. Peter the Great suggested a way out of the difficulty. He desired to see keelhauling. When informed that there was no sailor liable to that penalty, he replied: “That does not matter — take one of my suite.” Amos, Science of Law,33, — “Law eminently deals in general rules.” It knows not persons or personality. It must apply to more than one case. “The characteristic of law is generality, as that of morality is individual application.” Special legislation is the bane of good government; it does not properly fall within the province of the lawmaking power; it savors of the caprice of despotism, which gives commands to each subject at will. Hence our more advanced political constitutions check lobby influence and bribery, by prohibiting special legislation in all cases where general laws already exist. 3. Law implies power to enforce.

    It is essential to the existence of law, that there be power to enforce.

    Otherwise law becomes the expression of mere wish or advice. Since physical substances and forces have no intelligence and no power to resist, the four elements already mentioned exhaust the implications of the term ‘law as applied to nature. In the case of rational and free agents, however, law implies in addition: (e) Duty or obligation to obey and (f) Sanctions, or pains and penalties for disobedience. “Law that has no penalty is not law but advice, and the government in which infliction does not follow transgression is the reign of rogues or demons.” On the question whether any of the punishments of civil law are legal sanctions, except the punishment of death, see N. W. Taylor, Moral Govt., 2:367-387. Rewards are motives, but they are not sanctions. Since public opinion may be conceived of as billeting penalties for violation of her will, we speak figuratively of the laws of society, of fashion, of etiquette, of honor. Only so far as the community of nations can and does by sanctions compel obedience, can we with propriety assert the existence of international law. Even among nations, however, there may be moral as well as physical sanctions. The decision of an international tribunal has the same sanction as a treaty, and if the former is impotent, the latter also is. Fines and imprisonment do not deter decent people from violations of law half so effectively as do the social penalties of ostracism and disgrace and it will be the same with the findings of an international tribunal.

    Diplomacy, without ships and armies has been said to be law without penalty. But exclusion from civilized society is penalty. “In the unquestioning obedience to fashion’s decrees, to which we all quietly submit, we are simply yielding to the pressure of the persons about us. No one adopts a style of dress because it is reasonable, for the styles are often most unreasonable; but we meekly yield to the most absurd of them rather than resist this force and be called eccentric. So what we call public opinion is the most mighty power today known, whether in society or in politics.” 4. Law expresses and demands nature.

    The will, which thus binds its subjects by commands and penalties is an expression of the nature of the governing power, and reveals the normal relations of the subjects to that power. Finally, therefore, law (g) is an expression of the nature of the lawgiver; and (h) sets forth the condition or conduct in the subjects, which is requisite for harmony with that nature.

    Any so-called law, which fails to represent the nature of the governing power, soon becomes obsolete. All law that is permanent is a transcript of the facts of being, a discovery of what is and must be, in order to harmony between the governing and the governed. In short, positive law is just and lasting only as it is an expression and republication of the law of nature.

    Diman, Theistic Argument, 106, 107: John Austin, although he “rigorously limited the term law to the commands of a superior,” yet “rejected Ulpian’s explanation of the law of nature, and ridiculed as fustian the celebrated description in Hooker.” This we conceive to be the radical defect of Austin’s conception. The Will, which natural law proceeds from, is conceived of after a deistic fashion, instead of being immanent in the universe. Lightwood, in his Nature of Positive Law, 78- 90, criticizes Austin’s definition of law as command, and substitutes the idea of law as custom. Sir Henry Maine’s Ancient Law has shown us that the early village communities had customs, which only gradually took form as definite laws. But we reply that custom is not the ultimate source of anything Repeated acts of will are necessary to constitute custom. The first customs are due to the commanding will of the father in the patriarchal family. So Austin’s definition is justified. Collective morals (mores ) come from individual duty (due ); law originates in will.

    Martineau, Types, 2:18, 19, Behind this will however, is something which Austin does not take account of, namely, the nature of things as constituted by God, as revealing the universal Reason, and as furnishing the standard to which all positive law, if it would be permanent, must conform.

    See Montesquieu, Spirit of Laws, book 1, sec. 14 — “Laws are the necessary relations arising from the nature of things. There is a primitive Reason, and laws are the relations subsisting between it and different beings, and the relations of these to one another. These rules are a fixed and invariable relation. Particular intelligent beings may have laws of their own making, but they have some likewise that they never made. To say that there is nothing just or unjust but what is commanded or forbidden by positive laws, is the same as saying that before the describing of a circle all the radii were not equal. We must therefore acknowledge relations antecedent to the positive law by which they were established.” Kant, Metaphysic of Ethics, 169-172 — “By the science of law is meant systematic knowledge of the principles of the law of nature — from which positive law takes its rise — which is forever the same, and carries its sure and unchanging obligations over all nations and throughout all ages.” It is true even of a despot’s law, that it reveals his nature, and shows what is requisite in the subject to constitute him in harmony with that nature. A law, which does not represent the nature of things, or the real relations of the governor and the governed, has only a nominal existence, and cannot be permanent. On the definition and nature of law, see also Pomeroy, in Johnson’s Encyclopædia, art.: Law; Ahrens, Cours de Droit Naturel, book 1, sec. 14; Lorimer, Institutes of Law, 256, who quotes from Burke: “All human laws are, properly speaking, only declaratory. They may alter the mode and application, but have no power over the substance of original justice”; Lord Bacon: “Regula enim legem (ut acus nautica polos) indicat, non statuit.” Duke of Argyll, Reign of Law,64; H. C. Carey, Unity of Law.

    Fairbairn, in Contemp. Rev., Apl. 1895:478 — “The Roman jurists draw a distinction between jus naturale and jus civile and they used the former to affect the latter. The jus civile was statutory, established and fixed law, as it were, the actual legal environment; the jus naturale was ideal, the principle of justice and equity immanent in man, yet with the progress of his ethical culture growing ever more articulate.” We add the fact that jus in Latin and Recht in German have ceased to mean merely abstract right and have come to denote the legal system in which that abstract right is embodied and expressed. Here we have a proof that Christ is gradually moralizing the world and translating law into life. E. G. Robinson: “Never a government on earth made its own laws. Even constitutions simply declare laws already and actually existing. Where society falls into anarchy, the lex talionis becomes the prevailing principle.”

    II. THE LAW OF GOD IN PARTICULAR.

    The law of God is a general expression of the divine will enforced by power. It has two forms: Elemental Law and Positive Enactment. 1. Elemental Law, or law inwrought into the elements, substances, and forces of the rational and irrational creation. This is twofold:

    A. The expression of the divine will in the constitution of the Material universe — this we call physical, or natural law. Physical law is not necessary. Another order of things is conceivable. Physical order is not an end in itself; it exists for the sake of moral order. Physical order has therefore only a relative constancy and God supplements it at times by miracle.

    Bowne, Theory of Thought and Knowledge, 210 — “The laws of nature represent no necessity, but are only the orderly forms of procedure of some Being back of them. Cosmic uniformity is God’s method in freedom.” Philos. of Theism, 73 — “Any of the cosmic laws, from gravitation on, might conceivably have been lacking or altogether different. No trace of necessity can be found in the Cosmos or in its laws.” Seth, Hegelianism and Personality: “Nature is not necessary. Why put an island where it is, and not a mile east or west? Why connect the smell and shape of the rose or the taste and color of the orange? Why do\parH2 O form water? No one knows.” William James: “The parts seem shot at us out of a pistol.” Rather, we would say, out of a shotgun. Martineau, Seat of Authority,33 — “Why undulations in one medium should produce sound and in another light, why one speed of vibration should give red color, and another blue can be explained by no reason of necessity. Here is selecting will.”

    Brooks, Foundations of Zoology. 126 — “So far as the philosophy of evolution involves belief that nature is determinate, or due to a necessary law of universal progress or evolution, it seems to me to be utterly unsupported by evidence and totally unscientific.” There is no power to deduce anything whatever from homogeneity. Press the button and law does the rest? Yes, but what presses the button? The solution crystalizes when shaken?

    Yes, but what shakes it? Ladd, Philos. of Knowledge, 810 — “The directions and velocities of the stars fall under no common principles that astronomy can discover. One of the stars — ‘1830 Groombridge’ — is flying through space at a rate many times as great as it could attain if it had fallen through infinite space through all eternity toward the entire physical universe. fluids contract when coded and expand when heated yet there is the well known exception of water at the degree of freezing.” — “Things do not appear to be Mathematical all the way through. The system of things may be a Life, changing its modes of manifestation according to immanent ideas, rather than a collection of rigid entities, blindly subject in a mechanical way to unchanging laws.”

    Augustine: “Dei voluntas rerum natura est.” Joseph Cook: “The laws of nature are the habits of God.” But Campbell, Atonement, Introduction, xxvi, says there is this difference between the laws of the moral universe and those of the physical, namely, that we do not trace the existence of the former to an act of will, as we do the latter. “To say that God has given existence to goodness as he has to the laws of nature, would be equivalent to saying that he has given existence to himself.” Pepper, Outlines of Systematic Theology, 91 — “Moral law, unlike natural law, is a standard of action to be adopted or rejected in the exercise of rational freedom, i.e. , of moral agency.” See also Shedd, Dogmatic Theology, 1:531.

    Mark Hopkins, In Princeton Rev., Sept 1882:190 — “In moral law there is enforcement by punishment only — never by power, for this would confound moral law with physical and obedience can never be produced or secured by power. In physical law, on the contrary, enforcement is wholly by power and punishment is impossible. So far as man is free, he is not subject to law at all, in its physical sense. Our wills are free from law as enforced by power ; but are free under law, as enforced by punishment . Where law prevails in the same sense as in the Material world, there can be no freedom. Law does not prevail when we reach the region of choice. We hold to a power in the mind of man originating a free choice. Two objects or courses of action, between which choice is to be made, are presupposed: (1) A uniformity or set of uniforms implying a force by which the uniformity is produced [physical or natural law]. (2) A command, addressed to free and intelligent beings, that can be obeyed or disobeyed, and that has connected with it rewards or punishments” [moral law]. See also Wm. Arthur Difference between Physical and Moral Law.

    B. The expression of the divine will in the constitution of rational and free agents — this we call moral law. This elemental law of our moral nature with which only we are now concerned, has all the characteristics mentioned as belonging to law in general. It implies: (a) A divine Lawgiver, or ordaining Will. (b) Subjects, or moral beings upon whom the law terminates. (c) General command or expression of this will in the moral constitution of the subjects. (d) Power, enforcing the command. (e) Duty, or obligation to obey. (f) Sanctions, or pains and penalties for disobedience.

    All these are of a loftier sort than are found in human law. But we need especially to emphasize the fact that this law (g) is an expression of the moral nature of God, and therefore of God’s holiness, the fundamental attribute of that nature; and that it (h) sets forth absolute conformity to that holiness, as the normal condition of man. This law is inwrought into man’s rational and moral being. Man fulfills it only when, in his moral as well as his rational being, he is the image of God.

    Although the will from which the moral law springs is an expression of the nature of God and a necessary expression of that nature in view of the existence of moral beings, it is none the less a personal will. We should be careful not to attribute to the law a personality of its own. When Plutarch says: “Law is king both of mortal and immortal beings,” and when we say: “The law will take hold of you,” “The criminal is in danger of the law,” we are simply substituting the name of the agent for that of the principal. God is not subject to law, God is the source of law and we may say “If Jehovah be God, worship him; but if Law, worship it.”

    Since moral law merely reflects God, it is not a thing made . Men discover laws, but they do not make them any more than the chemist makes the laws by which the elements combine. Instance the solidification of hydrogen at Geneva. Utility does not constitute law, although we test law by utility; see Murphy, Scientific Bases of Faith, 53-71. The true nature of the moral law is set forth in the noble though rhetorical description of Hooker: (Ecclesiastes Pol., 1:194) — “Of law there can be no less acknowledged than that her seat is in the bosom of God, her voice the harmony of the world. All things in heaven and earth do her homage, the very least as feeling her care and the greatest as not exempted from her power. Both angels and men and creatures of what condition soever, though each in a different sort and manner, yet all with uniform consent admiring her as the mother of their peace and joy.” See also Martineau, Types, 2:119, and Study, 1:35.

    Curtis, Primitive Semitic Religions,66, 101 — “The Oriental believes that God makes right by edict. Saladin demonstrated to Henry of Champagne the loyalty of his Assassins, by commanding two of them to throw themselves down from a lofty tower to certain and violent death.”

    H. B. Smith, System. 192 — “Will implies personality and personality adds to abstract truth and duty the element of authority. Law therefore has the force that a person has over and above that of an idea.” Human law forbids only those offences, which constitute a breach of public order or of private right. God’s law forbids all that is an offence against the divine order, that is, all that is unlike God. The whole law maybe summed up in the words: “Be like God.” Salter, First Steps in Philosophy, 101-126 — “The realization of the nature of each being is the end to be striven for.

    Self-realization is an ideal end, not of one being, but of each being, with due regard to the value of each in the proper scale of worth. The beast can be sacrificed for man. All men are sacred as capable of unlimited progress. It is our duty to realize the capacities of our nature so far as they are consistent with one another and go to make up one whole.” This means that man fulfills the law only as he realizes the divine idea in his character and life or, in other words, as he becomes a finite image of God’s infinite perfections.

    Bixby, Crisis in Morals, 191, 201, 285, 286 — “Morality is rooted in the nature of things. There is a universe. We are all parts of an infinite organism. Man is inseparably bound to man [and to God]. All rights and duties arise out of this common life. In the solidarity of social life lies the ground of Kant’s law: So will, that the maxim of thy conduct may apply to all. The planet cannot safely fly away from the sun and the hand cannot safely separate itself from the heart. It is from the fundamental unity of life that our duties flow. The infinite world-organism is the body and manifestation of God. And when we recognize the solidarity of our vital being with this divine life and embodiment, we begin to see into the heart of the mystery, the unquestionable authority and supreme sanction of duty. Our moral intuitions are simply the unchanging laws of the universe that have emerged to consciousness in the human heart. The inherent principles of the universal Reason reflect themselves in the mirror of the moral nature. The enlightened conscience is the expression in the human soul of the divine Consciousness. Morality is the victory of the divine Life In us. Solidarity of our life with the universal Life gives it unconditional sacredness and transcendental authority. The microcosm must bring itself en rapport with the Macrocosm. Man must bring his spirit into resemblance to the World-essence and into union with it.”

    The law of God, then, is simply an expression of the nature of God in the form of moral requirement and a necessary expression of that nature in view of the existence of moral beings ( Psalm 19:7; cf. 1). To the existence of this law all men bear witness. The consciences even of the heathen testify to it ( Romans 2:14, 15). Those who have the written law recognize this elemental law as of greater compass and penetration ( Romans 7:14; 8:4). The perfect embodiment and fulfillment of this law is seen only in Christ ( Romans 10:4; Philippians 3:8,9). Psalm 19:7 — “The law of Jehovah is perfect restoring the soul”; cf. verse 1 — “The heavens declare the glory of God” two revelations of God — one in nature, the other in the moral law. Romans 2:14,15 — “for when Gentiles that have not the law do by nature the things of the law, these, not having the law, are the law unto themselves. In that they show the work of the law written in their hearts, their conscience bearing witness therewith, and their thoughts one with another accusing or else excusing them” — here the “work of the law” not the Ten Commandments, for of these the heathen were ignorant, but rather the work corresponding to them, i.e ., the substance of them. Romans 7:14 — “For we know that the law is spiritual” — this, says Meyer, is equivalent to saying “its essence is divine, of like nature with the Holy Spirit who gave it, a holy self-revelation of God.” Romans 8:4 — “that the ordinance of the law might be fulfilled in us, who walk not after the flesh, but after the spirit”; 10:4 — “For Christ is the end of the law unto righteousness to every one that believeth,” Philippians 3:8,9 — “that I any gain Christ and he found in him, not having a righteousness of mine own, even that which is of the law, but that which is through faith in Christ the righteousness which is from God by faith”; Hebrews 10:9 — “Lo, I am come to do thy will.” In Christ “the law appears Drawn out in living characters.” Just such as he was and is, we feel that we ought to be. Hence the character of Christ convicts us of sin, as does no other manifestation of God. See, on the passages from Romans, the Commentary of Philippi.

    Fleming, Vocab. Philos., 286 — “Moral laws are derived from the nature and will of God, and the character and condition of man.” God’s nature is reflected in the laws of our nature. Since law is inwrought into man’s nature, man is a law unto himself. To conform to his own nature, in which conscience is supreme, is to conform to the nature of God. The law is only the revelation of the constitutive principles of being, the declaration of what must be, so long as man is man and God is God. It says in effect: “Be like God, or you cannot be truly man.” So, moral law is not simply a test of obedience, but is also a revelation of eternal reality. Man cannot be lost to God, without being lost to himself also. “The hands of the living God” (Hebrews l0:31) into which we fall, are the laws of nature.” In the spiritual world “they are the same that wheels revolve, only there is no iron” (Drummond, Natural Law in the Spiritual World,27). Wuttke, Christian Ethics, 2:82-92 — “The totality of created being is to be in harmony with God and with itself. The idea of this harmony, as active in God under the form of will, is God’s law.” A manuscript of the U. S.

    Constitution was so written that when held at a little distances the shading of the letters and their position showed the countenance of George Washington. So the law of God is only God’s face disclosed to human sight.

    R. W. Emerson, Woodnotes, 57 — “Conscious Law is King of Kings.”

    Two centuries ago John Norton wrote a book entitled The Orthodox Evangelist, “designed for the begetting and establishing of the faith which is in Jesus,” in which we find the following: “God doth not will things because they are just, but things are therefore just because God so willeth them. What reasonable man but will yield that the being of the moral law hath no necessary connection with the being of God? That the actions of men not conformable to this law should be sin, that death should be the punishment of sin, these are the constitutions of God, proceeding from him not by way of necessity of nature, but freely, as effects and products of his eternal good pleasure.” This to make God an arbitrary despot. We should not say that God makes law, nor on the other hand that God is subject to law, but rather that God is law and the source of law.

    Bowne, Philos. of Theism, 161 — “God’s law is organic — inwrought into the constitution of men and things. The chart however does not make the channel. A law of nature is never the antecedent but the consequence of reality. What right has this consequence of reality to be personalized and made the ruler and source of reality? Law is only the fixed mode in which reality works. Law therefore can explain nothing. Only God, from whom reality springs, can explain reality.” In other words, law is never an agent but always a method — the method of God, or rather of Christ who is the only Revealer of God. Christ’s life in the flesh is the clearest manifestation of him who is the principle of law in the physical and moral universe. Christ is the reason of God in expression. It was he who gave the law on Mount Sinai as well as in the Sermon on the Mount. For fuller treatment of the subject, see Bowen, Metaph. and Ethics, 321-344; Talbot, Ethical Prolegomena, in Bap. Quar., July, 1877:257-274; Whewell, Elements of Morality, 2:85; and especially E. G. Robinson, Principles and Practice of Morality, 79-108.

    Each of the two last mentioned characteristics of God’s law is important in its implications. We treat of these in their order.

    First, the law of God as a transcript of the divine nature. If this is the nature of the law, then certain common misconceptions of it are excluded, The law of God is (a) Not arbitrary, or the product of arbitrary will. Since the will from which the law springs is a revelation of God’s nature, there can be no rashness or wisdom in the law itself.

    E. G. Robinson, Christ. Theology, 193 — ““No law of God seems ever to have been arbitrarily enacted, or simply with, a view to certain ends to be accomplished; it always represented some reality of life, which it was inexorably necessary that those who were to be regulated should carefully observe.” The theory that law originates in arbitrary will results in an effeminate type of piety, just as the theory that legislation has for its sole end the greatest happiness results in all manner of compromises of justice.

    Jones, Robert Browning, 43 — “He who cheats his neighbor believes in tortuosity, and, as Carlyle says, has the supreme Quack for his god.” (b) Not temporary, or ordained simply to meet an exigency. The law is a manifestation, not of temporary moods or desires, but of the essential nature of God.

    The great speech of Sophocles’ Antigone gives us this conception of law: “The ordinances of the gods are unwritten, but sure. Not one of them is for today or for yesterday alone, but they live forever.” Moses might break the tables of stone upon which the law was inscribed, and Jehoiakim might cut up the scroll and cast it into the fire( Exodus 32:19; Jeremiah36:23), but the law remained eternal as before in the nature of God and in the constitution of man. Prof. Walter Rauschenbusch: “The moral laws are just as stable as the law of gravitation. Every fuzzy human chicken that is hatched into the world tries to fool with those laws. Some grow wiser in the process and some do not. We talk about breaking God’s laws. But after those laws have been broken several billion times since Adam first tried to play with them, those laws are still intact and no seam or fracture is visible in them — not even a scratch on the enamel. But the lawbreakers — that is another story. If you want to find their fragments, go to the ruins of Egypt, of Babylon and of Jerusalem. Study statistics, read faces, keep your eyes open, visit Blackwell’s Island. Walk through the graveyard and read the invisible inscriptions left by the Angel of Judgment, for instance: ‘Here lie the fragments of John Smith, when he contradicted his Maker, played football with the ten commandments and departed this life at the age of thirty-five. His mother and wife weep for him. Nobody else does. May he rest in peace!” (c) Not merely negative, or a law of mere prohibition since positive conformity to God is the inmost requisition of law.

