QUESTIONS 55-70 QUESTION OF THE VIRTUES, AS TO THEIR ESSENCE (FOUR ARTICLES)\parWe come now to the consideration of habits specifically. And since habits, as we have said ( Q(54), A(3) ), are divided into good and bad, we must speak in the first place of good habits, which are virtues, and of other matters connected with them, namely the Gifts, Beatitudes and Fruits; in the second place, of bad habits, namely of vices and sins. Now five things must be considered about virtues: (1) the essence of virtue; (2) its subject; (3) the division of virtue; (4) the cause of virtue; (5) certain properties of virtue.

Under the first head, there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether human virtue is a habit? (2) Whether it is an operative habit? (3) Whether it is a good habit? (4) Of the definition of virtue.

P(2a)- Q(55)- A(1) Whether human virtue is a habit?

P(2a)- Q(55)- A(1)- O(1) — It would seem that human virtue is not a habit:

For virtue is “the limit of power” (De Coelo i, text. 116). But the limit of anything is reducible to the genus of that of which it is the limit; as a point is reducible to the genus of line. Therefore virtue is reducible to the genus of power, and not to the genus of habit.

P(2a)- Q(55)- A(1)- O(2) — Further, Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. ii) [*Retract. ix; cf. De Lib. Arb. ii, 19] that “virtue is good use of free-will.”

But use of free-will is an act. Therefore virtue is not a habit, but an act.

P(2a)- Q(55)- A(1)- O(3) — Further, we do not merit by our habits, but by our actions: otherwise a man would merit continually, even while asleep.

But we do merit by our virtues. Therefore virtues are not habits, but acts.

P(2a)- Q(55)- A(1)- O(4) — Further, Augustine says (De Moribus Eccl. xv) that “virtue is the order of love,” and (QQ. lxxxiii, qu. 30) that “the ordering which is called virtue consists in enjoying what we ought to enjoy, and using what we ought to use.” Now order, or ordering, denominates either an action or a relation. Therefore virtue is not a habit, but an action or a relation.

P(2a)- Q(55)- A(1)- O(5) — Further, just as there are human virtues, so are there natural virtues. But natural virtues are not habits, but powers.

Neither therefore are human virtues habits.

P(2a)- Q(55)- A(1) — On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Categor. vi) that science and virtue are habits.

P(2a)- Q(55)- A(1) — I answer that, Virtue denotes a certain perfection of a power. Now a thing’s perfection is considered chiefly in regard to its end. But the end of power is act. Wherefore power is said to be perfect, according as it is determinate to its act.

Now there are some powers which of themselves are determinate to their acts; for instance, the active natural powers. And therefore these natural powers are in themselves called virtues. But the rational powers, which are proper to man, are not determinate to one particular action, but are inclined indifferently to many: and they are determinate to acts by means of habits, as is clear from what we have said above ( Q(49), A(4) ). Therefore human virtues are habits.

P(2a)- Q(55)- A(1)- RO(1) — Sometimes we give the name of a virtue to that to which the virtue is directed, namely, either to its object, or to its act: for instance, we give the name Faith, to that which we believe, or to the act of believing, as also to the habit by which we believe. When therefore we say that “virtue is the limit of power,” virtue is taken for the object of virtue. For the furthest point to which a power can reach, is said to be its virtue; for instance, if a man can carry a hundredweight and not more, his virtue [*In English we should say ‘strength,’ which is the original signification of the Latin ‘virtus’: thus we speak of an engine being so many horse-power, to indicate its ‘strength’] is put at a hundredweight, and not at sixty. But the objection takes virtue as being essentially the limit of power.

P(2a)- Q(55)- A(1)- RO(2) — Good use of free-will is said to be a virtue, in the same sense as above (ad 1); that is to say, because it is that to which virtue is directed as to its proper act. For the act of virtue is nothing else than the good use of free-will.

P(2a)- Q(55)- A(1)- RO(3) — We are said to merit by something in two ways. First, as by merit itself, just as we are said to run by running; and thus we merit by acts. Secondly, we are said to merit by something as by the principle whereby we merit, as we are said to run by the motive power; and thus are we said to merit by virtues and habits.

P(2a)- Q(55)- A(1)- RO(4) — When we say that virtue is the order or ordering of love, we refer to the end to which virtue is ordered: because in us love is set in order by virtue.

P(2a)- Q(55)- A(1)- RO(5) — Natural powers are of themselves determinate to one act: not so the rational powers. And so there is no comparison, as we have said.

P(2a)- Q(55)- A(2) Whether human virtue is an operative habit?

P(2a)- Q(55)- A(2)- O(1) — It would seem that it is not essential to human virtue to be an operative habit. For Tully says (Tuscul. iv) that as health and beauty belong to the body, so virtue belongs to the soul. But health and beauty are not operative habits. Therefore neither is virtue.

P(2a)- Q(55)- A(2)- O(2) — Further, in natural things we find virtue not only in reference to act, but also in reference to being: as is clear from the Philosopher (De Coelo i), since some have a virtue to be always, while some have a virtue to be not always, but at some definite time. Now as natural virtue is in natural things, so is human virtue in rational beings.

Therefore also human virtue is referred not only to act, but also to being.

P(2a)- Q(55)- A(2)- O(3) — Further, the Philosopher says (Phys. vii, text. 17) that virtue “is the disposition of a perfect thing to that which is best.”

Now the best thing to which man needs to be disposed by virtue is God Himself, as Augustine proves (De Moribus Eccl. 3,6, 14) to Whom the soul is disposed by being made like to Him. Therefore it seems that virtue is a quality of the soul in reference to God, likening it, as it were, to Him; and not in reference to operation. It is not, therefore, an operative habit.

P(2a)- Q(55)- A(2) — On the contrary, The Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 6) says that “virtue of a thing is that which makes its work good.”

P(2a)- Q(55)- A(2) — I answer that, Virtue, from the very nature of the word, implies some perfection of power, as we have said above ( A(1) ).

Wherefore, since power [*The one Latin word ‘potentia’ is rendered ‘potentiality’ in the first case, and ‘power’ in the second] is of two kinds, namely, power in reference to being, and power in reference to act; the perfection of each of these is called virtue. But power in reference to being is on the part of matter, which is potential being, whereas power in reference to act, is on the part of the form, which is the principle of action, since everything acts in so far as it is in act.

Now man is so constituted that the body holds the place of matter, the soul that of form. The body, indeed, man has in common with other animals; and the same is to be said of the forces which are common to the soul and body: and only those forces which are proper to the soul, namely, the rational forces, belong to man alone. And therefore, human virtue, of which we are speaking now, cannot belong to the body, but belongs only to that which is proper to the soul. Wherefore human virtue does not imply reference to being, but rather to act. Consequently it is essential to human virtue to be an operative habit.

P(2a)- Q(55)- A(2)- RO(1) — Mode of action follows on the disposition of the agent: for such as a thing is, such is its act. And therefore, since virtue is the principle of some kind of operation, there must needs pre-exist in the operator in respect of virtue some corresponding disposition. Now virtue causes an ordered operation. Therefore virtue itself is an ordered disposition of the soul, in so far as, to wit, the powers of the soul are in some way ordered to one another, and to that which is outside. Hence virtue, inasmuch as it is a suitable disposition of the soul, is like health and beauty, which are suitable dispositions of the body. But this does not hinder virtue from being a principle of operation.

P(2a)- Q(55)- A(2)- RO(2) — Virtue which is referred to being is not proper to man; but only that virtue which is referred to works of reason, which are proper to man.

P(2a)- Q(55)- A(2)- RO(3) — As God’s substance is His act, the highest likeness of man to God is in respect of some operation. Wherefore, as we have said above ( Q(3) , A(2) ), happiness or bliss by which man is made most perfectly conformed to God, and which is the end of human life, consists in an operation.

P(2a)- Q(55)- A(3) Whether human virtue is a good habit?

P(2a)- Q(55)- A(3)- O(1) — It would seem that it is not essential to virtue that it should be a good habit. For sin is always taken in a bad sense. But there is a virtue even of sin; according to 1 Corinthians 15:56: “The virtue [Douay: ‘strength’] of sin is the Law.”

Therefore virtue is not always a good habit.

P(2a)- Q(55)- A(3)- O(2) — Further, Virtue corresponds to power. But power is not only referred to good, but also to evil: according to Isaiah 5: “Woe to you that are mighty to drink wine, and stout men at drunkenness.”

Therefore virtue also is referred to good and evil.

P(2a)- Q(55)- A(3)- O(3) — Further, according to the Apostle ( Corinthians 12:9): “Virtue [Douay: ‘power’] is made perfect in infirmity.”

But infirmity is an evil. Therefore virtue is referred not only to good, but also to evil.

P(2a)- Q(55)- A(3) — On the contrary, Augustine says (De Moribus Eccl. vi): “No one can doubt that virtue makes the soul exceeding good”: and the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 6): “Virtue is that which makes its possessor good, and his work good likewise.”

P(2a)- Q(55)- A(3) — I answer that, As we have said above ( A(1) ), virtue implies a perfection of power: wherefore the virtue of a thing is fixed by the limit of its power (De Coelo i). Now the limit of any power must needs be good: for all evil implies defect; wherefore Dionysius says (Div.

Hom. ii) that every evil is a weakness. And for this reason the virtue of a thing must be regarded in reference to good. Therefore human virtue which is an operative habit, is a good habit, productive of good works.

P(2a)- Q(55)- A(3)- RO(1) — Just as bad things are said metaphorically to be perfect, so are they said to be good: for we speak of a perfect thief or robber; and of a good thief or robber, as the Philosopher explains (Metaph. v, text. 21). In this way therefore virtue is applied to evil things: so that the “virtue” of sin is said to be law, in so far as occasionally sin is aggravated through the law, so as to attain to the limit of its possibility.

P(2a)- Q(55)- A(3)- RO(2) — The evil of drunkenness and excessive drink, consists in a falling away from the order of reason. Now it happens that, together with this falling away from reason, some lower power is perfect in reference to that which belongs to its own kind, even in direct opposition to reason, or with some falling away therefrom. But the perfection of that power, since it is compatible with a falling away from reason, cannot be called a human virtue.

P(2a)- Q(55)- A(3)- RO(3) — Reason is shown to be so much the more perfect, according as it is able to overcome or endure more easily the weakness of the body and of the lower powers. And therefore human virtue, which is attributed to reason, is said to be “made perfect in infirmity,” not of the reason indeed, but of the body and of the lower powers.

P(2a)- Q(55)- A(4) Whether virtue is suitably defined?

P(2a)- Q(55)- A(4)- O(1) — It would seem that the definition, usually given, of virtue, is not suitable, to wit: “Virtue is a good quality of the mind, by which we live righteously, of which no one can make bad use, which God works in us, without us.” For virtue is man’s goodness, since virtue it is that makes its subject good. But goodness does not seem to be good, as neither is whiteness white. It is therefore unsuitable to describe virtue as a “good quality.”

P(2a)- Q(55)- A(4)- O(2) — Further, no difference is more common than its genus; since it is that which divides the genus. But good is more common than quality, since it is convertible with being. Therefore “good” should not be put in the definition of virtue, as a difference of quality.

P(2a)- Q(55)- A(4)- O(3) — Further, as Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 3): “When we come across anything that is not common to us and the beasts of the field, it is something appertaining to the mind.” But there are virtues even of the irrational parts; as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 10). Every virtue, therefore, is not a good quality “of the mind.”

P(2a)- Q(55)- A(4)- O(4) — Further, righteousness seems to belong to justice; whence the righteous are called just. But justice is a species of virtue. It is therefore unsuitable to put “righteous” in the definition of virtue, when we say that virtue is that “by which we live righteously.”

P(2a)- Q(55)- A(4)- O(5) — Further, whoever is proud of a thing, makes bad use of it. But many are proud of virtue, for Augustine says in his Rule, that “pride lies in wait for good works in order to slay them.” It is untrue, therefore, “that no one can make bad use of virtue.”

P(2a)- Q(55)- A(4)- O(6) — Further, man is justified by virtue. But Augustine commenting on John 15:11: “He shall do greater things than these,” says [*Tract. xxvii in Joan.: Serm. xv de Verb. Ap. 11]: “He who created thee without thee, will not justify thee without thee.” It is therefore unsuitable to say that “God works virtue in us, without us.”

P(2a)- Q(55)- A(4) — On the contrary, We have the authority of Augustine from whose words this definition is gathered, and principally in De Libero Arbitrio ii, 19.

P(2a)- Q(55)- A(4) — I answer that, This definition comprises perfectly the whole essential notion of virtue. For the perfect essential notion of anything is gathered from all its causes. Now the above definition comprises all the causes of virtue. For the formal cause of virtue, as of everything, is gathered from its genus and difference, when it is defined as “a good quality”: for “quality” is the genus of virtue, and the difference, “good.” But the definition would be more suitable if for “quality” we substitute “habit,” which is the proximate genus.

Now virtue has no matter “out of which” it is formed, as neither has any other accident; but it has matter “about which” it is concerned, and matter “in which” it exits, namely, the subject. The matter about which virtue is concerned is its object, and this could not be included in the above definition, because the object fixes the virtue to a certain species, and here we are giving the definition of virtue in general. And so for material cause we have the subject, which is mentioned when we say that virtue is a good quality “of the mind.”

The end of virtue, since it is an operative habit, is operation. But it must be observed that some operative habits are always referred to evil, as vicious habits: others are sometimes referred to good, sometimes to evil; for instance, opinion is referred both to the true and to the untrue: whereas virtue is a habit which is always referred to good: and so the distinction of virtue from those habits which are always referred to evil, is expressed in the words “by which we live righteously”: and its distinction from those habits which are sometimes directed unto good, sometimes unto evil, in the words, “of which no one makes bad use.”

Lastly, God is the efficient cause of infused virtue, to which this definition applies; and this is expressed in the words “which God works in us without us.” If we omit this phrase, the remainder of the definition will apply to all virtues in general, whether acquired or infused.

P(2a)- Q(55)- A(4)- RO(1) — That which is first seized by the intellect is being: wherefore everything that we apprehend we consider as being, and consequently as gone, and as good, which are convertible with being.

Wherefore we say that essence is being and is one and is good; and that oneness is being and one and good: and in like manner goodness. But this is not the case with specific forms, as whiteness and health; for everything that we apprehend, is not apprehended with the notion of white and healthy. We must, however, observe that, as accidents and non-subsistent forms are called beings, not as if they themselves had being, but because things are by them; so also are they called good or one, not by some distinct goodness or oneness, but because by them something is good or one. So also is virtue called good, because by it something is good.

P(2a)- Q(55)- A(4)- RO(2) — Good, which is put in the definition of virtue, is not good in general which is convertible with being, and which extends further than quality, but the good as fixed by reason, with regard to which Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) “that the good of the soul is to be in accord with reason.”

P(2a)- Q(55)- A(4)- RO(3) — Virtue cannot be in the irrational part of the soul, except in so far as this participates in the reason (Ethic. i, 13). And therefore reason, or the mind, is the proper subject of virtue.

P(2a)- Q(55)- A(4)- RO(4) — Justice has a righteousness of its own by which it puts those outward things right which come into human use, and are the proper matter of justice, as we shall show further on ( Q(60), A(2) ; P(2b) , Q(58), A(8) ). But the righteousness which denotes order to a due end and to the Divine law, which is the rule of the human will, as stated above ( Q(19), A(4) ), is common to all virtues.

P(2a)- Q(55)- A(4)- RO(5) — One can make bad use of a virtue objectively, for instance by having evil thoughts about a virtue, e.g. by hating it, or by being proud of it: but one cannot make bad use of virtue as principle of action, so that an act of virtue be evil.

P(2a)- Q(55)- A(4)- RO(6) — Infused virtue is caused in us by God without any action on our part, but not without our consent. This is the sense of the words, “which God works in us without us.” As to those things which are done by us, God causes them in us, yet not without action on our part, for He works in every will and in every nature.

QUESTION OF THE SUBJECT OF VIRTUE (SIX ARTICLES) We now have to consider the subject of virtue, about which there are six points of inquiry: (1) Whether the subject of virtue is a power of the soul? (2) Whether one virtue can be in several powers? (3) Whether the intellect can be the subject of virtue? (4) Whether the irascible and concupiscible faculties can be the subject of virtue? (5) Whether the sensitive powers of apprehension can be the subject of virtue? (6) Whether the will can be the subject of virtue?

P(2a)- Q(56)- A(1) Whether the subject of virtue is a power of the soul?

P(2a)- Q(56)- A(1)- O(1) — It would seem that the subject of virtue is not a power of the soul. For Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. ii, 19) that “virtue is that by which we live righteously.” But we live by the essence of the soul, and not by a power of the soul. Therefore virtue is not a power, but in the essence of the soul.

P(2a)- Q(56)- A(1)- O(2) — Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 6) that “virtue is that which makes its possessor good, and his work good likewise.” But as work is set up by power, so he that has a virtue is set up by the essence of the soul. Therefore virtue does not belong to the power, any more than to the essence of the soul.

P(2a)- Q(56)- A(1)- O(3) — Further, power is in the second species of quality. But virtue is a quality, as we have said above ( Q(55), A(4) ): and quality is not the subject of quality. Therefore a power of the soul is not the subject of virtue.

P(2a)- Q(56)- A(1) — On the contrary, “Virtue is the limit of power” (De Coelo ii). But the limit is in that of which it is the limit. Therefore virtue is in a power of the soul.

P(2a)- Q(56)- A(1) — I answer that, It can be proved in three ways that virtue belongs to a power of the soul. First, from the notion of the very essence of virtue, which implies perfection of a power; for perfection is in that which it perfects. Secondly, from the fact that virtue is an operative habit, as we have said above ( Q(55), A(2) ): for all operation proceeds from the soul through a power. Thirdly, from the fact that virtue disposes to that which is best: for the best is the end, which is either a thing’s operation, or something acquired by an operation proceeding from the thing’s power. Therefore a power of the soul is the subject of virtue.

P(2a)- Q(56)- A(1)- RO(1) — “To live” may be taken in two ways.

Sometimes it is taken for the very existence of the living thing: in this way it belongs to the essence of the soul, which is the principle of existence in the living thing. But sometimes “to live” is taken for the operation of the living thing: in this sense, by virtue we live righteously, inasmuch as by virtue we perform righteous actions.

P(2a)- Q(56)- A(1)- RO(2) — Good is either the end, or something referred to the end. And therefore, since the good of the worker consists in the work, this fact also, that virtue makes the worker good, is referred to the work, and consequently, to the power.

P(2a)- Q(56)- A(1)- RO(3) — One accident is said to be the subject of another, not as though one accident could uphold another; but because one accident inheres to substance by means of another, as color to the body by means of the surface; so that surface is said to be the subject of color. In this way a power of the soul is said to be the subject of virtue.

P(2a)- Q(56)- A(2) Whether one virtue can be in several powers?

P(2a)- Q(56)- A(2)- O(1) — It would seem that one virtue can be in several powers. For habits are known by their acts. But one act proceeds in various way from several powers: thus walking proceeds from the reason as directing, from the will as moving, and from the motive power as executing. Therefore also one habit can be in several powers.

P(2a)- Q(56)- A(2)- O(2) — Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 4) that three things are required for virtue, namely: “to know, to will, and to work steadfastly.” But “to know” belongs to the intellect, and “to will” belongs to the will. Therefore virtue can be in several powers.

P(2a)- Q(56)- A(2)- O(3) — Further, prudence is in the reason since it is “the right reason of things to be done” (Ethic. vi, 5). And it is also in the will: for it cannot exist together with a perverse will (Ethic. vi, 12).

Therefore one virtue can be in two powers.

P(2a)- Q(56)- A(2) — On the contrary, The subject of virtue is a power of the soul. But the same accident cannot be in several subjects. Therefore one virtue cannot be in several powers of the soul.

P(2a)- Q(56)- A(2) — I answer that, It happens in two ways that one thing is subjected in two. First, so that it is in both on an equal footing. In this way it is impossible for one virtue to be in two powers: since diversity of powers follows the generic conditions of the objects, while diversity of habits follows the specific conditions thereof: and so wherever there is diversity of powers, there is diversity of habits; but not vice versa. In another way one thing can be subjected in two or more, not on an equal footing, but in a certain order. And thus one virtue can belong to several powers, so that it is in one chiefly, while it extends to others by a kind of diffusion, or by way of a disposition, in so far as one power is moved by another, and one power receives from another.

P(2a)- Q(56)- A(2)- RO(1) — One act cannot belong to several powers equally, and in the same degree; but only from different points of view, and in various degrees.

P(2a)- Q(56)- A(2)- RO(2) — “To know” is a condition required for moral virtue, inasmuch as moral virtue works according to right reason. But moral virtue is essentially in the appetite.

P(2a)- Q(56)- A(2)- RO(3) — Prudence is really subjected in reason: but it presupposes as its principle the rectitude of the will, as we shall see further on ( A(3) ; Q(57), A(4) ).

P(2a)- Q(56)- A(3) Whether the intellect can be the subject of virtue?

P(2a)- Q(56)- A(3)- O(1) — It would seem that the intellect is not the subject of virtue. For Augustine says (De Moribus Eccl. xv) that all virtue is love. But the subject of love is not the intellect, but the appetitive power alone. Therefore no virtue is in the intellect.

P(2a)- Q(56)- A(3)- O(2) — Further, virtue is referred to good, as is clear from what has been said above ( Q(55), A(3) ). Now good is not the object of the intellect, but of the appetitive power. Therefore the subject of virtue is not the intellect, but the appetitive power.

P(2a)- Q(56)- A(3)- O(3) — Further, virtue is that “which makes its possessor good,” as the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 6). But the habit which perfects the intellect does not make its possessor good: since a man is not said to be a good man on account of his science or his art. Therefore the intellect is not the subject of virtue.

P(2a)- Q(56)- A(3) — On the contrary, The mind is chiefly called the intellect. But the subject of virtue is the mind, as is clear from the definition, above given, of virtue ( Q(55), A(4) ). Therefore the intellect is the subject of virtue.

P(2a)- Q(56)- A(3) — I answer that, As we have said above ( Q(55), A(3) ), a virtue is a habit by which we work well. Now a habit may be directed to a good act in two ways. First, in so far as by the habit a man acquires an aptness to a good act; for instance, by the habit of grammar man has the aptness to speak correctly. But grammar does not make a man always speak correctly: for a grammarian may be guilty of a barbarism or make a solecism: and the case is the same with other sciences and arts. Secondly, a habit may confer not only aptness to act, but also the right use of that aptness: for instance, justice not only gives man the prompt will to do just actions, but also makes him act justly.

And since good, and, in like manner, being, is said of a thing simply, in respect, not of what it is potentially, but of what it is actually: therefore from having habits of the latter sort, man is said simply to do good, and to be good; for instance, because he is just, or temperate; and in like manner as regards other such virtues. And since virtue is that “which makes its possessor good, and his work good likewise,” these latter habits are called virtuous simply: because they make the work to be actually good, and the subject good simply. But the first kind of habits are not called virtues simply: because they do not make the work good except in regard to a certain aptness, nor do they make their possessor good simply. For through being gifted in science or art, a man is said to be good, not simply, but relatively; for instance, a good grammarian or a good smith. And for this reason science and art are often divided against virtue; while at other times they are called virtues (Ethic. vi, 2).

Hence the subject of a habit which is called a virtue in a relative sense, can be the intellect, and not only the practical intellect, but also the speculative, without any reference to the will: for thus the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 3) holds that science, wisdom and understanding, and also art, are intellectual virtues. But the subject of a habit which is called a virtue simply, can only be the will, or some power in so far as it is moved by the will. And the reason of this is, that the will moves to their acts all those other powers that are in some way rational, as we have said above ( Q(9) , A(1) ; Q(17), AA(1),5 ; P(1), Q(82), A(4) ): and therefore if man do well actually, this is because he has a good will. Therefore the virtue which makes a man to do well actually, and not merely to have the aptness to do well, must be either in the will itself; or in some power as moved by the will.

Now it happens that the intellect is moved by the will, just as are the other powers: for a man considers something actually, because he wills to do so.

And therefore the intellect, in so far as it is subordinate to the will, can be the subject of virtue absolutely so called. And in this way the speculative intellect, or the reason, is the subject of Faith: for the intellect is moved by the command of the will to assent to what is of faith: for “no man believeth, unless he will” [*Augustine: Tract. xxvi in Joan.]. But the practical intellect is the subject of prudence. For since prudence is the right reason of things to be done, it is a condition thereof that man be rightly disposed in regard to the principles of this reason of things to be done, that is in regard to their ends, to which man is rightly disposed by the rectitude of the will, just as to the principles of speculative truth he is rightly disposed by the natural light of the active intellect. And therefore as the subject of science, which is the right reason of speculative truths, is the speculative intellect in its relation to the active intellect, so the subject of prudence is the practical intellect in its relation to the right will.

P(2a)- Q(56)- A(3)- RO(1) — The saying of Augustine is to be understood of virtue simply so called: not that every virtue is love simply: but that it depends in some way on love, in so far as it depends on the will, whose first movement consists in love, as we have said above ( Q(25), AA(1),2,3 ; Q(27), A(4) ; P(1), Q(20), A(1) ).

P(2a)- Q(56)- A(3)- RO(2) — The good of each thing is its end: and therefore, as truth is the end of the intellect, so to know truth is the good act of the intellect. Whence the habit, which perfects the intellect in regard to the knowledge of truth, whether speculative or practical, is a virtue.

P(2a)- Q(56)- A(3)- RO(3) — This objection considers virtue simply so called.

P(2a)- Q(56)- A(4) Whether the irascible and concupiscible powers are the subject of virtue?

P(2a)- Q(56)- A(4)- O(1) — It would seem that the irascible and concupiscible powers cannot be the subject of virtue. For these powers are common to us and dumb animals. But we are now speaking of virtue as proper to man, since for this reason it is called human virtue. It is therefore impossible for human virtue to be in the irascible and concupiscible powers which are parts of the sensitive appetite, as we have said in the P(1), Q(81), A(2) .

P(2a)- Q(56)- A(4)- O(2) — Further, the sensitive appetite is a power which makes use of a corporeal organ. But the good of virtue cannot be in man’s body: for the Apostle says ( Romans 7): “I know that good does not dwell in my flesh.” Therefore the sensitive appetite cannot be the subject of virtue.

P(2a)- Q(56)- A(4)- O(3) — Further, Augustine proves (De Moribus Eccl. v) that virtue is not in the body but in the soul, for the reason that the body is ruled by the soul: wherefore it is entirely due to his soul that a man make good use of his body: “For instance, if my coachman, through obedience to my orders, guides well the horses which he is driving; this is all due to me.” But just as the soul rules the body, so also does the reason rule the sensitive appetite. Therefore that the irascible and concupiscible powers are rightly ruled, is entirely due to the rational powers. Now “virtue is that by which we live rightly,” as we have said above ( Q(55), A(4) ). Therefore virtue is not in the irascible and concupiscible powers, but only in the rational powers.

P(2a)- Q(56)- A(4)- O(4) — Further, “the principal act of moral virtue is choice” (Ethic. viii, 13). Now choice is not an act of the irascible and concupiscible powers, but of the rational power, as we have said above ( Q(13), A(2) ). Therefore moral virtue is not in the irascible and concupiscible powers, but in the reason.

P(2a)- Q(56)- A(4) — On the contrary, Fortitude is assigned to the irascible power, and temperance to the concupiscible power. Whence the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 10) says that “these virtues belong to the irrational part of the soul.”

P(2a)- Q(56)- A(4) — I answer that, The irascible and concupiscible powers can be considered in two ways. First, in themselves, in so far as they are parts of the sensitive appetite: and in this way they are not competent to be the subject of virtue. Secondly, they can be considered as participating in the reason, from the fact that they have a natural aptitude to obey reason. And thus the irascible or concupiscible power can be the subject of human virtue: for, in so far as it participates in the reason, it is the principle of a human act. And to these powers we must needs assign virtues.

