QUESTIONS 71-89 QUESTION OF VICE AND SIN CONSIDERED IN THEMSELVES (SIX ARTICLES)\parWe have in the next place to consider vice and sin: about which six points have to be considered: (1) Vice and sin considered in themselves; (2) their distinction; (3) their comparison with one another; (4) the subject of sin; (5) the cause of sin; (6) the effect of sin.

Under the first head there are six points of inquiry: (1) Whether vice is contrary to virtue? (2) Whether vice is contrary to nature? (3) Which is worse, a vice or a vicious act? (4) Whether a vicious act is compatible with virtue? (5) Whether every sin includes action? (6) Of the definition of sin proposed by Augustine (Contra Faust. xxii): “Sin is a word, deed, or desire against the eternal law.”

P(2a)- Q(71)- A(1) Whether vice is contrary to virtue?

P(2a)- Q(71)- A(1)- O(1) — It would seem that vice is not contrary to virtue. For one thing has one contrary, as proved in Metaph. x, text. 17.

Now sin and malice are contrary to virtue. Therefore vice is not contrary to it: since vice applies also to undue disposition of bodily members or of any things whatever.

P(2a)- Q(71)- A(1)- O(2) — Further, virtue denotes a certain perfection of power. But vice does not denote anything relative to power. Therefore vice is not contrary to virtue.

P(2a)- Q(71)- A(1)- O(3) — Further, Cicero (De Quaest. Tusc. iv) says that “virtue is the soul’s health.” Now sickness or disease, rather than vice, is opposed to health. Therefore vice is not contrary to virtue.

P(2a)- Q(71)- A(1) — On the contrary, Augustine says (De Perfect. Justit. ii) that “vice is a quality in respect of which the soul is evil.” But “virtue is a quality which makes its subject good,” as was shown above ( Q(55), AA(3),4 ). Therefore vice is contrary to virtue.

P(2a)- Q(71)- A(1) — I answer that, Two things may be considered in virtue — the essence of virtue, and that to which virtue is ordained. In the essence of virtue we may consider something directly, and we may consider something consequently. Virtue implies “directly” a disposition whereby the subject is well disposed according to the mode of its nature: wherefore the Philosopher says (Phys. vii, text. 17) that “virtue is a disposition of a perfect thing to that which is best; and by perfect I mean that which is disposed according to its nature.” That which virtue implies “consequently” is that it is a kind of goodness: because the goodness of a thing consists in its being well disposed according to the mode of its nature. That to which virtue is directed is a good act, as was shown above ( Q(56), A(3) ).

Accordingly three things are found to be contrary to virtue. One of these is “sin,” which is opposed to virtue in respect of that to which virtue is ordained: since, properly speaking, sin denotes an inordinate act; even as an act of virtue is an ordinate and due act: in respect of that which virtue implies consequently, viz. that it is a kind of goodness, the contrary of virtue is “malice”: while in respect of that which belongs to the essence of virtue directly, its contrary is “vice”: because the vice of a thing seems to consist in its not being disposed in a way befitting its nature: hence Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. iii): “Whatever is lacking for a thing’s natural perfection may be called a vice.”

P(2a)- Q(71)- A(1)- RO(1) — These three things are contrary to virtue, but not in the same respect: for sin is opposed to virtue, according as the latter is productive of a good work; malice, according as virtue is a kind of goodness; while vice is opposed to virtue properly as such.

P(2a)- Q(71)- A(1)- RO(2) — Virtue implies not only perfection of power, the principle of action; but also the due disposition of its subject. The reason for this is because a thing operates according as it is in act: so that a thing needs to be well disposed if it has to produce a good work. It is in this respect that vice is contrary to virtue.

P(2a)- Q(71)- A(1)- RO(3) — As Cicero says (De Quaest. Tusc. iv), “disease and sickness are vicious qualities,” for in speaking of the body “he calls it” disease “when the whole body is infected,” for instance, with fever or the like; he calls it sickness “when the disease is attended with weakness”; and vice “when the parts of the body are not well compacted together.” And although at times there may be disease in the body without sickness, for instance, when a man has a hidden complaint without being hindered outwardly from his wonted occupations; “yet, in the soul,” as he says, “these two things are indistinguishable, except in thought.” For whenever a man is ill-disposed inwardly, through some inordinate affection, he is rendered thereby unfit for fulfilling his duties: since “a tree is known by its fruit,” i.e. man by his works, according to Matthew 12:33. But “vice of the soul,” as Cicero says (De Quaest. Tusc. iv), “is a habit or affection of the soul discordant and inconsistent with itself through life”: and this is to be found even without disease and sickness, e.g. when a man sins from weakness or passion. Consequently vice is of wider extent than sickness or disease; even as virtue extends to more things than health; for health itself is reckoned a kind of virtue (Phys. vii, text. 17). Consequently vice is reckoned as contrary to virtue, more fittingly than sickness or disease.

P(2a)- Q(71)- A(2) Whether vice is contrary to nature?