    The negative form of the commandments in the Decalogue merely takes for granted the evil inclination in men’s hearts and practically opposes its gratification. In the case of each commandment a whole province of the moral life is taken into the account, although the act expressly forbidden is the acme of evil in that one province. So the Decalogue makes itself intelligible; it crosses man’s path just where he most feels inclined to wander. But back of the negative and specific expression do each case lies the whole mass of moral requirement; the thin edge of the wedge has the positive demand of holiness behind it, without obedience to which even the prohibition cannot in spirit be obeyed. Thus “the law is spiritual” ( Romans 7:14), and requires likeness in character and life to the spiritual God; John 4:24 — “God is spirit and they that worship him must worship in spirit and truth.” (d) Not partial, or addressed to one part only of man’s being since likeness to God requires purity of substance in man’s soul and body, as well as purity in all the thoughts and acts that proceed therefrom. As law proceeds from the nature of God, so it requires conformity to that nature in the nature of man.

    Whatever God gave to man at the beginning he requires of man with interest; cf . Matthew 25:17 — “thou oughtest therefore to have put my money to the bankers, and at my coming I should have received back mine own with interest.” Whatever comes short of perfect purity in soul or perfect health in body is nonconformity to God and contradicts his law. It, being understood that only that perfection is demanded, which answers to the creature’s stage of growth and progress; of the child there is required only the perfection of the child, of the youth only the perfection of the youth, of the man only the perfection of the man. See Julius Muller, Doctrine of Sin, chapter (e) Not outwardly published since all positive enactment is only the imperfect expression of this underlying and unwritten law of being.

    Much misunderstanding of God’s law results from confounding it with published, enactment. Paul takes the larger view that the law is independent of such expression,. See Romans 2:14,15 — “for when Gentiles that have not the law do by nature the things of the law, these, not having the law, are the law unto themselves; in that they show the work of the law written in their hearts, their conscience bearing witness therewith, and their thoughts one with another accusing or else excusing them:” see Expositor’s Greek Testament, in loco : “‘written on their hearts,’ when contrasted with the law written on the tables of stone, is equal to ‘unwritten’; the Apostle refers to what the Greeks called a]grafov no>mov .” (f) Not inwardly conscious, or limited in its scope by men’s consciousness of it. Like the laws of our physical being, the moral law exists whether we recognize it or not.

    Overeating brings its penalty in dyspepsia, whether we are conscious of our fault or not. We cannot by ignorance or by vote repeal the laws of our physical system. Self-will does not secure independence any more than the stars can by combination abolish gravitation. Man cannot get rid of God’s dominion by denying its existence or by refusing submission to it. Psalm 1:1-4 — “Why do the nations rage… against Jehovah… saying, Let us break their bonds asunder… He that sitteth in the heavens will laugh.” Salter, First Steps in Philosophy, 91 — “The fact that one is not aware of obligation no more affects its reality than ignorance of what is at the center of the earth affects the nature of what is really discoverable there. We discover obligation, and do not create it by thinking of it, any more than we create the sensible world by thinking of it.” (g) Not local, or confined to place since no moral creature can escape from God, from his own being, or from the natural necessity that unlikeness to God should involve misery and ruin. “The Dutch auction” was the public offer of property at a price beyond its value, followed by the lowering of the price until some one accepted it as a purchaser. There is no such local exception to the full validity of God’s demands. The moral law has even more necessary and universal sway than the law of gravitation in the physical universe. It is inwrought into the very constitution of man and of every other moral being. The man who offended the Roman Emperor found the whole empire a prison. (h) Not changeable, or capable of modification. Since law represents the unchangeable nature of God, it is not a sliding scale of requirements which adapts itself to the ability of the subjects. God himself cannot change it without ceasing to be God.

    The law, then, has a deeper foundation than that God merely “said so.”

    God’s word and God’s will are revelations of his inmost being; every transgression of the law is a stab at the heart of God. Simon, Reconciliation, 141, 142 — “God continues to demand loyalty even after man has proved disloyal. Sin changes man, and man’s change involves a change in God. Man now regards God as a ruler and exactor and God must regard man as a defaulter and a rebel.” God’s requirement is not lessened because man is unable to meet it. This inability is itself nonconformity to law, and is no excuse for sin; see Dr. Bushnell’s sermon on “Duty not measured by Ability.” The man with the withered hand would not have been justified in refusing to stretch it forth at Jesus’ command ( Matthew 13:10-13).

    The obligation to obey this law and to he conformed to God’s perfect moral character is based upon man’s original ability and the gifts which God bestowed upon him at the beginning. Created in the image of God, it is man’s duty to render back to God that which God first gave, enlarged and improved by growth and culture. ( Luke 19:23 — “wherefore gavest thou not my money into the bank, and I at my coming should have required it with interest”). This obligation is not impaired by sin or by the weakening of man’s powers. To let down the standard would be to misrepresent God. Adolphe Mound would not save himself from shame and remorse by lowering the claims of the law: “Save first the holy law of my God,” he says, “after that you shall save me!”

    Even salvation is not through violation of law. The moral law is immutable, because it is a transcript of the nature of the immutable God.

    Shall nature conform to me or I to nature? If I attempt to resist even physical laws, I am crushed. I can use nature only by obeying her laws.

    Lord Bacon: “Natura enim non nisi parendo vincitur.” So in the moral realm, we cannot buy off nor escape the moral law of God. God will not and God cannot change his law by one hair’s breadth, even to save a universe of sinners. Omar Kh·yy·m, in his Rub·yat, begs his god to “reconcile the law to my desires.” Marie Corelli says well: “As if a gnat should seek to build a cathedral and should ask to have the laws of architecture altered to suit its gnat-like capacity.” See Martineau, Types, 2:120.

    Secondly, the law of God as the ideal of human nature. A law thus identical with the eternal and necessary relations of the creature to the Creator and demanding of the creature nothing less than perfect holiness, as the condition of harmony with the infinite holiness of God, is adapted to man’s finite nature, as needing law. It is to man’s free nature, as needing moral law and to man’s progressive nature, as needing ideal law.

    Man, as finite, needs law just as railway cars need a track to guide them — to leap the track is to find, not freedom, but ruin. Railway President: “Our rules are written in blood.” Goethe, Was Wir Bringen, 19 Auftritt: “In vain shall spirits that are all unbound To the pure heights of perfection aspire; In limitation first the Master shines, And law alone can give us liberty.” — Man, as a free being, needs moral law. He is not an automaton, a creature of necessity, governed only by physical influences.

    With conscience to command the right, and will to choose or reject it, his true dignity and calling are that he should freely realize the right. Man, as a progressive being, needs nothing less than an ideal and infinite standard of attainment, a goal which he can never overpass, an end which shall ever attract and urge him forward. This he finds in the holiness of God.

    The law is a fence, not only for ownership but also for care. God not only demands but he protects. Law is the transcript of love as well as of holiness. We may reverse the well known couplet and say: “I slept and dreamed that life was Duty; I woke and found that life was Beauty.” “Cui servire regnare est.” Butcher, Aspects of Greek Genius, 56 — “In Plato’s Crito, the Laws are made to present themselves in person to Socrates in prison, not only as the guardians of his liberty, but as his lifelong friends, his well-wishers, his equals, with whom he had of his own free will, entered into binding compact.” It does not harm the scholar to have before him the ideal of perfect scholarship nor the teacher to have before him the ideal of a perfect school nor the legislator to have before him the ideal of perfect law. Gordon, The Christ of Today, 384 — “The moral goal must be a flying goal the standard to which we are to grow must be ever rising; the type to which we are to be conformed must have in it inexhaustible fullness.”

    John Caird, Fund. Ideas of Christianity, 2:139 — “It is just the best, purest, noblest human souls, who are least satisfied with themselves and their own spiritual attainments. The reason is that the human is not a nature essentially different from the divine but a nature which, just because it is in essential affinity with God, can be satisfied with nothing less than a divine perfection.” J. M. Whiton, The Divine Satisfaction: “Law requires being, character, likeness to God. It is automatic, selfoperating.

    Penalty is nontransferable. It cannot admit of any other satisfaction than the re-establishment of the normal relation, which it requires. Punishment proclaims that the law has not been satisfied. There is no canceling of the curse except through the growing up of the normal relation. Blessing and curse ensue upon what we are, not upon what we were. Reparation is within the spirit itself. The atonement is educational, not governmental.” We reply that the atonement is both governmental and educational and that reparation must first be made to the holiness of God before conscience, the mirror of God’s holiness, can reflect that reparation and be at peace.

    The law of God is therefore characterized by: (a) All-comprehensiveness. It is over us at all times, it respects our past, our present, and our future. It forbids every conceivable sin, it requires every conceivable virtue, and emissions as well as commissions are condemned by it. <19B996> Psalm 119:96 — “I have seen an end of all perfection… thy commandment is exceeding broad’’ Romans 3:23 — “all have sinned, and fall short of the glory of God”; James 4:17 — “To him therefore that knoweth to do good, and doeth it not, to him it sin.” Gravitation holds the mote as well as the world. God’s law detects and denounces the least sin, so that without atonement it cannot be pardoned. The law of gravitation may be suspended or abrogated, for it has no necessary ground in God’s being but God’s moral law cannot be suspended or abrogated, for that would contradict God’s holiness. “About right” is not “all right.” “The giant hexagonal pillars of basalt in the Scottish Staffs are identical in form with the microscopic crystals of the same mineral.” So God is our pattern, and goodness is our likeness to him. (b) Spirituality. It demands not only right acts and words, but also right dispositions and states. Perfect obedience requires not only the intense and unremitting reign of love toward God and man but also conformity of the whole inward and outward nature of man to the holiness of God. Matthew 5:22,28 — “the angry word is murder, the sinful look is adultery. Mark 12:30,31 — “thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart and with all thy soul, and with all thy mind and with all thy strength… Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself”; 2 Corinthians 10:5 — “bringing every thought into captivity to the obedience of Christ”; Ephesians 5:1 — “Be ye therefore imitators of God, as beloved children” 1 Peter 1:16 — “Ye shall be holy for I am holy.” As the brightest electric light, seen through a smoked glass against the sun appears like a black spot, so the brightest unregenerate character is dark, when compared with the holiness of God. Mattheson, Moments on the Mount 235, remarks on Galatians 6:4 — “let each man prove his own work and then shall he have his glorying in regard of himself alone and not of his neighbor.” “I have a small candle and I compare it with my brother’s taper and come away rejoicing. Why not compare it with the sun? Then I shall lose my pride and selfishness.” The distance to the sun from the top of an ant-hill and from the top of Mount Everest is nearly the same. The African princess praised for her beauty had no way to verify the compliments paid her but by looking in the glassy surface of the pool.

    But the trader came and sold her a mirror. Then she was so shocked at her own ugliness that she broke the mirror in pieces. So we look into the mirror of God’s law, compare ourselves with the Christ who is reflected there and hate the mirror which reveals us to ourselves ( James 1:23,24). (c) Solidarity. It exhibits in all its parts the nature of the one Lawgiver, and it expresses, in its least command, the one requirement of harmony with him. Matthew 5:48 — “Ye therefore shall be perfect, as your heavenly Father is perfect”; Mark 12:29,30 — “The Lord our God, the Lord is one and thou shalt love the Lord thy God”; James 2:10 — “For whosoever shall keep the whole law, and yet stumble in one point, he is become guilty of all” 4:12 — “One only is the lawgiver and judge.” Even little rattlesnakes are snakes. One link broken in the chain and the bucket will fall into the well. The least sin separates us from God. The least sin renders us guilty of the whole law, because it shows us to lack the love, which is required in all the commandments. Those who send us to the Sermon on the Mount for salvation, send us to a tribunal that damns us.

    The Sermon on the Mount is but a republication of the law given on Sinai but now in more spiritual and penetrating form. Thunder and lightning proceed from the NT, as from the OT, mount. The Sermon on the Mount is only the introductory lecture of Jesus’ theological course, as John 14-17 is the closing lecture. In it is announced the law, which prepares the way for the gospel. Those who would degrade doctrine by exalting precept will find that they have left men without the motive or the power to keep the precept. Æschylus, Agamemmon: “For there’s no bulwark in man’s wealth to him Who, through a surfeit, kicks — into the dim And disappearing — Right’s great altar.”

    Only to the first man, then, was the law proposed as a method of salvation.

    With the first sin, all hope of obtaining the divine favor by perfect obedience is lost. To sinners the law remains as a means of discovering and developing sin in its true nature and of compelling a recourse to the mercy provided in Jesus Christ. 2 Chronicles 34:19 — “And it came to pass, when the king had heard the words of the law, that he rent his clothes”; Job 42:5,6 — “I had heard of thee by the hearing of the ear; But now my eye seeth thee; Wherefore I abhor myself, And repent in dust and ashes.” The revelation of God in Isaiah 6:3,5 — “Holy, holy, holy, is Jehovah of hosts” — causes the prophet to cry like the leper: “Woe is me! For I am undone; because I am a man of unclean lips.” Romans 3:20 — “by the works of the law shall no flesh be justified in his sight; for through the law cometh the knowledge of sin” 5:20 — “the law came in besides that the trespass might abound” 7:7, 8 — “I had not known sin, except through the law: for I had not known coveting, except the law had said, Thou shalt not covet, but sin, finding occasion, wrought in me through the commandment all manner of coveting: for apart from the law sin is dead”; Galatians 3:24 — “So that the law is become our tutor,” or attendantslave, “to bring us unto Christ, that we might be justified by faith” = the law trains our wayward boyhood and leads it to Christ the Master, as in old times the slave accompanied children to school. Stevens, Pauline Theology, 177, 178 — “The law increases sin by increasing the knowledge of sin and by increasing the activity of sin. The law does not add to the inherent energy of the sinful principle which pervades human nature, but it does cause this principle to reveal itself more energetically in sinful act.” The law inspires fear, but it leads to love. The Rabbins said that if Israel repented but for one day, the Messiah would appear.

    No man ever yet drew a straight line or a perfect curve; yet he would be poor architect who contented himself with anything less. Since men never come up to their ideals, he who aims to live only an average moral life will inevitably fall below the average. The law, then, leads to Christ. He who is the ideal is also the way to attain the ideal. He who is himself the Word and the Law embodied is also the Spirit of life that makes obedience possible to us. ( John 14:6 — “I am the way, and the truth, and the life”; Romans 8:2 — “For the law of the Spirit of life in Christ Jesus made me free from the law of sin and of death”). Mrs. Browning. Aurora Leigh: “The Christ himself had been no Lawgiver, Unless he had given the Life too with the Law.” Christ for us upon the Cross, and Christ doe us by his Spirit, is the only deliverance from the curse of the law; Galatians 3:13 — “Christ redeemed us from the curse of the law, having become a curse for us.” We must see the claims of the law satisfied and the law itself written on our hearts. We are “reconciled in God through the death of his Son,” but We are also “saved by his life” ( Romans 5:10).

    Robert Browning, in The Ring and the Book, represents Caponsacchi as comparing ‘himself at his best with the new ideal of “perfect as Father in heaven is perfect” suggested by Pompilia’s purity, and as breaking out into the cry: “O great, just, good God! Miserable me!” In the Interpreter’s House of Pilgrim’s Progress, Law only stirred up the dust in the foul room — the Gospel had to sprinkle water on the floor before it could be cleansed. E.G. Robinson: “It is necessary to smoke a man out, before you can bring a higher motive to bear upon him.” Barnabas said that Christ was the answer to the riddle of the law. Romans 10:4 — “Christ is the end of the law unto righteousness to every one that believeth.” The railroad track opposite Detroit on the St. Clair River runs to the edge of the dock and seems intended to plunge the train into the abyss. But when the ferryboat comes up, rails are seen upon its deck, and the boat is the end of the track, to carry passengers over to Detroit. So the law, which by itself would bring only destruction, finds its end in Christ who ensures our passage to the celestial city.

    Law, then, with its picture of spotless innocence, simply reminds man of the heights from which he has fallen. “It is a mirror which reveals derangement but does not create or remove it.” With its demand of absolute perfection, up to the measure of man’s original endowments and possibilities, it drives us, in despair of ourselves, to Christ as our only righteousness and our only Savior ( Romans 8:3,4 — “For what the law could not do, in that it was weak through the flesh, God, sending his own Son in the likeness of sinful flesh and for sin, condemned sin in the flesh: that the ordinance of the law might be fulfilled in us who walk after the flesh, not after the Spirit”; Philippians 3:8,9 — “that I may gain Christ, and be fund in him, not having a righteousness of mine own, even that which is of the law but that which is through faith in Christ, the righteousness which is from God by faith”). Thus law must prepare the way for grace, and John the Baptist must precede Christ.

    When Sarah Bernhardt was solicited to add an eleventh commandment, she declined upon the ground there were already ten too many. It was as expression of pagan contempt of law. In heathendom, sin and insensibility to sin increased together. In Judaism and Christianity, on the contrary, there has been a growing sense of sin’s guilt and condemnation. McLaren, in S. S. Times, Sept. 23, 1893:600 — “Among the Jews there was a far profounder sense of sin than in any other ancient nation. The law written on men’s hearts evoked a lower consciousness of sin, and there are prayers on the Assyrian and Babylonian tablets which may almost stand beside the 51st Psalm . But, on the whole, the deep sense of sin was the product of the revealed law.” See Fairbairn, Revelation of Law and Scripture; Baird, Elohim Revealed, 187-242; Hovey, God with Us, 187- 210; Julius Muller, Doctrine of Sin, 1:45-50; Murphy, Scientific Bases of Faith, 53-71; Martineau, Types, 2:120-125. 2. Positive Enactment, or the expression of the will of God in published ordinances. This is also twofold:

    A. General moral precepts. These are written summaries of the elemental law ( Matthew 5:48; 22:37-40), or authorized applications of it to special human conditions ( Exodus 20:1-17; Matthew, chap. 5-8). Matthew 5:48 — “Ye therefore shall be perfect, as your heavenly Father is perfect”; 21:37-40 — “Thou shalt love the Lord thy God… Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself, in these two commandments the whole law hangeth and the prophets”; Exodus 20:1-17 — the Ten Commandments; Matthew, chap. 5-8 — the Sermon on the Mount. Cf .

    Augustine, on Psalm 57:1.

    Solly, On the Will, 162, gives two illustrations of the fact that positive precepts are merely applications of elemental law or the law of nature. “‘Thou shalt not steal ,’ is a moral law which may be stated “thou shalt not take that for thy own property, which is the property of another .”

    The contradictory of this proposition would be “thou mayest take that for thy own property which is the property of another.” But this is a contradiction in terms for it is the very conception of property, that the owner stands in a peculiar relation to its subject matter and what is every man’s property is no man’s property, as it is proper to no man. Hence the contradictory of the commandment contains a simple contradiction directly it is made a rule universal and the commandment itself is established as one of the principles for the harmony of individual wills. “‘Thou shalt not tell a lie ,’ as a rule of morality, may be expressed generally: thou shalt not by thy outward act make another to believe thy thought to be of other than it is. The contradictory made universal is “every man may by his outward act make another to believe his thought to be other than it is .” Now this maxim also contains a contradiction, and is self-destructive. It conveys a permission to do that which is rendered impossible by the permission itself. Absolute and universal indifference to truth, or the entire internal independence of the thought and symbol, makes the symbol cease to be a symbol and the conveyance of thought by its means, an impossibility.”

    Rant, Metaphysic of Ethics, 48, 90 — “Fundamental law of reason: So act, that thy maxims of will might become laws in a system of universal moral legislation.” This is Kant’s categorical imperative. He expresses it in yet another form: “Act from maxims fit to be regarded as universal laws of nature.” For expositions of the Decalogue which bring out its spiritual meaning, see Kurtz, Religionslehre, 9-72; Dick, Theology, 2:5l3- 554; Dwight, Theology, 3:163-560; Hodge, Systematic Theology, 3:259- 465.

    B. Ceremonial or special injunctions. These are illustrations of the elemental law, or approximate revelations of it, suited to lower degrees of capacity and to earlier stages of spiritual training ( Exodus 20:25; Matthew 19:8; Mark 10:5). Though temporary, only God can say when they cease to be binding upon us in their outward form.

    All positive enactment, therefore, whether they are moral or ceremonial, is republications of elemental law. Their forms may change but the substance is eternal. Certain modes of expression, like the Mosaic system, may be abolished, but the essential demands are unchanging ( Matthew 5:17,18; cf . Ephesians 2:15). From the imperfection of human language, no positive enactment is able to express in themselves the whole content and meaning of the elemental law. “It is not the purpose of revelation to disclose the whole of our duties.” Scripture is not a complete code of rules for practical action but an enunciation of principles with occasional precepts by way of illustration. Hence we must supplement the positive enactment by the law of being — the moral ideal found in the nature of God.

    Es. 20:25 — “Moreover also I gave them statutes that were not good and ordinances wherein they should not live” Matthew 15:9 — “Moses for your hardness of heart suffered you to put away your wives”; Mark 10:5 — “For your hardness of heart he wrote you this commandment”; Matthew 5:17,18 — “Think not that I am come to destroy the law or the prophets: I came not to destroy, but to fulfill. Verily I say unto you, Till heaven and earth pass away, one jot or one tittle shall in no wise pass away from the law, till all things be accomplished’’ cf. Ephesians 2:15 — “having abolished in his flesh the enmity, even the law of commandments contained in ordinances”; Hebrews 8:7 — “if that first covenant had been faultless, then would no place have been sought for a second.” Fisher, Nature and Method of Revelation, 90 — “After the coming of the new covenant, the keeping up of the old was as needless a burden as winter garments in the mild air of summer or as the attempt of an adult to wear the clothes of a child.”