For it is clear that there are some virtues in the irascible and concupiscible powers. Because an act, which proceeds from one power according as it is moved by another power, cannot be perfect, unless both powers be well disposed to the act: for instance, the act of a craftsman cannot be successful unless both the craftsman and his instrument be well disposed to act. Therefore in the matter of the operations of the irascible and concupiscible powers, according as they are moved by reason, there must needs be some habit perfecting in respect of acting well, not only the reason, but also the irascible and concupiscible powers. And since the good disposition of the power which moves through being moved, depends on its conformity with the power that moves it: therefore the virtue which is in the irascible and concupiscible powers is nothing else but a certain habitual conformity of these powers to reason.

P(2a)- Q(56)- A(4)- RO(1) — The irascible and concupiscible powers considered in themselves, as parts of the sensitive appetite, are common to us and dumb animals. But in so far as they are rational by participation, and are obedient to the reason, they are proper to man. And in this way they can be the subject of human virtue.

P(2a)- Q(56)- A(4)- RO(2) — Just as human flesh has not of itself the good of virtue, but is made the instrument of a virtuous act, inasmuch as being moved by reason, we “yield our members to serve justice”; so also, the irascible and concupiscible powers, of themselves indeed, have not the good of virtue, but rather the infection of the “fomes”: whereas, inasmuch as they are in conformity with reason, the good of reason is begotten in them.

P(2a)- Q(56)- A(4)- RO(3) — The body is ruled by the soul, and the irascible and concupiscible powers by the reason, but in different ways.

For the body obeys the soul blindly without any contradiction, in those things in which it has a natural aptitude to be moved by the soul: whence the Philosopher says (Polit. i, 3) that the “soul rules the body with a despotic command” as the master rules his slave: wherefore the entire movement of the body is referred to the soul. For this reason virtue is not in the body, but in the soul. But the irascible and concupiscible powers do not obey the reason blindly; on the contrary, they have their own proper movements, by which, at times, they go against reason, whence the Philosopher says (Polit. i, 3) that the “reason rules the irascible and concupiscible powers by a political command” such as that by which free men are ruled, who have in some respects a will of their own. And for this reason also must there be some virtues in the irascible and concupiscible powers, by which these powers are well disposed to act.

P(2a)- Q(56)- A(4)- RO(4) — In choice there are two things, namely, the intention of the end, and this belongs to the moral virtue; and the preferential choice of that which is unto the end, and this belongs to prudence (Ethic. vi, 2,5). But that the irascible and concupiscible powers have a right intention of the end in regard to the passions of the soul, is due to the good disposition of these powers. And therefore those moral virtues which are concerned with the passions are in the irascible and concupiscible powers, but prudence is in the reason.

P(2a)- Q(56)- A(5) Whether the sensitive powers of apprehension are the subject of virtue?

P(2a)- Q(56)- A(5)- O(1) — It would seem that it is possible for virtue to be in the interior sensitive powers of apprehension. For the sensitive appetite can be the subject of virtue, in so far as it obeys reason. But the interior sensitive powers of apprehension obey reason: for the powers of imagination, of cogitation, and of memory [*Cf. P(1), Q(78), A(4) ] act at the command of reason. Therefore in these powers there can be virtue.

P(2a)- Q(56)- A(5)- O(2) — Further, as the rational appetite, which is the will, can be hindered or helped in its act, by the sensitive appetite, so also can the intellect or reason be hindered or helped by the powers mentioned above. As, therefore, there can be virtue in the interior powers of appetite, so also can there be virtue in the interior powers of apprehension.

P(2a)- Q(56)- A(5)- O(3) — Further, prudence is a virtue, of which Cicero (De Invent. Rhetor. ii) says that memory is a part. Therefore also in the power of memory there can be a virtue: and in like manner, in the other interior sensitive powers of apprehension.

P(2a)- Q(56)- A(5) — On the contrary, All virtues are either intellectual or moral (Ethic. ii, 1). Now all the moral virtues are in the appetite; while the intellectual virtues are in the intellect or reason, as is clear from Ethic. vi, 1.

Therefore there is no virtue in the interior sensitive powers of apprehension.

P(2a)- Q(56)- A(5) — I answer that, In the interior sensitive powers of apprehension there are some habits. And this is made clear principally from what the Philosopher says (De Memoria ii), that “in remembering one thing after another, we become used to it; and use is a second nature.”

Now a habit of use is nothing else than a habit acquired by use, which is like unto nature. Wherefore Tully says of virtue in his Rhetoric that “it is a habit like a second nature in accord with reason.” Yet, in man, that which he acquires by use, in his memory and other sensitive powers of apprehension, is not a habit properly so called, but something annexed to the habits of the intellective faculty, as we have said above ( Q(50), A(4), ad 3).

Nevertheless even if there be habits in such powers, they cannot be virtues. For virtue is a perfect habit, by which it never happens that anything but good is done: and so virtue must needs be in that power which consummates the good act. But the knowledge of truth is not consummated in the sensitive powers of apprehension: for such powers prepare the way to the intellective knowledge. And therefore in these powers there are none of the virtues, by which we know truth: these are rather in the intellect or reason.

P(2a)- Q(56)- A(5)- RO(1) — The sensitive appetite is related to the will, which is the rational appetite, through being moved by it. And therefore the act of the appetitive power is consummated in the sensitive appetite: and for this reason the sensitive appetite is the subject of virtue. Whereas the sensitive powers of apprehension are related to the intellect rather through moving it; for the reason that the phantasms are related to the intellective soul, as colors to sight (De Anima iii, text. 18). And therefore the act of knowledge is terminated in the intellect; and for this reason the cognoscitive virtues are in the intellect itself, or the reason.

And thus is made clear the Reply to the Second Objection.

P(2a)- Q(56)- A(5)- RO(3) — Memory is not a part of prudence, as species is of a genus, as though memory were a virtue properly so called: but one of the conditions required for prudence is a good memory; so that, in a fashion, it is after the manner of an integral part.

P(2a)- Q(56)- A(6) Whether the will can be the subject of virtue?

P(2a)- Q(56)- A(6)- O(1) — It would seem that the will is not the subject of virtue. Because no habit is required for that which belongs to a power by reason of its very nature. But since the will is in the reason, it is of the very essence of the will, according to the Philosopher (De Anima iii, text. 42), to tend to that which is good, according to reason. And to this good every virtue is ordered, since everything naturally desires its own proper good; for virtue, as Tully says in his Rhetoric, is a “habit like a second nature in accord with reason.” Therefore the will is not the subject of virtue.

P(2a)- Q(56)- A(6)- O(2) — Further, every virtue is either intellectual or moral (Ethic. i, 13; ii, 1). But intellectual virtue is subjected in the intellect and reason, and not in the will: while moral virtue is subjected in the irascible and concupiscible powers which are rational by participation.

Therefore no virtue is subjected in the will.

P(2a)- Q(56)- A(6)- O(3) — Further, all human acts, to which virtues are ordained, are voluntary. If therefore there be a virtue in the will in respect of some human acts, in like manner there will be a virtue in the will in respect of all human acts. Either, therefore, there will be no virtue in any other power, or there will be two virtues ordained to the same act, which seems unreasonable. Therefore the will cannot be the subject of virtue.

P(2a)- Q(56)- A(6) — On the contrary, Greater perfection is required in the mover than in the moved. But the will moves the irascible and concupiscible powers. Much more therefore should there be virtue in the will than in the irascible and concupiscible powers.

P(2a)- Q(56)- A(6) — I answer that, Since the habit perfects the power in reference to act, then does the power need a habit perfecting it unto doing well, which habit is a virtue, when the power’s own proper nature does not suffice for the purpose.

Now the proper nature of a power is seen in its relation to its object.

Since, therefore, as we have said above ( Q(19), A(3) ), the object of the will is the good of reason proportionate to the will, in respect of this the will does not need a virtue perfecting it. But if man’s will is confronted with a good that exceeds its capacity, whether as regards the whole human species, such as Divine good, which transcends the limits of human nature, or as regards the individual, such as the good of one’s neighbor, then does the will need virtue. And therefore such virtues as those which direct man’s affections to God or to his neighbor are subjected in the will, as charity, justice, and such like.

P(2a)- Q(56)- A(6)- RO(1) — This objection is true of those virtues which are ordained to the willer’s own good; such as temperance and fortitude, which are concerned with the human passions, and the like, as is clear from what we have said ( Q(35), A(6) ).

P(2a)- Q(56)- A(6)- RO(2) — Not only the irascible and concupiscible powers are rational by participation but “the appetitive power altogether,” i.e. in its entirety (Ethic. i, 13). Now the will is included in the appetitive power. And therefore whatever virtue is in the will must be a moral virtue, unless it be theological, as we shall see later on ( Q(62), A(3) ).

P(2a)- Q(56)- A(6)- RO(3) — Some virtues are directed to the good of moderated passion, which is the proper good of this or that man: and in these cases there is no need for virtue in the will, for the nature of the power suffices for the purpose, as we have said. This need exists only in the case of virtues which are directed to some extrinsic good.

QUESTION OF THE INTELLECTUAL VIRTUES (SIX ARTICLES)\parWe now have to consider the various kinds of virtue: and (1) the intellectual virtues; (2) the moral virtues; (3) the theological virtues.

Concerning the first there are six points of inquiry: (1) Whether habits of the speculative intellect are virtues? (2) Whether they are three, namely, wisdom, science and understanding? (3) Whether the intellectual habit, which is art, is a virtue? (4) Whether prudence is a virtue distinct from art? (5) Whether prudence is a virtue necessary to man? (6) Whether “eubulia,” “synesis” and “gnome” are virtues annexed to prudence?

P(2a)- Q(57)- A(1) Whether the habits of the speculative intellect are virtues?

P(2a)- Q(57)- A(1)- O(1) — It would seem that the habits of the speculative intellect are not virtues. For virtue is an operative habit, as we have said above ( Q(55), A(2) ). But speculative habits are not operative: for speculative matter is distinct from practical, i.e. operative matter.

Therefore the habits of the speculative intellect are not virtues.

P(2a)- Q(57)- A(1)- O(2) — Further, virtue is about those things by which man is made happy or blessed: for “happiness is the reward of virtue” (Ethic. i, 9). Now intellectual habits do not consider human acts or other human goods, by which man acquires happiness, but rather things pertaining to nature or to God. Therefore such like habits cannot be called virtues.

P(2a)- Q(57)- A(1)- O(3) — Further, science is a speculative habit. But science and virtue are distinct from one another as genera which are not subalternate, as the Philosopher proves in Topic. 4:Therefore speculative habits are not virtues.

P(2a)- Q(57)- A(1) — On the contrary, The speculative habits alone consider necessary things which cannot be otherwise than they are. Now the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 1) places certain intellectual virtues in that part of the soul which considers necessary things that cannot be otherwise than they are. Therefore the habits of the speculative intellect are virtues.

P(2a)- Q(57)- A(1) — I answer that, Since every virtue is ordained to some good, as stated above ( Q(55), A(3) ), a habit, as we have already observed ( Q(56), A(3) ), may be called a virtue for two reasons: first, because it confers aptness in doing good; secondly, because besides aptness, it confers the right use of it. The latter condition, as above stated ( Q(55), A(3) ), belongs to those habits alone which affect the appetitive part of the soul: since it is the soul’s appetitive power that puts all the powers and habits to their respective uses.

Since, then, the habits of the speculative intellect do not perfect the appetitive part, nor affect it in any way, but only the intellective part; they may indeed be called virtues in so far as they confer aptness for a good work, viz. the consideration of truth (since this is the good work of the intellect): yet they are not called virtues in the second way, as though they conferred the right use of a power or habit. For if a man possess a habit of speculative science, it does not follow that he is inclined to make use of it, but he is made able to consider the truth in those matters of which he has scientific knowledge: that he make use of the knowledge which he has, is due to the motion of his will. Consequently a virtue which perfects the will, as charity or justice, confers the right use of these speculative habits. And in this way too there can be merit in the acts of these habits, if they be done out of charity: thus Gregory says (Moral. vi) that the “contemplative life has greater merit than the active life.”

P(2a)- Q(57)- A(1)- RO(1) — Work is of two kinds, exterior and interior.

Accordingly the practical or active faculty which is contrasted with the speculative faculty, is concerned with exterior work, to which the speculative habit is not ordained. Yet it is ordained to the interior act of the intellect which is to consider the truth. And in this way it is an operative habit.

P(2a)- Q(57)- A(1)- RO(2) — Virtue is about certain things in two ways. In the first place a virtue is about its object. And thus these speculative virtues are not about those things whereby man is made happy; except perhaps, in so far as the word “whereby” indicates the efficient cause or object of complete happiness, i.e. God, Who is the supreme object of contemplation. Secondly, a virtue is said to be about its acts: and in this sense the intellectual virtues are about those things whereby a man is made happy; both because the acts of these virtues can be meritorious, as stated above, and because they are a kind of beginning of perfect bliss, which consists in the contemplation of truth, as we have already stated ( Q(3) , A(7) ).

P(2a)- Q(57)- A(1)- RO(3) — Science is contrasted with virtue taken in the second sense, wherein it belongs to the appetitive faculty.

P(2a)- Q(57)- A(2) Whether there are only three habits of the speculative intellect, viz. wisdom, science and understanding?

P(2a)- Q(57)- A(2)- O(1) — It would seem unfitting to distinguish three virtues of the speculative intellect, viz. wisdom, science and understanding.

Because a species is a kind of science, as stated in Ethic. vi, 7. Therefore wisdom should not be condivided with science among the intellectual virtues.

P(2a)- Q(57)- A(2)- O(2) — Further, in differentiating powers, habits and acts in respect of their objects, we consider chiefly the formal aspect of these objects, as we have already explained ( P(1), Q(77), A(3) ). Therefore diversity of habits is taken, not from their material objects, but from the formal aspect of those objects. Now the principle of a demonstration is the formal aspect under which the conclusion is known. Therefore the understanding of principles should not be set down as a habit or virtue distinct from the knowledge of conclusions.

P(2a)- Q(57)- A(2)- O(3) — Further, an intellectual virtue is one which resides in the essentially rational faculty. Now even the speculative reason employs the dialectic syllogism for the sake of argument, just as it employs the demonstrative syllogism. Therefore as science, which is the result of a demonstrative syllogism, is set down as an intellectual virtue, so also should opinion be.

P(2a)- Q(57)- A(2) — On the contrary, The Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 1) reckons these three alone as being intellectual virtues, viz. wisdom, science and understanding.

P(2a)- Q(57)- A(2) — I answer that, As already stated ( A(1) ), the virtues of the speculative intellect are those which perfect the speculative intellect for the consideration of truth: for this is its good work. Now a truth is subject to a twofold consideration — as known in itself, and as known through another. What is known in itself, is as a “principle,” and is at once understood by the intellect: wherefore the habit that perfects the intellect for the consideration of such truth is called “understanding,” which is the habit of principles.

On the other hand, a truth which is known through another, is understood by the intellect, not at once, but by means of the reason’s inquiry, and is as a “term.” This may happen in two ways: first, so that it is the last in some particular genus; secondly, so that it is the ultimate term of all human knowledge. And, since “things that are knowable last from our standpoint, are knowable first and chiefly in their nature” (Phys. i, text. 2, 3); hence that which is last with respect to all human knowledge, is that which is knowable first and chiefly in its nature. And about these is “wisdom,” which considers the highest causes, as stated in Metaph. i, 1,2. Wherefore it rightly judges all things and sets them in order, because there can be no perfect and universal judgment that is not based on the first causes. But in regard to that which is last in this or that genus of knowable matter, it is “science” which perfects the intellect. Wherefore according to the different kinds of knowable matter, there are different habits of scientific knowledge; whereas there is but one wisdom.

P(2a)- Q(57)- A(2)- RO(1) — Wisdom is a kind of science, in so far as it has that which is common to all the sciences; viz. to demonstrate conclusions from principles. But since it has something proper to itself above the other sciences, inasmuch as it judges of them all, not only as to their conclusions, but also as to their first principles, therefore it is a more perfect virtue than science.

P(2a)- Q(57)- A(2)- RO(2) — When the formal aspect of the object is referred to a power or habit by one same act, there is no distinction of habit or power in respect of the formal aspect and of the material object: thus it belongs to the same power of sight to see both color, and light, which is the formal aspect under which color is seen, and is seen at the same time as the color. On the other hand, the principles of a demonstration can be considered apart, without the conclusion being considered at all. Again they can be considered together with the conclusions, since the conclusions can be deduced from them. Accordingly, to consider the principles in this second way, belongs to science, which considers the conclusions also: while to consider the principles in themselves belongs to understanding.

Consequently, if we consider the point aright, these three virtues are distinct, not as being on a par with one another, but in a certain order. The same is to be observed in potential wholes, wherein one part is more perfect than another; for instance, the rational soul is more perfect than the sensitive soul; and the sensitive, than the vegetal. For it is thus that science depends on understanding as on a virtue of higher degree: and both of these depend on wisdom, as obtaining the highest place, and containing beneath itself both understanding and science, by judging both of the conclusions of science, and of the principles on which they are based.

P(2a)- Q(57)- A(2)- RO(3) — As stated above ( Q(55), AA(3),4 ), a virtuous habit has a fixed relation to good, and is nowise referable to evil. Now the good of the intellect is truth, and falsehood is its evil. Wherefore those habits alone are called intellectual virtues, whereby we tell the truth and never tell a falsehood. But opinion and suspicion can be about both truth and falsehood: and so, as stated in Ethic. vi, 3, they are not intellectual virtues.

P(2a)- Q(57)- A(3) Whether the intellectual habit, art, is a virtue?

P(2a)- Q(57)- A(3)- O(1) — It would seem that art is not an intellectual virtue. For Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. ii, 18,19) that “no one makes bad use of virtue.” But one may make bad use of art: for a craftsman can work badly according to the knowledge of his art. Therefore art is not a virtue.

P(2a)- Q(57)- A(3)- O(2) — Further, there is no virtue of a virtue. But “there is a virtue of art,” according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 5).

Therefore art is not a virtue.

P(2a)- Q(57)- A(3)- O(3) — Further, the liberal arts excel the mechanical arts. But just as the mechanical arts are practical, so the liberal arts are speculative. Therefore, if art were an intellectual virtue, it would have to be reckoned among the speculative virtues.

P(2a)- Q(57)- A(3) — On the contrary, The Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 3,4) says that art is a virtue; and yet he does not reckon it among the speculative virtues, which, according to him, reside in the scientific part of the soul.

P(2a)- Q(57)- A(3) — I answer that, Art is nothing else but “the right reason about certain works to be made.” And yet the good of these things depends, not on man’s appetitive faculty being affected in this or that way, but on the goodness of the work done. For a craftsman, as such, is commendable, not for the will with which he does a work, but for the quality of the work. Art, therefore, properly speaking, is an operative habit. And yet it has something in common with the speculative habits: since the quality of the object considered by the latter is a matter of concern to them also, but not how the human appetite may be affected towards that object. For as long as the geometrician demonstrates the truth, it matters not how his appetitive faculty may be affected, whether he be joyful or angry: even as neither does this matter in a craftsman, as we have observed. And so art has the nature of a virtue in the same way as the speculative habits, in so far, to wit, as neither art nor speculative habit makes a good work as regards the use of the habit, which is the property of a virtue that perfects the appetite, but only as regards the aptness to work well.

P(2a)- Q(57)- A(3)- RO(1) — When anyone endowed with an art produces bad workmanship, this is not the work of that art, in fact it is contrary to the art: even as when a man lies, while knowing the truth, his words are not in accord with his knowledge, but contrary thereto. Wherefore, just as science has always a relation to good, as stated above ( A(2), ad 3), so it is with art: and it is for this reason that it is called a virtue. And yet it falls short of being a perfect virtue, because it does not make its possessor to use it well; for which purpose something further is requisite: although there cannot be a good use without the art.

P(2a)- Q(57)- A(3)- RO(2) — In order that man may make good use of the art he has, he needs a good will, which is perfected by moral virtue; and for this reason the Philosopher says that there is a virtue of art; namely, a moral virtue, in so far as the good use of art requires a moral virtue. For it is evident that a craftsman is inclined by justice, which rectifies his will, to do his work faithfully.

P(2a)- Q(57)- A(3)- RO(3) — Even in speculative matters there is something by way of work: e.g. the making of a syllogism or of a fitting speech, or the work of counting or measuring. Hence whatever habits are ordained to such like works of the speculative reason, are, by a kind of comparison, called arts indeed, but “liberal” arts, in order to distinguish them from those arts that are ordained to works done by the body, which arts are, in a fashion, servile, inasmuch as the body is in servile subjection to the soul, and man, as regards his soul, is free [liber]. On the other hand, those sciences which are not ordained to any such like work, are called sciences simply, and not arts. Nor, if the liberal arts be more excellent, does it follow that the notion of art is more applicable to them.

P(2a)- Q(57)- A(4) Whether prudence is a distinct virtue from art?

P(2a)- Q(57)- A(4)- O(1) — It would seem that prudence is not a distinct virtue from art. For art is the right reason about certain works. But diversity of works does not make a habit cease to be an art; since there are various arts about works widely different. Since therefore prudence is also right reason about works, it seems that it too should be reckoned a virtue.

P(2a)- Q(57)- A(4)- O(2) — Further, prudence has more in common with art than the speculative habits have; for they are both “about contingent matters that may be otherwise than they are” (Ethic. vi, 4,5). Now some speculative habits are called arts. Much more, therefore, should prudence be called an art.

P(2a)- Q(57)- A(4)- O(3) — Further, it belongs to prudence, “to be of good counsel” (Ethic. vi, 5). But counselling takes place in certain arts also, as stated in Ethic. iii, 3, e.g. in the arts of warfare, of seamanship, and of medicine. Therefore prudence is not distinct from art.

P(2a)- Q(57)- A(4) — On the contrary, The Philosopher distinguishes prudence from art (Ethic. vi, 5).

P(2a)- Q(57)- A(4) — I answer that, Where the nature of virtue differs, there is a different kind of virtue. Now it has been stated above ( A(1) ; Q(56), A(3) ) that some habits have the nature of virtue, through merely conferring aptness for a good work: while some habits are virtues, not only through conferring aptness for a good work, but also through conferring the use. But art confers the mere aptness for good work; since it does not regard the appetite; whereas prudence confers not only aptness for a good work, but also the use: for it regards the appetite, since it presupposes the rectitude thereof.

The reason for this difference is that art is the “right reason of things to be made”; whereas prudence is the “right reason of things to be done.” Now “making” and “doing” differ, as stated in Metaph. ix, text. 16, in that “making” is an action passing into outward matter, e.g. “to build,” “to saw,” and so forth; whereas “doing” is an action abiding in the agent, e.g. “to see,” “to will,” and the like. Accordingly prudence stands in the same relation to such like human actions, consisting in the use of powers and habits, as art does to outward making: since each is the perfect reason about the things with which it is concerned. But perfection and rectitude of reason in speculative matters, depend on the principles from which reason argues; just as we have said above ( A(2), ad 2) that science depends on and presupposes understanding, which is the habit of principles. Now in human acts the end is what the principles are in speculative matters, as stated in Ethic. vii, 8. Consequently, it is requisite for prudence, which is right reason about things to be done, that man be well disposed with regard to the ends: and this depends on the rectitude of his appetite. Wherefore, for prudence there is need of a moral virtue, which rectifies the appetite.

On the other hand the good things made by art is not the good of man’s appetite, but the good of those things themselves: wherefore art does not presuppose rectitude of the appetite. The consequence is that more praise is given to a craftsman who is at fault willingly, than to one who is unwillingly; whereas it is more contrary to prudence to sin willingly than unwillingly, since rectitude of the will is essential to prudence, but not to art. Accordingly it is evident that prudence is a virtue distinct from art.

P(2a)- Q(57)- A(4)- RO(1) — The various kinds of things made by art are all external to man: hence they do not cause a different kind of virtue. But prudence is right reason about human acts themselves: hence it is a distinct kind of virtue, as stated above.

P(2a)- Q(57)- A(4)- RO(2) — Prudence has more in common with art than a speculative habit has, if we consider their subject and matter: for they are both in the thinking part of the soul, and about things that may be otherwise than they are. But if we consider them as virtues, then art has more in common with the speculative habits, as is clear from what has been said.

P(2a)- Q(57)- A(4)- RO(3) — Prudence is of good counsel about matters regarding man’s entire life, and the end of human life. But in some arts there is counsel about matters concerning the ends proper to those arts.

Hence some men, in so far as they are good counselors in matters of warfare, or seamanship, are said to be prudent officers or pilots, but not simply prudent: only those are simply prudent who give good counsel about all the concerns of life.

P(2a)- Q(57)- A(5) Whether prudence is a virtue necessary to man?

P(2a)- Q(57)- A(5)- O(1) — It would seem that prudence is not a virtue necessary to lead a good life. For as art is to things that are made, of which it is the right reason, so is prudence to things that are done, in respect of which we judge of a man’s life: for prudence is the right reason about these things, as stated in Ethic. vi, 5. Now art is not necessary in things that are made, save in order that they be made, but not after they have been made.

Neither, therefore is prudence necessary to man in order to lead a good life, after he has become virtuous; but perhaps only in order that he may become virtuous.

P(2a)- Q(57)- A(5)- O(2) — Further, “It is by prudence that we are of good counsel,” as stated in Ethic. vi, 5. But man can act not only from his own, but also from another’s good counsel. Therefore man does not need prudence in order to lead a good life, but it is enough that he follow the counsels of prudent men.

P(2a)- Q(57)- A(5)- O(3) — Further, an intellectual virtue is one by which one always tells the truth, and never a falsehood. But this does not seem to be the case with prudence: for it is not human never to err in taking counsel about what is to be done; since human actions are about things that may be otherwise than they are. Hence it is written (Wis. 9:14): “The thoughts of mortal men are fearful, and our counsels uncertain.” Therefore it seems that prudence should not be reckoned an intellectual virtue.

P(2a)- Q(57)- A(5) — On the contrary, It is reckoned with other virtues necessary for human life, when it is written (Wis. 8:7) of Divine Wisdom: “She teacheth temperance and prudence and justice and fortitude, which are such things as men can have nothing more profitable in life.”

P(2a)- Q(57)- A(5) — I answer that, Prudence is a virtue most necessary for human life. For a good life consists in good deeds. Now in order to do good deeds, it matters not only what a man does, but also how he does it; to wit, that he do it from right choice and not merely from impulse or passion. And, since choice is about things in reference to the end, rectitude of choice requires two things: namely, the due end, and something suitably ordained to that due end. Now man is suitably directed to his due end by a virtue which perfects the soul in the appetitive part, the object of which is the good and the end. And to that which is suitably ordained to the due end man needs to be rightly disposed by a habit in his reason, because counsel and choice, which are about things ordained to the end, are acts of the reason. Consequently an intellectual virtue is needed in the reason, to perfect the reason, and make it suitably affected towards things ordained to the end; and this virtue is prudence. Consequently prudence is a virtue necessary to lead a good life.

P(2a)- Q(57)- A(5)- RO(1) — The good of an art is to be found, not in the craftsman, but in the product of the art, since art is right reason about things to be made: for since the making of a thing passes into external matter, it is a perfection not of the maker, but of the thing made, even as movement is the act of the thing moved: and art is concerned with the making of things. On the other hand, the good of prudence is in the active principle, whose activity is its perfection: for prudence is right reason about things to be done, as stated above ( A(4) ). Consequently art does not require of the craftsman that his act be a good act, but that his work be good. Rather would it be necessary for the thing made to act well (e.g. that a knife should carve well, or that a saw should cut well), if it were proper to such things to act, rather than to be acted on, because they have not dominion over their actions. Wherefore the craftsman needs art, not that he may live well, but that he may produce a good work of art, and have it in good keeping: whereas prudence is necessary to man, that he may lead a good life, and not merely that he may be a good man.

P(2a)- Q(57)- A(5)- RO(2) — When a man does a good deed, not of his own counsel, but moved by that of another, his deed is not yet quite perfect, as regards his reason in directing him and his appetite in moving him.

Wherefore, if he do a good deed, he does not do well simply; and yet this is required in order that he may lead a good life.

P(2a)- Q(57)- A(5)- RO(3) — As stated in Ethic. vi, 2, truth is not the same for the practical as for the speculative intellect. Because the truth of the speculative intellect depends on conformity between the intellect and the thing. And since the intellect cannot be infallibly in conformity with things in contingent matters, but only in necessary matters, therefore no speculative habit about contingent things is an intellectual virtue, but only such as is about necessary things. On the other hand, the truth of the practical intellect depends on conformity with right appetite. This conformity has no place in necessary matters, which are not affected by the human will; but only in contingent matters which can be effected by us, whether they be matters of interior action, or the products of external work. Hence it is only about contingent matters that an intellectual virtue is assigned to the practical intellect, viz. art, as regards things to be made, and prudence, as regards things to be done.

P(2a)- Q(57)- A(6) Whether “eubulia, synesis, and gnome” are virtues annexed to prudence? (*\euboulia, synesis, gnome\) P(2a)- Q(57)- A(6)- O(1) — It would seem that “\euboulia, synesis\, and \gnome\” are unfittingly assigned as virtues annexed to prudence. For “\euboulia\” is “a habit whereby we take good counsel” (Ethic. vi, 9).

Now it “belongs to prudence to take good counsel,” as stated (Ethic. vi, 9).

Therefore “\euboulia\” is not a virtue annexed to prudence, but rather is prudence itself.

P(2a)- Q(57)- A(6)- O(2) — Further, it belongs to the higher to judge the lower. The highest virtue would therefore seem to be the one whose act is judgment. Now “\synesis\” enables us to judge well. Therefore “\synesis\” is not a virtue annexed to prudence, but rather is a principal virtue.

P(2a)- Q(57)- A(6)- O(3) — Further, just as there are various matters to pass judgment on, so are there different points on which one has to take counsel. But there is one virtue referring to all matters of counsel.

Therefore, in order to judge well of what has to be done, there is no need, besides “\synesis\” of the virtue of “\gnome\.”

P(2a)- Q(57)- A(6)- O(4) — Further, Cicero (De Invent. Rhet. iii) mentions three other parts of prudence; viz. “memory of the past, understanding of the present, and foresight of the future.” Moreover, Macrobius (Super Somn. Scip. 1) mentions yet others: viz. “caution, docility,” and the like.

Therefore it seems that the above are not the only virtues annexed to prudence.

P(2a)- Q(57)- A(6) — On the contrary, stands the authority of the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 9,10,11), who assigns these three virtues as being annexed to prudence.

P(2a)- Q(57)- A(6) — I answer that, Wherever several powers are subordinate to one another, that power is the highest which is ordained to the highest act. Now there are three acts of reason in respect of anything done by man: the first of these is counsel; the second, judgment; the third, command. The first two correspond to those acts of the speculative intellect, which are inquiry and judgment, for counsel is a kind of inquiry: but the third is proper to the practical intellect, in so far as this is ordained to operation; for reason does not have to command in things that man cannot do. Now it is evident that in things done by man, the chief act is that of command, to which all the rest are subordinate. Consequently, that virtue which perfects the command, viz. prudence, as obtaining the highest place, has other secondary virtues annexed to it, viz. “\eustochia\,” which perfects counsel; and “\synesis\” and “\gnome\,” which are parts of prudence in relation to judgment, and of whose distinction we shall speak further on (ad 3).

P(2a)- Q(57)- A(6)- RO(1) — Prudence makes us be of good counsel, not as though its immediate act consisted in being of good counsel, but because it perfects the latter act by means of a subordinate virtue, viz. “\euboulia\.”

P(2a)- Q(57)- A(6)- RO(2) — Judgment about what is to be done is directed to something further: for it may happen in some matter of action that a man’s judgment is sound, while his execution is wrong. The matter does not attain to its final complement until the reason has commanded aright in the point of what has to be done.

P(2a)- Q(57)- A(6)- RO(3) — Judgment of anything should be based on that thing’s proper principles. But inquiry does not reach to the proper principles: because, if we were in possession of these, we should need no more to inquire, the truth would be already discovered. Hence only one virtue is directed to being of good counsel, wheres there are two virtues for good judgment: because difference is based not on common but on proper principles. Consequently, even in speculative matters, there is one science of dialectics, which inquires about all matters; whereas demonstrative sciences, which pronounce judgment, differ according to their different objects. “\Synesis\” and “\gnome\” differ in respect of the different rules on which judgment is based: for “\synesis\” judges of actions according to the common law; while “\gnome\” bases its judgment on the natural law, in those cases where the common law fails to apply, as we shall explain further on ( P(2b) Q(51), A(4) ).

P(2a)- Q(57)- A(6)- RO(4) — Memory, understanding and foresight, as also caution and docility and the like, are not virtues distinct from prudence: but are, as it were, integral parts thereof, in so far as they are all requisite for perfect prudence. There are, moreover, subjective parts or species of prudence, e.g. domestic and political economy, and the like. But the three first names are, in a fashion, potential parts of prudence; because they are subordinate thereto, as secondary virtues to a principal virtue: and we shall speak of them later ( P(2b) Q(48), seqq.).

QUESTION OF THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN MORAL AND INTELLECTUAL VIRTUES (FIVE ARTICLES)\parWe must now consider moral virtues. We shall speak (1) of the difference between them and intellectual virtues; (2) of their distinction, one from another, in respect of their proper matter; (3) of the difference between the chief or cardinal virtues and the others.

Under the first head there are five points of inquiry: (1) Whether every virtue is a moral virtue? (2) Whether moral virtue differs from intellectual virtue? (3) Whether virtue is adequately divided into moral and intellectual virtue? (4) Whether there can be moral without intellectual virtue? (5) Whether, on the other hand, there can be intellectual without moral virtue?

P(2a)- Q(58)- A(1) Whether every virtue is a moral virtue?

P(2a)- Q(58)- A(1)- O(1) — It would seem that every virtue is a moral virtue. Because moral virtue is so called from the Latin “mos,” i.e. custom.

Now, we can accustom ourselves to the acts of all the virtues. Therefore every virtue is a moral virtue.

P(2a)- Q(58)- A(1)- O(2) — Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 6) that moral virtue is “a habit of choosing the rational mean.” But every virtue is a habit of choosing: since the acts of any virtue can be done from choice.

And, moreover, every virtue consists in following the rational mean in some way, as we shall explain further on ( Q(64), AA(1),2 ,3). Therefore every virtue is a moral virtue.

P(2a)- Q(58)- A(1)- O(3) — Further, Cicero says (De Invent. Rhet. ii) that “virtue is a habit like a second nature, in accord with reason.” But since every human virtue is directed to man’s good, it must be in accord with reason: since man’s good “consists in that which agrees with his reason,” as Dionysius states (Div. Nom. iv). Therefore every virtue is a moral virtue.

P(2a)- Q(58)- A(1) — On the contrary, The Philosopher (Ethic. i, 13): “When we speak of a man’s morals, we do not say that he is wise or intelligent, but that he is gentle or sober.” Accordingly, then, wisdom and understanding are not moral virtues: and yet they are virtues, as stated above ( Q(57), A(2) ). Therefore not every virtue is a moral virtue.

P(2a)- Q(58)- A(1) — I answer that, In order to answer this question clearly, we must consider the meaning of the Latin word “mos”; for thus we shall be able to discover what a “moral” virtue is. Now “mos” has a twofold meaning. For sometimes it means custom, in which sense we read ( Acts 15:1): “Except you be circumcised after the manner (morem) of Moses, you cannot be saved.”

Sometimes it means a natural or quasi-natural inclination to do some particular action, in which sense the word is applied to dumb animals.

Thus we read (2 Macc. 1:2) that “rushing violently upon the enemy, like lions [*Leonum more, i.e. as lions are in the habit of doing], they slew them”: and the word is used in the same sense in Psalm 67:7, where we read: “Who maketh men of one manner [moris] to dwell in a house.” For both these significations there is but one word in Latin; but in the Greek there is a distinct word for each, for the word “ethos” is written sometimes with a long, and sometimes a short “e”.

Now “moral” virtue is so called from “mos” in the sense of a natural or quasi-natural inclination to do some particular action. And the other meaning of “mos,” i.e. “custom,” is akin to this: because custom becomes a second nature, and produces an inclination similar to a natural one. But it is evident that inclination to an action belongs properly to the appetitive power, whose function it is to move all the powers to their acts, as explained above ( Q(9) , A(1) ). Therefore not every virtue is a moral virtue, but only those that are in the appetitive faculty.

P(2a)- Q(58)- A(1)- RO(1) — This argument takes “mos” in the sense of “custom.”

P(2a)- Q(58)- A(1)- RO(2) — Every act of virtue can be done from choice: but no virtue makes us choose aright, save that which is in the appetitive part of the soul: for it has been stated above that choice is an act of the appetitive faculty ( Q(13), A(1) ). Wherefore a habit of choosing, i.e. a habit which is the principle whereby we choose, is that habit alone which perfects the appetitive faculty: although the acts of other habits also may be a matter of choice.

P(2a)- Q(58)- A(1)- RO(3) — “Nature is the principle of movement” (Phys. ii, text. 3). Now to move the faculties to act is the proper function of the appetitive power. Consequently to become as a second nature by consenting to the reason, is proper to those virtues which are in the appetitive faculty.

P(2a)- Q(58)- A(2) Whether moral virtue differs from intellectual virtue?

P(2a)- Q(58)- A(2)- O(1) — It would seem that moral virtue does not differ from intellectual virtue. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei iv, 21) “that virtue is the art of right conduct.” But art is an intellectual virtue.

Therefore moral and intellectual virtue do not differ.

P(2a)- Q(58)- A(2)- O(2) — Further, some authors put science in the definition of virtues: thus some define perseverance as a “science or habit regarding those things to which we should hold or not hold”; and holiness as “a science which makes man to be faithful and to do his duty to God.”

Now science is an intellectual virtue. Therefore moral virtue should not be distinguished from intellectual virtue.

P(2a)- Q(58)- A(2)- O(3) — Further, Augustine says (Soliloq. i, 6) that “virtue is the rectitude and perfection of reason.” But this belongs to the intellectual virtues, as stated in Ethic. vi, 13. Therefore moral virtue does not differ from intellectual.

P(2a)- Q(58)- A(2)- O(4) — Further, a thing does not differ from that which is included in its definition. But intellectual virtue is included in the definition of moral virtue: for the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 6) that “moral virtue is a habit of choosing the mean appointed by reason as a prudent man would appoint it.” Now this right reason that fixes the mean of moral virtue, belongs to an intellectual virtue, as stated in Ethic. vi, 13.

Therefore moral virtue does not differ from intellectual.

P(2a)- Q(58)- A(2) — On the contrary, It is stated in Ethic. i, 13 that “there are two kinds of virtue: some we call intellectual; some moral.”

P(2a)- Q(58)- A(2) — I answer that, Reason is the first principle of all human acts; and whatever other principles of human acts may be found, they obey reason somewhat, but in various ways. For some obey reason blindly and without any contradiction whatever: such are the limbs of the body, provided they be in a healthy condition, for as soon as reason commands, the hand or the foot proceeds to action. Hence the Philosopher says (Polit. i, 3) that “the soul rules the body like a despot,” i.e. as a master rules his slave, who has no right to rebel. Accordingly some held that all the active principles in man are subordinate to reason in this way.

If this were true, for man to act well it would suffice that his reason be perfect. Consequently, since virtue is a habit perfecting man in view of his doing good actions, it would follow that it is only in the reason, so that there would be none but intellectual virtues. This was the opinion of Socrates, who said “every virtue is a kind of prudence,” as stated in Ethic. vi, 13. Hence he maintained that as long as man is in possession of knowledge, he cannot sin; and that every one who sins, does so through ignorance.

Now this is based on a false supposition. Because the appetitive faculty obeys the reason, not blindly, but with a certain power of opposition; wherefore the Philosopher says (Polit. i, 3) that “reason commands the appetitive faculty by a politic power,” whereby a man rules over subjects that are free, having a certain right of opposition. Hence Augustine says on Psalm 118 (Serm. 8) that “sometimes we understand [what is right] while desire is slow, or follows not at all,” in so far as the habits or passions of the appetitive faculty cause the use of reason to be impeded in some particular action. And in this way, there is some truth in the saying of Socrates that so long as a man is in possession of knowledge he does not sin: provided, however, that this knowledge is made to include the use of reason in this individual act of choice.

Accordingly for a man to do a good deed, it is requisite not only that his reason be well disposed by means of a habit of intellectual virtue; but also that his appetite be well disposed by means of a habit of moral virtue. And so moral differs from intellectual virtue, even as the appetite differs from the reason. Hence just as the appetite is the principle of human acts, in so far as it partakes of reason, so are moral habits to be considered virtues in so far as they are in conformity with reason.

P(2a)- Q(58)- A(2)- RO(1) — Augustine usually applies the term “art” to any form of right reason; in which sense art includes prudence which is the right reason about things to be done, even as art is the right reason about things to be made. Accordingly, when he says that “virtue is the art of right conduct,” this applies to prudence essentially; but to other virtues, by participation, for as much as they are directed by prudence.

P(2a)- Q(58)- A(2)- RO(2) — All such definitions, by whomsoever given, were based on the Socratic theory, and should be explained according to what we have said about art (ad 1).

The same applies to the Third Objection.

P(2a)- Q(58)- A(2)- RO(4) — Right reason which is in accord with prudence is included in the definition of moral virtue, not as part of its essence, but as something belonging by way of participation to all the moral virtues, in so far as they are all under the direction of prudence.

P(2a)- Q(58)- A(3) Whether virtue is adequately divided into moral and intellectual?

P(2a)- Q(58)- A(3)- O(1) — It would seem that virtue is not adequately divided into moral and intellectual. For prudence seems to be a mean between moral and intellectual virtue, since it is reckoned among the intellectual virtues (Ethic. vi, 3,5); and again is placed by all among the four cardinal virtues, which are moral virtues, as we shall show further on ( Q(61), A(1) ). Therefore virtue is not adequately divided into intellectual and moral, as though there were no mean between them.

P(2a)- Q(58)- A(3)- O(2) — Further, contingency, perseverance, and patience are not reckoned to be intellectual virtues. Yet neither are they moral virtues; since they do not reduce the passions to a mean, and are consistent with an abundance of passion. Therefore virtue is not adequately divided into intellectual and moral.

P(2a)- Q(58)- A(3)- O(3) — Further, faith, hope, and charity are virtues.

Yet they are not intellectual virtues: for there are only five of these, viz. science, wisdom, understanding, prudence, and art, as stated above ( Q(57), AA(2),3 ,5). Neither are they moral virtues; since they are not about the passions, which are the chief concern of moral virtue. Therefore virtue is not adequately divided into intellectual and moral.

P(2a)- Q(58)- A(3) — On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 1) that “virtue is twofold, intellectual and moral.”

P(2a)- Q(58)- A(3) — I answer that, Human virtue is a habit perfecting man in view of his doing good deeds. Now, in man there are but two principles of human actions, viz. the intellect or reason and the appetite: for these are the two principles of movement in man as stated in De Anima iii, text. 48. Consequently every human virtue must needs be a perfection of one of these principles. Accordingly if it perfects man’s speculative or practical intellect in order that his deed may be good, it will be an intellectual virtue: whereas if it perfects his appetite, it will be a moral virtue. It follows therefore that every human virtue is either intellectual or moral.

P(2a)- Q(58)- A(3)- RO(1) — Prudence is essentially an intellectual virtue.

But considered on the part of its matter, it has something in common with the moral virtues: for it is right reason about things to be done, as stated above ( Q(57), A(4) ). It is in this sense that it is reckoned with the moral virtues.

P(2a)- Q(58)- A(3)- RO(2) — Contingency and perseverance are not perfections of the sensitive appetite. This is clear from the fact that passions abound in the continent and persevering man, which would not be the case if his sensitive appetite were perfected by a habit making it conformable to reason. Contingency and perseverance are, however, perfections of the rational faculty, and withstand the passions lest reason be led astray. But they fall short of being virtues: since intellectual virtue, which makes reason to hold itself well in respect of moral matters, presupposes a right appetite of the end, so that it may hold itself aright in respect of principles, i.e. the ends, on which it builds its argument: and this is wanting in the continent and persevering man. Nor again can an action proceeding from two principles be perfect, unless each principle be perfected by the habit corresponding to that operation: thus, however perfect be the principal agent employing an instrument, it will produce an imperfect effect, if the instrument be not well disposed also. Hence if the sensitive faculty, which is moved by the rational faculty, is not perfect; however perfect the rational faculty may be, the resulting action will be imperfect: and consequently the principle of that action will not be a virtue. And for this reason, contingency, desisting from pleasures, and perseverance in the midst of pains, are not virtues, but something less than a virtue, as the Philosopher maintains (Ethic. vii, 1,9).

P(2a)- Q(58)- A(3)- RO(3) — Faith, hope, and charity are superhuman virtues: for they are virtues of man as sharing in the grace of God.

P(2a)- Q(58)- A(4) Whether there can be moral without intellectual virtue?

P(2a)- Q(58)- A(4)- O(1) — It would seem that moral can be without intellectual virtue. Because moral virtue, as Cicero says (De Invent. Rhet. ii) is “a habit like a second nature in accord with reason.” Now though nature may be in accord with some sovereign reason that moves it, there is no need for that reason to be united to nature in the same subject, as is evident of natural things devoid of knowledge. Therefore in a man there may be a moral virtue like a second nature, inclining him to consent to his reason, without his reason being perfected by an intellectual virtue.

P(2a)- Q(58)- A(4)- O(2) — Further, by means of intellectual virtue man obtains perfect use of reason. But it happens at times that men are virtuous and acceptable to God, without being vigorous in the use of reason. Therefore it seems that moral virtue can be without intellectual.

P(2a)- Q(58)- A(4)- O(3) — Further moral virtue makes us inclined to do good works. But some, without depending on the judgment of reason, have a natural inclination to do good works. Therefore moral virtues can be without intellectual virtues.

P(2a)- Q(58)- A(4) — On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. xxii) that “the other virtues, unless we do prudently what we desire to do, cannot be real virtues.” But prudence is an intellectual virtue, as stated above ( Q(57), A(5) ). Therefore moral virtues cannot be without intellectual virtues.

P(2a)- Q(58)- A(4) — I answer that, Moral virtue can be without some of the intellectual virtues, viz. wisdom, science, and art; but not without understanding and prudence. Moral virtue cannot be without prudence, because it is a habit of choosing, i.e. making us choose well. Now in order that a choice be good, two things are required. First, that the intention be directed to a due end; and this is done by moral virtue, which inclines the appetitive faculty to the good that is in accord with reason, which is a due end. Secondly, that man take rightly those things which have reference to the end: and this he cannot do unless his reason counsel, judge and command aright, which is the function of prudence and the virtues annexed to it, as stated above ( Q(57), AA(5),6 ). Wherefore there can be no moral virtue without prudence: and consequently neither can there be without understanding. For it is by the virtue of understanding that we know selfevident principles both in speculative and in practical matters.

Consequently just as right reason in speculative matters, in so far as it proceeds from naturally known principles, presupposes the understanding of those principles, so also does prudence, which is the right reason about things to be done.

P(2a)- Q(58)- A(4)- RO(1) — The inclination of nature in things devoid of reason is without choice: wherefore such an inclination does not of necessity require reason. But the inclination of moral virtue is with choice: and consequently in order that it may be perfect it requires that reason be perfected by intellectual virtue.

P(2a)- Q(58)- A(4)- RO(2) — A man may be virtuous without having full use of reason as to everything, provided he have it with regard to those things which have to be done virtuously. In this way all virtuous men have full use of reason. Hence those who seem to be simple, through lack of worldly cunning, may possibly be prudent, according to Matthew 10:16: “Be ye therefore prudent [Douay: ‘wise’] as serpents, and simple as doves.”

P(2a)- Q(58)- A(4)- RO(3) — The natural inclination to a good of virtue is a kind of beginning of virtue, but is not perfect virtue. For the stronger this inclination is, the more perilous may it prove to be, unless it be accompanied by right reason, which rectifies the choice of fitting means towards the due end. Thus if a running horse be blind, the faster it runs the more heavily will it fall, and the more grievously will it be hurt. And consequently, although moral virtue be not right reason, as Socrates held, yet not only is it “according to right reason,” in so far as it inclines man to that which is, according to right reason, as the Platonists maintained [*Cf.

Plato, Meno xli.]; but also it needs to be “joined with right reason,” as Aristotle declares (Ethic. vi, 13).

P(2a)- Q(58)- A(5) Whether there can be intellectual without moral virtue?

P(2a)- Q(58)- A(5)- O(1) — It would seem that there can be intellectual without moral virtue. Because perfection of what precedes does not depend on the perfection of what follows. Now reason precedes and moves the sensitive appetite. Therefore intellectual virtue, which is a perfection of the reason, does not depend on moral virtue, which is a perfection of the appetitive faculty; and can be without it.

P(2a)- Q(58)- A(5)- O(2) — Further, morals are the matter of prudence, even as things makeable are the matter of art. Now art can be without its proper matter, as a smith without iron. Therefore prudence can be without the moral virtue, although of all the intellectual virtues, it seems most akin to the moral virtues.

P(2a)- Q(58)- A(5)- O(3) — Further, prudence is “a virtue whereby we are of good counsel” (Ethic. vi, 9). Now many are of good counsel without having the moral virtues. Therefore prudence can be without a moral virtue.

P(2a)- Q(58)- A(5) — On the contrary, To wish to do evil is directly opposed to moral virtue; and yet it is not opposed to anything that can be without moral virtue. Now it is contrary to prudence “to sin willingly” (Ethic. vi, 5). Therefore prudence cannot be without moral virtue.

P(2a)- Q(58)- A(5) — I answer that, Other intellectual virtues can, but prudence cannot, be without moral virtue. The reason for this is that prudence is the right reason about things to be done (and this, not merely in general, but also in particular); about which things actions are. Now right reason demands principles from which reason proceeds to argue. And when reason argues about particular cases, it needs not only universal but also particular principles. As to universal principles of action, man is rightly disposed by the natural understanding of principles, whereby he understands that he should do no evil; or again by some practical science.

But this is not enough in order that man may reason aright about particular cases. For it happens sometimes that the aforesaid universal principle, known by means of understanding or science, is destroyed in a particular case by a passion: thus to one who is swayed by concupiscence, when he is overcome thereby, the object of his desire seems good, although it is opposed to the universal judgment of his reason. Consequently, as by the habit of natural understanding or of science, man is made to be rightly disposed in regard to the universal principles of action; so, in order that he be rightly disposed with regard to the particular principles of action, viz. the ends, he needs to be perfected by certain habits, whereby it becomes connatural, as it were, to man to judge aright to the end. This is done by moral virtue: for the virtuous man judges aright of the end of virtue, because “such a man is, such does the end seem to him” (Ethic. iii, 5).

Consequently the right reason about things to be done, viz. prudence, requires man to have moral virtue.

P(2a)- Q(58)- A(5)- RO(1) — Reason, as apprehending the end, precedes the appetite for the end: but appetite for the end precedes the reason, as arguing about the choice of the means, which is the concern of prudence.

Even so, in speculative matters the understanding of principles is the foundation on which the syllogism of the reason is based.

P(2a)- Q(58)- A(5)- RO(2) — It does not depend on the disposition of our appetite whether we judge well or ill of the principles of art, as it does, when we judge of the end which is the principle in moral matters: in the former case our judgment depends on reason alone. Hence art does not require a virtue perfecting the appetite, as prudence does.

P(2a)- Q(58)- A(5)- RO(3) — Prudence not only helps us to be of good counsel, but also to judge and command well. This is not possible unless the impediment of the passions, destroying the judgment and command of prudence, be removed; and this is done by moral virtue.

QUESTION OF MORAL VIRTUE IN RELATION TO THE PASSIONS (FIVE ARTICLES)\parWe must now consider the difference of one moral virtue from another.

And since those moral virtues which are about the passions, differ accordingly to the difference of passions, we must consider (1) the relation of virtue to passion; (2) the different kinds of moral virtue in relation to the passions.

Under the first head there are five points of inquiry: (1) Whether moral virtue is a passion? (2) Whether there can be moral virtue with passion? (3) Whether sorrow is compatible with moral virtue? (4) Whether every moral virtue is about a passion? (5) Whether there can be moral virtue without passion?

P(2a)- Q(59)- A(1) Whether moral virtue is a passion?

P(2a)- Q(59)- A(1)- O(1) — It would seem that moral virtue is a passion.

Because the mean is of the same genus as the extremes. But moral virtue is a mean between two passions. Therefore moral virtue is a passion.

P(2a)- Q(59)- A(1)- O(2) — Further, virtue and vice, being contrary to one another, are in the same genus. But some passions are reckoned to be vices, such as envy and anger. Therefore some passions are virtues.

P(2a)- Q(59)- A(1)- O(3) — Further, pity is a passion, since it is sorrow for another’s ills, as stated above ( Q(35), A(8) ). Now “Cicero the renowned orator did not hesitate to call pity a virtue,” as Augustine states in De Civ.

Dei ix, 5. Therefore a passion may be a moral virtue.

P(2a)- Q(59)- A(1) — On the contrary, It is stated in Ethic. ii, 5 that “passions are neither virtues nor vices.”

P(2a)- Q(59)- A(1) — I answer that, Moral virtue cannot be a passion.

This is clear for three reasons. First, because a passion is a movement of the sensitive appetite, as stated above ( Q(22), A(3) ): whereas moral virtue is not a movement, but rather a principle of the movement of the appetite, being a kind of habit. Secondly, because passions are not in themselves good or evil. For man’s good or evil is something in reference to reason: wherefore the passions, considered in themselves, are referable both to good and evil, for as much as they may accord or disaccord with reason.

Now nothing of this sort can be a virtue: since virtue is referable to good alone, as stated above ( Q(55), A(3) ). Thirdly, because, granted that some passions are, in some way, referable to good only, or to evil only; even then the movement of passion, as passion, begins in the appetite, and ends in the reason, since the appetite tends to conformity with reason. On the other hand, the movement of virtue is the reverse, for it begins in the reason and ends in the appetite, inasmuch as the latter is moved by reason.

Hence the definition of moral virtue (Ethic. ii, 6) states that it is “a habit of choosing the mean appointed by reason as a prudent man would appoint it.”

P(2a)- Q(59)- A(1)- RO(1) — Virtue is a mean between passions, not by reason of its essence, but on account of its effect; because, to wit, it establishes the mean between passions.

P(2a)- Q(59)- A(1)- RO(2) — If by vice we understand a habit of doing evil deeds, it is evident that no passion is a vice. But if vice is taken to mean sin which is a vicious act, nothing hinders a passion from being a vice, or, on the other hand, from concurring in an act of virtue; in so far as a passion is either opposed to reason or in accordance with reason.

P(2a)- Q(59)- A(1)- RO(3) — Pity is said to be a virtue, i.e. an act of virtue, in so far as “that movement of the soul is obedient to reason”; viz. “when pity is bestowed without violating right, as when the poor are relieved, or the penitent forgiven,” as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ix, 5). But if by pity we understand a habit perfecting man so that he bestows pity reasonably, nothing hinders pity, in this sense, from being a virtue. The same applies to similar passions.

P(2a)- Q(59)- A(2) Whether there can be moral virtue with passion?

P(2a)- Q(59)- A(2)- O(1) — It would seem that moral virtue cannot be with passion. For the Philosopher says (Topic. iv) that “a gentle man is one who is not passionate; but a patient man is one who is passionate but does not give way.” The same applies to all the moral virtues. Therefore all moral virtues are without passion.

P(2a)- Q(59)- A(2)- O(2) — Further, virtue is a right affection of the soul, as health is to the body, as stated Phys. vii, text. 17: wherefore “virtue is a kind of health of the soul,” as Cicero says (Quaest. Tusc. iv). But the soul’s passions are “the soul’s diseases,” as he says in the same book.