    Wendt, Teaching of Jesus, 2:5-35 — “Jesus repudiates for himself and for his disciples absolute subjection to Old Testament Sabbath law ( Mark 2:27 sq. ); to Old Testament law as to external defilement ( Mark 7:15); to Old Testament divorce law ( Mark 10:2 sq .) He would ‘fulfill’ law and prophets by complete practical performance of the revealed will of God. He would bring out their inner meaning, bot by literal and slavish obedience to every minute requirement of the Mosaic law but by revealing in himself the perfect life and work toward which they intended. He would perfect the Old Testament conceptions of God — not keep then intact in their literal form, but in their essential spirit. Not by quantitative extension, but by qualitative renewal he would fulfill the law and the prophets. He would bring the imperfect expression in the Old Testament to perfection, not by servile letter-worship or allegorizing, but through grasp of the divine idea.”

    Scripture is not a series of minute injections and prohibitions such as the Pharisees and the Jesuits had lain down. The Koran showed its immeasurable inferiority to the Bible by establishing the letter instead of the spirit, by giving permanent, definite and specific rules of conduct instead of leaving room for the growth of the free spirit and for the education of conscience. This is not true either of Old Testament of the New Testament law. In Miss Fowler’s novel “The Farringdons”, Mrs. Herbert wishes “that the bible had been written on the principle of that dreadful little book called ‘Don’t’, which gives a list of the solecisms you should avoid; she would have understood it so much better than the present system.” Our Savior’s words about giving to him that asketh, and turning the cheek to the smiter ( Matthew 5:39-42) must be interpreted by the principle of love that lies at the foundation of the law. Giving to every tramp and yielding to every marauder is not pleasing our neighbor “for that which is good unto edifying” ( Romans 15:2). Only by confounding the divine law with the Scripture prohibition could one write as in N. Amer. Rev., Feb 1890:275 — “Sin is the transgression of a divine law but there is no divine law against suicide, therefore, suicide is not sin.”

    The written law was imperfect because God could, at the time, give no higher to an unenlightened people. “But to say that the scope and design were imperfectly moral is contradicted by the whole course of the history.

    We must ask what is the moral standard in which this course of education issues.” And this we find in the life and precepts of Christ. Even the law of repentance and faith does not take the place of the old law of being, but applies the latter to the special conditions of sin. Under the Levitical law, the prohibition of the touching of the dry bone ( Numbers 19:16) equally with the purification and sacrifices, the separations and penalties of the Mosaic code, expressed God’s holiness and his repelling from him all that savored of sin or death. The laws with regard to leprosy were symbolic, as well as sanitary. So church polity environs consciences better than abstract propositions could have done, the fundamental truths of the Christian scheme. Hence, they are not to be abrogated “till he come” ( 1 Corinthians 11:26).

    The Puritans, however, in re-enacting the Mosaic code, make the mistake of confounding the eternal law of God with a partial temporary and obsolete expression of it. Se we are not to rest in external precepts respecting woman’s hair, dress and speech but to find the underlying principle of modesty and subordination which alone is of universal and eternal validity. Robert Browning, the Ring the Book, 1:255 — “God breathes, not speaks, his verdicts, felt not heard — Passed on successively to each court I call Man’s conscience, custom, manners and all that make More and more effort to promulgate, mark God’s verdict in determinable words, Till last come human jurists — solidify Fluid results — what’s fixable lies forged, Statute, the residue escapes in fume, Yet hangs aloft a cloud, as palpable To the finer sense as word the legist welds. Justinian’s Pandects only make precise What simply sparkled in men’s eyes before, Twitched in their brow or quivered on their lip, Waited the speech they called, but would not come.” See Mozley, Ruling Ideas in Early Ages, 104; Tulloch, Doctrine of Sin, 141-144; Finney, Systematic Theology, 1- 40, 135-319; Mansel, Metaphysics, 378, 379; H. B. Smith, system of Theology, 191-195 Paul’s injunction to women to keep silence in the churches ( Corinthians 14:35, 1Tim 2:11, 12) is to be interpreted by the larger law of gospel equality and privilege ( Colossians 3:11). Modesty and subordination once required a seclusion of the female sex, which is no longer obligatory. Christianity has emancipated woman and has restored her to the dignity, which belonged to her at the beginning. “In the old dispensation, Miriam and Deborah and Huldah were recognized as leaders of God’s people and Anna was a notable prophetess in the temple courts at the time of the coming of Christ. Elizabeth and Mary spoke songs of praise for all generations. A prophecy of Joel 2:28 was that the daughters of the Lord’s people should prophesy, under the guidance of the Spirit, in the new dispensation. Philip the evangelist had ‘four virgin daughters, who prophesied’ ( Acts 21:9), and Paul cautioned Christian women to have their heads covered when they prayed or prophesied in public ( 1 Corinthians 11:5), but had no words against the work of such women. He brought Priscilla with him to Ephesus, where she aided in training Apollos into better preaching power ( Acts 18:26). He welcomed and was grateful for the work of those women who labored with him in the gospel at Philippi ( Philippians 4:3). And it is certainly an inference from the spirit and teachings of Paul that we should rejoice in the efficient service and sound words of Christian women today in the Sunday School and in the missionary field.” The command “And he that heareth let him say, Come” (Revelations 22:17) is addressed to women also. See Ellen Batelle Dietrick, Women in the Early Christian Ministry; per contra, see G. F. Wilkin, Prophesying of Women, 183-193.

    III. RELATION OF THE LAW TO THE GRACE OF GOD.

    In human government, while law is an expression of the will of the governing power, and so of the nature lying behind the will, it is by no means an exhaustive expression of that will and nature. Since it consists only of general ordinances, and leaves room for particular acts of command through the executive, as well as for “the institution of equity, the faculty of discretionary punishment and the prerogative of pardon.”

    Amos, Science of Law, 29-46, shows how “the institution of equity, the faculty of discretionary punishment and the prerogative of pardon” all involve expressions of will above and beyond what is contained in mere statute. Century Dictionary, on Equity: “English law had once to do only with property in goods, houses and lands. A man who had none of these might have an interest in a salary, a patent, a contract, a copyright or a security, but a creditor could not at common law levy upon these. When the creditor applied to the crown for redress, a chancellor or keeper of the king’s conscience was appointed, who determined what and how the debtor should pay. Often the debtor was required to put his intangible property into the hands of a receiver and could regain possession of it only when the claim against it was satisfied. These chancellors’ courts were called courts of equity and redressed wrongs, which the common law did not provide for. In later times, law and equity are administered for the most part by the same courts. The same court sits at one time as a court of law and at another time as court of equity.” “Summa lex, summa injuria,” is sometimes true.

    Applying now to the divine law this illustration drawn from human law, we remark: (a) The law of God is a general expression of God’s will, applicable to all moral beings. It therefore does not exclude the possibility of special injunctions to individuals and special acts of wisdom and power in creation and providence. The very specialty of these latter expressions of will prevents us from classing them under the category of law.

    Lord Bacon, Confession of Faith: “The soul of man was not produced by heaven or earth but was breathed immediately from God. The ways and dealings of God with spirits are not included in nature, that is, in the laws of heaven and earth but are reserved to the law of his secret will and grace.” (b) The law of God, accordingly, is a partial, not an exhaustive, expression of God’s nature. It constitutes, indeed, a manifestation of that attribute of holiness which is fundamental in God and which man must possess in order to be in harmony with God. But it does not fully express God’s nature in its aspects of personality, sovereignty, helpfulness and mercy.

    The chief error of all pantheistic theology is the assumption that law is an exhaustive expression of God: Strauss, Glaubenslehre, 1:31 — “If nature, as the self-realization of the divine essence, is equal to this divine essence, then it is infinite, and there can be nothing above and beyond it.” This is a denial of the transcendence of God (see notes on Pantheism, pages 100- 105). Mere law is illustrated by the Buddhist proverb: “As the cartwheel follows the tread of the ox, so punishment follows sin.” Denovan: “Apart from Christ, even if we have never yet broken the law, it is only by steady and perfect obedience for the entire future that we can remain justified. If we have sinned, we can be justified [without Christ] only by suffering and exhausting the whole penalty of the law.” (c) Mere law, therefore, leaves God’s nature in these aspects of personality, sovereignty, helpfulness and mercy to be expressed toward sinners in another way, namely, through the atoning, regenerating, pardoning and sanctifying work of the gospel of Christ. As creation does not exclude miracles, so law does not exclude grace ( Romans 8:3 — “what the law could not do… God” did).

    Murphy, Scientific Bases, 303-327, esp. 315 — “To impersonal law, it is indifferent whether its subjects obey or not. But God desires, not the punishment, but the destruction, of sin.” Campbell, Atonement, Introduction, 28 — “There are two regions of the divine selfmanifestation, one the reign of law, the other the kingdom of God.” C. H.

    M.: “Law is the transcript of the mind of God as to what man ought to be.

    But God is not merely law, but love. There is more in his heart than could be wrapped up in the ‘ten words.’ Not the law, but only Christ, is the perfect image of God” ( John 1:17 — “For the law was given through Moses; grace and truth came through Jesus Christ”). So there is more in man’s heart toward God than exact fulfillment of requirement. The mother when sacrifices herself for her sick child does it, not because she must, but because she loves. To say that we are saved by grace, is to say that we are saved both without merit on our own part, and without necessity on the part of God. Grace is made known in proclamation, offer, command but in all these it is gospel, or glad tidings. (d) Grace is to be regarded, however, not as abrogating law, but as republishing and enforcing it ( Romans 3:31 — “we establish the law”).

    By removing obstacles to pardon in the mind of God, and by enabling man to obey, grace secures the perfect fulfillment of law ( Romans 8:4 — “that the ordinance of the law might be fulfilled in us”). Even grace has its law ( Romans 8:2 — “the law of the Spirit of life”); another higher law of grace, the operation of individualizing mercy, overhears the “law of sin and of deaths.” This last, as in the case of the miracle, not being suspended, annulled or violated, but being merged in, while it is transcended by, the exertion of personal divine will.

    Honker, Ecclesiastical Polity, 1:155, 185, 194 — “Man, having utterly disabled his nature unto those [natural] means, hath had other revealed by God, and hath received from heaven a law to teach him how that which is desired naturally, must now be supernaturally attained. Finally, we see that, because those latter exclude not the former as unnecessary.

    Therefore, the law of grace teaches and includes natural duties also, such as are hard to ascertain by the law of nature.” The truth is midway between the Pelagian view, that there is no obstacle to the forgiveness of sins, and the modern rationalistic view, that since law fully expresses God, there can be no forgiveness of sins at all. Greg. Creed of Christendom, 2:217-228 — “God is the only being who cannot forgive sins… Punishment is not the execution of a sentence, but the occurrence of an effect.” Robertson, Lect. on Genesis, 100 — “Deeds are irrevocable, their consequences are knit up with them irrevocably.” So Baden Powell, Law and Gospel, in Noyes’ Theological Essays, 27. All this is true if God be regarded as merely the source of law. But there is such a thing as grace, and grace is more than law. There is no forgiveness in nature but grace is above and beyond nature.

    Bradford, Heredity, 233, quotes from Huxley the terrible utterance: “Nature always checkmates, without haste and without remorse, never overlooking a mistake, or making the slightest allowance for ignorance.”

    Bradford then remarks: “This is Calvinism with God left out. Christianity does not deny or minimize the law of retribution, but it discloses a Person who is able to deliver in spite of it. There is grace but grace brings salvation to those who accept the terms of salvation — terms strictly in accord with the laws revealed by science.” God revealed himself, we add, not only in law but in life; see Deuteronomy 1:6,7 — “Ye have dwelt long enough in this mountain” — the mountain of the law; “turn you and take your journey” — i. e., see how God’s law is to be applied to life. (e) Thus the revelation of grace, while it takes up and includes in itself the revelation of law, adds something different in kind, namely, the manifestation of the personal love of the Lawgiver. Without grace, law has only a demanding aspect. Only in connection with grace does it become “the perfect law, the law of liberty” ( James 1:25). In fine, grace is that larger and more complete manifestation of the divine nature of which law constitutes the necessary but preparatory stage.

    Law reveals God’s love and mercy but only in their mandatory aspect; it requires in men conformity to the love and mercy of God and as love and mercy in God are conditioned by holiness, so law requires that love and mercy should be conditioned by holiness in men. Law is therefore chiefly a revelation of holiness. It is in grace that we find the chief revelation of love though even love does not save by ignoring holiness but rather by vicariously satisfying its demands. Robert Browning, Saul: “I spoke as I saw. I report as man may of God’s work — All’s Love, yet all’s Law.”

    Dorner, Person of Christ, 1:64, 78 — “The law was a word lo>gov but it was not a lo>gov te>leiov , a plastic word, like the words of God that brought forth the world, for it was only imperative and there was no reality nor willing corresponding to the command (dem Sollen fehlte das Wollen). The Christian lo>gov ajlhqei>av — no>mov te>leiov th~v ejleuqeri>av — an operative and effective word, as that of creation.”

    Chaucer, The Persones Tale: “For sothly the lawe of God is the love of God.” S. S. Times, Sept. 14, 1901:595 — “Until man ceases to be an outsider to the kingdom and knows the liberty of the sons of God, he is apt to think of God as the great Exactor or the great Forbidder who reaps where he has not sown and gathers where he has not strewn.” Burton, in Bap. Rev., July, 1879:261-273, art.: Law and Divine Intervention; Farrar, Science and Theology, 184; Salmon, Reign of Law; Philippi, Glaubenslehre. 1:31.

    SECTION 2 — NATURE OF SIN.

    I. DEFINITION OF SIN.

    Sin is lack of conformity to the moral law of God, either in act, disposition or state.

    In explanation, we remark that (a) This definition regards sin as predicable only of rational and voluntary agents. (b) It assumes, however, that man has a rational nature below consciousness and a voluntary nature apart from actual volition. (c) It holds that the divine law requires moral likeness to God in the affections and tendencies of the nature, as well as in its outward activities. (d) It therefore considers lack of conformity to the divine holiness in disposition or state as a violation of law equally with the outward act of transgression.

    In our discussion of the Will (pages 504-513), we noticed that there are permanent states of the will, as well as of the intellect and of the sensibilities. It is evident, moreover, that these permanent states, unlike man’s deliberate acts, are always very imperfectly conscious, and in many cases are not conscious at all. Yet it is in these very states that man is most unlike God and so, as law only reflects God (see pages 537-544), most lacking in conformity to God’s law.

    One main difference between Old School and New School views of sin is that the latter constantly tends to limit sin to mere act while the former finds sin in the states of the soul. We propose what we think to be a valid and proper compromise between the two.

    We make sin coextensive, not with act but with activity. The Old School and the New School are not so far apart when we remember that the New School “choice” is elective preference , exercised so soon as the child is born (Park) and reasserting itself in all the subordinate choices of life. The Old School “state” is not a dead, passive or mechanical thing but is a state of active movement or of tendency to move, toward evil. As God’s holiness is not passive purity but purity willing (pages 268-275), so the opposite to this, sin, is not passive impurity but is impurity willing.

    The soul may not always be conscious, but it may always be active. At his creation man “became a living soul” ( Genesis 2:7), and it may be doubted whether the human spirit ever ceases its activity any more than the divine Spirit in whose image it is made. There is some reason to believe that even in the deepest sleep the body rests rather than the mind.

    And when we consider how large a portion of our activity is automatic and continuous, we see the impossibility of limiting the term ‘sin’ to the sphere of momentary act, whether conscious or unconscious.

    E. G. Robinson: “Sin is not mere act — something foreign to the being. It is a quality of being. There is no such thing as a sin apart from a sinner or an act apart from an actor. God punishes sinners, not sins. Sin is a mode of being as an entity by itself it never existed. God punishes sin as a state, not as an act. Man is not responsible for the consequences of his crimes, nor for the acts themselves except as they are symptomatic of his personal states.” Dorner, Hist. Doct. Person Christ, 5:162 — “The knowledge of sin has justly been termed the b and y of philosophy.”

    Our treatment of Holiness, as belonging to the nature of God (pages 268- 275); of Will, as not only the faculty of volition but also a permanent state of the soul (pages 504-513); and of Law as requiring the conformity of man a nature to God’s holiness (pages 537-544); has prepared us for the definition of sin as a state. The chief psychological defect of New School theology, next to its making holiness to be a mere form of love, is its ignoring of the unconscious and subconscious elements in human character. To help our understanding of sin as an underlying and permanent state of the soul, we subjoin references to recent writers of note upon psychology and its relations to theology.

    We may preface our quotations by remarking that mind is always greater than its conscious operations. The man is more than his acts. Only the smallest part of the self is manifested in the thoughts, feelings and volition. In counting, to put myself to sleep, I find, when say, attention, has been diverted by other thoughts that the counting has gone on all the time. Ladd, Philosophy of Mind, 176, speaks of the “dramatic sundering of the ego.” There are dream conversations. Dr. Johnson was once greatly vexed at being worsted by his opponent in an argument in a dream. M.

    Maury, in a dream corrected the bad English of his real self by the good English of his other unreal self. Spurgeon preached a sermon in his sleep after vainly trying to excogitate one when awake and his wife gave him the substance of it after he woke. Hegel said that “Life is divided into two realms — a night life of genius and a day life a of consciousness.”

    Du Prel, Philosophy of Mysticism, propounds the thesis: “The ego is not wholly embraced in self-consciousness,” and claims that there is much of psychical activity within us of which our common waking conception of ourselves takes no account. Thus when ‘dream dramatizes’ — when we engage in a dream conversation in which our interlocutor’s answer comes to us with a shock of surprise — if our own mind is assumed to have furnished that answer, it has done so by a process of unconscious activity.

    Dwinell, in Bibliotheca Sacra July, 1890:369-389 — “The soul is only imperfectly in possession of its organs and is able to report only a small part of its activities in consciousness.” Thoughts come to us like foundlings who were laid at our door. We slip in a question to the librarian, Memory, and after leaving it there awhile the answer appears on the bulletin board. Delúuf, Le Sommeil et lee R’ves, 91 — “The dreamer is a momentary and involuntary dupe of his own imagination, as the poet is the momentary and voluntary dupe and the insane man is the permanent and involuntary dupe.” If we are the organs sent only of our own past thinking but, as Herbert Spencer suggests, also the organs of the past thinking of the race, his doctrine may give additional, though unintended confirmation to a Scriptural view of sin.

    William James, Will to Believe, 316, quotes from F. W. H. Myers, in Jour. Psych. Research, who likens our ordinary consciousness to the visible part of the solar spectrum. The total consciousness is like that spectrum prolonged by the inclusion of the ultra-red and the ultra-violet rays = 1 to 12 and 96. “Each of us,” he says, is an abiding psychical entity far more extensive than he knows — an individuality, which can never express itself completely through any corporeal manifestation. The self manifests itself through the organism but there is always some part of the self non-manifested and always, as it seems, some power of organic expression in abeyance or reserve.” William James himself, in Scribner’s Monthly, March, 1890:361-373 sketches the hypnotic investigations of Janet and Binet. There is a secondary, subconscious self. Hysteria is the lack of synthesizing power and consequent disintegration of the field of consciousness into mutually exclusive parts. According to Janet, the secondary and the primary consciousness added together can never exceed the normally total consciousness of the individual. But Prof. James says: “There are trances which obey another type. I know a non-hysterical woman, who in her trances knows facts which altogether transcend her possible normal consciousness, facts about the lives of people whom she never saw or heard of before.”

    Our affections are deeper and stronger than we know. We learn how deep and strong they are, when their current is resisted by affliction or dammed up by death. We know how powerful evil passions are, only when we try to subdue them. Our dreams show us our naked selves. On the morality of dreams, the London Spectator remarks: “Our conscience and power of self-control act as a sort of watchdog over our worse selves during the day but, when the watchdog is off duty, the primitive or natural man is at liberty to act as he pleases. Our ‘soul’ has left us at the mercy of our own evil nature and in our dreams we become what, except for the grace of God, we would always be.”

    Both in conscience and in will there is a self-direction. Kant’s categorical imperative is only ones self-laying down the law to the other self. The whole Kantian system of ethics is based on this doctrine of double consciousness. Ladd, in his Philosophy of Mind, 169 sq ., speaks of “psychical automatism.” Yet this automatism is possible only for selfconscious and cognitively remembering minds. It is always the “I” that puts itself into “that other.” We could not conceive of the other self except under the figure of the “I.” All our mental operations are ours and we are responsible for them because the subconscious and even the unconscious self are the products of past self-conscious thoughts and volition. The present settled state of our wills is the result of former decisions. The will is a storage battery, charged by past acts, full of latent power, ready to manifest its energy so soon as the force which confines it is withdrawn.

    On unconscious mental action, see Carpenter, Mental Physiology, 139, 515-543 and criticism of Carpenter, in Ireland, Blot on the Brain, 226- 238; Bramwell, Hypnotism, its History, Practice and Theory, 358-398; Porter, Human Intellect, 333, 334; versus Sir Win. Hamilton, who adopts the maxim: “Non sentimus, nisi sentiamus nos sentire” (Philosophy, ed.

    Wight, 171). Observe also that sin may infect the body, as well as the soul, and may bring it into a state of non-conformity to God’s law (see H.

    B. Smith, Systematic Theology, 267).

    In adducing our Scriptural and rational proof of the definition of sin as a state, we desire to obviate the objection that this view leaves the soul wholly given over to the power of evil. While we maintain that this is true of man apart from God, we also insist that side by side with the evil bent of the human will there is always an immanent divine power, which greatly counteracts the force of evil. If not resisted, this leads the individual soul — even when resisted leads the race at large — toward truth and salvation.

    This immanent divine power is none other than Christ, the eternal Word, the Light which lighteth every man; see John 1:4,9. John 1:4,9 — “In him was life, and the life was the light of men… There was the true light, even the light which lighteth every man.” See a further statement in A. H. Strong, Cleveland Sermon May, 1904, with regard to the old and the new view as to sin. “Our fathers believed in total depravity. We agree with them that man naturally is devoid of love to God and that every faculty is weakened, disordered, and corrupted by the selfish bent of his will. They held to original sin. The selfish bent of the will of man can be traced back to the apostasy of our first parents and, on account of that, departure of the race from God all men are by nature children of wrath. And all this is true, if it is regarded as a statement of the facts, apart from their relation to Christ. But our fathers did not see as we do, that man’s relation to Christ antedated the Fall and constituted an under and modifying condition of man’s life. Humanity was naturally in Christ; in which things were created and in whom they all consist. Even man’s sin did not prevent Christ from still working in him to counteract the evil and to suggest the good. There was an internal, as well as an external, preparation for man’s redemption. In this of a divine principle in man striving against the selfish and godless will, there total redemption, over against man’s total depravity and an original grace that was even more powerful than original sin.

    We have become conscious that total depravity alone is not a sufficient or proper expression of the truth and the phrase has been outgrown. It has been felt that the old view of sin did not take account of the generous and noble aspirations, the unselfish efforts, and the strivings after God of even unregenerate men. For this reason has been less preaching about sin and less conviction as to its guilt and condemnation. The good impulses of men outside the Christian pale have been often credited to human nature, when they should have been credited to the indwelling Spirit of Christ. I make no doubt that one of our radical weaknesses at this present time is our more superficial view of sin. Without some sense of sin’s guilt and condemnation we cannot feel our need of redemption. John the Baptist must go before Christ; the law must prepare the way for the gospel. “My belief is that the new apprehension of Christ’s relation to the race will enable us to declare, as never before, the lost condition of the sinner while at the same time we show him that Christ is with him and in him to save. This presence in every man of a power not his own that works for righteousness is a very different doctrine that ‘divinity of man’ which is so often preached. The divinity is not the divine man but the divinity of Christ. And the power that works for righteousness is not the power of man but the power of Christ. It is a power whose warning, inviting, persuading influence renders only more marked and dreadful the evil-will which hampers and resists it. Depravity is all the worse when we recognize in it the constant antagonist of an ever-present, all-holy, and allloving Redeemer.” 1. Proof.

    As it is readily admitted that the outward act of transgression is properly denominated sin; we here attempt to show only that lack of conformity to the law of God in disposition or state is also and equally to be so denominated.

    A. From Scripture. (a) The words ordinarily translated ‘sin,’ or used as synonyms for it are as applicable to dispositions and states as to acts ( ha;f;j1 and aJmarti>a = a missing, failure, coming short [sc. of God’s will]).

    See Numbers 15:28 — “sinneth unwittingly”; Psalm 51:2 — “cleanse me from my sin”; 5 — “Behold. I was brought forth in iniquity; And in sin did, my mother conceive me”; Romans 7:17 — “sin which dwelleth in me’: compare Judges 20:16, where the literal meaning of the word appears: “sling stones at a hair-breadth, and not miss” ( af;j; ). In a similar manner, [V1S, [LXX ajse>beia ] = separation from, rebellion against [sc . God]; see Leviticus 16:16,21; cf . Delitzsch on Psalm 32:1. ow[; [ajdiki>a ] = bending, perversion [sc . of what is right], iniquity; see Leviticus 5:17; cf. John 7:18. See also the Hebrew [r [V;r; , [= ruin, confusion], and the Greek ajpostasi>a ejpiquri>a ecqra kaki>a ponhri>a sa>rx,. None of these designations of sin limits it to mere act — most of more naturally suggest disposition or state. Amarti>a implies that man in sin does not reach what he seeks therein; sin is a state of delusion and deception (Julius Muller). On the words mentioned, see Girdlestone, Old Testament Synonyms; Cremer, Lexicon New Testament; Present Day Tracts, 5:no. 28, pp. 43-47; Trench, New Testament Synonyms, part 2:61, (b) The New Testament descriptions of sin bring more distinctly to view the states and dispositions than the outward acts of the soul ( 1 John 3:4 — hJ aJmarti>a ejstia , where ajnomi>a, = not “transgression of the law,” but, as both context and etymology show, “lack of conformity to law” or “lawlessness” — Revised Version).

    See 1 John 5:17 — “All unrighteousness is sin”; Romans 14:23 — “whatsoever is not of faith is sin”; James 4:17 — “To him therefore that knoweth to do good, and doeth it not, to him it is sin.” Where the sin is that of not doing, sin cannot be said to consist in act. It must then at least be a state. (c) Moral evil is ascribed not only to the thoughts and affections but to the heart from which they spring (we read of the “evil thoughts” and of the “evil heart” — Matthew 15:19 and Hebrews 3:12).

    See also Matthew 5:22 — anger in the heart is murder; 28 — impure desire is adultery; Luke 6:45 — “the evil man out of the evil treasure [of his heart] bringeth forth that which is evil”; Hebrews 3:12 — “an evil heart of unbelief”; cf. Isaiah 1:5 — “the whole head is sick, and the whole heart faint”; Jeremiah 17:9 — “The heart is deceitful above all things, and it is exceedingly corrupt: who can know it?” — Here the sin that cannot be known is not sin of act, but sin of the heart. “Below the surface stream, shallow and light Of what we say we feel; below the stream, As light, of what we think we feel, there flows, With silent current, strong, obscure and deep, The central stream of what we feel indeed .” (d) The state or condition of the soul which gives rise to wrong desires and acts is expressly called sin ( Romans 7:8 — “Sin… wrought in me… all manner of coveting”). John 8:34 — “Every one that committeth sin is the bondservant of sin”; Romans 7:11,13,14,17,20 — “sin beguiled me… working death to me… I am carnal, sold under sin… sin which dwelleth in me.”

    These representations of sin as a principle or state of the soul are incompatible with the definition of it as a mere act. John Byrom, 1691- 1763: “Think and be careful what thou art within, For there is sin in the desire of sin. Think and be thankful in a different case, For there is grace in the desire of grace.”

    Alexander, Theories of the Will, 85 — “In the person of Paul is represented the man who has been already justified by faith and who is at peace with God. In the 6th chapter of Romans, the question is discussed whether such a man is obliged to keep moral law. But in the 7th chapter the question is not, must man keep the moral law but why is he so incapable of keeping the moral law? The struggle is thus, not in the soul of the unregenerate man who is dead in sin, but in the soul of the regenerate who has been pardoned and is endeavoring to keep the law. In a state of sin, the will is determined toward the bad, in a state of grace the will is determined toward righteousness but not wholly so, for the flesh is not at once subdued. There is a war between the good and bad principles of action in the soul of him who has been pardoned.” (e) Sin is represented as existing in the soul prior to the consciousness of it and as only discovered and awakened by the law. ( Romans 3:9,10 — “when the commandment came, sin revived, and I died” — if sin “revived,” it must have had previous existence and life, even though it did not manifest itself in acts of conscious transgression). Romans 7:8 — “apart from the law sin is dead” — here is sin which is not yet sin of act. Dead or unconscious, sin is still sin. The fire in a cave discovers reptiles and stirs them, but they were there before because the light and heat do not create them. Let a beam of light, says Jean Paul Richter, through your window shutter into a darkened room and you reveal a thousand motes floating in the air whose existence was before unsuspected. So the law of God reveals our “hidden faults” ( Psalm 19:12) — infirmities, imperfections, evil tendencies and desires which also cannot all be classed as acts of transgression. (f) The allusions to sin as a permanent power or reigning principle, not only in the individual but also in humanity at large, forbid us to define it as a momentary act. We are compelled to regard it as being primarily a settled depravity of nature, of which individual sins or acts of transgression are the workings and fruits. ( Romans 5:21 — “sin reigned in death”; 6:12 “let not therefore sin reign in your mortal body”).

    In Romans 5:21, the reign of sin is compared to the reign of grace. As grace is not an act but a principle, so sin is not an act but a principle. As the poisonous exhalations from a well indicate that there is corruption and death at the bottom, so the ever recurring thoughts and acts of sin are evidence that there is a principle of sin in the heart, in other words, that sin exists as a permanent disposition or state. A momentary act cannot “reign” nor “dwell” but a disposition or state can. Maudsley, Sleep, its Psychology, makes the damaging confession: “If we were held responsible for our dreams, is no living man who would not deserve to be hanged.” (g) The Mosaic sacrifices for sins of ignorance and of omission, and especially for general sinfulness, are evidence that sin is not to be limited to mere act but that it includes something deeper and more permanent in the heart and the life ( Leviticus 1:3; 5:11; 12:8; cf. Luke 2:24).

    The sin offering for sins of ignorance ( Leviticus 4:14,20,31), the trespass offering for an omission ( Leviticus 5:5,6), and the burnt offering to expiate general sinfulness ( Leviticus 1:3; cf. Luke 2:22-24), all witness that sin is not confined to mere act. John 1:29 — “the Lamb of God, who taketh away the sin,” not the sins, “of the world.” See Oehler, Old Testament Theology, 1:233; Schmid, Bib. Theol. New Testament, 194, 381, 442, 448, 492, 604; Philippi, Glaubenslehre, 3:210- 217; Muller, Doctrine of Sin, 2:259-306; Edwards, Works. 3:16-18. For the New School definition of sin, see Fitch, Nature of Sin, and Park, in Bibliotheca Sacra, 7:551.

    B. From the common judgment of mankind. (a) Men universally attribute vice as well as virtue not only to conscious and deliberate acts but also to dispositions and states. Belief in something more permanently evil than acts of transgression is indicated in the common phrases “hateful temper,” “wicked pride” or “bad character.”

    As the beatitudes ( Matthew 5:1-12) are pronounced, not upon acts, but upon dispositions of the soul, so the curses of the law are uttered not so much against single acts of transgression as against the evil affections from which they spring. Compare the “the works of the flesh” ( Galatians 5:19) with the “fruit of the Spirit” (5:22). In both, dispositions and states dominate. (b) Outward acts, indeed, are condemned only when they are regarded as originating in, and as symptomatic of, evil dispositions. Civil law proceeds upon this principle in holding crime to consist, not alone in the external act but also in the evil motive or intent with which it is formed.

    The mens rea is essential to the idea of crime. The “idle word” ( Matthew 12:36) shall be brought into the judgment, not because it is so important in itself but because floating straw that indicates the direction of the whole current of the heart and life. Murder differs from homicide, not in any outward respect, but simply because motive that prompts it — and that motive is always, in the last analysis, an evil disposition or state. (c) The stronger an evil disposition, or in other words, the more it connects itself with, or resolves itself into, a settled state or condition of the soul, the more blameworthy is it felt to be. This is shown by the distinction drawn between crimes of passion and crimes of deliberation.

    Edwards: “Guilt consists in having one’s heart wrong and in doing wrong from the heart.” There is guilt in evil desires, even when the will combats them. But there is greater guilt when the will consents. The outward act may be in each case the same but the guilt of it is proportioned to the extent to which the evil disposition is settled and strong. (d) This condemning sentence remains the same, even although the origin of the evil disposition or state cannot be traced back to any conscious act of the individual. Neither the general sense of mankind, nor the civil law in which this general sense is expressed, goes behind the fact on an existing evil will. Whether this evil-will is the result of personal transgression or is a hereditary bias derived from generations passed, this evil will is the man himself, and upon him terminates the blame. We do not excuse arrogance or sensuality upon the ground that they are family traits.

    The young murderer in Boston was not excused upon the ground of a congenitally cruel disposition. We repent in later years of sins of boyhood, which we only now see to be sins and converted cannibals repent, after becoming Christians, of the sins of heathendom, which they once committed without a thought of their wickedness. The peacock cannot escape from his feet by flying nor can we absolve ourselves from blame for an evil state of will by tracing its origin to a remote ancestry. We are responsible for what we are. How can this be, when we have not personally and consciously originated it, is the problem of original sin, which we have yet to discuss. (e) When any evil disposition has such strength in itself, or is so combined with others as to indicate a settled moral corruption in which no power to do good remains, this state is regarded with the deepest disapprobation of all. Sin weakens man’s power of obedience but the cannot is a will-not and is, therefore, condemnable. The opposite principle would lead to the conclusion that, the more a man weakened his powers by transgression, the less guilty he would be, until absolute depravity became absolute innocence.

    The boy who hates his father cannot change his hatred into love by a single act of will but he is not therefore innocent. Spontaneous and uncontrollable profanity is the worst profanity of all. It is a sign that the whole will is like a subterranean Kentucky river and moving away from God. No recuperative power is left in the soul, which can reach, into the depths to reverse its course. See Dorner, Glaubenslehre. 2:110-114; Shedd, Hist. Doct., 2:79-92, 152-157; Richards, Lectures on Theology, 256-301; Edwards, Works, 2:134; Baird, Elohim Revealed, 243-262; Princeton Essays, 2:224-239; Van Oosterzee, Dogmatics, 394.

    C. From the experience of the Christian.

    Christian experience is a testing of Scripture truth, and therefore is not an independent source of knowledge. It may, however, corroborate conclusions drawn from the word of God. Since the judgment of the Christian is formed under the influence of the Holy Spirit, we may trust this more implicitly than the general sense of the world. We affirm, then, that just in proportion to his spiritual enlightenment and self-knowledge, the Christian (a) Regards his outward deviations from God’s law, and his evil inclinations and desires, as outgrowths and revelations of a depravity of nature which lies below his consciousness and (b) Repents more deeply for this depravity of nature, which constitutes his inmost character and is inseparable from himself than for what he merely feels or does.

    In proof of these statements we appeal to the biographies and writings of those in all ages, who by general consent, have been regarded as most advanced in spiritual culture and discernment. “Intelligentia prima est, ut te noris peccatorem.” Compare David’s experience, Psalm 51:6 — “Behold, thou desirest truth in the inward parts: And in the hidden part thou wilt make me to know wisdom” — with Paul’s experience in Romans 7:24 — “Wretched man that l am! who shall deliver me out of the body of this death?” — with Isaiah’s experience (6:5), when in the presence of God’s glory he uses the words of the leper ( Leviticus 13:45) and calls himself “unclean,” and with Peter’s experience [ Luke 5:8) when at the manifestation of Christ’s miraculous power he “fell down at Jesus’ knees, saying, Depart from me, for I am a sinful man, O Lord.” So the publican cries: “God, be thou merciful to me the sinner’ ( Luke 18:13) and Paul calls himself the “chief” of sinners ( 1 Timothy 1:15). It is evident that in none of these cases were there merely single acts of transgression in view; the humiliation and self-abhorrence were in view of permanent states of depravity. Van Oosterzee: “What we do outwardly is only the revelation of our inner nature.” The outcropping and visible rock is but small in extent compared with the rock that is underlying and invisible. The iceberg has eight-ninths of its mass below the surface of the sea, yet icebergs have been seen near Cape Horn from 700 to 800 feet high above the water.

    It may be doubted whether any repentance is genuine which is not repentance for sin rather than for sins. Compare John 16:8 — the Holy Spirit “will convict the world in respect of sin.” On the difference between conviction of sins and conviction of sin, see Hare, Mission of the Comforter. Dr. A. J. Gordon, just before his death, desired to be left alone. He was then overheard confessing his sins in such seemingly extravagant terms as to excite fear that he was in delirium. Martensen, Dogmatics, 389 — Luther during his early experience “often wrote to Staupitz ‘Oh, my sins, my sins!’ Yet in the confessional he could name no sins in particular which he had to confess so that it was clearly a sense of the general depravity of his nature which filled his soul with deep sorrow and pain.” Luther’s conscience would not accept the comfort that he wished to be without sin and therefore had no real sin. When he thought himself too great a sinner to be saved, Staupitz replied: “Would you have the semblance of a sinner and the semblance of a Savior?”

    After twenty years of religious experience, Jonathan Edwards wrote (Works 1:22, 23; also 3:16-18): “Often, since I have lived in this town I have had very affecting views of my own sinfulness and vileness to such a degree as to hold me in a kind of loud weeping sometimes for a considerable time. I have been often obliged to shut myself up. I have had a vastly greater sense of my own wickedness and the badness of my heart than ever I had before my conversion. It has often appeared to me that if God should mark iniquity against me, I should appear the very worst of all mankind, of all that have been since the beginning of the world to this time and that I should have by far the lowest place in hell. When others who have come to talk with me about their soul’s concerns have expressed the sense they have had of their own wickedness by saying that it seemed to them they were as bad as the devil himself. I thought their expressions seemed exceeding faint and feeble to represent my wickedness.”

    Edwards continues: “My wickedness, as I am in myself, has long appeared to me perfectly ineffable and swallowing up all thought and imagination — like an infinite deluge, or mountains over my head. I know not how to express better what my sins appear to me to be than by heaping infinite on infinite and multiplying infinite by infinite. Very often for these many years, these expressions are in my mind and in my mouth: ‘Infinite upon infinite — infinite upon infinite!’ When I look into my heart and take a view of my wickedness, it looks like an abyss infinitely deeper than hell. It appears to me that, were it not for free grace exalted and raised up to the infinite height of all the fullness and glory of the great Jehovah and the arm of his power and grace stretched forth in all the majesty of his power and in all the glory of his sovereignty, I should appear sunk down in my sins below hell itself, far beyond the sight of everything but the eye of sovereign grace that can pierce even down to such a depth. And yet it seems to me that my conviction of sin is exceeding small and faint; it is enough to amaze me that I have no more sense of my sin. I know certainly that I have very little sense of my sinfulness. When I have had turns of weeping for my sins, I thought I knew at the time that my repentance was nothing to my sin. It is affecting to think how ignorant I was, when a young Christian, of the bottomless, infinite depths of wickedness, pride, hypocrisy and deceit left in my heart.” Jonathan Edwards was not an ungodly man, but the holiest man of his time. He was not an enthusiast but a man of acute and philosophic mind. He was not a man who indulged in exaggerated or random statements for with his power of introspection and analysis he combined a faculty and habit of exact expression unsurpassed among the sons of men.

    If the maxim “cuique in arte sua credendum est” is of any value, Edwards’s statements in a matter of religious experience are to be taken as correct interpretations of the facts. H. B. Smith (System. Theol. 275) quotes Thomasius as saying: “It is a striking fact in Scripture that statements of the depth and power of sin are chiefly from the regenerate.”

    Another has said that, “a serpent is never seen at its whole length until it is dead.” Thomas · Kempis (ed. Gould and Lincoln, 142) — “Do not think that thou hast made any progress toward perfection, till thou feelest that thou art less than the least of all human beings.” Young’s Night Thoughts: “Heaven’s Sovereign saves all beings but himself That hideous sight — a naked human heart.

    Law’s Serious Call to a Devout and Holy Life: “You may justly condemn yourself for being the greatest sinner that you know, 1. Because you know more of the folly of your own heart than of other people’s, and can charge yourself with various sins which you know only of yourself and cannot be sure that others are guilty of them. 2. The greatness of our guilt arises from the greatness of God’s goodness to us. You know more of these aggravations of your sins than you do of the sins of other people. Hence the greatest saints have in all ages condemned themselves as the greatest sinners.” 3. We may add that since each man is a peculiar being, each man is guilty of peculiar sins and, in certain particulars and aspects, may constitute an example of the enormity and hatefulness of sin such as neither earth nor hell can elsewhere show.

    Of Cromwell, as a representative of the Puritans, Green says (Short History of the English People, 454): “The vivid sense of the divine Purity close to such men, made the life of common men seem sin.” Dr. Arnold of Rugby (Life and Corresp., App. D.): “In a deep sense of moral evil, more perhaps than anything else, abides a saving knowledge of God.”

    Augustine, on his deathbed, had the 32d Psalm written over against him on the wall. For his expressions with regard to sin, see his Confessions, book 10. See also Shedd, Discourses and Essays, 284, note. 2. Inferences.

    In the light of the preceding discussion, we may properly estimate the elements of truth and of error, in the common definition of sin, as ‘the voluntary transgression of known law.’ (a) Not all sin is voluntary as being a distinct and conscious volition; for evil disposition and state often precede and occasion evil volition, and evil disposition and state are themselves sin. All sin, however, is voluntary as springing either directly from will, or indirectly from those perverse affections and desires, which have themselves, originated in will. ‘Voluntary’ is a term broader than ‘volitional,’ and includes all those permanent states of intellect and affection, which the will has made what they are. Will, moreover, is not to be regarded as simply the faculty of volition but as primarily the underlying determination of the being to a supreme end.

    Will, as we have seen, includes preference (qe>lhma voluntas, Wille) as well as volition (boulh> , arbitrium, Willkur). We do not, with Edwards and Hodge, regard the sensibilities as states of the will. They are, however, in their character and their objects determined by the will and so they may be called voluntary. The permanent state of the will (New School “elective preference”) is to be distinguished from the permanent state of the sensibilities (dispositions, or desires). But both are voluntary because both are due to past decisions of the will, and “whatever springs from will we are responsible for” (Shedd, Discourses and Essays, 243).

    Julius Muller, 2:51 — “We speak of self-consciousness and reason as something which the ego has , but we identify the will with the ego. No one would say, ‘my will has decided this or that,’ although we do say, my reason, my conscience teaches me this or that.’ The will is the very man himself, as Augustine says: ‘Voluntas est in omnibus; imo omnes nihil aliud quam voluntates sunt.”’ For other statements of the relation of disposition to will, see Alexander, Moral Science, 151 — “In regard to dispositions, we say that they are in a sense voluntary. They properly belong to the will, taking the word in a large sense. In judging of the morality of voluntary acts, the principle from which they proceed is always included in our view and comes in for a large part of the blame.” See also pages 201, 207, 208. Edwards on the Affections, 3:1-22; on the Will, 3:4 — “The affections are only certain modes of the exercise of the will.” A. A. Hodge, Outlines of Theology, 234 — “All sin is voluntary in the sense that all sin has its root in the perverted dispositions, desires and affections which constitute the depraved state of the will.” But to Alexander, Edwards, and Hodge, we reply that the first sin was not voluntary in this sense for there was no such depraved state of the will from which it could spring. We are responsible for dispositions, not upon the ground that they are a part of the will, but upon the ground that they are effects of will or, in other words, that past decisions of the will have made them what they are. See pages 504-513. (b) Deliberate intention to sin is an aggravation of transgression but it is not essential to constitute any given act or feeling a sin. Those evil inclinations and impulses which rise unbidden and master the soul before it is well aware of their nature, are themselves violations of the divine law and indications of an inward depravity which, in the case of each descendant of Adam, is the chief and fatal transgression.