Now health is incompatible with disease. Therefore neither is passion compatible with virtue.

P(2a)- Q(59)- A(2)- O(3) — Further, moral virtue requires perfect use of reason even in particular matters. But the passions are an obstacle to this: for the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 5) that “pleasures destroy the judgment of prudence”: and Sallust says (Catilin.) that “when they,” i.e. the soul’s passions, “interfere, it is not easy for the mind to grasp the truth.” Therefore passion is incompatible with moral virtue.

P(2a)- Q(59)- A(2) — On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 6): “If the will is perverse, these movements,” viz. the passions, “are perverse also: but if it is upright, they are not only blameless, but even praiseworthy.” But nothing praiseworthy is incompatible with moral virtue. Therefore moral virtue does not exclude the passions, but is consistent with them.

P(2a)- Q(59)- A(2) — I answer that, The Stoics and Peripatetics disagreed on this point, as Augustine relates (De Civ. Dei ix, 4). For the Stoics held that the soul’s passions cannot be in a wise or virtuous man: whereas the Peripatetics, who were founded by Aristotle, as Augustine says (De Civ.

Dei ix, 4), maintained that the passions are compatible with moral virtue, if they be reduced to the mean.

This difference, as Augustine observes (De Civ. Dei ix, 4), was one of words rather than of opinions. Because the Stoics, through not discriminating between the intellective appetite, i.e. the will, and the sensitive appetite, which is divided into irascible and concupiscible, did not, as the Peripatetics did, distinguish the passions from the other affections of the human soul, in the point of their being movements of the sensitive appetite, whereas the other emotions of the soul, which are not passions, are movements of the intellective appetite or will; but only in the point of the passions being, as they maintained, any emotions in disaccord with reason. These emotions could not be in a wise or virtuous man if they arose deliberately: while it would be possible for them to be in a wise man, if they arose suddenly: because, in the words of Aulus Gellius [*Noct.

Attic. xix, 1], quoted by Augustine (De Civ. Dei ix, 4), “it is not in our power to call up the visions of the soul, known as its fancies; and when they arise from awesome things, they must needs disturb the mind of a wise man, so that he is slightly startled by fear, or depressed with sorrow,” in so far as “these passions forestall the use of reason without his approving of such things or consenting thereto.”

Accordingly, if the passions be taken for inordinate emotions, they cannot be in a virtuous man, so that he consent to them deliberately; as the Stoics maintained. But if the passions be taken for any movements of the sensitive appetite, they can be in a virtuous man, in so far as they are subordinate to reason. Hence Aristotle says (Ethic. ii, 3) that “some describe virtue as being a kind of freedom from passion and disturbance; this is incorrect, because the assertion should be qualified”: they should have said virtue is freedom from those passions “that are not as they should be as to manner and time.”

P(2a)- Q(59)- A(2)- RO(1) — The Philosopher quotes this, as well as many other examples in his books on Logic, in order to illustrate, not his own mind, but that of others. It was the opinion of the Stoics that the passions of the soul were incompatible with virtue: and the Philosopher rejects this opinion (Ethic. ii, 3), when he says that virtue is not freedom from passion. It may be said, however, that when he says “a gentle man is not passionate,” we are to understand this of inordinate passion.

P(2a)- Q(59)- A(2)- RO(2) — This and all similar arguments which Tully brings forward in De Tusc. Quaest. iv take the passions in the execution of reason’s command.

P(2a)- Q(59)- A(2)- RO(3) — When a passion forestalls the judgment of reason, so as to prevail on the mind to give its consent, it hinders counsel and the judgment of reason. But when it follows that judgment, as through being commanded by reason, it helps towards the execution of reason’s command.

P(2a)- Q(59)- A(3) Whether sorrow is compatible with moral virtue?

P(2a)- Q(59)- A(3)- O(1) — It would seem that sorrow is incompatible with virtue. Because the virtues are effects of wisdom, according to Wis. 8:7: “She,” i.e. Divine wisdom, “teacheth temperance, and prudence, and justice, and fortitude.” Now the “conversation” of wisdom “hath no bitterness,” as we read further on (verse 16). Therefore sorrow is incompatible with virtue also.

P(2a)- Q(59)- A(3)- O(2) — Further, sorrow is a hindrance to work, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. vii, 13; x, 5). But a hindrance to good works is incompatible with virtue. Therefore sorrow is incompatible with virtue.

P(2a)- Q(59)- A(3)- O(3) — Further, Tully calls sorrow a disease of the mind (De Tusc. Quaest. iv). But disease of the mind is incompatible with virtue, which is a good condition of the mind. Therefore sorrow is opposed to virtue and is incompatible with it.

P(2a)- Q(59)- A(3) — On the contrary, Christ was perfect in virtue. But there was sorrow in Him, for He said ( Matthew 26:38): “My soul is sorrowful even unto death.” Therefore sorrow is compatible with virtue.

P(2a)- Q(59)- A(3) — I answer that, As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 8), the Stoics held that in the mind of the wise man there are three \eupatheiai\, i.e. “three good passions,” in place of the three disturbances: viz. instead of covetousness, “desire”; instead of mirth, “joy”; instead of fear, “caution.” But they denied that anything corresponding to sorrow could be in the mind of a wise man, for two reasons.

First, because sorrow is for an evil that is already present. Now they held that no evil can happen to a wise man: for they thought that, just as man’s only good is virtue, and bodily goods are no good to man; so man’s only evil is vice, which cannot be in a virtuous man. But this is unreasonable.

For, since man is composed of soul and body, whatever conduces to preserve the life of the body, is some good to man; yet not his supreme good, because he can abuse it. Consequently the evil which is contrary to this good can be in a wise man, and can cause him moderate sorrow. Again, although a virtuous man can be without grave sin, yet no man is to be found to live without committing slight sins, according to 1 John 1:8: “If we say that we have no sin, we deceive ourselves.” A third reason is because a virtuous man, though not actually in a state of sin, may have been so in the past. And he is to be commended if he sorrow for that sin, according to 2 Corinthians 7:10: “The sorrow that is according to God worketh penance steadfast unto salvation.”

Fourthly, because he may praiseworthily sorrow for another’s sin.

Therefore sorrow is compatible with moral virtue in the same way as the other passions are when moderated by reason.

Their second reason for holding this opinion was that sorrow is about evil present, whereas fear is for evil to come: even as pleasure is about a present good, while desire is for a future good. Now the enjoyment of a good possessed, or the desire to have good that one possesses not, may be consistent with virtue: but depression of the mind resulting from sorrow for a present evil, is altogether contrary to reason: wherefore it is incompatible with virtue. But this is unreasonable. For there is an evil which can be present to the virtuous man, as we have just stated; which evil is rejected by reason. Wherefore the sensitive appetite follows reason’s rejection by sorrowing for that evil; yet moderately, according as reason dictates. Now it pertains to virtue that the sensitive appetite be conformed to reason, as stated above ( A(1), ad 2). Wherefore moderated sorrow for an object which ought to make us sorrowful, is a mark of virtue; as also the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 6,7). Moreover, this proves useful for avoiding evil: since, just as good is more readily sought for the sake of pleasure, so is evil more undauntedly shunned on account of sorrow.

Accordingly we must allow that sorrow for things pertaining to virtue is incompatible with virtue: since virtue rejoices in its own. On the other hand, virtue sorrows moderately for all that thwarts virtue, no matter how.

P(2a)- Q(59)- A(3)- RO(1) — The passage quoted proves that the wise man is not made sorrowful by wisdom. Yet he sorrows for anything that hinders wisdom. Consequently there is no room for sorrow in the blessed, in whom there can be no hindrance to wisdom.

P(2a)- Q(59)- A(3)- RO(2) — Sorrow hinders the work that makes us sorrowful: but it helps us to do more readily whatever banishes sorrow.

P(2a)- Q(59)- A(3)- RO(3) — Immoderate sorrow is a disease of the mind: but moderate sorrow is the mark of a well-conditioned mind, according to the present state of life.

P(2a)- Q(59)- A(4) Whether all the moral virtues are about the passions?

P(2a)- Q(59)- A(4)- O(1) — It would seem that all the moral virtues are about the passions. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 3) that “moral virtue is about objects of pleasure and sorrow.” But pleasure and sorrow are passions, as stated above ( Q(23), A(4) ; Q(31), A(1) ; Q(35), AA(1), 2).

Therefore all the moral virtues are about the passions.

P(2a)- Q(59)- A(4)- O(2) — Further, the subject of the moral virtues is a faculty which is rational by participation, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. i, 13). But the passions are in this part of the soul, as stated above ( Q(22), A(3) ). Therefore every moral virtue is about the passions.

P(2a)- Q(59)- A(4)- O(3) — Further, some passion is to be found in every moral virtue: and so either all are about the passions, or none are. But some are about the passions, as fortitude and temperance, as stated in Ethic. iii, 6,10. Therefore all the moral virtues are about the passions.

P(2a)- Q(59)- A(4) — On the contrary, Justice, which is a moral virtue, is not about the passions; as stated in Ethic. v, 1, seqq.

P(2a)- Q(59)- A(4) — I answer that, Moral virtue perfects the appetitive part of the soul by directing it to good as defined by reason. Now good as defined by reason is that which is moderated or directed by reason.

Consequently there are moral virtues about all matters that are subject to reason’s direction and moderation. Now reason directs, not only the passions of the sensitive appetite, but also the operations of the intellective appetite, i.e. the will, which is not the subject of a passion, as stated above ( Q(22), A(3) ). Therefore not all the moral virtues are about passions, but some are about passions, some about operations.

P(2a)- Q(59)- A(4)- RO(1) — The moral virtues are not all about pleasures and sorrows, as being their proper matter; but as being something resulting from their proper acts. For every virtuous man rejoices in acts of virtue, and sorrows for the contrary. Hence the Philosopher, after the words quoted, adds, “if virtues are about actions and passions; now every action and passion is followed by pleasure or sorrow, so that in this way virtue is about pleasures and sorrows,” viz. as about something that results from virtue.

P(2a)- Q(59)- A(4)- RO(2) — Not only the sensitive appetite which is the subject of the passions, is rational by participation, but also the will, where there are no passions, as stated above.

P(2a)- Q(59)- A(4)- RO(3) — Some virtues have passions as their proper matter, but some virtues not. Hence the comparison does not hold for all cases.

P(2a)- Q(59)- A(5) Whether there can be moral virtue without passion?

P(2a)- Q(59)- A(5)- O(1) — It would seem that moral virtue can be without passion. For the more perfect moral virtue is, the more does it overcome the passions. Therefore at its highest point of perfection it is altogether without passion.

P(2a)- Q(59)- A(5)- O(2) — Further, then is a thing perfect, when it is removed from its contrary and from whatever inclines to its contrary. Now the passions incline us to sin which is contrary to virtue: hence ( Romans 7:5) they are called “passions of sins.” Therefore perfect virtue is altogether without passion.

P(2a)- Q(59)- A(5)- O(3) — Further, it is by virtue that we are conformed to God, as Augustine declares (De Moribus Eccl. vi, xi, xiii). But God does all things without passion at all. Therefore the most perfect virtue is without any passion.

P(2a)- Q(59)- A(5) — On the contrary, “No man is just who rejoices not in his deeds,” as stated in Ethic. i, 8. But joy is a passion. Therefore justice cannot be without passion; and still less can the other virtues be.

P(2a)- Q(59)- A(5) — I answer that, If we take the passions as being inordinate emotions, as the Stoics did, it is evident that in this sense perfect virtue is without the passions. But if by passions we understand any movement of the sensitive appetite, it is plain that moral virtues, which are about the passions as about their proper matter, cannot be without passions. The reason for this is that otherwise it would follow that moral virtue makes the sensitive appetite altogether idle: whereas it is not the function of virtue to deprive the powers subordinate to reason of their proper activities, but to make them execute the commands of reason, by exercising their proper acts. Wherefore just as virtue directs the bodily limbs to their due external acts, so does it direct the sensitive appetite to its proper regulated movements.

Those moral virtues, however, which are not about the passions, but about operations, can be without passions. Such a virtue is justice: because it applies the will to its proper act, which is not a passion. Nevertheless, joy results from the act of justice; at least in the will, in which case it is not a passion. And if this joy be increased through the perfection of justice, it will overflow into the sensitive appetite; in so far as the lower powers follow the movement of the higher, as stated above ( Q(17), A(7) ; Q(24), A(3) ). Wherefore by reason of this kind of overflow, the more perfect a virtue is, the more does it cause passion.

P(2a)- Q(59)- A(5)- RO(1) — Virtue overcomes inordinate passion; it produces ordinate passion.

P(2a)- Q(59)- A(5)- RO(2) — It is inordinate, not ordinate, passion that leads to sin.

P(2a)- Q(59)- A(5)- RO(3) — The good of anything depends on the condition of its nature. Now there is no sensitive appetite in God and the angels, as there is in man. Consequently good operation in God and the angels is altogether without passion, as it is without a body: whereas the good operation of man is with passion, even as it is produced with the body’s help.

QUESTION HOW THE MORAL VIRTUES DIFFER FROM ONE ANOTHER (FIVE ARTICLES) We must now consider how the moral virtues differ from one another: under which head there are five points of inquiry: (1) Whether there is only one moral virtue? (2) Whether those moral virtues which are about operations, are distinct from those which are about passions? (3) Whether there is but one moral virtue about operations? (4) Whether there are different moral virtues about different passions? (5) Whether the moral virtues differ in point of the various objects of the passions?

P(2a)- Q(60)- A(1) Whether there is only one moral virtue?

P(2a)- Q(60)- A(1)- O(1) — It would seem that there is only one moral virtue. Because just as the direction of moral actions belongs to reason which is the subject of the intellectual virtues; so does their inclination belong to the appetite which is the subject of moral virtues. But there is only one intellectual virtue to direct all moral acts, viz. prudence.

Therefore there is also but one moral virtue to give all moral acts their respective inclinations.

P(2a)- Q(60)- A(1)- O(2) — Further, habits differ, not in respect of their material objects, but according to the formal aspect of their objects. Now the formal aspect of the good to which moral virtue is directed, is one thing, viz. the mean defined by reason. Therefore, seemingly, there is but one moral virtue.

P(2a)- Q(60)- A(1)- O(3) — Further, things pertaining to morals are specified by their end, as stated above ( Q(1) , A(3) ). Now there is but one common end of all moral virtues, viz. happiness, while the proper and proximate ends are infinite in number. But the moral virtues themselves are not infinite in number. Therefore it seems that there is but one.

P(2a)- Q(60)- A(1) — On the contrary, One habit cannot be in several powers, as stated above ( Q(56), A(2) ). But the subject of the moral virtues is the appetitive part of the soul, which is divided into several powers, as stated in the P(1), Q(80), A(2) ; P(1), Q(81), A(2) . Therefore there cannot be only one moral virtue.

P(2a)- Q(60)- A(1) — I answer that, As stated above ( Q(58), AA(1),2 ,3), the moral virtues are habits of the appetitive faculty. Now habits differ specifically according to the specific differences of their objects, as stated above ( Q(54), A(2) ). Again, the species of the object of appetite, as of any thing, depends on its specific form which it receives from the agent. But we must observe that the matter of the passive subject bears a twofold relation to the agent. For sometimes it receives the form of the agent, in the same kind specifically as the agent has that form, as happens with all univocal agents, so that if the agent be one specifically, the matter must of necessity receive a form specifically one: thus the univocal effect of fire is of necessity something in the species of fire. Sometimes, however, the matter receives the form from the agent, but not in the same kind specifically as the agent, as is the case with non-univocal causes of generation: thus an animal is generated by the sun. In this case the forms received into matter are not of one species, but vary according to the adaptability of the matter to receive the influx of the agent: for instance, we see that owing to the one action of the sun, animals of various species are produced by putrefaction according to the various adaptability of matter.

Now it is evident that in moral matters the reason holds the place of commander and mover, while the appetitive power is commanded and moved. But the appetite does not receive the direction of reason univocally so to say; because it is rational, not essentially, but by participation (Ethic. i, 13). Consequently objects made appetible by the direction of reason belong to various species, according to their various relations to reason: so that it follows that moral virtues are of various species and are not one only.

P(2a)- Q(60)- A(1)- RO(1) — The object of the reason is truth. Now in all moral matters, which are contingent matters of action, there is but one kind of truth. Consequently, there is but one virtue to direct all such matters, viz. prudence. On the other hand, the object of the appetitive power is the appetible good, which varies in kind according to its various relations to reason, the directing power.

P(2a)- Q(60)- A(1)- RO(2) — This formal element is one generically, on account of the unity of the agent: but it varies in species, on account of the various relations of the receiving matter, as explained above.

P(2a)- Q(60)- A(1)- RO(3) — Moral matters do not receive their species from the last end, but from their proximate ends: and these, although they be infinite in number, are not infinite in species.

P(2a)- Q(60)- A(2) Whether moral virtues about operations are different from those that are about passions?

P(2a)- Q(60)- A(2)- O(1) — It would seem that moral virtues are not divided into those which are about operations and those which are about passions. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 3) that moral virtue is “an operative habit whereby we do what is best in matters of pleasure or sorrow.” Now pleasure and sorrow are passions, as stated above ( Q(31), A(1) ; Q(35), A(1) ). Therefore the same virtue which is about passions is also about operations, since it is an operative habit.

P(2a)- Q(60)- A(2)- O(2) — Further, the passions are principles of external action. If therefore some virtues regulate the passions, they must, as a consequence, regulate operations also. Therefore the same moral virtues are about both passions and operations.

P(2a)- Q(60)- A(2)- O(3) — Further, the sensitive appetite is moved well or ill towards every external operation. Now movements of the sensitive appetite are passions. Therefore the same virtues that are about operations are also about passions.

P(2a)- Q(60)- A(2) — On the contrary, The Philosopher reckons justice to be about operations; and temperance, fortitude and gentleness, about passions (Ethic. ii, 3,7; v, 1, seqq.).

P(2a)- Q(60)- A(2) — I answer that, Operation and passion stand in a twofold relation to virtue. First, as its effects; and in this way every moral virtue has some good operations as its product; and a certain pleasure or sorrow which are passions, as stated above ( Q(59), A(4), ad 1).

Secondly, operation may be compared to moral virtue as the matter about which virtue is concerned: and in this sense those moral virtues which are about operations must needs differ from those which are about passions.

The reason for this is that good and evil, in certain operations, are taken from the very nature of those operations, no matter how man may be affected towards them: viz. in so far as good and evil in them depend on their being commensurate with someone else. In operations of this kind there needs to be some power to regulate the operations in themselves: such are buying and selling, and all such operations in which there is an element of something due or undue to another. For this reason justice and its parts are properly about operations as their proper matter. On the other hand, in some operations, good and evil depend only on commensuration with the agent. Consequently good and evil in these operations depend on the way in which man is affected to them. And for this reason in such like operations virtue must needs be chiefly about internal emotions which are called the passions of the soul, as is evidently the case with temperance, fortitude and the like.

It happens, however, in operations which are directed to another, that the good of virtue is overlooked by reason of some inordinate passion of the soul. In such cases justice is destroyed in so far as the due measure of the external act is destroyed: while some other virtue is destroyed in so far as the internal passions exceed their due measure. Thus when through anger, one man strikes another, justice is destroyed in the undue blow; while gentleness is destroyed by the immoderate anger. The same may be clearly applied to other virtues.

This suffices for the Replies to the Objections. For the first considers operations as the effect of virtue, while the other two consider operation and passion as concurring in the same effect. But in some cases virtue is chiefly about operations, in others, about passions, for the reason given above.

P(2a)- Q(60)- A(3) Whether there is only one moral virtue about operations?

P(2a)- Q(60)- A(3)- O(1) — It would seem that there is but one moral virtue about operations. Because the rectitude of all external operations seems to belong to justice. Now justice is but one virtue. Therefore there is but one virtue about operations.

P(2a)- Q(60)- A(3)- O(2) — Further, those operations seem to differ most, which are directed on the one side to the good of the individual, and on the other to the good of the many. But this diversity does not cause diversity among the moral virtues: for the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 1) that legal justice, which directs human acts to the common good, does not differ, save logically, from the virtue which directs a man’s actions to one man only. Therefore diversity of operations does not cause a diversity of moral virtues.

P(2a)- Q(60)- A(3)- O(3) — Further, if there are various moral virtues about various operations, diversity of moral virtues would needs follow diversity of operations. But this is clearly untrue: for it is the function of justice to establish rectitude in various kinds of commutations, and again in distributions, as is set down in Ethic. v, 2. Therefore there are not different virtues about different operations.

P(2a)- Q(60)- A(3) — On the contrary, Religion is a moral virtue distinct from piety, both of which are about operations.

P(2a)- Q(60)- A(3) — I answer that, All the moral virtues that are about operations agree in one general notion of justice, which is in respect of something due to another: but they differ in respect of various special notions. The reason for this is that in external operations, the order of reason is established, as we have stated ( A(2) ), not according as how man is affected towards such operations, but according to the becomingness of the thing itself; from which becomingness we derive the notion of something due which is the formal aspect of justice: for, seemingly, it pertains to justice that a man give another his due. Wherefore all such virtues as are about operations, bear, in some way, the character of justice.

But the thing due is not of the same kind in all these virtues: for something is due to an equal in one way, to a superior, in another way, to an inferior, in yet another; and the nature of a debt differs according as it arises from a contract, a promise, or a favor already conferred. And corresponding to these various kinds of debt there are various virtues: e.g. “Religion” whereby we pay our debt to God; “Piety,” whereby we pay our debt to our parents or to our country; “Gratitude,” whereby we pay our debt to our benefactors, and so forth.

P(2a)- Q(60)- A(3)- RO(1) — Justice properly so called is one special virtue, whose object is the perfect due, which can be paid in the equivalent.

But the name of justice is extended also to all cases in which something due is rendered: in this sense it is not as a special virtue.

P(2a)- Q(60)- A(3)- RO(2) — That justice which seeks the common good is another virtue from that which is directed to the private good of an individual: wherefore common right differs from private right; and Tully (De Inv. ii) reckons as a special virtue, piety which directs man to the good of his country. But that justice which directs man to the common good is a general virtue through its act of command: since it directs all the acts of the virtues to its own end, viz. the common good. And the virtues, in so far as they are commanded by that justice, receive the name of justice: so that virtue does not differ, save logically, from legal justice; just as there is only a logical difference between a virtue that is active of itself, and a virtue that is active through the command of another virtue.

P(2a)- Q(60)- A(3)- RO(3) — There is the same kind of due in all the operations belonging to special justice. Consequently, there is the same virtue of justice, especially in regard to commutations. For it may be that distributive justice is of another species from commutative justice; but about this we shall inquire later on ( P(2b) Q(61), A(1) ).

P(2a)- Q(60)- A(4) Whether there are different moral virtues about different passions?

P(2a)- Q(60)- A(4)- O(1) — It would seem that there are not different moral virtues about different passions. For there is but one habit about things that concur in their source and end: as is evident especially in the case of sciences. But the passions all concur in one source, viz. love; and they all terminate in the same end, viz. joy or sorrow, as we stated above ( Q(25), AA(1),2 ,4; Q(27), A(4) ). Therefore there is but one moral virtue about all the passions.

P(2a)- Q(60)- A(4)- O(2) — Further, if there were different moral virtues about different passions, it would follow that there are as many moral virtues as passions. But this clearly is not the case: since there is one moral virtue about contrary passions; namely, fortitude, about fear and daring; temperance, about pleasure and sorrow. Therefore there is no need for different moral virtues about different passions.

P(2a)- Q(60)- A(4)- O(3) — Further, love, desire, and pleasure are passions of different species, as stated above ( Q(23), A(4) ). Now there is but one virtue about all these three, viz. temperance. Therefore there are not different moral virtues about different passions.

P(2a)- Q(60)- A(4) — On the contrary, Fortitude is about fear and daring; temperance about desire; meekness about anger; as stated in Ethic. iii, 6,10; iv, 5.

P(2a)- Q(60)- A(4) — I answer that, It cannot be said that there is only one moral virtue about all the passions: since some passions are not in the same power as other passions; for some belong to the irascible, others to the concupiscible faculty, as stated above ( Q(23), A(1) ).

On the other hand, neither does every diversity of passions necessarily suffice for a diversity of moral virtues. First, because some passions are in contrary opposition to one another, such as joy and sorrow, fear and daring, and so on. About such passions as are thus in opposition to one another there must needs be one same virtue. Because, since moral virtue consists in a kind of mean, the mean in contrary passions stands in the same ratio to both, even as in the natural order there is but one mean between contraries, e.g. between black and white. Secondly, because there are different passions contradicting reason in the same manner, e.g. by impelling to that which is contrary to reason, or by withdrawing from that which is in accord with reason. Wherefore the different passions of the concupiscible faculty do not require different moral virtues, because their movements follow one another in a certain order, as being directed to the one same thing, viz. the attainment of some good or the avoidance of some evil: thus from love proceeds desire, and from desire we arrive at pleasure; and it is the same with the opposite passions, for hatred leads to avoidance or dislike, and this leads to sorrow. On the other hand, the irascible passions are not all of one order, but are directed to different things: for daring and fear are about some great danger; hope and despair are about some difficult good; while anger seeks to overcome something contrary which has wrought harm. Consequently there are different virtues about such like passions: e.g. temperance, about the concupiscible passions; fortitude, about fear and daring; magnanimity, about hope and despair; meekness, about anger.

P(2a)- Q(60)- A(4)- RO(1) — All the passions concur in one common principle and end; but not in one proper principle or end: and so this does not suffice for the unity of moral virtue.

P(2a)- Q(60)- A(4)- RO(2) — Just as in the natural order the same principle causes movement from one extreme and movement towards the other; and as in the intellectual order contraries have one common ratio; so too between contrary passions there is but one moral virtue, which, like a second nature, consents to reason’s dictates.

P(2a)- Q(60)- A(4)- RO(3) — Those three passions are directed to the same object in a certain order, as stated above: and so they belong to the same virtue.

P(2a)- Q(60)- A(5) Whether the moral virtues differ in point of the various objects of the passions?

P(2a)- Q(60)- A(5)- O(1) — It would seem that the moral virtues do not differ according to the objects of the passions. For just as there are objects of passions, so are there objects of operations. Now those moral virtues that are about operations, do not differ according to the objects of those operations: for the buying and selling either of a house or of a horse belong to the one same virtue of justice. Therefore neither do those moral virtues that are about passions differ according to the objects of those passions.

P(2a)- Q(60)- A(5)- O(2) — Further, the passions are acts or movements of the sensitive appetite. Now it needs a greater difference to differentiate habits than acts. Hence diverse objects which do not diversify the species of passions, do not diversify the species of moral virtue: so that there is but one moral virtue about all objects of pleasure, and the same applies to the other passions.

P(2a)- Q(60)- A(5)- O(3) — Further, more or less do not change a species.

Now various objects of pleasure differ only by reason of being more or less pleasurable. Therefore all objects of pleasure belong to one species of virtue: and for the same reason so do all fearful objects, and the same applies to others. Therefore moral virtue is not diversified according to the objects of the passions.

P(2a)- Q(60)- A(5)- O(4) — Further, virtue hinders evil, even as it produces good. But there are various virtues about the desires for good things: thus temperance is about desires for the pleasure of touch, and “eutrapelia” [*\eutrapelia\] about pleasures in games. Therefore there should be different virtues about fears of evils.

P(2a)- Q(60)- A(5) — On the contrary, Chastity is about sexual pleasures, abstinence about pleasures of the table, and “eutrapelia” about pleasures in games.

I answer that, The perfection of a virtue depends on the reason; whereas the perfection of a passion depends on the sensitive appetite.