    Joseph Cook: “Only the surface water of the sea is penetrated with light.

    Beneath is a half-lit region and still further down is absolute darkness. We are greater than we know.” Weismann, Heredity, 2:8 — “At the depth of 170 meters, or 552 feet, there is about as much light as that of a starlight night when there is no moon. Light penetrates as far as 400 meters, or 1,300 feet, but animal life exists at a depth of 4,000 meters, or 13,000 feet. Below 1,300 feet, all animals are blind.” Cf . Psalm 51:6; 19:12 — “the inward parts… the hidden parts… hidden faults” — hidden not only from others but even from ourselves. The light of consciousness plays only on the surface of the waters of man’s soul. (c) Knowledge of the sinfulness of an act or feeling is also an aggravation of transgression but it is not essential to constitute it a sin. Moral blindness is the effect of transgression and, as inseparable from corrupt affections and desires, does the divine law condemn itself.

    It is our duty to do better than we know. Our duty of knowing is as real as our duty of doing. Sin is an opiate. Some of the most deadly diseases do not reveal themselves in the patient’s countenance nor has the patient any adequate understanding of his malady. There is ignorance, which is indolence. Men are often unwilling to take the trouble of rectifying their standards of judgment. There is also ignorance, which is intention.

    Instance many students’ ignorance of College laws.

    We cannot excuse disobedience by saying: “I forgot.” God’s commandment is: “Remember” — as in Exodus 20:8; cf. 2 Peter 3:5 — “For this they willfully forget.” “Ignorantia legis neminem excusat.” Romans 2:12 — “as many as have sinned without the law shall also perish without the law”; Luke 12:43 — “he that knew not and did things worthy of stripes, shall be beaten [though] with few stripes.” The aim of revelation and of preaching is to bring man “to himself” (cf. Luke 15:17) — to show him what he has been doing and what he is. Goethe: “We are never deceived; we deceive ourselves.” Royce, World and Individual, 2:359 — “The sole possible free moral action is then a freedom that relates to the present fixing of attention upon the ideas of the Ought which are already present. To sin is consciously to choose to forget, through a narrowing of the field of attention, an Ought that one already recognizes.” (d) Ability to fulfill the law is not essential to constitute the non-fulfillment sin. Inability to fulfill the law is a result of transgression and, as consisting not in an original deficiency of faculty but in a settled state of the affections and will, it is itself condemnable. Since the law presents the holiness of God as the only standard for the creature, ability to obey can never be the measure of obligation or the test of sin.

    Not power to the contrary, in the sense of ability to change all our permanent states by mere volition, is the basis of obligation and responsibility for surely Satan’s responsibility does not depend upon his power at any moment to turn to God and be holy.

    Definitions of sin — Melanchthon: Defectus vel inclinatio vel actio pugnans cum lege Dei. Calvin: Illegalitas, seu difformitas a lege. Hollaz:

    Aberratio a lege divina. HolIaz adds: “Voluntaries do not enter into the definition of sin, generically considered. Sin may be called voluntary, either in respect to its cause as it inheres in the will or, in respect to the act, as it proceeds from deliberate volition. Here is the antithesis to the Roman Catholics and to the Socinians, the latter of whom define sin as a voluntary [i. e ., a volitional] transgression of law.” It is a view, says Hase (Hutterus Redivivus, 11th ed., 162-164), “which is derived from the necessary methods of civil tribunals and which is incompatible with the orthodox doctrine of original sin.”

    On the New School definition of sin, see Fairchild, Nature of Sin, in Bibliotheca Sacra, 25:30-48; Whedon, in Bibliotheca Sacra, 19:251, and On the Will, 323. Per contra, see Hodge, Systematic Theology, 2:180- 190; Lawrence, Old School in New Testament Theol., in Bibliotheca Sacra, 20:317-328; Julius Muller, Doc. Sin. 2:40-72; Nitzsch, Christ.

    Doct., 216; Luthardt, Compendium der Dogmatik, 124-126.

    II. THE ESSENTIAL PRINCIPLE OF SIN.

    The definition of sin as lack of conformity to the divine law does not exclude, but rather necessitates, an inquiry into the characterizing motive or impelling power, which explains its existence and constitutes its guilt.

    Only three views require extended examination. Of these the first two constitute the most common excuses for sin, although not propounded for his purpose by their authors: Sin is due (1) to the human body or (2) to finite weakness. The third, which we regard as the Scriptural view, considers sin as (3) the supreme choice of self or selfishness.

    In the preceding section on the Definition of Sin, we showed that sin is a state, and a state of the will. We now ask, what is the nature of this state?

    We expect to show that it is essentially a selfish state of the will. 1. Sin as Sensuousness.

    This view regards sin as the necessary product of man’s sensuous nature — a result of the soul’s connection with a physical organism. This is the view of Schleiermacher and of Rothe. More recent writers, with John Fiske, regard moral evil as man’s inheritance from a brute ancestry.

    For statement of the view here opposed, see Schleiermacher, Der Christliche Glaube, 1:361-364 — “Sin is a prevention of the determining power of the spirit, caused by the independence (Selbstandigkeit) of the sensuous functions.” The child lives at first a life of sense, in which the bodily appetites are supreme. The senses are the avenues of all temptation, the physical domineers over the spiritual and the soul never shakes off the body. Sin is, therefore, a malaria’s exhalation from the low grounds of human nature or, to use the words of Schleiermacher, “a positive opposition of the flesh to the spirit.” Pfleiderer, Prot. Theol. seit Kant, 113, says that Schleiermacher here repeats Spinoza’s “inability of the spirit to control the sensuous affections.” Pfleiderer, Philos. Religion, 1:230 — “In the development of man out of the natural, the lower impulses have already won a power of self-assertion and resistance before the reason could yet come to its valid position and authority. As this propensity of the self-will is grounded in the specific nature of man, it may be designated as inborn, hereditary or original sinfulness.”

    Rothe’s view of sin may be found in his Dogmatik, 1:300-302; notice the connection of Rothe’s view of sin with his doctrine of continuous creation (see page 416 of this Compendium). Encyclopædia Britannica, 21:2 — “Rothe was a thorough going evolutionist who regarded the natural man as the consummation of the development of physical nature and regarded spirit as the personal attainment, with divine help, of those beings in whom the further creative process of moral development is carried on.

    This process of development necessarily takes an abnormal form and passes through the phase of sin. This abnormal condition necessitates a fresh creative act, that of salvation, which was however from the very first a part of the divine plan of development. Rothe, notwithstanding his evolutionary doctrine, believed in the supernatural birth of Christ.”

    John Fiske, Destiny of Man, 103 — “Original sin is neither more nor less than the brute inheritance which every man carries with him and the process of evolution is an advance toward true salvation.” Thus man is a sphinx in whom the human has not yet escaped from the animal. So Bowne, Atonement,69, declares that sin is “a relic of the animal not yet outgrown, a resultant of the mechanism of appetite and impulse and reflex action for which the proper inhibitions are not yet developed. Only slowly does it grow into a consciousness of itself as evil. It would be hysteria to regard the common life of men as rooting in a conscious choice of unrighteousness.”

    In refutation of this view, it will be sufficient to urge the following considerations: (a) It involves an assumption of the inherent evil of matter, at least so far as regards the substance of man’s body. But this is either a form of dualism and may be met with the objections already brought against that system or it implies that God, in being the author of man’s physical organism, is also the responsible originator of human sin.

    This has been called the “caged-eagle theory” of man’s existence; it holds that the body is a prison only or, as Plato expressed it, “the tomb of the soul,” so that the soul can be pure only by escaping from the body. But matter is not eternal. God made it and made it pure. The body was made to be the servant of the spirit. We must not throw the blame of sin upon the senses but upon the spirit that used the senses so wickedly. To attribute sin to the body is to make God, the author of the body, to be also the author of sin, which is the greatest of blasphemies. Men cannot “justly accuse Their Maker or their making or their fate” (Milton, Paradise Lost, 3:112). Sin is a contradiction within the spirit itself and not simply between the spirit and the flesh. Sensuous activities are not themselves sinful — this is essential Manichæanism. Robert Burns was wrong when he laid the blame for his delinquencies upon “the passions wild and strong.” And Samuel Johnson was wrong when he said “Every man is a rascal so soon as he is sick.” The normal soul has power to rise above both passion and sickness and to make them serve its moral development.

    On the development of the body, as the organ of sin, see Straffen’s Hulsean Lectures on Sin, 33-50. The essential error of this view is its identification of the moral with the physical. If it were true then Jesus, who came in human flesh, must be a sinner. (b) In explaining sin as an inheritance from the brute, this theory ignores the fact that man, even though derived from a brute ancestry is no longer brute but man, with power to recognize and to realize moral ideals and under no necessity to violate the law of his being.

    See A. H. Strong, Christ in Creation, 163-180, on The Fall and the Redemption of Man, in the Light of Evolution: “Evolution has been thought to be incompatible with any proper doctrine of a fall. It has been assumed by many that man’s immoral course and conduct are simply survivals of his brute inheritance, inevitable remnants of his old animal propensities, yielding of the weak will to fleshly appetites and passions.

    This is to deny that sin is truly sin but it is also to deny that man is truly man. Sin must be referred to freedom or it is not sin. To explain it as the natural results of the weak will that is overmastered by lower impulses is to make the animal nature, and not the will, the cause of transgression.

    And that is to say that man at the beginning is not man, but brute.” See also D. W. Simon, in Bibliotheca Sacra, Jan. 1897:1-20 — “The key to the strange and dark contrast between man and his animal ancestry is to be found in the fact of the Fall. Other species live normally. No remnant of the reptile hinders the bird. The bird is a true bird. Only man fails to live normally and is a true man only after ages of sin and misery.”

    Marlowe very properly makes his Faustus to be tempted by sensual baits only after he has sold himself to Satan for power.

    To regard vanity, deceitfulness, malice and revenge as inherited from brute ancestors is to deny man’s original innocence and the creator-ship of God. B. W. Lockhart, “The animal mind knows not God, is not subject to his law neither indeed can be, just because it is animal and as such is incapable of right or wrong. If man were an animal and nothing more, he could not sin. It is by virtue of being something more that he becomes capable of sin. Sin is the yielding of the known higher to the known lower.

    It is the soul’s abdication of its being to the brute, hence the need of spiritual forces from the spiritual world of divine revelation. This is to heal and build and discipline the soul within itself, giving it the victory over the animal passions, which constitute the body and over the kingdom of blind desire, which constitutes the world. The final purpose of man is growth of the soul into liberty, truth, love and likeness to God. Education is the word that covers the movement and probation is incident to education.” We add that reparation for past sin and renewing power from above must follow probation in order to make education possible.

    Some recent writers hold to a real fall of man and yet regard that fall as necessary to his moral development. Emma Marie Caillard, in Contemp.

    Rev., Dec. 1893:879 — “Man passed out of a state of innocence — unconscious of his own imperfection — into a state of consciousness of it.

    The will became slave instead of master. The result would have been the complete stoppage of his evolution but for redemption, which restored his will and made the continuance of his evolution possible. Incarnation was the method of redemption. But even apart from the fall, this incarnation would have been necessary to reveal to man the goal of his evolution and so to secure his cooperation in it.” Lisle, Evolution of Spiritual Man, 39, and in Bibliotheca Sacra, July, 1892:431-452 — “Evolution by catastrophe in the natural world has a striking analogue in the spiritual world. Sin is primarily not so much a fall from a higher to a lower, as a failure to rise from a lower to a higher, not so much eating of the forbidden tree, as failure to partake of the tree of life. The latter represented communion and correspondence with God, and had innocent man continued to reach out for this, he would not have fallen. Man’s refusal to choose the higher preceded and conditioned his fall to the lower and the essence of sin is therefore in this refusal, whatever may cause the will to make it. Man chose the lower of his own free will. Then his centripetal force was gone. His development was swiftly and endlessly away from God. He reverted to his original type of savage animalism and yet, as a self-conscious and free-acting being, he retained a sense of responsibility that filled him with fear and suffering.”

    On the development-theory of sin, see W. W. McLane, in New Englander, 1891:180-188; A. B. Bruce, Apologetics, 60-62; Lyman Abbott, Evolution of Christianity, 203-208; Le Conte, Evolution, 330, 365-375:

    Henry Drummond, Ascent of Man, 1-13, 329, 342; Salem Wilder, Life, its Nature, 266-273; Wm. Graham, Creed of Science, 38-44; Frank H.

    Foster, Evolution and the Evangelical System; Chandler, The Spirit of Man, 45-47. (c) It rests upon an incomplete induction of facts, taking account of sin solely in its aspect of self-degradation but ignoring the worst aspect of it as self-exaltation. Avarice, envy, pride, ambition, malice, cruelty, revenge, self-righteousness, unbelief, enmity to God, are none of them fleshly sins and, upon this principle, are incapable of explanation.

    Two historical examples may suffice to show the insufficiency of the sensuous theory of sin. Goethe was not a markedly sensual man yet the spiritual vivisection, which he practiced on Friederike Brion. His perfidious misrepresentation of his relations with Kestner’s wife in the “Sorrows of Werther” and his flattery of Napoleon when a patriot would have scorned the advances of the invader of his country, show Goethe to have been a very incarnation of heartlessness and selfishness. The patriot Boerne said of him: “Not once has he ever advanced a poor solitary word in his country’s cause — he who from the lofty height he has attained might speak out what none other but himself would dare pronounce.” It has been said that Goethe’s first commandment to genius was: “Thou shalt love thy neighbor and thy neighbor’s wife.” His biographers’ count up sixteen women to whom he made love and who reciprocated his affection, though it is doubtful whether he contented himself with the doctrine of 16 to 1. As Sainte-Beuve said of Ch‚teaubriand’s attachments, “They are like the stars in the sky, the longer you look, the more of them you discover.” Christiane Vulpius, after being for seventeen years his mistress, became at last his wife. But the wife was so slighted that she was driven to intemperance and Goethe’s only son inherited her passion and died of drink. Goethe was the great heathen of modem Christendom, deriding self-denial, extolling self-confidence, attention to the present, the seeking of enjoyment and the submission of one’s self to the decrees of fate. Hutton calls Goethe “a Narcissus in love with himself.” Like George Eliot’s “Dinah,” in Adam Bede, Goethe’s “Confessions of a Beautiful Soul,” in Wilhelm Meister, are the purely artistic delineation of a character with which he had no inner sympathy. On Goethe, see Hutton, Essays, 2:1-79; Shedd, Dogm. Theology, 1:490; A. H. Strong, Great Poets, 279-331 Principal Shairp, Culture and Religion,16 — “Goethe, the high priest of culture, loathes Luther, the preacher of righteousness”; S. Law Wilson, Theology of Modem Literature, 149-156.

    Napoleon was not a markedly sensual man, but “his self-sufficiency surpassed the self-sufficiency of common men as the great Sahara desert surpasses an ordinary sand patch.” He wantonly divulged his amours to Josephine, with all the details of his ill-conduct, and when she revolted from them, he only replied: “I have the right to meet all your complaints with an eternal I.” When his wars had left almost no able-bodied men in France, he called for the boys, saying: “A boy can stop a bullet as well as a man,” and so the French nation lost two inches of stature. Before the battle of Leipzig when there was prospect of unexampled slaughter, he exclaimed, “What are the lives of a million of men, to carry out the will of a man like me?” His most truthful epitaph was, “The little butchers of Ghent to Napoleon the Great” [butcher]. Heine represents Napoleon as saying to the world, “Thou shalt have no other gods before me.” Memoirs of Madame de Remusat, 1:225 — “At a f’te given by the city of Paris to the Emperor, the repertory of inscriptions being exhausted, a brilliant device was resorted to. Over the throne, of which he was to occupy were placed in letters of gold, the following words from the Holy Scriptures: ‘I am the I am.’ And no one seemed to be scandalized.” Iago, in Shakespeare’s Othello, is the greatest villain of all literature but Coleridge, Works, 4:180, calls attention to his passionless character. His sin is, like that of Goethe and of Napoleon, sin not of the flesh but of the intellect and will. (d) It leads to absurd conclusions, as, for example, that asceticism, by weakening the power of sense, must weaken the power of sin; that man becomes less sinful as his senses fail with age; that disembodied spirits are necessarily holy; that death is the only Redeemer.

    Asceticism only turns the current of sin in other directions. Spiritual pride and tyranny take the place of fleshly desires. The miser clutches his gold more closely as he nears death. Satan has no physical organism yet he is the prince of evil. Not our own death but Christ’s death saves us. But when Rousseau’s …mile comes to die, he calmly declares, “I am delivered from the trammels of the body and am myself without contradiction.” At the age of seventy-five Goethe wrote to Eckermann: “I have ever been esteemed one of fortune’s favorites nor can I complain of the course my life has taken. Yet truly there has been nothing but care and toil and I may say that I have never had four weeks of genuine pleasure” Shedd, Dogm.

    Theology, 2:743 — “When the authoritative demand of Jesus Christ to confess sin and beg remission through atoning blood is made to David Hume or David Strauss or John Stuart Mill, none of whom were sensualists, it wakens intense mental hostility.” (e) It interprets Scripture erroneously. In passages like Romans 7:18 — oujk oijkei~ ejmoi> tou~t ejstin ejn th~| sarki> mou ajgaqo>n — sa>rx, or flesh, signifies not man’s body but man’s whole being when destitute of the Spirit of God. The Scriptures distinctly recognize the seat of sin as being in the soul itself, not in its physical organism. God does not tempt man nor has he made man’s nature to tempt him ( James 1:13,14).

    In the use of the term “flesh” Scripture puts a stigma upon sin and intimates that human nature without God is as corruptible and perishable as the body would be without the soul to inhabit it. The “carnal mind,” or “mind of the flesh” ( Romans 8:7), accordingly means not the sensual mind but the mind which is not under the control of the Holy Spirit, its true life. See Meyer, on 1 Corinthians 1:26 — sa>rx = “the purely human element in man, as opposed to the divine principle”; Pope, Theology, 2:65 — sa>rx = “the whole being of man, body, soul, and spirit, separated from God and subjected to the creature”; Julius Muller, Proof-texts, 19 — sa>rx = “human nature as living in and for itself, sundered from God and opposed to him.” The earliest and best statement of this view of the term pneu~ma is that of Julius Muller, Doctrine of Sin, 1:295-333, especially 321. See also Dickson, St. Paul’s Use of the Terms Flesh and Spirit, 270-271 sa>rx = “human nature without the pneu>ma … man standing by himself or left to himself, over against God… the natural man, conceived as not having yet received grace or as not yet wholly under its influence.” James 1:14,15 — “desire, when it hath conceived, beareth sin” = innocent desire — for it comes in before the sin — innocent constitutional propensity, not yet of the nature of depravity, is only the occasion of sin.

    The love of freedom is a part of our nature; sin arises only when the will determines to indulge this impulse without regard to the restraints of the divine law. Luther, Preface to Ep. to Romans: “Thou must not understand ‘flesh’ as though that only were ‘flesh’ which is connected with unchastely. St. Paul uses ‘flesh’ of the whole man, body and soul, reason and all his faculties included, because all that is in him longs and strives after the flesh’.” Melanchthon: “Note that ‘flesh’ signifies the entire nature of man, sense and reason, without the Holy Spirit.” Gould Bib.

    Theol. New Testament 78 — “The sa>rx of Paul corresponds to the ko>smov of John. Paul sees the divine economy and John the divine nature.

    That Paul did not hold sin to consist in the possession of a body appears from his doctrine of a bodily resurrection (1 Corinthians 25:38-49). This resurrection of the body is an integral part of immortality.” Sa>rx, see Thayer, New Testament Lexicon, 571; Kaftan, Dogmatik, 319. (f) Instead of explaining sin, this theory virtually denies its existence, for if sin arises from the original constitution of our being, reason may recognize it as misfortune but conscience cannot attribute to it guilt.

    Sin, which, in its ultimate origin, is a necessary thing, is no longer sin. On the whole theory of the sensuous origin of sin, see Neander, Planting and Training, 386, 428; Ernesti, Ursprung der Sunde, 1:29-274; Philippi, Glaubenslehre, 2:132-147; Tulloch, Doctrine of Sin, 144 — “That which is an inherent and necessary power in the creation cannot be a contradiction of its highest law.” This theory confounds sin with the mere consciousness of sin. On Schleiermacher, see Julius Muller, Doctrine of Sin, 341-349. On the sense-theory of sin in general, see John Caird, Fund.

    Ideas of Christianity, 2:26-52; N. R. Wood, The Witness of Sin, 79-87. 2. Sin as Finiteness.

    This view explains sin as a necessary result of the limitations of man’s finite being. As an incident of imperfect development, the fruit of ignorance and impotence, sin is not absolutely but only relatively evil — an element in human education and a means of progress. This is the view of Leibnitz and of Spinoza. Modern writers as Schurman and Royce have maintained that moral evil is the necessary background and condition of moral good.

    The theory of Leibnitz may be found in his Theodicee, part 1, sections and 31; that of Spinoza in his Ethics, part 4, proposition 20. Upon this view, sin is the blundering of inexperience, the thoughtlessness that takes evil for good, the ignorance that puts its fingers into the fire, the stumbling without which one cannot learn to walk. It is a fruit which is sour and bitter simply because it is immature. It is a means of discipline and training for something better, it is holiness in the germ, good in the making — “Erhebung des Menschen zur freien Vernunft.” The Fall was a fall up and not down. John Fiske, in addition to his sense-theory of sin already mentioned, seems to hold this theory also. In his Mystery of Evil he says, “Its impress upon the human soul is the indispensable background, which, shall be set hereafter the eternal joys of heaven.” In other words, sin is necessary to holiness, as darkness is the indispensable contrast and background to light for without black, we should never be able to know white. Schurman, Belief in God, 251 sq . — “The possibility of sin is the correlative of the free initiative God has vacated on man’s behalf. The essence of sin is the enthronement of self. Yet, without such self-absorption, there could be no sense of union with God. For consciousness is possible only through opposition. To know A, we must know it through not A. Alienation from God is the necessary condition of communion with God. And this is the meaning of the Scripture that ‘where sin abounded grace shall much more abound.’ Modern culture protests against the Puritan enthronement of goodness above truth. For the Decalogue it would substitute the wider new commandment of Goethe: ‘Live resolutely in the Whole, in the Good, in the Beautiful.’ The highest religion can be content with nothing short of the synthesis demanded by Goethe. God is the universal life in which individual activities are included as movements of a single organism.

    Royce, World and Individual, 2:361-384 — “Evil is a discord necessary to perfect harmony. In itself it is evil, but in relation to the whole it has value by showing us its own finiteness and imperfection. It is a sorrow to God as much as to us, indeed, all our sorrow is his sorrow. The evil serves the good only by being overcome, thwarted, overruled. Every evil deed must somewhere and at some time must be atoned for, by some other than the agent, if not by the agent himself. All finite life is a struggle with evil. Yet from the final point of view the Whole is good. The temporal order contains at no moment anything that can satisfy. Yet the eternal order is perfect. We have all sinned and come short of the glory of God.

    Yet in just our life, viewed in its entirety, the glory of God is completely manifest. These hard sayings are the deepest expressions of the essence of true religion. They are also the most inevitable outcome of philosophy.

    Were there no longing in time, there would be no peace in eternity. The prayer that God’s will may be done on earth as it is in heaven is identical with what philosophy regards as simple fact.”

    We object to this theory that (a) It rests upon a pantheistic basis, as the sense-theory rests upon dualism.

    The moral is confounded with the physical; might is identified with right.

    Since sin is a necessary incident of finiteness and creature can never be infinite, it follows that sin must be everlasting, not only in the universe, but in each individual soul.

    Goethe, Carlyle and Emerson are representatives of this view in literature.

    Goethe spoke of the “idleness of wishing to jump off from one’s own shadow.” He was a disciple of Spinoza, who believed in one substance with contradictory attributes of thought and extension. Goethe took the pantheistic view of God with the personal view of man. He ignored the fact of sin. Hutton calls him “the wisest man the world has seen who was without humility and faith and who lacked the wisdom of a child.”

    Speaking of Goethe’s Faust, Hutton says, “The great drama is radically false in its fundamental philosophy. Its primary notion is that even a spirit of pure evil is an exceedingly useful being because he stirs into activity those whom he leads into sin and so prevents them from rusting away in pure indolence. There are other and better means of stimulating the positive affections of men than by tempting them to sin.” On Goethe, see Hutton, Essays, 2:1-79; Shedd, Dogmatic Theology, 1:490; A. H. Strong, Great Poets and their Theology, 279-331.

    Carlyle was a Scotch Presbyterian minus Christianity. At the age of twenty-five, he rejected miraculous and historical religion and thenceforth had no God but natural Law. His worship of objective truth became a worship of subjective sincerity, and his worship of personal will became a worship of impersonal force. He preached truth, service, sacrifice but all in a mandatory and pessimistic way. He saw in England and Wales “twenty-nine millions — mostly fools.” He had no love, no remedy and no hope. In our civil war, he was upon the side of the slaveholder. He claimed that his philosophy made right to be might, but in practice he made might to be right. Confounding all moral distinctions, as he did in his later writings, he was fit to wear the title, which he invented for another: “President of the Heaven-and-Hell-Amalgamation Society.”

    Froude calls him “a Calvinist without the theology” — a believer in predestination without grace. On Carlyle, see S. Law Wilson, Theology of Modern Literature, 131-178.

    Emerson also is the worshiper of successful force. His pantheism is most manifest in his poems “Cupido” and “Brahma,” and in his Essays on “Spirit” and on “The Oversoul.” Cupido: “The solid, solid universe Is pervious to Love; With bandaged eyes he never errs, Around, below, above. His blinding light He flingeth white On God’s and Satan’s brood, And reconciles by mystic wiles The evil and the good.” Brahma: “If the red slayer thinks he slays, Or if the slain think he is slain, They know not well the subtle ways I keep, and pass, and turn again. Far or forgot to me is near; Shadow and sunlight are the same; The vanished gods to me appear; And one to me are shame or fame. They reckon ill who leave me out; When me they fly, I am the wings; I am the doubter and the doubt, And I the hymn the Brahmin sings. The strong gods pine for my abode, And pine in vain the sacred Seven; But thou, meek lover of the good, Find me, and turn thy back on heaven.”

    Emerson taught that man’s imperfection is not sin, and that the cure for it lies in education. “He lets God evaporate into abstract Ideality. Not a Deity in the concrete, nor a superhuman Person, but rather the immanent divinity in things, the essentially spiritual structure of the universe, is the object of the transcendental cult.” His view of Jesus is found in his Essays, 2:263 — “Jesus would absorb the race but Tom Paine, or the coarsest blasphemer, helps humanity by resisting this exuberance of power.” In his Divinity School Address, he banished the person of Jesus from genuine religion. He thought “one could not he a man if he must subordinate his nature to Christ’s nature.” He failed to see that Jesus not only absorbs but transforms and that we grow only by the impact of nobler souls than our own. Emerson’s essay style is devoid of clear and precise theological statement, and in this vagueness lies its harmfulness.

    Fisher, Nature and Method of Revelation, xii — “Emerson’s pantheism is not hardened into a consistent creed, for to the end he clung to the belief in personal immortality, and he pronounced the acceptance of this belief ‘the test of mental sanity.’” On Emerson, see S. L. Wilson, Theology of Modern Literature, 97-128.

    We may call this theory the “green-apple theory” of sin. Sin is a green apple, which needs only time and sunshine and growth to bring it to ripeness and beauty and usefulness. But we answer that sin is not a green apple but an apple with a worm at its heart. The evil of it can never be cured by growth. The fall can never be anything else than downward.

    Upon this theory, sin is an inseparable factor in the nature of finite things.

    The highest archangel cannot be without it. Man in moral character is “the asymptote of God,” — forever learning, but never able to come to the knowledge of the truth. The throne of iniquity is set up forever in the universe. If this theory were true, Jesus, in virtue of his partaking of our finite humanity, must be a sinner. His perfect development, without sin, shows that sin was not a necessity of finite progress. Matthews, in Christianity and Evolution, 137 — “It was not necessary for the prodigal to go into the far country and become a swineherd, in order to find out the father’s love.” E. H. Johnson, Systematic Theology, 141 — “It is not the privilege of the Infinite alone to be good.” Dorner, System, 1:119, speaks of the moral career, which this theory describes, as “a progressus in infinitum, where the constant approach to the goal has as its reverse side an eternal separation from the goal.” In his “Transformation,” Hawthorne hints, though rather hesitatingly, that without sin the highest humanity of man could not be taken up at all, and that sin may be essential to the first conscious awakening of moral freedom and to the possibility of progress; see Hutton, Essays, 2:381. (b) So far as this theory regards moral evil as a necessary presupposition and condition of moral good, it commits the serious error of confounding the possible with the actual. What is necessary to goodness is not the actuality of evil but only the possibility of evil.

    Since we cannot know white except in contrast to black, it is claimed that without knowing actual evil we could never know actual good. George A:

    Gordon, New Epoch for Faith,49,50, has well shown that in that case the elimination of evil would imply the elimination of good. Sin would need to have place in God’s being in order that he might be holy, and thus he would be divinity and devil in one person. Jesus too must be evil as well as good. Not only would it be true, as intimated above,, that Christ since his humanity is finite, must be a sinner, but also that we ourselves who must always be finite, must always be sinners. We grant that holiness, in either God or man, must involve the abstract possibility of its opposite.

    But we maintain that, as this possibility in God is only abstract and never realized, so in man it should be only abstract and never realized. Man has power to reject this possible evil. His sin is a turning of the merely possible evil, by the decision of his will, into actual evil. Robert Browning is not free from the error above mentioned; see S. Law Wilson, Theology of Modern Literature, 207-210; A. H. Strong, Great Poets and their Theology, 433-444.

    This theory of sin dates back to Hegel. To him there is no real sin and cannot be. Imperfection there is and must always be, because the relative can never become the absolute. Redemption is only an evolutionary process, indefinitely prolonged, and evil must remain an eternal condition.

    All finite thought is an element in the infinite thought and all finite will an element in the infinite will. As good cannot exist without evil as its antithesis, infinite righteousness should have for its counterpart an infinite wickedness. Hegel’s guiding principle was that “What is rational is real and what is real is rational.” Seth, Hegelianism and Personality, remarks that this principle ignores “the riddle of the painful earth.” The disciples of Hegel thought that nothing remained for history to accomplish, now that the World-spirit had come to know himself in Hegel’s philosophy.

    Biedermann’s Dogmatik is based upon the Hegelian philosophy. At page 649 we read: “Evil is the finiteness of the world-being which clings to all individual existences by virtue of belonging to the immanent world-order.

    Evil is therefore a necessary element in the divinely willed being of the world.” Bradley follows Hegel in making sin to be no reality, but only a relative appearance. There is no freewill, and no antagonism between the will of God and the will of man. Darkness is an evil, a destroying agent.

    But it is not a positive force, as light is. It cannot be attacked and overcome as an entity. Bring light and darkness disappears. So evil Is not a positive force, as good is. Bring good, and evil disappears. Herbert Spencer’s Evolutionary Ethics is in with such a system, for he says: “A perfect man in an imperfect race is impossible.” On Hegel’s view of sin, a view that denies holiness even to Christ, see J. Muller Doct:. Sin, 1:390- 407; Dorner, Hist. Doct. Person of Christ, B. 3:131-162: Stearns, Evidence of Christ. Experience, 92-96; John Caird, Fund. Ideas, 2:1-25; Forrest, Authority of Christ, 13-16. (c) It is inconsistent with known facts, as for example, the following: Not all sins are negative sins of ignorance and infirmity; there are acts of positive malignity, conscious transgressions, willful and presumptuous choices of evil. Increased knowledge of the nature of sin does not of itself give strength to overcome it but, on the contrary, repeated acts of conscious transgression harden the heart in evil. Men of greatest mental powers are not of necessity the greatest of saints nor are the greatest sinners men of least strength of will and understanding.

    Not the weak but the strong are the greatest sinners. We do not pity Nero and Caesar Borgia for their weakness; we abhor them for their crimes.

    Judas was an able man, a practical administrator and Satan is a being of great natural endowments. Sin is not simply a weakness, it is also a power. A pantheistic philosophy should worship Satan most of all for he is the truest type of godless intellect and selfish strength. John 12:6 — Judas, “having the bag, made away with what was put therein.” Judas was set by Christ to do the work he was best fitted for and that was best fitted to interest and save him. Some men may be put into the ministry because that is the only work that will prevent their destruction. Pastors should find for their members work suited to the aptitudes of each. Judas was tempted, or tried, as all men are according to his native propensity. While his motive in objecting to Mary’s generosity was really avarice, his pretext was charity, or regard for the poor. Each one of the apostles had a gift that was peculiar to him and was chosen because of it. The sin of Judas was not a sin of weakness or ignorance or infirmity. It was a sin of disappointed ambition, of malice, of hatred for Christ’s self-sacrificing purity.

    E. H. Johnson: “Sins are not men’s limitations, but the active expressions of a perverse nature.” M. F. H. Round, Sec. of Nat. Prison Association, after examining the record of a thousand criminals, found that one quarter of them had an exceptionally fine basis of physical life and strength; the other three quarters fell only a little below the average of ordinary humanity. See The Forum, Sept. 1893. The theory that sin is only holiness in the making reminds us of the view that the most objectionable refuse can by ingenious processes be converted into butter or at least into oleomargarine. It is not true that “tout comprendre est tout pardonner.”

    Such doctrine obliterates all moral distinctions. Gilbert, Bab Ballads, “My Dream”: “I dreamt that somehow I had come To dwell in Topsy- Turvydom, Where vice is virtue, virtue vice; Where nice is nasty, nasty nice; Where right is wrong, and wrong is right; Where white is black and black is white.” (d) Like the sense-theory of sin, it contradicts both conscience and Scripture by denying human responsibility and by transferring the blame of sin from the creature to the Creator. This is to explain sin, again, by denying its existence. (Edipus said that his evil deeds had been suffered, not done. Agamemnon, in the Thad, says the blame belongs, not to himself, but to Jupiter and to fate. So sin blames everything and everybody but self. ( Genesis 3:12 — “The woman whom thou gavest to be with me, she gave me of the tree, and I did eat.” But self-vindicating is God-accusing. Made imperfect at the start, man cannot help his sin. By the very fact of his creation he is cut loose from God. That cannot be sin, which is a necessary outgrowth of human nature, for it is not our act but our fate. To all this, the one answer is found in Conscience. Conscience testifies that sin is not “das Gewordene” but “das Gemachte” and that it was his own act when man, by transgression, fell. The Scriptures refer man’s sin , not to the limitations of his being, but to the free will of man himself. On the theory here combated, see Muller, Doct. Sin, 1:271-295; Philippi, Glaubenslehre, 3:123-131; N. H. Wood, The Witness of Sin, 20- — 42. 3. Sin as Selfishness.

    We hold the essential principle of sin to be selfishness. By selfishness we mean not simply the exaggerated self-love which constitutes the antithesis of benevolence, but that choice of self as the supreme end which constitutes the antithesis of supreme love to God. That selfishness is the essence of sin may be shown as follows:

    A. Love to God is the essence of all virtue. The opposite of this, the choice of self as the supreme end, must therefore be the essence of sin.

    We are to remember, however, that the love to God in which virtue consists is a love for that which is most characteristic and fundamental in God, namely, his holiness. It is not to be confounded with supreme regard for God s interests or for the good of being in general not mere benevolence, but love for God as holy, is the principle and source of holiness in man. Since the love of God required by the law is of this sort, it not only does not imply that love, in the sense of benevolence, is the essence of holiness in God rather, it implies that holiness, or self-loving and self-affirming purity, is fundamental in the divine nature. From this selfloving and self-affirming purity, love properly so-called, or the selfcommunicating attribute, is to be carefully distinguished (see vol. 1, pages 271-275).

    Bossuet, describing heathendom, says: “Every thing was God but God himself.” Sin goes further than this, and says: “I am myself all things,” not simply as Louis XVI: “I am the state,” but: “I am the world, the universe, God.” Heinrich Heine: “I am no child. I do not want a heavenly Father any more.” A French critic of Fichte’s philosophy said that it was a flight toward the infinite, which began with the ego, and never got beyond it. Kidd, Social Evolution, 75 — “In Calderon’s tragic story, the unknown figure, which throughout life is everywhere in conflict with the individual whom it haunts, lifts the mask at last to disclose to the opponent his own features.” Caird, Evolution of Religion, 1:78 — “Every self, once awakened, is naturally a despot and ‘bears, like the Turk, no brother near the throne.”’ Every one has, as Hobbes said, “an infinite desire for gain or glory,” and can be satisfied with nothing but a whole universe for himself. Selfishness = “homo homini lupus.” James Martineau: We ask Comte to lift the veil from the holy of holies and show us the all-perfect object of worship, he produces a looking glass and shows us ourselves.” Comte’s religion is a “synthetic idealization of our existence” — a worship, not of God, but of humanity, and “the festival of humanity” among Positivists = Walt Whitman’s “I celebrate myself.” On Comte, see Martineau, Types, 1:499. The most thorough discussion of the essential principle of sin is that of Julius Muller, Doct. Sin, 1:147-182. He defines sin as “a turning away from the love of God to self-seeking.”

    N. W. Taylor holds that self-love is the primary cause of all moral action.

    Selfishness is a different thing and consists not in making our own happiness our ultimate end, which we must do if we are moral beings, but in love of the world and in preferring the world to God as our portion or chief good. (See N. W. Taylor, Moral Govt., 1:24-26; 2:20-24, and Rev. Theol., 134-162; Tyler, Letters on the New Haven Theology, 72). We claim, on the contrary, that to make our own happiness our ultimate aim is itself sin and the essence of sin. As God makes his holiness the central thing, so we are to live for that, loving self only in God and for God’s sake. This love for God as holy is the essence of virtue. The opposite to this, or supreme love for self, is sin. As Richard Lovelace writes: “I could not love thee, dear, so much, Loved I not honor more,” so Christian friends can say: “Our loves in higher love endure.” The sinner raises some lower object of instinct or desire to supremacy, regardless of God and his law, and this he does for no other reason than to gratify self. On the distinction between mere benevolence and the love required by God’s law, see Hovey, God With Us, 187-200; Hopkins, Works, 1:235; F. W.

    Robertson, Sermon I. Emerson: “Your goodness must have some edge to it, else it is none.” See Newman Smyth, Christian Ethics, 327-370, on duties toward self as a moral end.

    Love to God is the essence of all virtue. We are to love God with all the heart. But what God is that? Surely, not the false God, the God who is indifferent to moral distinctions and who treats the wicked as he treats the righteous. The love, which the law requires, is love for the true God, the God of holiness. Such love aims at the reproduction of God’s holiness in us and in others. We are to love ourselves only for God’s sake and for the sake of realizing the divine idea in us. We are to love others only for God’s sake and for the sake of realizing the divine idea in them. In our moral progress we, first, love self for our own sake, secondly, God for our own sake, thirdly, God for his own sake, fourthly, ourselves for God’s sake. The first is our state by nature, the second requires munificent grace, the third, regenerating grace, and the fourth, sanctifying grace.

    Only the last is reasonable self-love. Balfour, Foundations of Belief, — “Reasonable self-love is a virtue wholly incompatible with what is commonly called selfishness. Society suffers, not from having too much of it, but from having too little.” Altruism is not the whole of duty. Selfrealization is equally important. But to care only for self, like Goethe, is to miss the true self-realization, which love to God ensures.

    Love desires only the best for its object, and the best is God. The golden rule bids us give, not what others desire, but what they need. Romans 15:2 — “Let each one of us please his neighbor for that which is good, unto edifying.” Deutsche Liebe: “Nicht Liebe die fragt: Willst du mein sein? Sondern Liebe die sagt: Ich muss dein sein.” Sin consists in taking for one’s self alone and apart from God that in one’s self and in others to which one has a right only in God and for God’s sake. Mrs. Humphrey Ward, David Grieve, 403 — “How dare a man pluck from the Lord’s hand, for his wild and reckless use, a soul and body for which he died?

    How dare he, the Lord’s bondsman, steal his joy, carrying it off by himself into the wilderness, like an animal his prey, instead of asking it at the hands and under the blessing of the Master? How dare he, a member of the Lord’s body, forget the whole, in his greed for the one — eternity in his thirst for the present?” Wordsworth, Prelude, 546 — “Delight how pitiable, Unless this love by a still higher love Be hallowed, love that breathes not without awe; Love that adores, but on the knees of prayer, By heaven inspired… This spiritual love acts not nor can exist Without imagination, which in truth Is but another name for absolute power, And clearest insight, amplitude of mind, And reason in her most exalted mood.” Aristotle says that the wicked have no right to have a love of self but that the good may. So, from a Christian point of view, we may say that no unregenerate man can properly respect himself. Self-respect belongs only to the man who lives in God and who has God’s image restored to him thereby. True self-love is not love for the happiness of the self, but for the worth of the self in God’s sight, and this self-love is the condition of all genuine and worthy love for others. But true self-love is in turn conditioned by love to God as holy, and it seeks primarily, not the happiness, but the holiness, of others. Asquith, Christian Conception of Holiness, 98, 145, 154, 207 — “Benevolence or love is not the same with altruism. Altruism is instinctive and has not its origin in the moral reason.

    It has utility and it may even furnish material for reflection on the part of the moral reason. But so far as it is not deliberate, not indulged for the sake of the end, but only for the gratification of the instinct of the moment, it is not moral. Holiness is dedication to God, the Good, not as an external Ruler, but as an internal controller and transformer of character. God is a being whose every thought is love, of whose thoughts not one is for self, save so far as himself is not himself, that is, so far as there is a distinction of persons in the Godhead. Creation is one great unselfish thought — the bringing into being creatures that can know the happiness that God knows. To the spiritual man holiness and love are one.

    Salvation is deliverance from selfishness.” Kaftan, Dogmatik, 319, 320, regards the essence of sin as consisting, not In selfishness, but in turning away from God and so from the love which would cause man to grow in knowledge and likeness to God. But this seems to be nothing else than choosing self instead of God as our object and end.

    B. All the different forms of sin can be shown to have their root in selfishness, while selfishness itself, considered as the choice of self as a Supreme end, cannot be resolved into any simpler elements. (a) Selfishness may reveal itself in the elevation to supreme dominion of any one of man’s natural appetites, desires, or affections. Sensuality is selfishness in the form of inordinate appetite. Selfish desire takes the forms respectively of avarice, ambition, vanity, pride, according as it is set upon property, power, esteem, independence. Selfish affection is falsehood or malice, according as it hopes to make others its voluntary servants, or regards them as standing in its way; it is unbelief or enmity to God, according as it simply turns away from the truth and love of God, or conceives of God’s holiness as positively resisting and punishing it.