Consequently virtues must needs be differentiated according to their relation to reason, but the passions according to their relation to the appetite. Hence the objects of the passions, according as they are variously related to the sensitive appetite, cause the different species of passions: while, according as they are related to reason, they cause the different species of virtues. Now the movement of reason is not the same as that of the sensitive appetite. Wherefore nothing hinders a difference of objects from causing diversity of passions, without causing diversity of virtues, as when one virtue is about several passions, as stated above ( A(4) ); and again, a difference of objects from causing different virtues, without causing a difference of passions, since several virtues are directed about one passion, e.g. pleasure.

And because diverse passions belonging to diverse powers, always belong to diverse virtues, as stated above ( A(4) ); therefore a difference of objects that corresponds to a difference of powers always causes a specific difference of virtues — for instance the difference between that which is good absolutely speaking, and that which is good and difficult to obtain.

Moreover since the reason rules man’s lower powers in a certain order, and even extends to outward things; hence, one single object of the passions, according as it is apprehended by sense, imagination, or reason, and again, according as it belongs to the soul, body, or external things, has various relations to reason, and consequently is of a nature to cause a difference of virtues. Consequently man’s good which is the object of love, desire and pleasure, may be taken as referred either to a bodily sense, or to the inner apprehension of the mind: and this same good may be directed to man’s good in himself, either in his body or in his soul, or to man’s good in relation to other men. And every such difference, being differently related to reason, differentiates virtues.

Accordingly, if we take a good, and it be something discerned by the sense of touch, and something pertaining to the upkeep of human life either in the individual or in the species, such as the pleasures of the table or of sexual intercourse, it will belong to the virtue of “temperance.” As regards the pleasures of the other senses, they are not intense, and so do not present much difficulty to the reason: hence there is no virtue corresponding to them; for virtue, “like art, is about difficult things” (Ethic. ii, 3).

On the other hand, good discerned not by the senses, but by an inner power, and belonging to man in himself, is like money and honor; the former, by its very nature, being employable for the good of the body, while the latter is based on the apprehension of the mind. These goods again may be considered either absolutely, in which way they concern the concupiscible faculty, or as being difficult to obtain, in which way they belong to the irascible part: which distinction, however, has no place in pleasurable objects of touch; since such are of base condition, and are becoming to man in so far as he has something in common with irrational animals. Accordingly in reference to money considered as a good absolutely, as an object of desire, pleasure, or love, there is “liberality”: but if we consider this good as difficult to get, and as being the object of our hope, there is “magnificence” [*\megaloprepeia\]. With regard to that good which we call honor, taken absolutely, as the object of love, we have a virtue called “philotimia” [*\philotimia\], i.e. “love of honor”: while if we consider it as hard to attain, and as an object of hope, then we have “magnanimity.” Wherefore liberality and “philotimia” seem to be in the concupiscible part, while magnificence and magnanimity are in the irascible.

As regards man’s good in relation to other men, it does not seem hard to obtain, but is considered absolutely, as the object of the concupiscible passions. This good may be pleasurable to a man in his behavior towards another either in some serious matter, in actions, to wit, that are directed by reason to a due end, or in playful actions, viz. that are done for mere pleasure, and which do not stand in the same relation to reason as the former. Now one man behaves towards another in serious matters, in two ways. First, as being pleasant in his regard, by becoming speech and deeds: and this belongs to a virtue which Aristotle (Ethic. ii, 7) calls “friendship” [*\philia\], and may be rendered “affability.” Secondly, one man behaves towards another by being frank with him, in words and deeds: this belongs to another virtue which (Ethic. iv, 7) he calls “truthfulness” [*\aletheia\].

For frankness is more akin to the reason than pleasure, and serious matters than play. Hence there is another virtue about the pleasures of games, which the Philosopher “eutrapelia” [*\eutrapelia\] (Ethic. iv, 8).

It is therefore evident that, according to Aristotle, there are ten moral virtues about the passions, viz. fortitude, temperance, liberality, magnificence, magnanimity, “philotimia,” gentleness, friendship, truthfulness, and “eutrapelia,” all of which differ in respect of their diverse matter, passions, or objects: so that if we add “justice,” which is about operations, there will be eleven in all.

P(2a)- Q(60)- A(5)- RO(1) — All objects of the same specific operation have the same relation to reason: not so all the objects of the same specific passion; because operations do not thwart reason as the passions do.

P(2a)- Q(60)- A(5)- RO(2) — Passions are not differentiated by the same rule as virtues are, as stated above.

P(2a)- Q(60)- A(5)- RO(3) — More and less do not cause a difference of species, unless they bear different relations to reason.

P(2a)- Q(60)- A(5)- RO(4) — Good is a more potent mover than evil: because evil does not cause movement save in virtue of good, as Dionysius states (Div. Nom. iv). Hence an evil does not prove an obstacle to reason, so as to require virtues unless that evil be great; there being, seemingly, one such evil corresponding to each kind of passion. Hence there is but one virtue, meekness, for every form of anger; and, again, but one virtue, fortitude, for all forms of daring. On the other hand, good involves difficulty, which requires virtue, even if it be not a great good in that particular kind of passion. Consequently there are various moral virtues about desires, as stated above.

QUESTION OF THE CARDINAL VIRTUES (FIVE ARTICLES) We must now consider the cardinal virtues: under which head there are five points of inquiry: (1) Whether the moral virtues should be called cardinal or principal virtues? (2) Of their number; (3) Which are they? (4) Whether they differ from one another? (5) Whether they are fittingly divided into social, perfecting, perfect, and exemplar virtues?

P(2a)- Q(61)- A(1) Whether the moral virtues should be called cardinal or principal virtues?

P(2a)- Q(61)- A(1)- O(1) — It would seem that moral virtues should not be called cardinal or principal virtues. For “the opposite members of a division are by nature simultaneous” (Categor. x), so that one is not principal rather than another. Now all the virtues are opposite members of the division of the genus “virtue.” Therefore none of them should be called principal.

P(2a)- Q(61)- A(1)- O(2) — Further, the end is principal as compared to the means. But the theological virtues are about the end; while the moral virtues are about the means. Therefore the theological virtues, rather than the moral virtues, should be called principal or cardinal.

P(2a)- Q(61)- A(1)- O(3) — Further, that which is essentially so is principal in comparison with that which is so by participation. But the intellectual virtues belong to that which is essentially rational: whereas the moral virtues belong to that which is rational by participation, as stated above ( Q(58), A(3) ). Therefore the intellectual virtues are principal, rather than the moral virtues.

P(2a)- Q(61)- A(1) — On the contrary, Ambrose in explaining the words, “Blessed are the poor in spirit” ( Luke 6:20) says: “We know that there are four cardinal virtues, viz. temperance, justice, prudence, and fortitude.”

But these are moral virtues. Therefore the moral virtues are cardinal virtues.

P(2a)- Q(61)- A(1) — I answer that, When we speak of virtue simply, we are understood to speak of human virtue. Now human virtue, as stated above ( Q(56), A(3) ), is one that answers to the perfect idea of virtue, which requires rectitude of the appetite: for such like virtue not only confers the faculty of doing well, but also causes the good deed done. On the other hand, the name virtue is applied to one that answers imperfectly to the idea of virtue, and does not require rectitude of the appetite: because it merely confers the faculty of doing well without causing the good deed to be done. Now it is evident that the perfect is principal as compared to the imperfect: and so those virtues which imply rectitude of the appetite are called principal virtues. Such are the moral virtues, and prudence alone, of the intellectual virtues, for it is also something of a moral virtue, as was clearly shown above ( Q(57), A(4) ). Consequently, those virtues which are called principal or cardinal are fittingly placed among the moral virtues.

P(2a)- Q(61)- A(1)- RO(1) — When a univocal genus is divided into its species, the members of the division are on a par in the point of the generic idea; although considered in their nature as things, one species may surpass another in rank and perfection, as man in respect of other animals. But when we divide an analogous term, which is applied to several things, but to one before it is applied to another, nothing hinders one from ranking before another, even in the point of the generic idea; as the notion of being is applied to substance principally in relation to accident. Such is the division of virtue into various kinds of virtue: since the good defined by reason is not found in the same way in all things.

P(2a)- Q(61)- A(1)- RO(2) — The theological virtues are above man, as stated above ( Q(58), A(3), ad 3). Hence they should properly be called not human, but “super-human” or godlike virtues.

P(2a)- Q(61)- A(1)- RO(3) — Although the intellectual virtues, except in prudence, rank before the moral virtues, in the point of their subject, they do not rank before them as virtues; for a virtue, as such, regards good, which is the object of the appetite.

P(2a)- Q(61)- A(2) Whether there are four cardinal virtues?

P(2a)- Q(61)- A(2)- O(1) — It would seem that there are not four cardinal virtues. For prudence is the directing principle of the other moral virtues, as is clear from what has been said above ( Q(58), A(4) ). But that which directs other things ranks before them. Therefore prudence alone is a principal virtue.

P(2a)- Q(61)- A(2)- O(2) — Further, the principal virtues are, in a way, moral virtues. Now we are directed to moral works both by the practical reason, and by a right appetite, as stated in Ethic. vi, 2. Therefore there are only two cardinal virtues.

P(2a)- Q(61)- A(2)- O(3) — Further, even among the other virtues one ranks higher than another. But in order that a virtue be principal, it needs not to rank above all the others, but above some. Therefore it seems that there are many more principal virtues.

P(2a)- Q(61)- A(2) — On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. ii): “The entire structure of good works is built on four virtues.”

P(2a)- Q(61)- A(2) — I answer that, Things may be numbered either in respect of their formal principles, or according to the subjects in which they are: and either way we find that there are four cardinal virtues.

For the formal principle of the virtue of which we speak now is good as defined by reason; which good is considered in two ways. First, as existing in the very act of reason: and thus we have one principal virtue, called “Prudence.” Secondly, according as the reason puts its order into something else; either into operations, and then we have “Justice”; or into passions, and then we need two virtues. For the need of putting the order of reason into the passions is due to their thwarting reason: and this occurs in two ways. First, by the passions inciting to something against reason, and then the passions need a curb, which we call “Temperance.” Secondly, by the passions withdrawing us from following the dictate of reason, e.g. through fear of danger or toil: and then man needs to be strengthened for that which reason dictates, lest he turn back; and to this end there is “Fortitude.”

In like manner, we find the same number if we consider the subjects of virtue. For there are four subjects of the virtue we speak of now: viz. the power which is rational in its essence, and this is perfected by “Prudence”; and that which is rational by participation, and is threefold, the will, subject of “Justice,” the concupiscible faculty, subject of “Temperance,” and the irascible faculty, subject of “Fortitude.”

P(2a)- Q(61)- A(2)- RO(1) — Prudence is the principal of all the virtues simply. The others are principal, each in its own genus.

P(2a)- Q(61)- A(2)- RO(2) — That part of the soul which is rational by participation is threefold, as stated above.

P(2a)- Q(61)- A(2)- RO(3) — All the other virtues among which one ranks before another, are reducible to the above four, both as to the subject and as to the formal principle.

P(2a)- Q(61)- A(3) Whether any other virtues should be called principal rather than these?

P(2a)- Q(61)- A(3)- O(1) — It would seem that other virtues should be called principal rather than these. For, seemingly, the greatest is the principal in any genus. Now “magnanimity has a great influence on all the virtues” (Ethic. iv, 3). Therefore magnanimity should more than any be called a principal virtue.

P(2a)- Q(61)- A(3)- O(2) — Further, that which strengthens the other virtues should above all be called a principal virtue. But such is humility: for Gregory says (Hom. iv in Ev.) that “he who gathers the other virtues without humility is as one who carries straw against the wind.” Therefore humility seems above all to be a principal virtue.

P(2a)- Q(61)- A(3)- O(3) — Further, that which is most perfect seems to be principal. But this applies to patience, according to James 1:4: “Patience hath a perfect work.” Therefore patience should be reckoned a principal virtue.

P(2a)- Q(61)- A(3) — On the contrary, Cicero reduces all other virtues to these four (De Invent. Rhet. ii).

P(2a)- Q(61)- A(3) — I answer that, As stated above ( A(2) ), these four are reckoned as cardinal virtues, in respect of the four formal principles of virtue as we understand it now. These principles are found chiefly in certain acts and passions. Thus the good which exists in the act of reason, is found chiefly in reason’s command, but not in its counsel or its judgment, as stated above ( Q(57), A(6) ). Again, good as defined by reason and put into our operations as something right and due, is found chiefly in commutations and distributions in respect of another person, and on a basis of equality. The good of curbing the passions is found chiefly in those passions which are most difficult to curb, viz. in the pleasures of touch. The good of being firm in holding to the good defined by reason, against the impulse of passion, is found chiefly in perils of death, which are most difficult to withstand.

Accordingly the above four virtues may be considered in two ways. First, in respect of their common formal principles. In this way they are called principal, being general, as it were, in comparison with all the virtues: so that, for instance, any virtue that causes good in reason’s act of consideration, may be called prudence; every virtue that causes the good of right and due in operation, be called justice; every virtue that curbs and represses the passions, be called temperance; and every virtue that strengthens the mind against any passions whatever, be called fortitude.

Many, both holy doctors, as also philosophers, speak about these virtues in this sense: and in this way the other virtues are contained under them.

Wherefore all the objections fail.

Secondly, they may be considered in point of their being denominated, each one from that which is foremost in its respective matter, and thus they are specific virtues, condivided with the others. Yet they are called principal in comparison with the other virtues, on account of the importance of their matter: so that prudence is the virtue which commands; justice, the virtue which is about due actions between equals; temperance, the virtue which suppresses desires for the pleasures of touch; and fortitude, the virtue which strengthens against dangers of death.

Thus again do the objections fail: because the other virtues may be principal in some other way, but these are called principal by reason of their matter, as stated above.

P(2a)- Q(61)- A(4) Whether the four cardinal virtues differ from one another?

P(2a)- Q(61)- A(4)- O(1) — It would seem that the above four virtues are not diverse and distinct from one another. For Gregory says (Moral. xxii, 1): “There is no true prudence, unless it be just, temperate and brave; no perfect temperance, that is not brave, just and prudent; no sound fortitude, that is not prudent, temperate and just; no real justice, without prudence, fortitude and temperance.” But this would not be so, if the above virtues were distinct from one another: since the different species of one genus do not qualify one another. Therefore the aforesaid virtues are not distinct from one another.

P(2a)- Q(61)- A(4)- O(2) — Further, among things distinct from one another the function of one is not attributed to another. But the function of temperance is attributed to fortitude: for Ambrose says (De Offic. xxxvi): “Rightly do we call it fortitude, when a man conquers himself, and is not weakened and bent by any enticement.” And of temperance he says (De Offic. xliii, xlv) that it “safeguards the manner and order in all things that we decide to do and say.” Therefore it seems that these virtues are not distinct from one another.

P(2a)- Q(61)- A(4)- O(3) — Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 4) that the necessary conditions of virtue are first of all “that a man should have knowledge; secondly, that he should exercise choice for a particular end; thirdly, that he should possess the habit and act with firmness and steadfastness.” But the first of these seems to belong to prudence which is rectitude of reason in things to be done; the second, i.e. choice, belongs to temperance, whereby a man, holding his passions on the curb, acts, not from passion but from choice; the third, that a man should act for the sake of a due end, implies a certain rectitude, which seemingly belongs to justice; while the last, viz. firmness and steadfastness, belongs to fortitude.

Therefore each of these virtues is general in comparison to other virtues.

Therefore they are not distinct from one another.

P(2a)- Q(61)- A(4) — On the contrary, Augustine says (De Moribus Eccl. xi) that “there are four virtues, corresponding to the various emotions of love,” and he applies this to the four virtues mentioned above. Therefore the same four virtues are distinct from one another.

P(2a)- Q(61)- A(4) — I answer that, As stated above ( A(3) ), these four virtues are understood differently by various writers. For some take them as signifying certain general conditions of the human mind, to be found in all the virtues: so that, to wit, prudence is merely a certain rectitude of discretion in any actions or matters whatever; justice, a certain rectitude of the mind, whereby a man does what he ought in any matters; temperance, a disposition of the mind, moderating any passions or operations, so as to keep them within bounds; and fortitude, a disposition whereby the soul is strengthened for that which is in accord with reason, against any assaults of the passions, or the toil involved by any operations. To distinguish these four virtues in this way does not imply that justice, temperance and fortitude are distinct virtuous habits: because it is fitting that every moral virtue, from the fact that it is a “habit,” should be accompanied by a certain firmness so as not to be moved by its contrary: and this, we have said, belongs to fortitude. Moreover, inasmuch as it is a “virtue,” it is directed to good which involves the notion of right and due; and this, we have said, belongs to justice. Again, owing to the fact that it is a “moral virtue” partaking of reason, it observes the mode of reason in all things, and does not exceed its bounds, which has been stated to belong to temperance. It is only in the point of having discretion, which we ascribed to prudence, that there seems to be a distinction from the other three, inasmuch as discretion belongs essentially to reason; whereas the other three imply a certain share of reason by way of a kind of application (of reason) to passions or operations. According to the above explanation, then, prudence would be distinct from the other three virtues: but these would not be distinct from one another; for it is evident that one and the same virtue is both habit, and virtue, and moral virtue.

Others, however, with better reason, take these four virtues, according as they have their special determinate matter; each of its own matter, in which special commendation is given to that general condition from which the virtue’s name is taken as stated above ( A(3) ). In this way it is clear that the aforesaid virtues are distinct habits, differentiated in respect of their diverse objects.

P(2a)- Q(61)- A(4)- RO(1) — Gregory is speaking of these four virtues in the first sense given above. It may also be said that these four virtues qualify one another by a kind of overflow. For the qualities of prudence overflow on to the other virtues in so far as they are directed by prudence.

And each of the others overflows on to the rest, for the reason that whoever can do what is harder, can do what is less difficult. Wherefore whoever can curb his desires for the pleasures of touch, so that they keep within bounds, which is a very hard thing to do, for this very reason is more able to check his daring in dangers of death, so as not to go too far, which is much easier; and in this sense fortitude is said to be temperate.

Again, temperance is said to be brave, by reason of fortitude overflowing into temperance: in so far, to wit, as he whose mind is strengthened by fortitude against dangers of death, which is a matter of very great difficulty, is more able to remain firm against the onslaught of pleasures; for as Cicero says (De Offic. i), “it would be inconsistent for a man to be unbroken by fear, and yet vanquished by cupidity; or that he should be conquered by lust, after showing himself to be unconquered by toil.”

From this the Reply to the Second Objection is clear. For temperance observes the mean in all things, and fortitude keeps the mind unbent by the enticements of pleasures, either in so far as these virtues are taken to denote certain general conditions of virtue, or in the sense that they overflow on to one another, as explained above.

P(2a)- Q(61)- A(4)- RO(3) — These four general conditions of virtue set down by the Philosopher, are not proper to the aforesaid virtues. They may, however, be appropriated to them, in the way above stated.

P(2a)- Q(61)- A(5) Whether the cardinal virtues are fittingly divided into social virtues, perfecting, perfect, and exemplar virtues?

P(2a)- Q(61)- A(5)- O(1) — It would seem that these four virtues are unfittingly divided into exemplar virtues, perfecting virtues, perfect virtues, and social virtues. For as Macrobius says (Super Somn. Scip. 1), the “exemplar virtues are such as exist in the mind of God.” Now the Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 8) that “it is absurd to ascribe justice, fortitude, temperance, and prudence to God.” Therefore these virtues cannot be exemplar.

P(2a)- Q(61)- A(5)- O(2) — Further, the “perfect” virtues are those which are without any passion: for Macrobius says (Super Somn. Scip. 1) that “in a soul that is cleansed, temperance has not to check worldly desires, for it has forgotten all about them: fortitude knows nothing about the passions; it does not have to conquer them.” Now it was stated above ( Q(59), A(5) ) that the aforesaid virtues cannot be without passions.

Therefore there is no such thing as “perfect” virtue.

P(2a)- Q(61)- A(5)- O(3) — Further, he says (Macrobius: Super Somn.

Scip. 1) that the “perfecting” virtues are those of the man “who flies from human affairs and devotes himself exclusively to the things of God.” But it seems wrong to do this, for Cicero says (De Offic. i): “I reckon that it is not only unworthy of praise, but wicked for a man to say that he despises what most men admire, viz. power and office.” Therefore there are no “perfecting” virtues.

P(2a)- Q(61)- A(5)- O(4) — Further, he says (Macrobius: Super Somn.

Scip. 1) that the “social” virtues are those “whereby good men work for the good of their country and for the safety of the city.” But it is only legal justice that is directed to the common weal, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. v, 1). Therefore other virtues should not be called “social.”

P(2a)- Q(61)- A(5) — On the contrary, Macrobius says (Super Somn. Scip. 1): “Plotinus, together with Plato foremost among teachers of philosophy, says: ‘The four kinds of virtue are fourfold: In the first place there are social* virtues; secondly, there are perfecting virtues [*Virtutes purgatoriae: literally meaning, cleansing virtues]; thirdly, there are perfect [*Virtutes purgati animi: literally, virtues of the clean soul] virtues; and fourthly, there are exemplar virtues.’“ [*Cf. Chrysostom’s fifteenth homily on St. Matthew, where he says: “The gentle, the modest, the merciful, the just man does not shut up his good deeds within himself . . .

He that is clean of heart and peaceful, and suffers persecution for the sake of the truth, lives for the common weal.”] P(2a)- Q(61)- A(5) — I answer that, As Augustine says (De Moribus Eccl. vi), “the soul needs to follow something in order to give birth to virtue: this something is God: if we follow Him we shall live aright.”

Consequently the exemplar of human virtue must needs pre-exist in God, just as in Him pre-exist the types of all things. Accordingly virtue may be considered as existing originally in God, and thus we speak of “exemplar” virtues: so that in God the Divine Mind itself may be called prudence; while temperance is the turning of God’s gaze on Himself, even as in us it is that which conforms the appetite to reason. God’s fortitude is His unchangeableness; His justice is the observance of the Eternal Law in His works, as Plotinus states (Cf. Macrobius, Super Somn. Scip. 1).

Again, since man by his nature is a social [*See above note on Chrysostom] animal, these virtues, in so far as they are in him according to the condition of his nature, are called “social” virtues; since it is by reason of them that man behaves himself well in the conduct of human affairs. It is in this sense that we have been speaking of these virtues until now.

But since it behooves a man to do his utmost to strive onward even to Divine things, as even the Philosopher declares in Ethic. x, 7, and as Scripture often admonishes us — for instance: “Be ye . . . perfect, as your heavenly Father is perfect” ( Matthew 5:48), we must needs place some virtues between the social or human virtues, and the exemplar virtues which are Divine. Now these virtues differ by reason of a difference of movement and term: so that some are virtues of men who are on their way and tending towards the Divine similitude; and these are called “perfecting” virtues. Thus prudence, by contemplating the things of God, counts as nothing all things of the world, and directs all the thoughts of the soul to God alone: temperance, so far as nature allows, neglects the needs of the body; fortitude prevents the soul from being afraid of neglecting the body and rising to heavenly things; and justice consists in the soul giving a whole-hearted consent to follow the way thus proposed. Besides these there are the virtues of those who have already attained to the Divine similitude: these are called the “perfect virtues.” Thus prudence sees nought else but the things of God; temperance knows no earthly desires; fortitude has no knowledge of passion; and justice, by imitating the Divine Mind, is united thereto by an everlasting covenant. Such as the virtues attributed to the Blessed, or, in this life, to some who are at the summit of perfection.

P(2a)- Q(61)- A(5)- RO(1) — The Philosopher is speaking of these virtues according as they relate to human affairs; for instance, justice, about buying and selling; fortitude, about fear; temperance, about desires; for in this sense it is absurd to attribute them to God.

P(2a)- Q(61)- A(5)- RO(2) — Human virtues, that is to say, virtues of men living together in this world, are about the passions. But the virtues of those who have attained to perfect bliss are without passions. Hence Plotinus says (Cf. Macrobius, Super Somn. Scip. 1) that “the social virtues check the passions,” i.e. they bring them to the relative mean; “the second kind,” viz. the perfecting virtues, “uproot them”; “the third kind,” viz. the perfect virtues, “forget them; while it is impious to mention them in connection with virtues of the fourth kind,” viz. the exemplar virtues. It may also be said that here he is speaking of passions as denoting inordinate emotions.

P(2a)- Q(61)- A(5)- RO(3) — To neglect human affairs when necessity forbids is wicked; otherwise it is virtuous. Hence Cicero says a little earlier: “Perhaps one should make allowances for those who by reason of their exceptional talents have devoted themselves to learning; as also to those who have retired from public life on account of failing health, or for some other yet weightier motive; when such men yielded to others the power and renown of authority.” This agrees with what Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 19): “The love of truth demands a hollowed leisure; charity necessitates good works. If no one lays this burden on us we may devote ourselves to the study and contemplation of truth; but if the burden is laid on us it is to be taken up under the pressure of charity.”

P(2a)- Q(61)- A(5)- RO(4) — Legal justice alone regards the common weal directly: but by commanding the other virtues it draws them all into the service of the common weal, as the Philosopher declares (Ethic. v, 1). For we must take note that it concerns the human virtues, as we understand them here, to do well not only towards the community, but also towards the parts of the community, viz. towards the household, or even towards one individual.

QUESTION OF THE THEOLOGICAL VIRTUES (FOUR ARTICLES) We must now consider the Theological Virtues: under which head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether there are any theological virtues? (2) Whether the theological virtues are distinct from the intellectual and moral virtues? (3) How many, and which are they? (4) Of their order.

P(2a)- Q(62)- A(1) Whether there are any theological virtues?

P(2a)- Q(62)- A(1)- O(1) — It would seem that there are not any theological virtues. For according to Phys. vii, text. 17, “virtue is the disposition of a perfect thing to that which is best: and by perfect, I mean that which is disposed according to nature.” But that which is Divine is above man’s nature. Therefore the theological virtues are not virtues of a man.

P(2a)- Q(62)- A(1)- O(2) — Further, theological virtues are quasi-Divine virtues. But the Divine virtues are exemplars, as stated above ( Q(61), A(5) ), which are not in us but in God. Therefore the theological virtues are not virtues of man.

P(2a)- Q(62)- A(1)- O(3) — Further, the theological virtues are so called because they direct us to God, Who is the first beginning and last end of all things. But by the very nature of his reason and will, man is directed to his first beginning and last end. Therefore there is no need for any habits of theological virtue, to direct the reason and will to God.

P(2a)- Q(62)- A(1) — On the contrary, The precepts of the Law are about acts of virtue. Now the Divine Law contains precepts about the acts of faith, hope, and charity: for it is written (Ecclus. 2:8, seqq.): “Ye that fear the Lord believe Him,” and again, “hope in Him,” and again, “love Him.”

Therefore faith, hope, and charity are virtues directing us to God.

Therefore they are theological virtues.

P(2a)- Q(62)- A(1) — I answer that, Man is perfected by virtue, for those actions whereby he is directed to happiness, as was explained above ( Q(5) , A(7) ). Now man’s happiness is twofold, as was also stated above ( Q(5) , A(5) ). One is proportionate to human nature, a happiness, to wit, which man can obtain by means of his natural principles. The other is a happiness surpassing man’s nature, and which man can obtain by the power of God alone, by a kind of participation of the Godhead, about which it is written ( 2 Peter 1:4) that by Christ we are made “partakers of the Divine nature.” And because such happiness surpasses the capacity of human nature, man’s natural principles which enable him to act well according to his capacity, do not suffice to direct man to this same happiness. Hence it is necessary for man to receive from God some additional principles, whereby he may be directed to supernatural happiness, even as he is directed to his connatural end, by means of his natural principles, albeit not without Divine assistance. Such like principles are called “theological virtues”: first, because their object is God, inasmuch as they direct us aright to God: secondly, because they are infused in us by God alone: thirdly, because these virtues are not made known to us, save by Divine revelation, contained in Holy Writ.

P(2a)- Q(62)- A(1)- RO(1) — A certain nature may be ascribed to a certain thing in two ways. First, essentially: and thus these theological virtues surpass the nature of man. Secondly, by participation, as kindled wood partakes of the nature of fire: and thus, after a fashion, man becomes a partaker of the Divine Nature, as stated above: so that these virtues are proportionate to man in respect of the Nature of which he is made a partaker.