    Augustine and Aquinas held the essence of sin to be pride; Luther and Calvin regarded its essence to be unbelief. Krebig (Versohnungslehre) regards it as “world-love”; still others consider it as enmity to God. In opposing the view that sensuality is the essence of sin, Julius Muller says: “Wherever we find sensuality, there we find selfishness but we do not find that where there is selfishness there is always sensuality. Selfishness may embody itself in fleshly lust or inordinate desire for the creature but this last cannot bring forth spiritual sins which have no element of sensuality in them.”

    Covetousness or avarice makes, not sensual gratification itself, but the things that may minister thereto, the object of pursuit and, in this last chase often loses sight of its original aim. Ambition is selfish love of power and vanity is selfish love of esteem. Pride is but the selfcomplacency, self-sufficiency, and self-isolation of a selfish spirit that desires nothing so much as unrestrained independence. Falsehood originates in selfishness, first as self-deception, and then, since man by sin isolates himself and yet in a thousand ways needs the fellowship of his brethren, as deception of others. Malice, the perversion of natural resentment (together with hatred and revenge), is the reaction of selfishness against those who stand, or are imagined to stand, in its way.

    Unbelief and enmity to God are effects of sin, rather than its essence; selfishness leads us first to doubt, and then to hate the Lawgiver and Judge. Tacitus: “Humani generis proprium est odisse quem læseris.” In sin, self-affirmation and self-surrender are not coordinate elements, as Dorner holds, but the former conditions the latter.

    As love to God is love to God’s holiness, so love to man is love for holiness in man and desire to impart it. In other words, true love for man is the longing to make man like God. Over against this normal desire which should fill the heart and inspire the life, there stands a hierarchy of lower desires which may be utilized and sanctified by the higher love but which may assert their independence and may thus be the occasions of sin.

    Physical gratification, money, esteem, power, knowledge, family, virtue, are proper objects of regard, so long as these are sought for God’s sake and within the limitations of his will. Sin consists in turning our backs on God and in seeking any one of these objects for its own sake, which is the same thing as for our own sakes. Appetite gratified without regard to God’s law is lust and the love of money becomes avarice. The desire for esteem then becomes vanity, the longing for power becomes ambition, the love for knowledge becomes a selfish thirst for intellectual satisfaction, parental affection degenerates into indulgence and nepotism, the seeking of virtue becomes self-righteousness and self-sufficiency. Kaftan, Dogmatik, 323 — “Jesus grants that even the heathen and sinners love those who love them. But family love becomes family pride, patriotism comes to stand for country right or wrong, happiness in one’s calling leads to class distinctions.”

    Dante, in his Divine Comedy, divides the Inferno into three great sections: those in which are punished respectively: incontinence, bestiality and malice. Incontinence = sin of the heart, the emotions, the affections.

    Lower down is found bestiality = sin of the head, the thoughts, the mind, as infidelity and heresy. Lowest of all is malice = sin of the will, deliberate rebellion, fraud and treachery. So we are taught that the heart carries the intellect with it and that the sin of unbelief gradually deepens into the intensity of malice. See A. H. Strong, Great Poets and their Theology, 133 — “Dante teaches us that sin is the self-perversion of the will. If there is any thought fundamental to his system, it is the thought of freedom. Man is not a waif swept irresistibly downward on the current; he is a being endowed with power to resist and therefore, guilty if he yields.

    Sin is not misfortune or disease or natural necessity but it is willfulness and crime and self-destruction. The Divine Comedy is, beyond all other poems, the poem of conscience and this could not be if it did not recognize man as a free agent, the responsible cause of his own evil acts and his own evil state.” See also Harris, in Jour. Spec. Philos., 21:350-451; Dinsmore, Atonement in Literature and Life, 69-86.

    In Greek tragedy, says Prof. Win. Arnold Stevens, the one sin, which the gods hated and would not pardon was uJbriv — obstinate self-assertion of mind or will, absence of reverence and humility — of which we have an illustration in Ajax. George MacDonald: “A man may be possessed of himself, as of a devil.” Shakespeare depicts this insolence of infatuation in Shylock, Macbeth and Richard III. Troilus and Cressida, 4:4 — “Something may be done that we will not; And sometimes we are devils to ourselves, When we will tempt the frailty of our powers, Presuming on their changeful potency.” Yet Robert G. Ingersoll said that Shakespeare holds crime to be the mistake of ignorance! N. P. Willis, Parrhasius: “How like a mounting devil in the heart Rules unrestrained ambition!” (b) Even in the nobler forms of unregenerate life, the principle of selfishness is to be regarded as manifesting itself in the preference of lower ends to that of God’s proposing. Others are loved with idolatrous affection because these others are regarded as a part of self. That the selfish element is present even here, is evident upon considering that such affection does not seek the highest interest of its object that it often ceases when not returned and that it sacrifices to its own gratification the claims of God and his law.

    Even in the mother’s idolatry of her child, the explorer’s devotion to science, the sailor’s risk of his life to save another’s, the gratification sought may be that of a lower instinct or desire. Any substitution of a lower for the highest object is non-conformity to law, and therefore sin. H.

    B. Smith, System Theology, 277 — “Some lower affection is supreme.”

    And the underlying motive, which leads to this substitution, is selfgratification.

    There is no such thing as disinterested sin, for “every one that loveth is begotten of God” ( 1 John 4:7). Thomas Hughes, The Manliness of Christ: Much of the heroism of battle is simply “resolution in the actors to have their way. Contempt for ease, animal courage, which we share with the bulldog and the weasel, intense assertion of individual will and force, avowal of the rough-handed man that he has that in him which enables him to defy pain and danger and death.”

    Mozley on Blanco White, in Essays, 2:143: Truth may be sought in order to absorb truth in self, not for the sake of absorbing self in truth. So Blanco White, in spite of the pain of separating from old views and friends, lived for the selfish pleasure of new discovery, till all his early faith vanished, and even immortality seemed a dream. He falsely thought that the pain he suffered in giving up old beliefs was evidence of selfsacrifice with which God must be pleased, whereas it was the inevitable pain, which attends the victory of selfishness. Robert Browning, Paracelsus, 81 — “I still must hoard and heap and class all truths With one ulterior purpose: [must know! Would God translate me to his throne, believe That I should only listen to his words To further my own ends.” F.

    W. Robertson on Genesis, 57 — “He who sacrifices his sense of right, his conscience, for another sacrifices the God within him; he is not sacrificing self. He who prefers his dearest friend or his beloved child to the call of duty, will soon show that he prefers himself to his dearest friend and would not sacrifice himself for his child.” Ib., 91 — “In those who love little, love [for finite beings] is a primary affection, a secondary, in those who love much. The only true affection is that which is subordinate to a higher.” True love is love for the soul and its highest, its eternal interests; love that seeks to make it holy, love for the sake of God and for the accomplishment of God’s idea in his creation.

    Although we cannot, with Augustine, call the virtues of the heathen “splendid vices” for they were relatively good and useful. They still, except in possible instances where God’s Spirit wrought upon the heart, were illustrations of a morality divorced from love to God, were lacking in the most essential element demanded by the law, were therefore infected with sin. Since the law judges all action by the heart from which it springs, no action of the unregenerate can be other than sin. The ebonytree is white in its outer circles of woody fiber; at heart it is black as ink.

    There is no unselfishness in the unregenerate heart, apart from the divine enlightenment and energizing. Self-sacrifice for the sake of self is selfishness after all. Professional burglars and bank-robbers are often carefully abstemious in their personal habits, and they deny themselves the use of liquor and tobacco while in the active practice of their trade.

    Herron, The Larger Christ,47 — “It is as truly immoral to seek truth out of mere love of knowing it as it is to seek money out of love to gain. Truth sought for truth’s sake is an intellectual vine; it is spiritual covetousness.

    It is an idolatry, setting up the worship of abstractions and generalities in place of the living God.” (c) It must be remembered however, that side by side with the selfish will and striving against it, is the power of Christ, the immanent God, imparting aspirations and impulses foreign to unregenerate humanity and preparing the way for the soul’s surrender to truth and righteousness. Romans 8:7 — “the mind of the flesh is enmity against God”; Acts 17:2; 28 — “he is not far from each one of us: for in him we live, and move, and have our being”; Romans 2:4 — “the goodness of God leadeth thee to repentance”; John 1:9 — “the light which lighteth every man.” Many generous traits and acts of self-sacrifice in the unregenerate must be ascribed to the munificent grace of God and to the enlightening influence of the Spirit of Christ. A mother, during the Russian famine, gave to her children all the little supply of food that came to her in the distribution and died that they might live. In her decision to sacrifice herself for her offspring she may have found her probation and may have surrendered herself to God. The impulse to make the sacrifice may have been due to the Holy Spirit and her yielding may have been essentially an act of saving faith. In Mark 10:21,22 — “And Jesus looking upon him loved him… he went any sorrowful.” Our Lord apparently loved the young man not only for his gifts, his efforts and his possibilities, but also for the manifest working in him of the divine Spirit even while in his natural character he was without God and without love, self-ignorant, self-righteous, and self-seeking.

    Paul, in like manner, before his conversion, loved and desired righteousness, provided only that this righteousness might be the product and achievement of his own will and might reflect honor on himself, in short, provided only that self might still be uppermost. To be dependent for righteousness upon another was abhorrent to him. And yet this very impulse toward righteousness may have been due to the divine Spirit within him. On Paul’s experience before conversion, see E. B. Burton, Bib. World, Jan. 1893. Peter objected to the washing of his feet by Jesus ( John 13:8), not because it humbled the Master too much in the eyes of the disciple, but because it humbled the disciple too much in his own eyes. Pfleiderer, Philos. Religion, 1:218 — “Sin is the violation of the God-willed moral order of the world by the self-will of the individual.”

    Tophel on the Holy Spirit,17 — “You would deeply wound him [the average sinner] if you told him that his heart, full of sin, is an object of horror to the holiness of God.” The impulse to repentance, as well as the impulse to righteousness, is the product, not of man’s own nature, but of the Christ within him who is moving him to seek salvation.

    Elizabeth Barrett wrote to Robert Browning after she had accepted his proposal of marriage: “Henceforth I am yours for everything but to do you harm.” George Harris, Moral Evolution, 138 — “Love seeks the true good of the person loved. It will not minister in an unworthy way to afford a temporary pleasure. It will not approve or tolerate that which is wrong.

    It will not encourage the coarse, base passions of the one loved. It condemns impurity, falsehood or selfishness. A parent does not really love his child if he tolerates the self-indulgence and does not correct or punish the faults of the child.” Hutton: “You might as well say that it is a fit subject for art to paint the morbid ecstasy of cannibals over their horrid feasts as to paint lust without love. If you are to delineate man at all, you must delineate him with his human nature and therefore, you can never omit from any worthy picture that conscience which is its crown.”

    Tennyson. in In Memoriam, speaks of “Fantastic beauty such as lurks In some wild poet when he works Without a conscience or an aim.” Such work may be due to mere human nature. But the lofty work of true creative genius, and the still loftier acts of men still unregenerate but conscientious and self-sacrificing, must be explained by the working in them of the immanent Christ, the life and light of men. James Martineau, Study, 1:20 — “Conscience may act as human, before it is discovered to be divine.” See J. D. Stoops, in Jour. Philos., Psych., and Sci. Meth., 2:512 — “If there is a divine life over and above the separate streams of individual lives, the welling up of this larger life in the experience of the individual is precisely the point of contact between the individual person and God.” Caird, Fund. Ideas of Christianity, 2:122 — “It is this divine element in man, this relationship to God, which gives to sin the darkest and direst complexion. For such a life is the turning of a light brighter than the sun into darkness, the squandering or bartering away of a boundless wealth, the suicidal abasement to the things that perish. This nature is destined by its very constitution and structure for participation in the very being and blessedness of God.”

    On the various forms of sin as manifestations of selfishness, see Julius Muller, Doct. Sin, 1:147-182; Jonathan Edwards, Works, 2:268, 269; Philippi, Glaubenslehre, 3:5, 6; Baird, Elohim Revealed, 243-262; Stewart, Active and Moral Powers, 11-91; Hopkins, Moral Science, 86- 156. On the Roman Catholic “Seven Deadly sins” (pride, envy, anger, sloth, avarice, gluttony, lust), see Wetzer und Welte, Kirchenlexikon, and Orby Shipley, Theory about Sin, preface, xvi — xvii.

    C. This view accords best with Scripture. (a) The law requires love to God as its all-embracing requirement. (b) The holiness of Christ consisted in this, that he sought not his own will or glory, but made God his supreme end. (c) The Christian is one who has ceased to live for self. (d) The tempter’s promise is a promise of selfish independence. (e) The prodigal separates himself from his father and seeks his own interest and pleasure. (f) The “man of sin” illustrates the nature of sin, in “opposing and exalting himself against all that is called God.” (a) Matthew. 22:37-39 — the command of love to God and man; Romans 13:8-10 — “love therefore is the fulfillment of the law”; Galatians 5:14 — “the whole law is fulfilled in one word, even in this:

    Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself”; James 2:8 — “the royal law”; (b) John 5:30 — “my judgment is righteous; because I seek not mine own will, but the will of him that sent me”; 7:18 — “He that speaketh from himself seeketh his own glory but he that seeketh the glory of him that sent him, the same is true and no unrighteousness is in him”; Romans 15:3 — “Christ also pleased not himself” (c) Romans 14:7 — “none of us liveth to himself and none dieth to himself’; 2 Corinthians 5:15 — “he died for all, that they that live should no longer live unto themselves, but unto him who for their sakes died and rose again”; Galatians 2:20 — “I have been crucified with Christ; and it is no longer I that live, but Christ liveth in me.” Contrast 2 Timothy 3:2 — “lovers of self.” (d) Genesis 3:5 — “ye shall be as God, knowing good and evil.” (e) Luke 35:12, 13 — “give me the portion of thy substance… gathered all together and took his journey into a far country.” (f) 2 Thessalonians 2:3,4 — “the man of sin… the son of perdition, he that opposeth and exalteth himself against all that is called God or that is worshipped; so that he sitteth in the temple of God, setting himself forth as God.”

    Contrast “the man of sin” who “exalteth himself” ( 2 Thessalonians 2:3,4) with the Son of God who “emptied himself” ( Philippians 2:7).

    On “the man of sin”, see Wm. Arnold Stevens, in Bap. Quar. Rev., July, 1889:328-360. Ritchie, Darwin, and Hegel, 24 — “We are conscious of sin, because we know that our true self is God, from whom we are severed. No ethics is possible unless we recognize an ideal for all human effort in the presence of the eternal Self which any account of conduct presupposes.” John Caird, Fund. Ideas of Christianity, 2:58-73 — “Here, as in all organic life, the individual member or organ has no independent or exclusive life and the attempt to attain to it is fatal to itself.” Milton describes man as ‘affecting Godhead, and so losing all.” Of the sinner, we may say with Shakespeare, Coriolanus, 5:4 — “He wants nothing of a god but eternity and a heaven to throne in. There is no more mercy in him than there is milk in a male tiger.” No one of us then can sign too early “the declaration of dependence.” Both Old School and New School theologians agree that sin is selfishness; see Bellamy, Hopkins, Emmons, the younger Edwards, Pinney, and Taylor. See also A. H. Strong, Christ in Creation, 287-292.

    Sin, therefore, is not merely a negative thing, or an absence of love to God.

    It is a fundamental and positive choice or preference of self instead of God, as the object of affection and the supreme end of being. Instead of making God the center of his life and surrendering himself unconditionally to God and possessing himself only in subordination to God’s will, the sinner makes self the center of his life. He sets himself directly against God and constitutes his own interest, the supreme motive and his own will the supreme rule.

    We may follow Dr. E. G. Robinson in saying that, while sin as a state is unlikeness to God, as a principle is opposition to God, and as an act is transgression of God’s law, the essence of it always and everywhere is selfishness. It is therefore not something external, or the result of compulsion from without; it is a depravity of the affections and a perversion of the will, which constitutes man’s inmost character.

    See Harris, in Bibliotheca Sacra, 18:148 — “Sin is essentially egoism or selfism, putting self in God’s place. It has four principal characteristics or manifestations: (1) self-sufficiency instead of faith, (2) self-will instead of submission, (3) self-seeking instead of benevolence, (4) self-righteousness instead of humility and reverence.” All sin is either explicit or implicit “enmity against God” ( Romans 8:7). All true confessions are like David’s ( Psalm 51:4) — “Against thee, thee only, have I sinned, And done this which is evil in thy sight.” Of all sinners it might be said that they “Fight neither with small nor great, save only with the king of Israel” (1Kings 22:31).

    Not every sinner is conscious of this enmity. Sin is a principle in course of development. It is not yet “full-grown” (James:1:5 — “the sin, when it is full-grown, bringeth forth death”). Even now, as James Martineau has said: “If it could be known that God was dead, the news would cause but little excitement in the streets of London and Paris.” But this indifference easily grows, in the presence of threatening and penalty, into violent hatred to God and positive defiance of his law. If the sin which is now hidden in the sinner’s heart were but permitted to develop itself according to its own nature, it would hurl the Almighty from his throne, and would set up its own kingdom upon the ruins of the moral universe. Sin is worlddestroying, as well as God-destroying, for it is inconsistent with the conditions which make being as a whole possible; see Royce, World and Individual, 2:366; Dwight, Works, sermon 80.

    SECTION 3. UNIVERSALITY OF SIN.

    We have shown that sin is a state, a state of the will, a selfish state of the will. We now proceed to show that this selfish state of the will is universal.

    We divide our proof into two parts. In the first, we regard sin in its aspect as conscious violation of law and in the second, in its aspect as a bias of the nature to evil, prior to or underlying consciousness.

    I. EVERY HUMAN BEING WHO HAS ARRIVED AT MORAL CONSCIOUSNESS HAS COMMITED ACTS OR CHERISHED DISPOSITIONS CONTRARY TO THE DIVINE LAW.

    1. Proof from Scripture.

    The universality of transgression is: (a) Set forth in direct statements of Scripture. 1Ki.8:46 — “there is no man that sinneth not”; <19E302> Psalm 143:2 — “enter not into judgment with thy servant; For in thy sight no man living is righteous”; Proverbs 20:9 — “Who can say, I have made my heart clean, I am pure from my sin?” Ecclesiastes 7:20 — “Surely there is not a righteous man upon earth that doeth good and sinneth not”; Luke 11:13 — “If ye, then, being evil”; Romans 3:10,12 — “There is non righteous, no not one… There is none that doeth good, no, not so much as one”; 19, 20 — “that every mouth may be stopped, and all the world may be brought under the judgment of God: because by the works of the law shall no flesh be justified in his sight; for through the law cometh the knowledge of sin”; 23 — “for all have sinned and fall short of the glory of God”; Galatians 3:22 — “the scripture shut up all things under sin”; James 3:2 — “For in many things we all stumble”; 1 John 1:8 — “If we say we have no sin, we deceive ourselves and the truth is not in us.” Compare Matthew 6:12 — “forgive us our debts” — given as a prayer for all men; 14 — “if ye forgive men their trespasses” — the condition of our own forgiveness. (b) Implied in declarations of the universal need of atonement, regeneration and repentance.

    Universal need of atonement: Mark 16:16 — “He that believeth and is baptized shall be saved” ( Mark 16:9-20, though probably not written by Mark, is nevertheless of canonical authority); John 3:16 — “God so loved the world, that he gave his only begotten Son, that whosoever believeth on him should not perish”; 6:50 — “This is the bread which cometh down out of heaven, that a man may eat thereof, and not die”; 12:47 — “I came not to judge the world, but to save the world”; Acts 4:12 — “in none other is there salvation: for neither is there any other name under heaven, that is given among men, wherein we must be saved.”

    Universal need of regeneration: John 3:3,5 — “Except one be born anew, he cannot see the kingdom of God….Except one be born of water and the Spirit, he cannot enter into the kingdom of God.” Universal need of repentance: Acts 17:30 — “commandeth men that they should all everywhere repent.”

    Yet Mrs. Mary Baker G. Eddy, In her “Unity of Good,” speaks of “the illusion which calls sin real and man a sinner needing a Savior.” (c) Shown from the condemnation resting upon all of those who do not accept Christ. John 3:18 — “he that believeth not hath been judged already, because he hath not believed on the name of the only begotten Son of God”; 36 — “he that obeyeth not the Son shall not see life, but the wrath of God abideth on him”; Compare 1 John 5:19 — “the whole world lieth in [i. e ., in union with] the evil one”; see Annotated Paragraph Bible, in loco .

    Kaftan, Dogmatik, 318 — “Law requires love to God. This implies love to our neighbor by not only abstaining from all injury to him but righteousness in all our relations, forgiving instead of requiting. Love is implied with help to enemies as well as friends in all salutary ways, selfdiscipline, and avoidance of all sensuous immoderation, subjection of all sensuous activity as a means for spiritual ends in the kingdom of God. All this is done, not as a matter of outward conduct merely, but from the heart and as the satisfaction of one’s own will and desire. This is the will of God respecting us, which Jesus has revealed and of which he is the example in his life. Instead of this, man universally seeks to promote own life, pleasure, and honor.” (d) Consistent with those passages, which at first sight, seem to ascribe to certain men a goodness, which renders them acceptable to God. A closer examination will show that, in each case, the goodness supposed is a merely imperfect and fancied goodness, a goodness of mere aspiration and impulse due to preliminary workings of God’s Spirit or a goodness resulting from the trust of a conscious sinner in God’s method of salvation.

    In Matthew. 9:12 — “They that are whole have no need of a physician, but they that are sick” — Jesus means those who in their own esteem are whole; cf. 13 — “I came not to call the righteous, but sinners” = “of any were truly righteous, they would not need my salvation; if they think themselves so, they will not care to seek it” (An. Par. Bib.). In Luke 10:30-37 — the parable of the good Samaritan — Jesus intimates, not that the good Samaritan was not a sinner, but that there were saved sinners outside of the bounds of Israel. In Acts 10:35 — “in every nation he that feareth him, and worketh righteousness, is acceptable to him” — Peter declares, not that Cornelius was a sinner, but that God had accepted him through Christ. Cornelius was already justified, but he needed to know (1) that he was saved and (2) how he was saved. Peter was sent to tell him of the fact and of the method of his salvation in Christ. In Romans 2:14 — “for when Gentiles that have not the law do by nature the things of the law these, not having the law, are a law unto themselves. “It is only said that in certain respects the obedience of these Gentiles shows that they have an unwritten law in their hearts. It is not said that they perfectly obey the law and therefore have no sin for Paul says immediately after ( Romans 3:9) — “we before laid to the charge both of Jews and Greeks, that they are all under sin.”

    So with regard to the words “perfect” and “upright” as applied to godly men. We shall see, when we come to consider the doctrine of Sanctification, that the word “perfect,” as applied to spiritual conditions already attained signifies only a relative perfection, equivalent to sincere piety or maturity of Christian judgment. In other words, the perfection of a sinner who has long trusted in Christ and in whom Christ has overcome his chief defects of character. See 1 Corinthians 2:6 — “we speak wisdom among the perfect” (Am. Rev.: “among them that are fullgrown”); Philippians 3:15 — “Let us therefore, as many as are perfect be thus minded” — i.e ., to press toward the goal — a goal expressly said by the apostles to be not yet attained (v. 12-14). “Est deus in noble; agitante calescimus illo.” God is the “spark that fires our clay.” S. S. Times, Sept. 21,1901:609 — “Humanity is better and worse than men have painted it. There has been a kind of theological pessimism in denouncing human sinfulness, which has been blind to the abounding love and patience and courage and fidelity to duty among men.” A. H. Strong, Christ in Creation, 287-290 — “There is a natural life of Christ, and that life pulses and throbs in all men everywhere. All men are created in Christ before they are recreated in him. The whole race lives, moves, and has its being in him, for he is the soul of its soul and the life of its life.” To Christ then, and not to unaided human nature, we attribute the noble impulses of unregenerate men. These impulses are drawings of his Spirit, moving men to repentance. But they are influences of his grace, which if resisted, leave the soul in more than its original darkness. 2. Proof from history, observation, and the common judgment of mankind. (a) History witnesses to the universality of sin, in its accounts of the universal prevalence of priesthood and sacrifice.

    See references in Luthardt, Fund. Truths, 161-172, 335-339. Baptist Review, 1882:343 — “Plutarch speaks of the tear-stained eyes, the pallid and woebegone countenances which he sees at the public altars, men rolling themselves in the mire and confessing their sins. Among the common people the dull feeling of guilt was too real to be shaken off or laughed away.” (b) Every man knows of himself to have come short of moral perfection and, in proportion to his experience of the world, recognizes the fact that every other man has come short of it also.

    Chinese proverb: “There are but two good men; one is dead, and the other is not yet born.” Idaho proverb: “The only good Indian is a dead Indian.”

    But the proverb applies to the white man also. Dr. Jacob Chamberlain, the missionary, said: “I never but once in India heard a man deny that he was a sinner. But once a Brahmin interrupted me and said, ‘I deny your premises. I am not a sinner. I do not need to do better.’ For a moment I was abashed. Then I said: ‘But what do your neighbors say?’ Thereupon one cried out: ‘He cheated me in trading horses’; another: ‘He defrauded a widow of her inheritance.’ The Brahmin went out of the house, and I never saw him again.” A great nephew of Richard Brinsley Sheridan, Joseph Sheridan Le Faun, when a child, wrote in a few lines an “Essay on the Life of Man,” which ran as follows: “A man’s life naturally divides itself into three distinct parts. The first when he is contriving and planning all kinds of villainy and rascality, that is the period of youth and innocence. In the second, he is found putting in practice all the villainy and rascality he has contrived, that is the flower of mankind and prime of life. The third and last period is that when he is making his soul and preparing for another world, that is the period of dotage.” (c) The common judgment of mankind declares that there is an element of selfishness in every human heart and that every man is prone to some form of sin. This common judgment is expressed in the maxims: “No man is perfect”; “Every man has his weak side”, or “his price”; and every great name in literature has attested its truth.

    Seneca, De Ira, 3:26 — “We are all wicked. What one blames in another he will find in his own bosom. We live among the wicked, ourselves being wicked”; Ep., 22 — “No one has strength of himself to emerge [from this wickedness]; some one must needs hold forth a hand; some one must draw us out.” Ovid, Met., 7:19 — “I see the things that are better and I approve them, yet I follow the worse. We strive even after that which is forbidden and we desire the things that are denied.” Cicero: “Nature has given us faint sparks of knowledge; we extinguish them by our immoralities.”

    Shakespeare, Othello, 3:3 — “Where’s that palace where into foul things Sometimes intrude not? Who has a breast so pure, But some uncleanly apprehensions keep leets [meetings in court] and law days, and in sessions sit With meditations lawful?” Henry VI., 11:3:3 — “Forbear to judge, for we are sinners all.” Hamlet, 2:2, compares God’s influence to the sun which “breeds maggots in a dead dog, Kissing carrion,” — that is, God is no more responsible for the corruption in man’s heart and the evil that comes from it, than the sun is responsible for the maggots which its heat breeds in a dead dog. 3:l — “We are arrant knaves all” Timon of Athens, 1:2 — “Who lives that’s not depraved or depraves?”

    Goethe: “I see no fault committed which I too might not have committed” Dr. Johnson: “Every man knows that of himself which he dare not tell to his dearest friend.” Thackeray showed himself a master in fiction by having no heroes; the paragons of virtue belonged to a cruder age of romance. So George Eliot represents life correctly by setting before us no perfect characters; all of them act from mixed motives. Carlyle, heroworshiper as he was inclined to be, is said to have become disgusted with each of his heroes before he finished his biography. Emerson said that to understand any crime, he had only to look into his own heart. Robert Burns: “God knows I’m no thing I would be, Nor am I even the thing I could be” Huxley: “The best men of the best epochs are simply those who make the fewest blunders and commit the fewest sins.” And he speaks of “the infinite wickedness” which has attended the course of human history.

    Matthew Arnold: “What mortal, when he saw, Life’s voyage done, his heavenly Friend, Could ever yet dare tell him fearlessly: — I have kept uninfringed my nature’s law: The only written chart thou gavest me, to guide me, I have kept by to the end?” Walter Besant, Children of Gibeon: “The men of ability do not desire a system in which they shall not be able to do good to themselves first.” “Ready to offer praise and prayer on Sunday, if on Monday they may go into the market place to skin their fellows and sell their hides.” Yet Confucius declares that “man is born good.” He confounds conscience with will — the sense of right with the love of right. Dean Swift’s worthy sought many years for a method of extracting sunbeams from cucumbers. Human nature, by itself, is as little able to bear the fruits of God.

    Every man will grant (1) that he is not perfect in moral character, (2) that love to God has not been the constant motive of his actions, i. e., that he has been to some degree selfish, (3) that he has committed at least one known violation of conscience. Shedd, Sermons to the Natural Man, 86, 87 — “Those theorists who reject revealed religion, and remand man to the first principles of ethics and morality as the only religion that he needs, send him to a tribunal that damns him.” It is simple fact that “no human creature, in any country or grade of civilization, has ever glorified God to the extent of his knowledge of God.” 3. Proof from Christian experience (a) In proportion to his spiritual progress does the Christian recognize evil dispositions within him, which but for divine grace might germinate and bring forth the most various forms of outward transgression.

    See Goodwin’s experience, in Baird, Elohim Revealed, 409; Goodwin, member of the Westminster Assembly of Divines, speaking of his conversion, says: “An abundant discovery was made to me of my inward lusts and concupiscence, and I was amazed to see with what greediness I had sought the gratification of every sin.” Tollner’s experience, in Martensen’s Dogmatics: Tollner, though inclined to Pelagianism, says: “I look into my own heart and I see with penitent sorrow that I must in God’s sight accuse myself of all the offences I have named,” — and he had named only deliberate transgressions. “He who does not allow that he is similarly guilty, let him look deep into his own heart.” John Newton sees the murderer led to execution, and says: “There, but for the grace of God, goes John Newton.” Count de Maistre: “I do not know what the heart of a villain may be — I only know that of a virtuous man and that is frightful.” Tholuck, on the fiftieth anniversary of his professorship at Halle, said to his students: “In review of God’s manifold blessings, the thing I seem most to thank him for is the conviction of sin.”

    Roger Ascham: “By experience we find out a short way, by a long wandering.” Luke 15:25-32 is sometimes referred to as indicating that there are some of God’s children who never wander from the Father’s house. But there were two prodigals in that family. The elder was a servant in spirit as well as the younger. J. J. Murphy, Nat. Selection and Spir. Freedom,41,42 — “In the wish of the elder son that he might sometimes feast with his own friends apart from his father was contained the germ of that desire to escape the wholesome restraints of home. This wish, in its full development, had brought his brother first to riotous living, and afterwards to the service of the stranger and the herding of swine. This root of sin is in us all, but in him it was not so fully-grown as to bring death. Yet he says: ‘Lo, these many years do I serve thee’ (douleu>w — as a bondservant), ‘and I never transgressed a commandment of thine.’ Are the father’s commandments grievous? Is service true and sincere, without love from the heart? The elder brother was calculating toward his father and unsympathetic toward his brother.”

    Sir J. R. Seelye, Ecce Homo: “No virtue can be safe, unless it is enthusiastic.” Wordsworth: “Heaven rejects the love of nicely calculated less or more.” (b) Since those most enlightened by the Holy Spirit recognize themselves as guilty of unnumbered violations of the divine law, the absence of any consciousness of sin on the part of unregenerate men must be regarded as proof that they are blinded by persistent transgression.

    It is a remarkable fact that, while those who are enlightened by the Holy Spirit and who are actually overcoming their sins see more and more of the evil of their hearts and lives. Those who are the slaves of sin see less and less of that evil and often deny that they are sinners at all. Rousseau, in his Confessions, confesses sin in a spirit which itself needs to be confessed. He glosses over his vices and magnifies his virtues. “No man,” he says, “can come to the throne of God and say: ‘I am a better man than Rousseau.’….Let the trumpet of the last judgment sound when it will:

    Twill present myself before the Sovereign Judge with this book in my hand and I will say aloud: ‘Here is what I did, what I thought, and what I was.”’ “Ah,” said he, just before he expired, “how happy a thing it is to die, when one has no reason for remorse or self-reproach!” And then, addressing himself to the Almighty, he said: “Eternal Being, the soul that I am going to give thee back is as pure at this moment as it was when it proceeded from thee; render it a partaker of thy felicity!” Yet, in his boyhood, Rousseau was a petty thief. In his writings, he advocated adultery and suicide. He lived for more than twenty years in practical licentiousness. His children, most of whom, if not all, were illegitimate, he sent off to the foundling hospital as soon as they were born, thus casting them upon the charity of strangers, yet he inflamed the mothers of France with his eloquent appeals to them to nurse their own babies. He was mean, vacillating, treacherous, hypocritical, and blasphemous. And in his Confessions, he rehearses the exciting scenes of his life in the spirit of the bold adventurer. See N. M. Williams, in Bap. Review, art.: Rousseau, from which the substance of the above is taken.

    Edwin Forrest, when accused of being converted in a religious revival, wrote an indignant denial to the public press, saying that he had nothing to regret. His sins were those of omission rather than commission, he had always acted upon the principle of loving his friends and hating his enemies. Trusting in the justice as well as the mercy of God, he hoped, when he left this earthly sphere, to wrap the drapery of his couch about him, and lie down to pleasant dreams.’ And yet no man of his time was more arrogant, self-sufficient, licentious, revengeful. John V. McCane, when sentenced to Sing Sing prison for six years for violating the election laws by the most highhanded bribery and ballot stuffing, declared that he had never done anything wrong in his life. He was a Sunday School Superintendent, moreover. A lady, who had lived to the age of 92, protested that, if she had her whole life to live over again, she would not alter a single thing. Lord Nelson, after he had received his death wound at Trafalgar, said: “I have never been a great sinner.” Yet at that very time he was living in open adultery. Tennyson, Sea Dreams: “With all his conscience and one eye askew, So false, he partly took himself for true.”

    Contrast the utterance of the apostle Paul: 1 Timothy 1:15 — “Christ Jesus came into the world to save sinners; of whom I am chief.” It has been well said that “the greatest of sins is to be conscious of none.”

    Rowland Hill: “The devil makes little of sin, that he may retain the sinner.”

    The following reasons may be suggested for men’s unconsciousness of their sins: 1. We never know the force of any evil passion or principle within us until we begin to resist it. 2. God’s providential restraints upon sin have hitherto prevented its full development. 3. God’s judgments against sin have not yet been made manifest. 4. Sin itself has a blinding influence upon the mind. 5. Only he who has been saved from the penalty of sin is willing to look into the abyss from which he has been rescued. That a man is unconscious of any sin is therefore only proof that he is a great and hardened transgressor. This is also the most hopeless feature of his case, since for one who never realizes his sin there is no salvation. In the light of this truth, we see the amazing grace of God, not only in the gift of Christ to die for sinners, but in the gift of the Holy Spirit to convince men of their sins and to lead them to accept the Savior. Psalm 90:8 — “Thou hast set our secret sins in the light of thy countenance” = man’s inner sinfulness is hidden from himself, until it is contrasted with the holiness of God. Light = a luminary or sun, which shines down into the depths of the heart and brings out its hidden evil into painful relief. See Julius Muller, Doctrine of Sin, 2:248-259; Edwards, Works, 2:326; John Caird, Reasons for Men’s Unconsciousness of their Sins, in Sermons, 33.

    II. EVERY MEMBER OF THE HUMAN RACE, WITHOUT EXCEPTION, POSSESSES A CORRUPTED NATURE, WHICH IS A SOURCE OF ACTUAL SIN, AND IS ITSELF SIN.

    1. Proof from Scripture.

    A. The sinful acts and dispositions of men are referred to, and explained by, a corrupt nature.

    By ‘nature’ we mean that which is born in a man that which he has by birth. That there is an inborn corrupt state from which spiteful acts and dispositions flow is evident from Luke 6:43-45 — “there is no good tree that bringeth forth corrupt fruit… the evil man out of the evil treasure [of his heart] bringeth forth that which is evil”; Matthew 12:34 — “Ye offspring of vipers, how can ye, being evil, speak good things?” Psalm 58:3 — “The wicked are estranged from the womb: They go astray as soon as they are born, speaking lies.”

    This corrupt nature (a) belongs to man from the first moment of his being, (b) underlies man’s consciousness, (c) cannot be changed by man’s own power, (d) first constitutes him a sinner before God and (e) is the common heritage of the race. (a) Psalm 51:5 — “Behold, I was brought forth in iniquity; And in sin did my mother conceive me” — here David is confessing, not his mother’s sin, but his own sin and he declares that this sin goes back to the very moment of his conception. Tholuck, quoted by H. B. Smith System, — “David confesses that sin begins with the life of man; that not only his works, but the man himself, is guilty before God.” Shedd, Dogmatic Theology, 2:94 — David mentions the fact that he was born sinful, as an aggravation of his particular act of adultery, and not as an excuse for it.” (b) Psalm 19:12 — “Who can discern his errors? Clear thou me from hidden faults”; 51:6, 7 — Behold, thou desirest truth in the inward parts; And in the hidden part thou wilt make me to know wisdom. Purify me with hyssop, and I shall be clean: Wash me, and I shall he whiter than snow. (c) Jeremiah 13:23 — “Can the Ethiopian change his skin, or the leopard his spots? then may ye also do good, that are accustomed to do evil”; Romans 7:24 — “Wretched man that I am I who shall deliver me out of the body of this death?” (d) Psalm 51:6 — “Behold, thou desirest truth in the inward parts”; Jeremiah 17:9 — “The heart is deceitful above all things and it is exceedingly corrupt: who can know it? I, Jehovah, search the mind, I try the heart” = only God can fully know the native and incurable depravity of the human heart; see Annotated Paragraph Bible, in loco . (e) Job 14:4 — “Who can bring a clean thing out of an unclean? not one”; John 3:6 — “That which is born of the flesh is flesh,” i e., human nature sundered from God. Pope, Theology, 2:53 — “Christ, who knew what was in man, says: ‘If ye then, being evil’ (Matthew. 7:11), and ‘That which is born of the flesh is flesh’ ( John 3:6), that is — putting the two together — ‘men are evil, because they are born evil.’” Nathaniel Hawthorn’s story of The Minister’s Black Veil portrays the isolation of every man’s deepest life, and the awe, which any visible assertion of that isolation inspires. C. P. Cranch: “We are spirits clad in veils; Man by man was never seen; All our deep communing falls To remove the shadowy screen.” In the heart of every one of us is that fearful “black drop,” which the Koran says the angel showed to Mohammed. Sin is like the taint of scrofula in the blood, which shows itself in tumors, in consumption, in cancer, in manifold forms but is everywhere the same organic evil. Byron spoke truly of “This ineradicable taint of sin, this boundless Upas, this all-blasting tree.”

    E. G. Robinson, Christ. Theol., 161, 162 — “The objection that conscience brings no charge of guilt against inborn depravity, however true it may be of the nature in its passive state, is seen, when the nature is roused to activity, to be unfounded. This faculty, on the contrary, lends support to the doctrine it is supposed to overthrow. When the conscience holds intelligent inquisition upon single acts, it soon discovers that these are mere accessories to crime, while the principal is hidden away beyond the reach of consciousness. In following up its inquisition, it in due time extorts the exclamation of David: Psalm 51:5 — ‘Behold, I was brought forth in iniquity; And in sin did my mother conceive me.’

    Conscience traces guilt to its seat in the inherited nature.”

    B. All men are declared to be by nature children of wrath ( Ephesians 2:3). Here ‘nature’ signifies something inborn and original, as distinguished from that which is subsequently acquired. The text implies that: (a) Sin is a nature, in the sense of a congenital depravity of the will. (b) This nature is guilty and condemnable, since God’s wrath rests only upon that which deserves it. (c) All men participate in this nature and in this consequent guilt and condemnation. Ephesians 2:3 — “were by nature children of wrath, even as the rest” Shedd: “Nature here is not substance created by God, but corruption of that substance, which corruption is created by man.” ‘Nature’ (from nascor ) may denote anything inborn and the term may just as properly designate inborn evil tendencies and state, as inborn faculties or substance. “By nature” therefore = “by birth”; compare Galatians 2:15 — “Jews by nature.” E. G. Robinson: “Nature = not oujsi>a or essence, but only qualification of essence, as something born in us. There is just as much difference in babes, from the beginning of their existence, as there is in adults. If sin is defined as ‘voluntary transgression of known law,’ the definition of course disposes of original sin,” But if sin is a selfish state of the will, such a state is demonstrably inborn. Aristotle speaks of some men as born to be savages fu>sei ba>rbaroi , and of others as destined by nature to be slaves fu>sei dou~loi . Here evidently is a congenital aptitude and disposition. Similarly we can interpret Pain’s words as declaring nothing less than that men are possessed at birth of an aptitude and disposition which is the object of God’s just displeasure.

    The opposite view can be found in Stevens, Pauline Theology, 152-157.

    Principal Fairbairn also says that inherited sinfulness “is not transgression, and is without guilt.” Ritschl, Just, and Recon., 344 — “The predicate ‘children of wrath’ refers to the former actual transgression of those who now as Christians have the right to apply to themselves that divine purpose of grace which is the antithesis of wrath.”

    Meyer interprets the verse: “We become children of wrath by following a natural propensity.” He claims the doctrine of the apostle to be that man incurs the divine wrath by his actual sin, when he submits his will to the inborn sin principle. So N. W. Taylor, Concio ad Clerum, quoted in H. B.

    Smith, System, 281 — “We were by nature such that we became through our own act children of wrath.” “But,” says Smith, “if the apostle had meant this, he could have said so; there is a proper Greek word for ‘became’; the word which is used can only be rendered ‘were.”’ So, Corinthians 7:14 — “else were your children unclean” — implies that, apart from the operations of grace, all men are defiled in virtue of their very birth from a corrupt stock. Cloth is first dyed in the wool and then dyed again after the weaving. Man is a “double-dyed villain.” He is corrupted by nature and afterwards by practice. The colored physician in New Orleans advertised that his method was “first to remove the disease, and then to eradicate the system.” The New School method of treating this text is of a similar sort. Beginning with a definition of sin, which excludes from that category all inborn states of the will, it proceeds to vacate of their meaning the positive statements of Scripture.

    For the proper interpretation of Ephesians 2:3, see Julius Muller, Doct. of Sin, 2:278, and Commentaries of Harless and Olshausen. See also Philippi, Glaubenslehre, 3:2l2 sq . Thomasius, Christi Person und Werk, 1:289; and an excellent note in the Expositor’s Greek New Testament, in loco . Per contra, see Reuss, Christ. Theol. in Apost. Age, 2:29, 79-84; Weiss, Bib. Theol. New Testament, 239.

    C. Death, the penalty of sin, is visited even upon those who have never exercised a personal and conscious choice ( Romans 5:12-14). This text implies that (a) Sin exists in the case of infants prior to moral consciousness, and therefore in the