P(2a)- Q(62)- A(1)- RO(2) — These virtues are called Divine, not as though God were virtuous by reason of them, but because of them God makes us virtuous, and directs us to Himself. Hence they are not exemplar but exemplate virtues.

P(2a)- Q(62)- A(1)- RO(3) — The reason and will are naturally directed to God, inasmuch as He is the beginning and end of nature, but in proportion to nature. But the reason and will, according to their nature, are not sufficiently directed to Him in so far as He is the object of supernatural happiness.

P(2a)- Q(62)- A(2) Whether the theological virtues are distinct from the intellectual and moral virtues?

P(2a)- Q(62)- A(2)- O(1) — It would seem that the theological virtues are not distinct from the moral and intellectual virtues. For the theological virtues, if they be in a human soul, must needs perfect it, either as to the intellective, or as to the appetitive part. Now the virtues which perfect the intellective part are called intellectual; and the virtues which perfect the appetitive part, are called moral. Therefore, the theological virtues are not distinct from the moral and intellectual virtues.

P(2a)- Q(62)- A(2)- O(2) — Further, the theological virtues are those which direct us to God. Now, among the intellectual virtues there is one which directs us to God: this is wisdom, which is about Divine things, since it considers the highest cause. Therefore the theological virtues are not distinct from the intellectual virtues.

P(2a)- Q(62)- A(2)- O(3) — Further, Augustine (De Moribus Eccl. xv) shows how the four cardinal virtues are the “order of love.” Now love is charity, which is a theological virtue. Therefore the moral virtues are not distinct from the theological.

P(2a)- Q(62)- A(2) — On the contrary, That which is above man’s nature is distinct from that which is according to his nature. But the theological virtues are above man’s nature; while the intellectual and moral virtues are in proportion to his nature, as clearly shown above ( Q(58), A(3) ).

Therefore they are distinct from one another.

P(2a)- Q(62)- A(2) — I answer that, As stated above ( Q(54), A(2), ad 1), habits are specifically distinct from one another in respect of the formal difference of their objects. Now the object of the theological virtues is God Himself, Who is the last end of all, as surpassing the knowledge of our reason. On the other hand, the object of the intellectual and moral virtues is something comprehensible to human reason. Wherefore the theological virtues are specifically distinct from the moral and intellectual virtues.

P(2a)- Q(62)- A(2)- RO(1) — The intellectual and moral virtues perfect man’s intellect and appetite according to the capacity of human nature; the theological virtues, supernaturally.

P(2a)- Q(62)- A(2)- RO(2) — The wisdom which the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 3,7) reckons as an intellectual virtue, considers Divine things so far as they are open to the research of human reason. Theological virtue, on the other hand, is about those same things so far as they surpass human reason.

P(2a)- Q(62)- A(2)- RO(3) — Though charity is love, yet love is not always charity. When, then, it is stated that every virtue is the order of love, this can be understood either of love in the general sense, or of the love of charity. If it be understood of love, commonly so called, then each virtue is stated to be the order of love, in so far as each cardinal virtue requires ordinate emotions; and love is the root and cause of every emotion, as stated above ( Q(27), A(4) ; Q(28), A(6), ad 2; Q(41), A(2), ad 1). If, however, it be understood of the love of charity, it does not mean that every other virtue is charity essentially: but that all other virtues depend on charity in some way, as we shall show further on ( Q(65), AA(2),5 ; P(2b) Q(23), A(7) ).

P(2a)- Q(62)- A(3) Whether faith, hope, and charity are fittingly reckoned as theological virtues?

P(2a)- Q(62)- A(3)- O(1) — It would seem that faith, hope, and charity are not fittingly reckoned as three theological virtues. For the theological virtues are in relation to Divine happiness, what the natural inclination is in relation to the connatural end. Now among the virtues directed to the connatural end there is but one natural virtue, viz. the understanding of principles. Therefore there should be but one theological virtue.

P(2a)- Q(62)- A(3)- O(2) — Further, the theological virtues are more perfect than the intellectual and moral virtues. Now faith is not reckoned among the intellectual virtues, but is something less than a virtue, since it is imperfect knowledge. Likewise hope is not reckoned among the moral virtues, but is something less than a virtue, since it is a passion. Much less therefore should they be reckoned as theological virtues.

P(2a)- Q(62)- A(3)- O(3) — Further, the theological virtues direct man’s soul to God. Now man’s soul cannot be directed to God, save through the intellective part, wherein are the intellect and will. Therefore there should be only two theological virtues, one perfecting the intellect, the other, the will.

P(2a)- Q(62)- A(3) — On the contrary, The Apostle says ( 1 Corinthians 13:13): “Now there remain faith, hope, charity, these three.”

P(2a)- Q(62)- A(3) — I answer that, As stated above ( A(1) ), the theological virtues direct man to supernatural happiness in the same way as by the natural inclination man is directed to his connatural end. Now the latter happens in respect of two things. First, in respect of the reason or intellect, in so far as it contains the first universal principles which are known to us by the natural light of the intellect, and which are reason’s starting-point, both in speculative and in practical matters. Secondly, through the rectitude of the will which tends naturally to good as defined by reason.

But these two fall short of the order of supernatural happiness, according to 1 Corinthians 2:9: “The eye hath not seen, nor ear heard, neither hath it entered into the heart of man, what things God hath prepared for them that love Him.”

Consequently in respect of both the above things man needed to receive in addition something supernatural to direct him to a supernatural end. First, as regards the intellect, man receives certain supernatural principles, which are held by means of a Divine light: these are the articles of faith, about which is faith. Secondly, the will is directed to this end, both as to that end as something attainable — and this pertains to hope — and as to a certain spiritual union, whereby the will is, so to speak, transformed into that end — and this belongs to charity. For the appetite of a thing is moved and tends towards its connatural end naturally; and this movement is due to a certain conformity of the thing with its end.

P(2a)- Q(62)- A(3)- RO(1) — The intellect requires intelligible species whereby to understand: consequently there is need of a natural habit in addition to the power. But the very nature of the will suffices for it to be directed naturally to the end, both as to the intention of the end and as to its conformity with the end. But the nature of the power is insufficient in either of these respects, for the will to be directed to things that are above its nature. Consequently there was need for an additional supernatural habit in both respects.

P(2a)- Q(62)- A(3)- RO(2) — Faith and hope imply a certain imperfection: since faith is of things unseen, and hope, of things not possessed. Hence faith and hope, in things that are subject to human power, fall short of the notion of virtue. But faith and hope in things which are above the capacity of human nature surpass all virtue that is in proportion to man, according to 1 Corinthians 1:25: “The weakness of God is stronger than men.”

P(2a)- Q(62)- A(3)- RO(3) — Two things pertain to the appetite, viz. movement to the end, and conformity with the end by means of love.

Hence there must needs be two theological virtues in the human appetite, namely, hope and charity.

P(2a)- Q(62)- A(4) Whether faith precedes hope, and hope charity?

P(2a)- Q(62)- A(4)- O(1) — It would seem that the order of the theological virtues is not that faith precedes hope, and hope charity. For the root precedes that which grows from it. Now charity is the root of all the virtues, according to Ephesians 3:17: “Being rooted and founded in charity.” Therefore charity precedes the others.

P(2a)- Q(62)- A(4)- O(2) — Further, Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i): “A man cannot love what he does not believe to exist. But if he believes and loves, by doing good works he ends in hoping.” Therefore it seems that faith precedes charity, and charity hope.

P(2a)- Q(62)- A(4)- O(3) — Further, love is the principle of all our emotions, as stated above ( A(2), ad 3). Now hope is a kind of emotion, since it is a passion, as stated above ( Q(25), A(2) ). Therefore charity, which is love, precedes hope.

P(2a)- Q(62)- A(4) — On the contrary, The Apostle enumerates them thus ( 1 Corinthians 13:13): “Now there remain faith, hope, charity.”

I answer that, Order is twofold: order of generation, and order of perfection. By order of generation, in respect of which matter precedes form, and the imperfect precedes the perfect, in one same subject faith precedes hope, and hope charity, as to their acts: because habits are all infused together. For the movement of the appetite cannot tend to anything, either by hoping or loving, unless that thing be apprehended by the sense or by the intellect. Now it is by faith that the intellect apprehends the object of hope and love. Hence in the order of generation, faith precedes hope and charity. In like manner a man loves a thing because he apprehends it as his good. Now from the very fact that a man hopes to be able to obtain some good through someone, he looks on the man in whom he hopes as a good of his own. Hence for the very reason that a man hopes in someone, he proceeds to love him: so that in the order of generation, hope precedes charity as regards their respective acts.

But in the order of perfection, charity precedes faith and hope: because both faith and hope are quickened by charity, and receive from charity their full complement as virtues. For thus charity is the mother and the root of all the virtues, inasmuch as it is the form of them all, as we shall state further on ( P(2b) Q(23), A(8) ).

This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.

P(2a)- Q(62)- A(4)- RO(2) — Augustine is speaking of that hope whereby a man hopes to obtain bliss through the merits which he has already: this belongs to hope quickened by and following charity. But it is possible for a man before having charity, to hope through merits not already possessed, but which he hopes to possess.

P(2a)- Q(62)- A(4)- RO(3) — As stated above ( Q(40), A(7) ), in treating of the passions, hope regards two things. One as its principal object, viz. the good hoped for. With regard to this, love always precedes hope: for good is never hoped for unless it be desired and loved. Hope also regards the person from whom a man hopes to be able to obtain some good. With regard to this, hope precedes love at first; though afterwards hope is increased by love. Because from the fact that a man thinks that he can obtain a good through someone, he begins to love him: and from the fact that he loves him, he then hopes all the more in him.

QUESTION OF THE CAUSE OF VIRTUES (FOUR ARTICLES) We must now consider the cause of virtues; and under this head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether virtue is in us by nature? (2) Whether any virtue is caused in us by habituation? (3) Whether any moral virtues are in us by infusion? (4) Whether virtue acquired by habituation, is of the same species as infused virtue?

P(2a)- Q(63)- A(1) Whether virtue is in us by nature?

P(2a)- Q(63)- A(1)- O(1) — It would seem that virtue is in us by nature.

For Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 14): “Virtues are natural to us and are equally in all of us.” And Antony says in his sermon to the monks: “If the will contradicts nature it is perverse, if it follow nature it is virtuous.”

Moreover, a gloss on Matthew 4:23, “Jesus went about,” etc., says: “He taught them natural virtues, i.e. chastity, justice, humility, which man possesses naturally.”

P(2a)- Q(63)- A(1)- O(2) — Further, the virtuous good consists in accord with reason, as was clearly shown above ( Q(55), A(4), ad 2). But that which accords with reason is natural to man; since reason is part of man’s nature. Therefore virtue is in man by nature.

P(2a)- Q(63)- A(1)- O(3) — Further, that which is in us from birth is said to be natural to us. Now virtues are in some from birth: for it is written ( Job 31:18): “From my infancy mercy grew up with me; and it came out with me from my mother’s womb.”

Therefore virtue is in man by nature.

P(2a)- Q(63)- A(1) — On the contrary, Whatever is in man by nature is common to all men, and is not taken away by sin, since even in the demons natural gifts remain, as Dionysius states (Div. Nom. iv). But virtue is not in all men; and is cast out by sin. Therefore it is not in man by nature.

P(2a)- Q(63)- A(1) — I answer that, With regard to corporeal forms, it has been maintained by some that they are wholly from within, by those, for instance, who upheld the theory of “latent forms” [*Anaxagoras; Cf. P(1), Q(45), A(8) ; Q(65), A(4) ]. Others held that forms are entirely from without, those, for instance, who thought that corporeal forms originated from some separate cause. Others, however, esteemed that they are partly from within, in so far as they pre-exist potentially in matter; and partly from without, in so far as they are brought into act by the agent.

In like manner with regard to sciences and virtues, some held that they are wholly from within, so that all virtues and sciences would pre-exist in the soul naturally, but that the hindrances to science and virtue, which are due to the soul being weighed down by the body, are removed by study and practice, even as iron is made bright by being polished. This was the opinion of the Platonists. Others said that they are wholly from without, being due to the inflow of the active intellect, as Avicenna maintained.

Others said that sciences and virtues are within us by nature, so far as we are adapted to them, but not in their perfection: this is the teaching of the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 1), and is nearer the truth.

To make this clear, it must be observed that there are two ways in which something is said to be natural to a man; one is according to his specific nature, the other according to his individual nature. And, since each thing derives its species from its form, and its individuation from matter, and, again, since man’s form is his rational soul, while his matter is his body, whatever belongs to him in respect of his rational soul, is natural to him in respect of his specific nature; while whatever belongs to him in respect of the particular temperament of his body, is natural to him in respect of his individual nature. For whatever is natural to man in respect of his body, considered as part of his species, is to be referred, in a way, to the soul, in so far as this particular body is adapted to this particular soul.

In both these ways virtue is natural to man inchoatively. This is so in respect of the specific nature, in so far as in man’s reason are to be found instilled by nature certain naturally known principles of both knowledge and action, which are the nurseries of intellectual and moral virtues, and in so far as there is in the will a natural appetite for good in accordance with reason. Again, this is so in respect of the individual nature, in so far as by reason of a disposition in the body, some are disposed either well or ill to certain virtues: because, to wit, certain sensitive powers are acts of certain parts of the body, according to the disposition of which these powers are helped or hindered in the exercise of their acts, and, in consequence, the rational powers also, which the aforesaid sensitive powers assist. In this way one man has a natural aptitude for science, another for fortitude, another for temperance: and in these ways, both intellectual and moral virtues are in us by way of a natural aptitude, inchoatively, but not perfectly, since nature is determined to one, while the perfection of these virtues does not depend on one particular mode of action, but on various modes, in respect of the various matters, which constitute the sphere of virtue’s action, and according to various circumstances.

It is therefore evident that all virtues are in us by nature, according to aptitude and inchoation, but not according to perfection, except the theological virtues, which are entirely from without.

This suffices for the Replies to the Objections. For the first two argue about the nurseries of virtue which are in us by nature, inasmuch as we are rational beings. The third objection must be taken in the sense that, owing to the natural disposition which the body has from birth, one has an aptitude for pity, another for living temperately, another for some other virtue.

P(2a)- Q(63)- A(2) Whether any virtue is caused in us by habituation?

P(2a)- Q(63)- A(2)- O(1) — It would seem that virtues can not be caused in us by habituation. Because a gloss of Augustine [*Cf. Lib. Sentent.

Prosperi cvi.] commenting on Romans 14:23, “All that is not of faith is sin,” says: “The whole life of an unbeliever is a sin: and there is no good without the Sovereign Good. Where knowledge of the truth is lacking, virtue is a mockery even in the best behaved people.” Now faith cannot be acquired by means of works, but is caused in us by God, according to Ephesians 2:8: “By grace you are saved through faith.” Therefore no acquired virtue can be in us by habituation.

P(2a)- Q(63)- A(2)- O(2) — Further, sin and virtue are contraries, so that they are incompatible. Now man cannot avoid sin except by the grace of God, according to Wis. 8:21: “I knew that I could not otherwise be continent, except God gave it.” Therefore neither can any virtues be caused in us by habituation, but only by the gift of God.

P(2a)- Q(63)- A(2)- O(3) — Further, actions which lead toward virtue, lack the perfection of virtue. But an effect cannot be more perfect than its cause. Therefore a virtue cannot be caused by actions that precede it.

P(2a)- Q(63)- A(2) — On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that good is more efficacious than evil. But vicious habits are caused by evil acts. Much more, therefore, can virtuous habits be caused by good acts.

P(2a)- Q(63)- A(2) — I answer that, We have spoken above ( Q(51), AA(2),3 ) in a general way about the production of habits from acts; and speaking now in a special way of this matter in relation to virtue, we must take note that, as stated above ( Q(55), AA(3),4 ), man’s virtue perfects him in relation to good. Now since the notion of good consists in “mode, species, and order,” as Augustine states (De Nat. Boni. iii) or in “number, weight, and measure,” as expressed in Wis. 11:21, man’s good must needs be appraised with respect to some rule. Now this rule is twofold, as stated above ( Q(19), AA(3),4 ), viz. human reason and Divine Law. And since Divine Law is the higher rule, it extends to more things, so that whatever is ruled by human reason, is ruled by the Divine Law too; but the converse does not hold.

It follows that human virtue directed to the good which is defined according to the rule of human reason can be caused by human acts: inasmuch as such acts proceed from reason, by whose power and rule the aforesaid good is established. On the other hand, virtue which directs man to good as defined by the Divine Law, and not by human reason, cannot be caused by human acts, the principle of which is reason, but is produced in us by the Divine operation alone. Hence Augustine in giving the definition of the latter virtue inserts the words, “which God works in us without us” (Super Psalm 118, Serm. xxvi). It is also of these virtues that the First Objection holds good.

P(2a)- Q(63)- A(2)- RO(2) — Mortal sin is incompatible with divinely infused virtue, especially if this be considered in its perfect state. But actual sin, even mortal, is compatible with humanly acquired virtue; because the use of a habit in us is subject to our will, as stated above ( Q(49), A(3) ): and one sinful act does not destroy a habit of acquired virtue, since it is not an act but a habit, that is directly contrary to a habit.

Wherefore, though man cannot avoid mortal sin without grace, so as never to sin mortally, yet he is not hindered from acquiring a habit of virtue, whereby he may abstain from evil in the majority of cases, and chiefly in matters most opposed to reason. There are also certain mortal sins which man can nowise avoid without grace, those, namely, which are directly opposed to the theological virtues, which are in us through the gift of grace. This, however, will be more fully explained later ( Q(109), A(4) ).

P(2a)- Q(63)- A(2)- RO(3) — As stated above ( A(1) ; Q(51), A(1) ), certain seeds or principles of acquired virtue pre-exist in us by nature. These principles are more excellent than the virtues acquired through them: thus the understanding of speculative principles is more excellent than the science of conclusions, and the natural rectitude of the reason is more excellent than the rectification of the appetite which results through the appetite partaking of reason, which rectification belongs to moral virtue.

Accordingly human acts, in so far as they proceed from higher principles, can cause acquired human virtues.

P(2a)- Q(63)- A(3) Whether any moral virtues are in us by infusion?

P(2a)- Q(63)- A(3)- O(1) — It would seem that no virtues besides the theological virtues are infused in us by God. Because God does not do by Himself, save perhaps sometimes miraculously, those things that can be done by second causes; for, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. iv), “it is God’s rule to bring about extremes through the mean.” Now intellectual and moral virtues can be caused in us by our acts, as stated above ( A(2) ).

Therefore it is not reasonable that they should be caused in us by infusion.

P(2a)- Q(63)- A(3)- O(2) — Further, much less superfluity is found in God’s works than in the works of nature. Now the theological virtues suffice to direct us to supernatural good. Therefore there are no other supernatural virtues needing to be caused in us by God.

P(2a)- Q(63)- A(3)- O(3) — Further, nature does not employ two means where one suffices: much less does God. But God sowed the seeds of virtue in our souls, according to a gloss on Hebrews 1 [*Cf. Jerome on Galatians 1: 15,16]. Therefore it is unfitting for Him to cause in us other virtues by means of infusion.

P(2a)- Q(63)- A(3) — On the contrary, It is written (Wis. 8:7): “She teacheth temperance and prudence and justice and fortitude.”

P(2a)- Q(63)- A(3) — I answer that, Effects must needs be proportionate to their causes and principles. Now all virtues, intellectual and moral, that are acquired by our actions, arise from certain natural principles preexisting in us, as above stated ( A(1) ; Q(51), A(1) ): instead of which natural principles, God bestows on us the theological virtues, whereby we are directed to a supernatural end, as stated ( Q(62), A(1) ). Wherefore we need to receive from God other habits corresponding, in due proportion, to the theological virtues, which habits are to the theological virtues, what the moral and intellectual virtues are to the natural principles of virtue.

P(2a)- Q(63)- A(3)- RO(1) — Some moral and intellectual virtues can indeed be caused in us by our actions: but such are not proportionate to the theological virtues. Therefore it was necessary for us to receive, from God immediately, others that are proportionate to these virtues.

P(2a)- Q(63)- A(3)- RO(2) — The theological virtues direct us sufficiently to our supernatural end, inchoatively: i.e. to God Himself immediately.

But the soul needs further to be perfected by infused virtues in regard to other things, yet in relation to God.

P(2a)- Q(63)- A(3)- RO(3) — The power of those naturally instilled principles does not extend beyond the capacity of nature. Consequently man needs in addition to be perfected by other principles in relation to his supernatural end.

P(2a)- Q(63)- A(4) Whether virtue by habituation belongs to the same species as infused virtue?

P(2a)- Q(63)- A(4)- O(1) — It would seem that infused virtue does not differ in species from acquired virtue. Because acquired and infused virtues, according to what has been said ( A(3) ), do not differ seemingly, save in relation to the last end. Now human habits and acts are specified, not by their last, but by their proximate end. Therefore the infused moral or intellectual virtue does not differ from the acquired virtue.

P(2a)- Q(63)- A(4)- O(2) — Further, habits are known by their acts. But the act of infused and acquired temperance is the same, viz. to moderate desires of touch. Therefore they do not differ in species.

P(2a)- Q(63)- A(4)- O(3) — Further, acquired and infused virtue differ as that which is wrought by God immediately, from that which is wrought by a creature. But the man whom God made, is of the same species as a man begotten naturally; and the eye which He gave to the man born blind, as one produced by the power of generation. Therefore it seems that acquired and infused virtue belong to the same species.

P(2a)- Q(63)- A(4) — On the contrary, Any change introduced into the difference expressed in a definition involves a difference of species. But the definition of infused virtue contains the words, “which God works in us without us,” as stated above ( Q(55), A(4) ). Therefore acquired virtue, to which these words cannot apply, is not of the same species as infused virtue.

P(2a)- Q(63)- A(4) — I answer that, There is a twofold specific difference among habits. The first, as stated above ( Q(54), A(2) ; Q(56), A(2) ; Q(60), A(1) ), is taken from the specific and formal aspects of their objects. Now the object of every virtue is a good considered as in that virtue’s proper matter: thus the object of temperance is a good in respect of the pleasures connected with the concupiscence of touch. The formal aspect of this object is from reason which fixes the mean in these concupiscences: while the material element is something on the part of the concupiscences. Now it is evident that the mean that is appointed in such like concupiscences according to the rule of human reason, is seen under a different aspect from the mean which is fixed according to Divine rule. For instance, in the consumption of food, the mean fixed by human reason, is that food should not harm the health of the body, nor hinder the use of reason: whereas, according to the Divine rule, it behooves man to “chastise his body, and bring it into subjection” ( 1 Corinthians 9:27), by abstinence in food, drink and the like. It is therefore evident that infused and acquired temperance differ in species; and the same applies to the other virtues.

The other specific differences among habits is taken from the things to which they are directed: for a man’s health and a horse’s are not of the same species, on account of the difference between the natures to which their respective healths are directed. In the same sense, the Philosopher says (Polit. iii, 3) that citizens have diverse virtues according as they are well directed to diverse forms of government. In the same way, too, those infused moral virtues, whereby men behave well in respect of their being “fellow-citizens with the saints, and of the household [Douay: ‘domestics’] of God” ( Ephesians 2:19), differ from the acquired virtues, whereby man behaves well in respect of human affairs.

P(2a)- Q(63)- A(4)- RO(1) — Infused and acquired virtue differ not only in relation to the ultimate end, but also in relation to their proper objects, as stated.

P(2a)- Q(63)- A(4)- RO(2) — Both acquired and infused temperance moderate desires for pleasures of touch, but for different reasons, as stated: wherefore their respective acts are not identical.

P(2a)- Q(63)- A(4)- RO(3) — God gave the man born blind an eye for the same act as the act for which other eyes are formed naturally: consequently it was of the same species. It would be the same if God wished to give a man miraculously virtues, such as those that are acquired by acts. But the case is not so in the question before us, as stated.

QUESTION OF THE MEAN OF VIRTUE (FOUR ARTICLES)\parWe must now consider the properties of virtues: and (1) the mean of virtue, (2) the connection between virtues, (3) equality of virtues, (4) the duration of virtues.

Under the first head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether moral virtue observes the mean? (2) Whether the mean of moral virtue is the real mean or the rational mean? (3) Whether the intellectual virtues observe the mean? (4) Whether the theological virtues do?

P(2a)- Q(64)- A(1) Whether moral virtues observe the mean?

P(2a)- Q(64)- A(1)- O(1) — It would seem that moral virtue does not observe the mean. For the nature of a mean is incompatible with that which is extreme. Now the nature of virtue is to be something extreme; for it is stated in De Coelo i that “virtue is the limit of power.” Therefore moral virtue does not observe the mean.

P(2a)- Q(64)- A(1)- O(2) — Further, the maximum is not a mean. Now some moral virtues tend to a maximum: for instance, magnanimity to very great honors, and magnificence to very large expenditure, as stated in Ethic. iv, 2,3. Therefore not every moral virtue observes the mean.

P(2a)- Q(64)- A(1)- O(3) — Further, if it is essential to a moral virtue to observe the mean, it follows that a moral virtue is not perfected, but the contrary corrupted, through tending to something extreme. Now some moral virtues are perfected by tending to something extreme; thus virginity, which abstains from all sexual pleasure, observes the extreme, and is the most perfect chastity: and to give all to the poor is the most perfect mercy or liberality. Therefore it seems that it is not essential to moral virtue that it should observe the mean.

P(2a)- Q(64)- A(1) — On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 6) that “moral virtue is a habit of choosing the mean.”

P(2a)- Q(64)- A(1) — I answer that, As already explained ( Q(55), A(3) ), the nature of virtue is that it should direct man to good. Now moral virtue is properly a perfection of the appetitive part of the soul in regard to some determinate matter: and the measure or rule of the appetitive movement in respect of appetible objects is the reason. But the good of that which is measured or ruled consists in its conformity with its rule: thus the good things made by art is that they follow the rule of art. Consequently, in things of this sort, evil consists in discordance from their rule or measure.

Now this may happen either by their exceeding the measure or by their falling short of it; as is clearly the case in all things ruled or measured.

Hence it is evident that the good of moral virtue consists in conformity with the rule of reason. Now it is clear that between excess and deficiency the mean is equality or conformity. Therefore it is evident that moral virtue observes the mean.

P(2a)- Q(64)- A(1)- RO(1) — Moral virtue derives goodness from the rule of reason, while its matter consists in passions or operations. If therefore we compare moral virtue to reason, then, if we look at that which is has of reason, it holds the position of one extreme, viz. conformity; while excess and defect take the position of the other extreme, viz. deformity. But if we consider moral virtue in respect of its matter, then it holds the position of mean, in so far as it makes the passion conform to the rule of reason.

Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 6) that “virtue, as to its essence, is a mean state,” in so far as the rule of virtue is imposed on its proper matter: “but it is an extreme in reference to the ‘best’ and the ‘excellent,’“ viz. as to its conformity with reason.

P(2a)- Q(64)- A(1)- RO(2) — In actions and passions the mean and the extremes depend on various circumstances: hence nothing hinders something from being extreme in a particular virtue as to one circumstance, while the same thing is a mean in respect of other circumstances, through being in conformity with reason. This is the case with magnanimity and magnificence. For if we look at the absolute quantity of the respective objects of these virtues, we shall call it an extreme and a maximum: but if we consider the quantity in relation to other circumstances, then it has the character of a mean: since these virtues tend to this maximum in accordance with the rule of reason, i.e. “where” it is right, “when” it is right, and for an “end” that is right. There will be excess, if one tends to this maximum “when” it is not right, or “where” it is not right, or for an undue “end”; and there will be deficiency if one fails to tend thereto “where” one ought, and “when” one aught. This agrees with the saying of the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 3) that the “magnanimous man observes the extreme in quantity, but the mean in the right mode of his action.”

P(2a)- Q(64)- A(1)- RO(3) — The same is to be said of virginity and poverty as of magnanimity. For virginity abstains from all sexual matters, and poverty from all wealth, for a right end, and in a right manner, i.e. according to God’s word, and for the sake of eternal life. But if this be done in an undue manner, i.e. out of unlawful superstition, or again for vainglory, it will be in excess. And if it be not done when it ought to be done, or as it ought to be done, it is a vice by deficiency: for instance, in those who break their vows of virginity or poverty.

P(2a)- Q(64)- A(2) Whether the mean of moral virtue is the real mean, or the rational mean?

P(2a)- Q(64)- A(2)- O(1) — It would seem that the mean of moral virtue is not the rational mean, but the real mean. For the good of moral virtue consists in its observing the mean. Now, good, as stated in Metaph. ii, text. 8, is in things themselves. Therefore the mean of moral virtue is a real mean.

P(2a)- Q(64)- A(2)- O(2) — Further, the reason is a power of apprehension. But moral virtue does not observe a mean between apprehensions, but rather a mean between operations or passions.

Therefore the mean of moral virtue is not the rational, but the real mean.

P(2a)- Q(64)- A(2)- O(3) — Further, a mean that is observed according to arithmetical or geometrical proportion is a real mean. Now such is the mean of justice, as stated in Ethic. v, 3. Therefore the mean of moral virtue is not the rational, but the real mean.

P(2a)- Q(64)- A(2) — On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 6) that “moral virtue observes the mean fixed, in our regard, by reason.”

P(2a)- Q(64)- A(2) — I answer that, The rational mean can be understood in two ways. First, according as the mean is observed in the act itself of reason, as though the very act of reason were made to observe the mean: in this sense, since moral virtue perfects not the act of reason, but the act of the appetitive power, the mean of moral virtue is not the rational mean.

Secondly, the mean of reason may be considered as that which the reason puts into some particular matter. In this sense every mean of moral virtue is a rational mean, since, as above stated ( A(1) ), moral virtue is said to observe the mean, through conformity with right reason.

But it happens sometimes that the rational mean is also the real mean: in which case the mean of moral virtue is the real mean, for instance, in justice. On the other hand, sometimes the rational mean is not the real mean, but is considered in relation to us: and such is the mean in all the other moral virtues. The reason for this is that justice is about operations, which deal with external things, wherein the right has to be established simply and absolutely, as stated above ( Q(60), A(2) ): wherefore the rational mean in justice is the same as the real mean, in so far, to wit as justice gives to each one his due, neither more nor less. But the other moral virtues deal with interior passions wherein the right cannot be established in the same way, since men are variously situated in relation to their passions; hence the rectitude of reason has to be established in the passions, with due regard to us, who are moved in respect of the passions.

This suffices for the Replies to the Objections. For the first two arguments take the rational mean as being in the very act of reason, while the third argues from the mean of justice.

P(2a)- Q(64)- A(3) Whether the intellectual virtues observe the mean?

P(2a)- Q(64)- A(3)- O(1) — It would seem that the intellectual virtues do not observe the mean. Because moral virtue observes the mean by conforming to the rule of reason. But the intellectual virtues are in reason itself, so that they seem to have no higher rule. Therefore the intellectual virtues do not observe the mean.

P(2a)- Q(64)- A(3)- O(2) — Further, the mean of moral virtue is fixed by an intellectual virtue: for it is stated in Ethic. ii, 6, that “virtue observes the mean appointed by reason, as a prudent man would appoint it.” If therefore intellectual virtue also observe the mean, this mean will have to be appointed for them by another virtue, so that there would be an indefinite series of virtues.

P(2a)- Q(64)- A(3)- O(3) — Further, a mean is, properly speaking, between contraries, as the Philosopher explains (Metaph. x, text. 22,23). But there seems to be no contrariety in the intellect; since contraries themselves, as they are in the intellect, are not in opposition to one another, but are understood together, as white and black, healthy and sick. Therefore there is no mean in the intellectual virtues.

P(2a)- Q(64)- A(3) — On the contrary, Art is an intellectual virtue; and yet there is a mean in art (Ethic. ii, 6). Therefore also intellectual virtue observes the mean.

P(2a)- Q(64)- A(3) — I answer that, The good of anything consists in its observing the mean, by conforming with a rule or measure in respect of which it may happen to be excessive or deficient, as stated above ( A(1) ).

Now intellectual virtue, like moral virtue, is directed to the good, as stated above ( Q(56), A(3) ). Hence the good of an intellectual virtue consists in observing the mean, in so far as it is subject to a measure. Now the good of intellectual virtue is the true; in the case of contemplative virtue, it is the true taken absolutely (Ethic. vi, 2); in the case of practical virtue, it is the true in conformity with a right appetite.

Now truth apprehended by our intellect, if we consider it absolutely, is measured by things; since things are the measure of our intellect, as stated in Metaph. x, text. 5; because there is truth in what we think or say, according as the thing is so or not. Accordingly the good of speculative intellectual virtue consists in a certain mean, by way of conformity with things themselves, in so far as the intellect expresses them as being what they are, or as not being what they are not: and it is in this that the nature of truth consists. There will be excess if something false is affirmed, as though something were, which in reality it is not: and there will be deficiency if something is falsely denied, and declared not to be, whereas in reality it is.

The truth of practical intellectual virtue, if we consider it in relation to things, is by way of that which is measured; so that both in practical and in speculative intellectual virtues, the mean consists in conformity with things. But if we consider it in relation to the appetite, it has the character of a rule and measure. Consequently the rectitude of reason is the mean of moral virtue, and also the mean of prudence — of prudence as ruling and measuring, of moral virtue, as ruled and measured by that mean. In like manner the difference between excess and deficiency is to be applied in both cases.

P(2a)- Q(64)- A(3)- RO(1) — Intellectual virtues also have their measure, as stated, and they observe the mean according as they conform to that measure.

P(2a)- Q(64)- A(3)- RO(2) — There is no need for an indefinite series of virtues: because the measure and rule of intellectual virtue is not another kind of virtue, but things themselves.

P(2a)- Q(64)- A(3)- RO(3) — The things themselves that are contrary have no contrariety in the mind, because one is the reason for knowing the other: nevertheless there is in the intellect contrariety of affirmation and negation, which are contraries, as stated at the end of Peri Hermenias. For though “to be” and “not to be” are not in contrary, but in contradictory opposition to one another, so long as we consider their signification in things themselves, for on the one hand we have “being” and on the other we have simply “non-being”; yet if we refer them to the act of the mind, there is something positive in both cases. Hence “to be” and “not to be” are contradictory: but the opinion stating that “good is good” is contrary to the opinion stating that “good is not good”: and between two such contraries intellectual virtue observes the mean.

P(2a)- Q(64)- A(4) Whether the theological virtues observe the mean?

P(2a)- Q(64)- A(4)- O(1) — It would seem that theological virtue observes the mean. For the good of other virtues consists in their observing the mean. Now the theological virtues surpass the others in goodness.

Therefore much more does theological virtue observe the mean.

P(2a)- Q(64)- A(4)- O(2) — Further, the mean of moral virtue depends on the appetite being ruled by reason; while the mean of intellectual virtue consists in the intellect being measured by things. Now theological virtue perfects both intellect and appetite, as stated above ( Q(62), A(3) ).

Therefore theological virtue also observes the mean.

P(2a)- Q(64)- A(4)- O(3) — Further, hope, which is a theological virtue, is a mean between despair and presumption. Likewise faith holds a middle course between contrary heresies, as Boethius states (De Duab. Natur. vii): thus, by confessing one Person and two natures in Christ, we observe the mean between the heresy of Nestorius, who maintained the existence of two persons and two natures, and the heresy of Eutyches, who held to one person and one nature. Therefore theological virtue observes the mean.

P(2a)- Q(64)- A(4) — On the contrary, Wherever virtue observes the mean it is possible to sin by excess as well as by deficiency. But there is no sinning by excess against God, Who is the object of theological virtue: for it is written (Ecclus. 43:33): “Blessing the Lord, exalt Him as much as you can: for He is above all praise.” Therefore theological virtue does not observe the mean.

P(2a)- Q(64)- A(4) — I answer that, As stated above ( A(1) ), the mean of virtue depends on conformity with virtue’s rule or measure, in so far as one may exceed or fall short of that rule. Now the measure of theological virtue may be twofold. One is taken from the very nature of virtue, and thus the measure and rule of theological virtue is God Himself: because our faith is ruled according to Divine truth; charity, according to His goodness; hope, according to the immensity of His omnipotence and loving kindness.

This measure surpasses all human power: so that never can we love God as much as He ought to be loved, nor believe and hope in Him as much as we should. Much less therefore can there be excess in such things.

Accordingly the good of such virtues does not consist in a mean, but increases the more we approach to the summit.

The other rule or measure of theological virtue is by comparison with us: for although we cannot be borne towards God as much as we ought, yet we should approach to Him by believing, hoping and loving, according to the measure of our condition. Consequently it is possible to find a mean and extremes in theological virtue, accidentally and in reference to us.

P(2a)- Q(64)- A(4)- RO(1) — The good of intellectual and moral virtues consists in a mean of reason by conformity with a measure that may be exceeded: whereas this is not so in the case of theological virtue, considered in itself, as stated above.

P(2a)- Q(64)- A(4)- RO(2) — Moral and intellectual virtues perfect our intellect and appetite in relation to a created measure and rule; whereas the theological virtues perfect them in relation to an uncreated rule and measure. Wherefore the comparison fails.

P(2a)- Q(64)- A(4)- RO(3) — Hope observes the mean between presumption and despair, in relation to us, in so far, to wit, as a man is said to be presumptuous, through hoping to receive from God a good in excess of his condition; or to despair through failing to hope for that which according to his condition he might hope for. But there can be no excess of hope in comparison with God, Whose goodness is infinite. In like manner faith holds a middle course between contrary heresies, not by comparison with its object, which is God, in Whom we cannot believe too much; but in so far as human opinion itself takes a middle position between contrary opinions, as was explained above.

QUESTION OF THE CONNECTION OF VIRTUES (FIVE ARTICLES) We must now consider the connection of virtues: under which head there are five points of inquiry: (1) Whether the moral virtues are connected with one another? (2) Whether the moral virtues can be without charity? (3) Whether charity can be without them? (4) Whether faith and hope can be without charity? (5) Whether charity can be without them?

P(2a)- Q(65)- A(1) Whether the moral virtues are connected with one another?

P(2a)- Q(65)- A(1)- O(1) — It would seem that the moral virtues are not connected with one another. Because moral virtues are sometimes caused by the exercise of acts, as is proved in Ethic. ii, 1,2. But man can exercise himself in the acts of one virtue, without exercising himself in the acts of some other virtue. Therefore it is possible to have one moral virtue without another.

P(2a)- Q(65)- A(1)- O(2) — Further, magnificence and magnanimity are moral virtues. Now a man may have other moral virtues without having magnificence or magnanimity: for the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 2,3) that “a poor man cannot be magnificent,” and yet he may have other virtues; and (Ethic. iv) that “he who is worthy of small things, and so accounts his worth, is modest, but not magnanimous.” Therefore the moral virtues are not connected with one another.

P(2a)- Q(65)- A(1)- O(3) — Further, as the moral virtues perfect the appetitive part of the soul, so do the intellectual virtues perfect the intellective part. But the intellectual virtues are not mutually connected: since we may have one science, without having another. Neither, therefore, are the moral virtues connected with one another.

P(2a)- Q(65)- A(1)- O(4) — Further, if the moral virtues are mutually connected, this can only be because they are united together in prudence.

But this does not suffice to connect the moral virtues together. For, seemingly, one may be prudent about things to be done in relation to one virtue, without being prudent in those that concern another virtue: even as one may have the art of making certain things, without the art of making certain others. Now prudence is right reason about things to be done.

Therefore the moral virtues are not necessarily connected with one another.

P(2a)- Q(65)- A(1) — On the contrary, Ambrose says on Luke 6:20: “The virtues are connected and linked together, so that whoever has one, is seen to have several”: and Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 4) that “the virtues that reside in the human mind are quite inseparable from one another”: and Gregory says (Moral. xxii, 1) that “one virtue without the other is either of no account whatever, or very imperfect”: and Cicero says (Quaest. Tusc. ii): “If you confess to not having one particular virtue, it must needs be that you have none at all.”

P(2a)- Q(65)- A(1) — I answer that, Moral virtue may be considered either as perfect or as imperfect. An imperfect moral virtue, temperance for instance, or fortitude, is nothing but an inclination in us to do some kind of good deed, whether such inclination be in us by nature or by habituation. If we take the moral virtues in this way, they are not connected: since we find men who, by natural temperament or by being accustomed, are prompt in doing deeds of liberality, but are not prompt in doing deeds of chastity.

But the perfect moral virtue is a habit that inclines us to do a good deed well; and if we take moral virtues in this way, we must say that they are connected, as nearly as all are agreed in saying. For this two reasons are given, corresponding to the different ways of assigning the distinction of the cardinal virtues. For, as we stated above ( Q(61), AA(3),4 ), some distinguish them according to certain general properties of the virtues: for instance, by saying that discretion belongs to prudence, rectitude to justice, moderation to temperance, and strength of mind to fortitude, in whatever matter we consider these properties to be. In this way the reason for the connection is evident: for strength of mind is not commended as virtuous, if it be without moderation or rectitude or discretion: and so forth. This, too, is the reason assigned for the connection by Gregory, who says (Moral. xxii, 1) that “a virtue cannot be perfect” as a virtue, “if isolated from the others: for there can be no true prudence without temperance, justice and fortitude”: and he continues to speak in like manner of the other virtues (cf. Q(61), A(4), O(1) ). Augustine also gives the same reason (De Trin. vi, 4).

Others, however, differentiate these virtues in respect of their matters, and it is in this way that Aristotle assigns the reason for their connection (Ethic. vi, 13). Because, as stated above ( Q(58), A(4) ), no moral virtue can be without prudence; since it is proper to moral virtue to make a right choice, for it is an elective habit. Now right choice requires not only the inclination to a due end, which inclination is the direct outcome of moral virtue, but also correct choice of things conducive to the end, which choice is made by prudence, that counsels, judges, and commands in those things that are directed to the end. In like manner one cannot have prudence unless one has the moral virtues: since prudence is “right reason about things to be done,” and the starting point of reason is the end of the thing to be done, to which end man is rightly disposed by moral virtue. Hence, just as we cannot have speculative science unless we have the understanding of the principles, so neither can we have prudence without the moral virtues: and from this it follows clearly that the moral virtues are connected with one another.

P(2a)- Q(65)- A(1)- RO(1) — Some moral virtues perfect man as regards his general state, in other words, with regard to those things which have to be done in every kind of human life. Hence man needs to exercise himself at the same time in the matters of all moral virtues. And if he exercise himself, by good deeds, in all such matters, he will acquire the habits of all the moral virtues. But if he exercise himself by good deeds in regard to one matter, but not in regard to another, for instance, by behaving well in matters of anger, but not in matters of concupiscence; he will indeed acquire a certain habit of restraining his anger; but this habit will lack the nature of virtue, through the absence of prudence, which is wanting in matters of concupiscence. In the same way, natural inclinations fail to have the complete character of virtue, if prudence be lacking.

But there are some moral virtues which perfect man with regard to some eminent state, such as magnificence and magnanimity; and since it does not happen to all in common to be exercised in the matter of such virtues, it is possible for a man to have the other moral virtues, without actually having the habits of these virtues — provided we speak of acquired virtue.

Nevertheless, when once a man has acquired those other virtues he possesses these in proximate potentiality. Because when, by practice, a man has acquired liberality in small gifts and expenditure, if he were to come in for a large sum of money, he would acquire the habit of magnificence with but little practice: even as a geometrician, by dint of little study, acquires scientific knowledge about some conclusion which had never been presented to his mind before. Now we speak of having a thing when we are on the point of having it, according to the saying of the Philosopher (Phys. ii, text. 56): “That which is scarcely lacking is not lacking at all.”

This suffices for the Reply to the Second Objection.

P(2a)- Q(65)- A(1)- RO(3) — The intellectual virtues are about divers matters having no relation to one another, as is clearly the case with the various sciences and arts. Hence we do not observe in them the connection that is to be found among the moral virtues, which are about passions and operations, that are clearly related to one another. For all the passions have their rise in certain initial passions, viz. love and hatred, and terminate in certain others, viz. pleasure and sorrow. In like manner all the operations that are the matter of moral virtue are related to one another, and to the passions. Hence the whole matter of moral virtues falls under the one rule of prudence.

Nevertheless, all intelligible things are related to first principles. And in this way, all the intellectual virtues depend on the understanding of principles; even as prudence depends on the moral virtues, as stated. On the other hand, the universal principles which are the object of the virtue of understanding of principles, do not depend on the conclusions, which are the objects of the other intellectual virtues, as do the moral virtues depend on prudence, because the appetite, in a fashion, moves the reason, and the reason the appetite, as stated above ( Q(9) , A(1) ; Q(58), A(5), ad 1).

P(2a)- Q(65)- A(1)- RO(4) — Those things to which the moral virtues incline, are as the principles of prudence: whereas the products of art are not the principles, but the matter of art. Now it is evident that, though reason may be right in one part of the matter, and not in another, yet in no way can it be called right reason, if it be deficient in any principle whatever. Thus, if a man be wrong about the principle, “A whole is greater than its part,” he cannot acquire the science of geometry, because he must necessarily wander from the truth in his conclusion. Moreover, things “done” are related to one another, but not things “made,” as stated above (ad 3). Consequently the lack of prudence in one department of things to be done, would result in a deficiency affecting other things to be done: whereas this does not occur in things to be made.

P(2a)- Q(65)- A(2) Whether moral virtues can be without charity?

P(2a)- Q(65)- A(2)- O(1) — It would seem that moral virtues can be without charity. For it is stated in the Liber Sentent. Prosperi vii, that “every virtue save charity may be common to the good and bad.” But “charity can be in none except the good,” as stated in the same book.

Therefore the other virtues can be had without charity.

P(2a)- Q(65)- A(2)- O(2) — Further, moral virtues can be acquired by means of human acts, as stated in Ethic. ii, 1,2, whereas charity cannot be had otherwise than by infusion, according to Romans 5:5: “The charity of God is poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Ghost Who is given to us.”

Therefore it is possible to have the other virtues without charity.

P(2a)- Q(65)- A(2)- O(3) — Further, the moral virtues are connected together, through depending on prudence. But charity does not depend on prudence; indeed, it surpasses prudence, according to Ephesians 3:19: “The charity of Christ, which surpasseth all knowledge.” Therefore the moral virtues are not connected with charity, and can be without it.

P(2a)- Q(65)- A(2) — On the contrary, It is written ( 1 John 3:14): “He that loveth not, abideth in death.” Now the spiritual life is perfected by the virtues, since it is “by them” that “we lead a good life,” as Augustine states (De Lib. Arb. ii, 17,19). Therefore they cannot be without the love of charity.

P(2a)- Q(65)- A(2) — I answer that, As stated above ( Q(63), A(2) ), it is possible by means of human works to acquire moral virtues, in so far as they produce good works that are directed to an end not surpassing the natural power of man: and when they are acquired thus, they can be without charity, even as they were in many of the Gentiles. But in so far as they produce good works in proportion to a supernatural last end, thus they have the character of virtue, truly and perfectly; and cannot be acquired by human acts, but are infused by God. Such like moral virtues cannot be without charity. For it has been stated above ( A(1) ; Q(58), AA(4),5 ) that the other moral virtues cannot be without prudence; and that prudence cannot be without the moral virtues, because these latter make man well disposed to certain ends, which are the starting-point of the procedure of prudence. Now for prudence to proceed aright, it is much more necessary that man be well disposed towards his ultimate end, which is the effect of charity, than that he be well disposed in respect of other ends, which is the effect of moral virtue: just as in speculative matters right reason has greatest need of the first indemonstrable principle, that “contradictories cannot both be true at the same time.” It is therefore evident that neither can infused prudence be without charity; nor, consequently, the other moral virtues, since they cannot be without prudence.

It is therefore clear from what has been said that only the infused virtues are perfect, and deserve to be called virtues simply: since they direct man well to the ultimate end. But the other virtues, those, namely, that are acquired, are virtues in a restricted sense, but not simply: for they direct man well in respect of the last end in some particular genus of action, but not in respect of the last end simply. Hence a gloss of Augustine [*Cf. Lib.

Sentent. Prosperi cvi.] on the words, “All that is not of faith is sin” ( Romans 14:23), says: “He that fails to acknowledge the truth, has no true virtue, even if his conduct be good.”

P(2a)- Q(65)- A(2)- RO(1) — Virtue, in the words quoted, denotes imperfect virtue. Else if we take moral virtue in its perfect state, “it makes its possessor good,” and consequently cannot be in the wicked.

P(2a)- Q(65)- A(2)- RO(2) — This argument holds good of virtue in the sense of acquired virtue.

P(2a)- Q(65)- A(2)- RO(3) — Though charity surpasses science and prudence, yet prudence depends on charity, as stated: and consequently so do all the infused moral virtues.

P(2a)- Q(65)- A(3) Whether charity can be without moral virtue?

P(2a)- Q(65)- A(3)- O(1) — It would seem possible to have charity without the moral virtues. For when one thing suffices for a certain purpose, it is superfluous to employ others. Now charity alone suffices for the fulfilment of all the works of virtue, as is clear from 1 Corinthians 13:4, seqq.: “Charity is patient, is kind,” etc. Therefore it seems that if one has charity, other virtues are superfluous.

P(2a)- Q(65)- A(3)- O(2) — Further, he that has a habit of virtue easily performs the works of that virtue, and those works are pleasing to him for their own sake: hence “pleasure taken in a work is a sign of habit” (Ethic. ii, 3). Now many have charity, being free from mortal sin, and yet they find it difficult to do works of virtue; nor are these works pleasing to them for their own sake, but only for the sake of charity. Therefore many have charity without the other virtues.

P(2a)- Q(65)- A(3)- O(3) — Further, charity is to be found in every saint: and yet there are some saints who are without certain virtues. For Bede says (on Luke 17:10) that the saints are more humbled on account of their not having certain virtues, than rejoiced at the virtues they have.

Therefore, if a man has charity, it does not follow of necessity that he has all the moral virtues.

P(2a)- Q(65)- A(3) — On the contrary, The whole Law is fulfilled through charity, for it is written ( Romans 13:8): “He that loveth his neighbor, hath fulfilled the Law.”

Now it is not possible to fulfil the whole Law, without having all the moral virtues: since the law contains precepts about all acts of virtue, as stated in Ethic. v, 1,2. Therefore he that has charity, has all the moral virtues.

Moreover, Augustine says in a letter (Epis. clxvii) [*Cf. Serm. xxxix and xlvi de Temp.] that charity contains all the cardinal virtues.

P(2a)- Q(65)- A(3) — I answer that, All the moral virtues are infused together with charity. The reason for this is that God operates no less perfectly in works of grace than in works of nature. Now, in the works of nature, we find that whenever a thing contains a principle of certain works, it has also whatever is necessary for their execution: thus animals are provided with organs whereby to perform the actions that their souls empower them to do. Now it is evident that charity, inasmuch as it directs man to his last end, is the principle of all the good works that are referable to his last end. Wherefore all the moral virtues must needs be infused together with charity, since it is through them that man performs each different kind of good work.

It is therefore clear that the infused moral virtues are connected, not only through prudence, but also on account of charity: and, again, that whoever loses charity through mortal sin, forfeits all the infused moral virtues.

P(2a)- Q(65)- A(3)- RO(1) — In order that the act of a lower power be perfect, not only must there be perfection in the higher, but also in the lower power: for if the principal agent were well disposed, perfect action would not follow, if the instrument also were not well disposed.

Consequently, in order that man work well in things referred to the end, he needs not only a virtue disposing him well to the end, but also those virtues which dispose him well to whatever is referred to the end: for the virtue which regards the end is the chief and moving principle in respect of those things that are referred to the end. Therefore it is necessary to have the moral virtues together with charity.

P(2a)- Q(65)- A(3)- RO(2) — It happens sometimes that a man who has a habit, finds it difficult to act in accordance with the habit, and consequently feels no pleasure and complacency in the act, on account of some impediment supervening from without: thus a man who has a habit of science, finds it difficult to understand, through being sleepy or unwell.

In like manner sometimes the habits of moral virtue experience difficulty in their works, by reason of certain ordinary dispositions remaining from previous acts. This difficulty does not occur in respect of acquired moral virtue: because the repeated acts by which they are acquired, remove also the contrary dispositions.

P(2a)- Q(65)- A(3)- RO(3) — Certain saints are said not to have certain virtues, in so far as they experience difficulty in the acts of those virtues, for the reason stated; although they have the habits of all the virtues.

P(2a)- Q(65)- A(4) Whether faith and hope can be without charity?

P(2a)- Q(65)- A(4)- O(1) — It would seem that faith and hope are never without charity. Because, since they are theological virtues, they seem to be more excellent than even the infused moral virtues. But the infused moral virtues cannot be without charity. Neither therefore can faith and hope be without charity.

P(2a)- Q(65)- A(4)- O(2) — Further, “no man believes unwillingly” as Augustine says (Tract. xxvi in Joan.). But charity is in the will as a perfection thereof, as stated above ( Q(62), A(3) ). Therefore faith cannot be without charity.

P(2a)- Q(65)- A(4)- O(3) — Further, Augustine says (Enchiridion viii) that “there can be no hope without love.” But love is charity: for it is of this love that he speaks. Therefore hope cannot be without charity.

P(2a)- Q(65)- A(4) — On the contrary, A gloss on Matthew 1:2 says that “faith begets hope, and hope, charity.” Now the begetter precedes the begotten, and can be without it. Therefore faith can be without hope; and hope, without charity.

P(2a)- Q(65)- A(4) — I answer that, Faith and hope, like the moral virtues, can be considered in two ways; first in an inchoate state; secondly, as complete virtues. For since virtue is directed to the doing of good works, perfect virtue is that which gives the faculty of doing a perfectly good work, and this consists in not only doing what is good, but also in doing it well. Else, if what is done is good, but not well done, it will not be perfectly good; wherefore neither will the habit that is the principle of such an act, have the perfect character of virtue. For instance, if a man do what is just, what he does is good: but it will not be the work of a perfect virtue unless he do it well, i.e. by choosing rightly, which is the result of prudence; for which reason justice cannot be a perfect virtue without prudence.

Accordingly faith and hope can exist indeed in a fashion without charity: but they have not the perfect character of virtue without charity. For, since the act of faith is to believe in God; and since to believe is to assent to someone of one’s own free will: to will not as one ought, will not be a perfect act of faith. To will as one ought is the outcome of charity which perfects the will: since every right movement of the will proceeds from a right love, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 9). Hence faith may be without charity, but not as a perfect virtue: just as temperance and fortitude can be without prudence. The same applies to hope. Because the act of hope consists in looking to God for future bliss. This act is perfect, if it is based on the merits which we have; and this cannot be without charity. But to expect future bliss through merits which one has not yet, but which one proposes to acquire at some future time, will be an imperfect act; and this is possible without charity. Consequently, faith and hope can be without charity; yet, without charity, they are not virtues properly so-called; because the nature of virtue requires that by it, we should not only do what is good, but also that we should do it well (Ethic. ii, 6).

P(2a)- Q(65)- A(4)- RO(1) — Moral virtue depends on prudence: and not even infused prudence has the character of prudence without charity; for this involves the absence of due order to the first principle, viz. the ultimate end. On the other hand faith and hope, as such, do not depend either on prudence or charity; so that they can be without charity, although they are not virtues without charity, as stated.

P(2a)- Q(65)- A(4)- RO(2) — This argument is true of faith considered as a perfect virtue.

P(2a)- Q(65)- A(4)- RO(3) — Augustine is speaking here of that hope whereby we look to gain future bliss through merits which we have already; and this is not without charity.

P(2a)- Q(65)- A(5) Whether charity can be without faith and hope?

P(2a)- Q(65)- A(5)- O(1) — It would seem that charity can be without faith and hope. For charity is the love of God. But it is possible for us to love God naturally, without already having faith, or hope in future bliss.

Therefore charity can be without faith and hope.

P(2a)- Q(65)- A(5)- O(2) — Further, charity is the root of all the virtues, according to Ephesians 3:17: “Rooted and founded in charity.” Now the root is sometimes without branches. Therefore charity can sometimes be without faith and hope, and the other virtues.

P(2a)- Q(65)- A(5)- O(3) — Further, there was perfect charity in Christ.

And yet He had neither faith nor hope: because He was a perfect comprehensor, as we shall explain further on ( P(3) , Q(7) , AA(3),4 ).

Therefore charity can be without faith and hope.

P(2a)- Q(65)- A(5) — On the contrary, The Apostle says ( Hebrews 11:6): “Without faith it is impossible to please God”; and this evidently belongs most to charity, according to Proverbs 8:17: “I love them that love me.” Again, it is by hope that we are brought to charity, as stated above ( Q(62), A(4) ). Therefore it is not possible to have charity without faith and hope.

P(2a)- Q(65)- A(5) — I answer that, Charity signifies not only the love of God, but also a certain friendship with Him; which implies, besides love, a certain mutual return of love, together with mutual communion, as stated in Ethic. viii, 2. That this belongs to charity is evident from 1 John 4:16: “He that abideth in charity, abideth in God, and God in him,” and from 1 Corinthians 1:9, where it is written: “God is faithful, by Whom you are called unto the fellowship of His Son.” Now this fellowship of man with God, which consists in a certain familiar colloquy with Him, is begun here, in this life, by grace, but will be perfected in the future life, by glory; each of which things we hold by faith and hope.

Wherefore just as friendship with a person would be impossible, if one disbelieved in, or despaired of, the possibility of their fellowship or familiar colloquy; so too, friendship with God, which is charity, is impossible without faith, so as to believe in this fellowship and colloquy with God, and to hope to attain to this fellowship. Therefore charity is quite impossible without faith and hope.

P(2a)- Q(65)- A(5)- RO(1) — Charity is not any kind of love of God, but that love of God, by which He is loved as the object of bliss, to which object we are directed by faith and hope.

P(2a)- Q(65)- A(5)- RO(2) — Charity is the root of faith and hope, in so far as it gives them the perfection of virtue. But faith and hope as such are the precursors of charity, as stated above ( Q(62), A(4) ), and so charity is impossible without them.

P(2a)- Q(65)- A(5)- RO(3) — In Christ there was neither faith nor hope, on account of their implying an imperfection. But instead of faith, He had manifest vision, and instead of hope, full comprehension [*See above, Q(4) , A(3) ]: so that in Him was perfect charity.

QUESTION OF EQUALITY AMONG THE VIRTUES (SIX ARTICLES) We must now consider equality among the virtues: under which head there are six points of inquiry: (1) Whether one virtue can be greater or less than another? (2) Whether all the virtues existing together in one subject are equal? (3) Of moral virtue in comparison with intellectual virtue; (4) Of the moral virtues as compared with one another; (5) Of the intellectual virtues in comparison with one another; (6) Of the theological virtues in comparison with one another.

P(2a)- Q(66)- A(1) Whether one virtue can be greater or less than another?

P(2a)- Q(66)- A(1)- O(1) — It would seem that one virtue cannot be greater or less than another. For it is written ( Revelation 21:16) that the sides of the city of Jerusalem are equal; and a gloss says that the sides denote the virtues. Therefore all virtues are equal; and consequently one cannot be greater than another.

P(2a)- Q(66)- A(1)- O(2) — Further, a thing that, by its nature, consists in a maximum, cannot be more or less. Now the nature of virtue consists in a maximum, for virtue is “the limit of power,” as the Philosopher states (De Coelo i, text. 116); and Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. ii, 19) that “virtues are very great boons, and no one can use them to evil purpose.” Therefore it seems that one virtue cannot be greater or less than another.

P(2a)- Q(66)- A(1)- O(3) — Further, the quantity of an effect is measured by the power of the agent. But perfect, viz. infused virtues, are from God Whose power is uniform and infinite. Therefore it seems that one virtue cannot be greater than another.

P(2a)- Q(66)- A(1) — On the contrary, Wherever there can be increase and greater abundance, there can be inequality. Now virtues admit of greater abundance and increase: for it is written ( Matthew 5:20): “Unless your justice abound more than that of the Scribes and Pharisees, you shall not enter into the kingdom of heaven”: and ( Proverbs 15:5): “In abundant justice there is the greatest strength [virtus].” Therefore it seems that a virtue can be greater or less than another.

P(2a)- Q(66)- A(1) — I answer that, When it is asked whether one virtue can be greater than another, the question can be taken in two senses. First, as applying to virtues of different species. In this sense it is clear that one virtue is greater than another; since a cause is always more excellent than its effect; and among effects, those nearest to the cause are the most excellent. Now it is clear from what has been said ( Q(18), A(5) ; Q(61), A(2) ) that the cause and root of human good is the reason. Hence prudence which perfects the reason, surpasses in goodness the other moral virtues which perfect the appetitive power, in so far as it partakes of reason. And among these, one is better than another, according as it approaches nearer to the reason. Consequently justice, which is in the will, excels the remaining moral virtues; and fortitude, which is in the irascible part, stands before temperance, which is in the concupiscible, which has a smaller share of reason, as stated in Ethic. vii, 6.

The question can be taken in another way, as referring to virtues of the same species. In this way, according to what was said above ( Q(52), A(1) ), when we were treating of the intensity of habits, virtue may be said to be greater or less in two ways: first, in itself; secondly with regard to the subject that partakes of it. If we consider it in itself, we shall call it greater or little, according to the things to which it extends. Now whosoever has a virtue, e.g. temperance, has it in respect of whatever temperance extends to. But this does not apply to science and art: for every grammarian does not know everything relating to grammar. And in this sense the Stoics said rightly, as Simplicius states in his Commentary on the Predicaments, that virtue cannot be more or less, as science and art can; because the nature of virtue consists in a maximum.

If, however, we consider virtue on the part of the subject, it may then be greater or less, either in relation to different times, or in different men.

Because one man is better disposed than another to attain to the mean of virtue which is defined by right reason; and this, on account of either greater habituation, or a better natural disposition, or a more discerning judgment of reason, or again a greater gift of grace, which is given to each one “according to the measure of the giving of Christ,” as stated in Ephesians 4:9. And here the Stoics erred, for they held that no man should be deemed virtuous, unless he were, in the highest degree, disposed to virtue. Because the nature of virtue does not require that man should reach the mean of right reason as though it were an indivisible point, as the Stoics thought; but it is enough that he should approach the mean, as stated in Ethic. ii, 6. Moreover, one same indivisible mark is reached more nearly and more readily by one than by another: as may be seen when several arches aim at a fixed target.

P(2a)- Q(66)- A(1)- RO(1) — This equality is not one of absolute quantity, but of proportion: because all virtues grow in a man proportionately, as we shall see further on ( A(2) ).

P(2a)- Q(66)- A(1)- RO(2) — This “limit” which belongs to virtue, can have the character of something “more” or “less” good, in the ways explained above: since, as stated, it is not an indivisible limit.

P(2a)- Q(66)- A(1)- RO(3) — God does not work by necessity of nature, but according to the order of His wisdom, whereby He bestows on men various measures of virtue, according to Ephesians 4:7: “To every one of you [Vulg.: ‘us’] is given grace according to the measure of the giving of Christ.”

P(2a)- Q(66)- A(2) Whether all the virtues that are together in one man, are equal?

P(2a)- Q(66)- A(2)- O(1) — It would seem that the virtues in one same man are not all equally intense. For the Apostle says ( 1 Corinthians 7:7): “Everyone hath his proper gift from God; one after this manner, and another after that.”

Now one gift would not be more proper than another to a man, if God infused all the virtues equally into each man. Therefore it seems that the virtues are not all equal in one and the same man.

P(2a)- Q(66)- A(2)- O(2) — Further, if all the virtues were equally intense in one and the same man, it would follow that whoever surpasses another in one virtue, would surpass him in all the others. But this is clearly not the case: since various saints are specially praised for different virtues; e.g.

Abraham for faith ( Romans 4), Moses for his meekness ( Numbers 7:3), Job for his patience (Tob. 2:12). This is why of each Confessor the Church sings: “There was not found his like in keeping the law of the most High,” [*See Lesson in the Mass Statuit (Dominican Missal)], since each one was remarkable for some virtue or other. Therefore the virtues are not all equal in one and the same man.

P(2a)- Q(66)- A(2)- O(3) — Further, the more intense a habit is, the greater one’s pleasure and readiness in making use of it. Now experience shows that a man is more pleased and ready to make use of one virtue than of another. Therefore the virtues are not all equal in one and the same man.

P(2a)- Q(66)- A(2) — On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 4) that “those who are equal in fortitude are equal in prudence and temperance,” and so on. Now it would not be so, unless all the virtues in one man were equal. Therefore all virtues are equal in one man.

P(2a)- Q(66)- A(2) — I answer that, As explained above ( A(1) ), the comparative greatness of virtues can be understood in two ways. First, as referring to their specific nature: and in this way there is no doubt that in a man one virtue is greater than another, for example, charity, than faith and hope. Secondly, it may be taken as referring to the degree of participation by the subject, according as a virtue becomes intense or remiss in its subject. In this sense all the virtues in one man are equal with an equality of proportion, in so far as their growth in man is equal: thus the fingers are unequal in size, but equal in proportion, since they grow in proportion to one another.

Now the nature of this equality is to be explained in the same way as the connection of virtues; for equality among virtues is their connection as to greatness. Now it has been stated above ( Q(65), A(1) ) that a twofold connection of virtues may be assigned. The first is according to the opinion of those who understood these four virtues to be four general properties of virtues, each of which is found together with the other in any matter. In this way virtues cannot be said to be equal in any matter unless they have all these properties equal. Augustine alludes to this kind of equality (De Trin. vi, 4) when he says: “If you say these men are equal in fortitude, but that one is more prudent than the other; it follows that the fortitude of the latter is less prudent. Consequently they are not really equal in fortitude, since the former’s fortitude is more prudent. You will find that this applies to the other virtues if you run over them all in the same way.”

The other kind of connection among virtues followed the opinion of those who hold these virtues to have their own proper respective matters ( Q(65), AA(1),2 ). In this way the connection among moral virtues results from prudence, and, as to the infused virtues, from charity, and not from the inclination, which is on the part of the subject, as stated above ( Q(65), A(1) ). Accordingly the nature of the equality among virtues can also be considered on the part of prudence, in regard to that which is formal in all the moral virtues: for in one and the same man, so long as his reason has the same degree of perfection, the mean will be proportionately defined according to right reason in each matter of virtue.

But in regard to that which is material in the moral virtues, viz. the inclination to the virtuous act, one may be readier to perform the act of one virtue, than the act of another virtue, and this either from nature, or from habituation, or again by the grace of God.

P(2a)- Q(66)- A(2)- RO(1) — This saying of the Apostle may be taken to refer to the gifts of gratuitous grace, which are not common to all, nor are all of them equal in the one same subject. We might also say that it refers to the measure of sanctifying grace, by reason of which one man has all the virtues in greater abundance than another man, on account of his greater abundance of prudence, or also of charity, in which all the infused virtues are connected.

P(2a)- Q(66)- A(2)- RO(2) — One saint is praised chiefly for one virtue, another saint for another virtue, on account of his more admirable readiness for the act of one virtue than for the act of another virtue.

This suffices for the Reply to the Third Objection.

P(2a)- Q(66)- A(3) Whether the moral virtues are better than the intellectual virtues?

P(2a)- Q(66)- A(3)- O(1) — It would seem that the moral virtues are better than the intellectual. Because that which is more necessary, and more lasting, is better. Now the moral virtues are “more lasting even than the sciences” (Ethic. i) which are intellectual virtues: and, moreover, they are more necessary for human life. Therefore they are preferable to the intellectual virtues.

P(2a)- Q(66)- A(3)- O(2) — Further, virtue is defined as “that which makes its possessor good.” Now man is said to be good in respect of moral virtue, and art in respect of intellectual virtue, except perhaps in respect of prudence alone. Therefore moral is better than intellectual virtue.

P(2a)- Q(66)- A(3)- O(3) — Further, the end is more excellent than the means. But according to Ethic. vi, 12, “moral virtue gives right intention of the end; whereas prudence gives right choice of the means.” Therefore moral virtue is more excellent than prudence, which is the intellectual virtue that regards moral matters.

P(2a)- Q(66)- A(3) — On the contrary, Moral virtue is in that part of the soul which is rational by participation; while intellectual virtue is in the essentially rational part, as stated in Ethic. i, 13. Now rational by essence is more excellent than rational by participation. Therefore intellectual virtue is better than moral virtue.

P(2a)- Q(66)- A(3) — I answer that, A thing may be said to be greater or less in two ways: first, simply; secondly, relatively. For nothing hinders something from being better simply, e.g. “learning than riches,” and yet not better relatively, i.e. “for one who is in want” [*Aristotle, Topic. iii.].

Now to consider a thing simply is to consider it in its proper specific nature. Accordingly, a virtue takes its species from its object, as explained above ( Q(54), A(2) ; Q(60), A(1) ). Hence, speaking simply, that virtue is more excellent, which has the more excellent object. Now it is evident that the object of the reason is more excellent than the object of the appetite: since the reason apprehends things in the universal, while the appetite tends to things themselves, whose being is restricted to the particular.

Consequently, speaking simply, the intellectual virtues, which perfect the reason, are more excellent than the moral virtues, which perfect the appetite.

But if we consider virtue in its relation to act, then moral virtue, which perfects the appetite, whose function it is to move the other powers to act, as stated above ( Q(9) , A(1) ), is more excellent. And since virtue is so called from its being a principle of action, for it is the perfection of a power, it follows again that the nature of virtue agrees more with moral than with intellectual virtue, though the intellectual virtues are more excellent habits, simply speaking.

P(2a)- Q(66)- A(3)- RO(1) — The moral virtues are more lasting than the intellectual virtues, because they are practised in matters pertaining to the life of the community. Yet it is evident that the objects of the sciences, which are necessary and invariable, are more lasting than the objects of moral virtue, which are certain particular matters of action. That the moral virtues are more necessary for human life, proves that they are more excellent, not simply, but relatively. Indeed, the speculative intellectual virtues, from the very fact that they are not referred to something else, as a useful thing is referred to an end, are more excellent. The reason for this is that in them we have a kind of beginning of that happiness which consists in the knowledge of truth, as stated above ( Q(3) , A(6) ).

P(2a)- Q(66)- A(3)- RO(2) — The reason why man is said to be good simply, in respect of moral virtue, but not in respect of intellectual virtue, is because the appetite moves the other powers to their acts, as stated above ( Q(56), A(3) ). Wherefore this argument, too, proves merely that moral virtue is better relatively.

P(2a)- Q(66)- A(3)- RO(3) — Prudence directs the moral virtues not only in the choice of the means, but also in appointing the end. Now the end of each moral virtue is to attain the mean in the matter proper to that virtue; which mean is appointed according to the right ruling of prudence, as stated in Ethic. ii, 6; vi, 13.

P(2a)- Q(66)- A(4) Whether justice is the chief of the moral virtues?

P(2a)- Q(66)- A(4)- O(1) — It would seem that justice is not the chief of the moral virtues. For it is better to give of one’s own than to pay what is due. Now the former belongs to liberality, the latter to justice. Therefore liberality is apparently a greater virtue than justice.

P(2a)- Q(66)- A(4)- O(2) — Further, the chief quality of a thing is, seemingly, that in which it is most perfect. Now, according to Jm. 1:4, “Patience hath a perfect work.” Therefore it would seem that patience is greater than justice.

P(2a)- Q(66)- A(4)- O(3) — Further, “Magnanimity has a great influence on every virtue,” as stated in Ethic. iv, 3. Therefore it magnifies even justice.

Therefore it is greater than justice.

P(2a)- Q(66)- A(4) — On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 1) that “justice is the most excellent of the virtues.”

P(2a)- Q(66)- A(4) — I answer that, A virtue considered in its species may be greater or less, either simply or relatively. A virtue is said to be greater simply, whereby a greater rational good shines forth, as stated above ( A(1) ). In this way justice is the most excellent of all the moral virtues, as being most akin to reason. This is made evident by considering its subject and its object: its subject, because this is the will, and the will is the rational appetite, as stated above ( Q(8) , A(1) ; Q(26), A(1) ): its object or matter, because it is about operations, whereby man is set in order not only in himself, but also in regard to another. Hence “justice is the most excellent of virtues” (Ethic. v, 1). Among the other moral virtues, which are about the passions, the more excellent the matter in which the appetitive movement is subjected to reason, so much the more does the rational good shine forth in each. Now in things touching man, the chief of all is life, on which all other things depend. Consequently fortitude which subjects the appetitive movement to reason in matters of life and death, holds the first place among those moral virtues that are about the passions, but is subordinate to justice. Hence the Philosopher says (Rhet. 1) that “those virtues must needs be greatest which receive the most praise: since virtue is a power of doing good. Hence the brave man and the just man are honored more than others; because the former,” i.e. fortitude, “is useful in war, and the latter,” i.e. justice, “both in war and in peace.” After fortitude comes temperance, which subjects the appetite to reason in matters directly relating to life, in the one individual, or in the one species, viz. in matters of food and of sex. And so these three virtues, together with prudence, are called principal virtues, in excellence also.

A virtue is said to be greater relatively, by reason of its helping or adorning a principal virtue: even as substance is more excellent simply than accident: and yet relatively some particular accident is more excellent than substance in so far as it perfects substance in some accidental mode of being.

P(2a)- Q(66)- A(4)- RO(1) — The act of liberality needs to be founded on an act of justice, for “a man is not liberal in giving, unless he gives of his own” (Polit. ii, 3). Hence there could be no liberality apart from justice, which discerns between “meum” and “tuum”: whereas justice can be without liberality. Hence justice is simply greater than liberality, as being more universal, and as being its foundation: while liberality is greater relatively since it is an ornament and an addition to justice.

P(2a)- Q(66)- A(4)- RO(2) — Patience is said to have “a perfect work,” by enduring evils, wherein it excludes not only unjust revenge, which is also excluded by justice; not only hatred, which is also suppressed by charity; nor only anger, which is calmed by gentleness; but also inordinate sorrow, which is the root of all the above. Wherefore it is more perfect and excellent through plucking up the root in this matter. It is not, however, more perfect than all the other virtues simply. Because fortitude not only endures trouble without being disturbed, but also fights against it if necessary. Hence whoever is brave is patient; but the converse does not hold, for patience is a part of fortitude.

P(2a)- Q(66)- A(4)- RO(3) — There can be no magnanimity without the other virtues, as stated in Ethic. iv, 3. Hence it is compared to them as their ornament, so that relatively it is greater than all the others, but not simply.

P(2a)- Q(66)- A(5) Whether wisdom is the greatest of the intellectual virtues?

P(2a)- Q(66)- A(5)- O(1) — It would seem that wisdom is not the greatest of the intellectual virtues. Because the commander is greater than the one commanded. Now prudence seems to command wisdom, for it is stated in Ethic. i, 2 that political science, which belongs to prudence (Ethic. vi, 8), “orders that sciences should be cultivated in states, and to which of these each individual should devote himself, and to what extent.” Since, then, wisdom is one of the sciences, it seems that prudence is greater than wisdom.

P(2a)- Q(66)- A(5)- O(2) — Further, it belongs to the nature of virtue to direct man to happiness: because virtue is “the disposition of a perfect thing to that which is best,” as stated in Phys. vii, text. 17. Now prudence is “right reason about things to be done,” whereby man is brought to happiness: whereas wisdom takes no notice of human acts, whereby man attains happiness. Therefore prudence is a greater virtue than wisdom.

P(2a)- Q(66)- A(5)- O(3) — Further, the more perfect knowledge is, the greater it seems to be. Now we can have more perfect knowledge of human affairs, which are the subject of science, than of Divine things, which are the object of wisdom, which is the distinction given by Augustine (De Trin. xii, 14): because Divine things are incomprehensible, according to Job 26:26: “Behold God is great, exceeding our knowledge.” Therefore science is a greater virtue than wisdom.

P(2a)- Q(66)- A(5)- O(4) — Further, knowledge of principles is more excellent than knowledge of conclusions. But wisdom draws conclusions from indemonstrable principles which are the object of the virtue of understanding, even as other sciences do. Therefore understanding is a greater virtue than wisdom.

P(2a)- Q(66)- A(5) — On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 7) that wisdom is “the head” among “the intellectual virtues.”

P(2a)- Q(66)- A(5) — I answer that, As stated above ( A(3) ), the greatness of a virtue, as to its species, is taken from its object. Now the object of wisdom surpasses the objects of all the intellectual virtues: because wisdom considers the Supreme Cause, which is God, as stated at the beginning of the Metaphysics. And since it is by the cause that we judge of an effect, and by the higher cause that we judge of the lower effects; hence it is that wisdom exercises judgment over all the other intellectual virtues, directs them all, and is the architect of them all.

P(2a)- Q(66)- A(5)- RO(1) — Since prudence is about human affairs, and wisdom about the Supreme Cause, it is impossible for prudence to be a greater virtue than wisdom, “unless,” as stated in Ethic. vi, 7, “man were the greatest thing in the world.” Wherefore we must say, as stated in the same book (Ethic. vi), that prudence does not command wisdom, but vice versa: because “the spiritual man judgeth all things; and he himself is judged by no man” ( 1 Corinthians 2:15). For prudence has no business with supreme matters which are the object of wisdom: but its command covers things directed to wisdom, viz. how men are to obtain wisdom.

Wherefore prudence, or political science, is, in this way, the servant of wisdom; for it leads to wisdom, preparing the way for her, as the doorkeeper for the king.

P(2a)- Q(66)- A(5)- RO(2) — Prudence considers the means of acquiring happiness, but wisdom considers the very object of happiness, viz. the Supreme Intelligible. And if indeed the consideration of wisdom were perfect in respect of its object, there would be perfect happiness in the act of wisdom: but as, in this life, the act of wisdom is imperfect in respect of its principal object, which is God, it follows that the act of wisdom is a beginning or participation of future happiness, so that wisdom is nearer than prudence to happiness.

P(2a)- Q(66)- A(5)- RO(3) — As the Philosopher says (De Anima i, text. 1), “one knowledge is preferable to another, either because it is about a higher object, or because it is more certain.” Hence if the objects be equally good and sublime, that virtue will be greater which possesses more certain knowledge. But a virtue which is less certain about a higher and better object, is preferable to that which is more certain about an object of inferior degree. Wherefore the Philosopher says (De Coelo ii, text. 60) that “it is a great thing to be able to know something about celestial beings, though it be based on weak and probable reasoning”; and again (De Part.

Animal. i, 5) that “it is better to know a little about sublime things, than much about mean things.” Accordingly wisdom, to which knowledge about God pertains, is beyond the reach of man, especially in this life, so as to be his possession: for this “belongs to God alone” (Metaph. i, 2): and yet this little knowledge about God which we can have through wisdom is preferable to all other knowledge.

P(2a)- Q(66)- A(5)- RO(4) — The truth and knowledge of indemonstrable principles depends on the meaning of the terms: for as soon as we know what is a whole, and what is a part, we know at once that every whole is greater than its part. Now to know the meaning of being and non-being, of whole and part, and of other things consequent to being, which are the terms whereof indemonstrable principles are constituted, is the function of wisdom: since universal being is the proper effect of the Supreme Cause, which is God. And so wisdom makes use of indemonstrable principles which are the object of understanding, not only by drawing conclusions from them, as other sciences do, but also by passing its judgment on them, and by vindicating them against those who deny them. Hence it follows that wisdom is a greater virtue than understanding.

P(2a)- Q(66)- A(6) Whether charity is the greatest of the theological virtues?

P(2a)- Q(66)- A(6)- O(1) — It would seem that charity is not the greatest of the theological virtues. Because, since faith is in the intellect, while hope and charity are in the appetitive power, it seems that faith is compared to hope and charity, as intellectual to moral virtue. Now intellectual virtue is greater than moral virtue, as was made evident above ( Q(62), A(3) ).

Therefore faith is greater than hope and charity.

P(2a)- Q(66)- A(6)- O(2) — Further, when two things are added together, the result is greater than either one. Now hope results from something added to charity; for it presupposes love, as Augustine says (Enchiridion viii), and it adds a certain movement of stretching forward to the beloved.

Therefore hope is greater than charity.

P(2a)- Q(66)- A(6)- O(3) — Further, a cause is more noble than its effect.

Now faith and hope are the cause of charity: for a gloss on Matthew 1:3 says that “faith begets hope, and hope charity.” Therefore faith and hope are greater than charity.

P(2a)- Q(66)- A(6) — On the contrary, The Apostle says ( 1 Corinthians 13:13): “Now there remain faith, hope, charity, these three; but the greatest of these is charity.”

P(2a)- Q(66)- A(6) — I answer that, As stated above ( A(3) ), the greatness of a virtue, as to its species, is taken from its object. Now, since the three theological virtues look at God as their proper object, it cannot be said that any one of them is greater than another by reason of its having a greater object, but only from the fact that it approaches nearer than another to that object; and in this way charity is greater than the others. Because the others, in their very nature, imply a certain distance from the object: since faith is of what is not seen, and hope is of what is not possessed. But the love of charity is of that which is already possessed: since the beloved is, in a manner, in the lover, and, again, the lover is drawn by desire to union with the beloved; hence it is written ( 1 John 4:16): “He that abideth in charity, abideth in God, and God in him.”

P(2a)- Q(66)- A(6)- RO(1) — Faith and hope are not related to charity in the same way as prudence to moral virtue; and for two reasons. First, because the theological virtues have an object surpassing the human soul: whereas prudence and the moral virtues are about things beneath man.

Now in things that are above man, to love them is more excellent than to know them. Because knowledge is perfected by the known being in the knower: whereas love is perfected by the lover being drawn to the beloved.

Now that which is above man is more excellent in itself than in man: since a thing is contained according to the mode of the container. But it is the other way about in things beneath man. Secondly, because prudence moderates the appetitive movements pertaining to the moral virtues, whereas faith does not moderate the appetitive movement tending to God, which movement belongs to the theological virtues: it only shows the object. And this appetitive movement towards its object surpasses human knowledge, according to Ephesians 3:19: “The charity of Christ which surpasseth all knowledge.”

P(2a)- Q(66)- A(6)- RO(2) — Hope presupposes love of that which a man hopes to obtain; and such love is love of concupiscence, whereby he who desires good, loves himself rather than something else. On the other hand, charity implies love of friendship, to which we are led by hope, as stated above ( Q(62), A(4) ).

P(2a)- Q(66)- A(6)- RO(3) — An efficient cause is more noble than its effect: but not a disposing cause. For otherwise the heat of fire would be more noble than the soul, to which the heat disposes the matter. It is in this way that faith begets hope, and hope charity: in the sense, to wit, that one is a disposition to the other.

QUESTION OF THE DURATION OF VIRTUES AFTER THIS LIFE (SIX ARTICLES) We must now consider the duration of virtues after this life, under which head there are six points of inquiry: (1) Whether the moral virtues remain after this life? (2) Whether the intellectual virtues remain? (3) Whether faith remains? (4) Whether hope remains? (5) Whether anything remains of faith or hope? (6) Whether charity remains?

P(2a)- Q(67)- A(1) Whether the moral virtues remain after this life?

P(2a)- Q(67)- A(1)- O(1) — It would seem that the moral virtues doe not remain after this life. For in the future state of glory men will be like angels, according to Matthew 22:30. But it is absurd to put moral virtues in the angels [*”Whatever relates to moral action is petty, and unworthy of the gods” (Ethic. x, 8)], as stated in Ethic. x, 8. Therefore neither in man will there be moral virtues after this life.

P(2a)- Q(67)- A(1)- O(2) — Further, moral virtues perfect man in the active life. But the active life does not r