P(2a)- Q(71)- A(2)- O(1) — It would seem that vice is not contrary to nature. Because vice is contrary to virtue, as stated above ( A(1) ). Now virtue is in us, not by nature but by infusion or habituation, as stated above ( Q(63), AA(1),2 , 3 ). Therefore vice is not contrary to nature.

P(2a)- Q(71)- A(2)- O(2) — Further, it is impossible to become habituated to that which is contrary to nature: thus “a stone never becomes habituated to upward movement” (Ethic. ii, 1). But some men become habituated to vice. Therefore vice is not contrary to nature.

P(2a)- Q(71)- A(2)- O(3) — Further, anything contrary to a nature, is not found in the greater number of individuals possessed of that nature. Now vice is found in the greater number of men; for it is written ( Matthew 7:13): “Broad is the way that leadeth to destruction, and many there are who go in thereat.” Therefore vice is not contrary to nature.

P(2a)- Q(71)- A(2)- O(4) — Further, sin is compared to vice, as act to habit, as stated above ( A(1) ). Now sin is defined as “a word, deed, or desire, contrary to the Law of God,” as Augustine shows (Contra Faust. xxii, 27). But the Law of God is above nature. Therefore we should say that vice is contrary to the Law, rather than to nature.

P(2a)- Q(71)- A(2) — On the contrary, Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. iii, 13): “Every vice, simply because it is a vice, is contrary to nature.”

P(2a)- Q(71)- A(2) — I answer that, As stated above ( A(1) ), vice is contrary to virtue. Now the virtue of a thing consists in its being well disposed in a manner befitting its nature, as stated above ( A(1) ). Hence the vice of any thing consists in its being disposed in a manner not befitting its nature, and for this reason is that thing “vituperated,” which word is derived from “vice” according to Augustine (De Lib. Arb. iii, 14).

But it must be observed that the nature of a thing is chiefly the form from which that thing derives its species. Now man derives his species from his rational soul: and consequently whatever is contrary to the order of reason is, properly speaking, contrary to the nature of man, as man; while whatever is in accord with reason, is in accord with the nature of man, as man. Now “man’s good is to be in accord with reason, and his evil is to be against reason,” as Dionysius states (Div. Nom. iv). Therefore human virtue, which makes a man good, and his work good, is in accord with man’s nature, for as much as it accords with his reason: while vice is contrary to man’s nature, in so far as it is contrary to the order of reason.

P(2a)- Q(71)- A(2)- RO(1) — Although the virtues are not caused by nature as regards their perfection of being, yet they incline us to that which accords with reason, i.e. with the order of reason. For Cicero says (De Inv.

Rhet. ii) that “virtue is a habit in accord with reason, like a second nature”: and it is in this sense that virtue is said to be in accord with nature, and on the other hand that vice is contrary to nature.

P(2a)- Q(71)- A(2)- RO(2) — The Philosopher is speaking there of a thing being against nature, in so far as “being against nature” is contrary to “being from nature”: and not in so far as “being against nature” is contrary to “being in accord with nature,” in which latter sense virtues are said to be in accord with nature, in as much as they incline us to that which is suitable to nature.

P(2a)- Q(71)- A(2)- RO(3) — There is a twofold nature in man, rational nature, and the sensitive nature. And since it is through the operation of his senses that man accomplishes acts of reason, hence there are more who follow the inclinations of the sensitive nature, than who follow the order of reason: because more reach the beginning of a business than achieve its completion. Now the presence of vices and sins in man is owing to the fact that he follows the inclination of his sensitive nature against the order of his reason.

P(2a)- Q(71)- A(2)- RO(4) — Whatever is irregular in a work of art, is unnatural to the art which produced that work. Now the eternal law is compared to the order of human reason, as art to a work of art. Therefore it amounts to the same that vice and sin are against the order of human reason, and that they are contrary to the eternal law. Hence Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. iii, 6) that “every nature, as such, is from God; and is a vicious nature, in so far as it fails from the Divine art whereby it was made.”

P(2a)- Q(71)- A(3) Whether vice is worse than a vicious act?

P(2a)- Q(71)- A(3)- O(1) — It would seem that vice, i.e. a bad habit, is worse than a sin, i.e. a bad act. For, as the more lasting a good is, the better it is, so the longer an evil lasts, the worse it is. Now a vicious habit is more lasting than vicious acts, that pass forthwith. Therefore a vicious habit is worse than a vicious act.

P(2a)- Q(71)- A(3)- O(2) — Further, several evils are more to be shunned than one. But a bad habit is virtually the cause of many bad acts. Therefore a vicious habit is worse than a vicious act.

P(2a)- Q(71)- A(3)- O(3) — Further, a cause is more potent than its effect.

But a habit produces its actions both as to their goodness and as to their badness. Therefore a habit is more potent than its act, both in goodness and in badness.

P(2a)- Q(71)- A(3) — On the contrary, A man is justly punished for a vicious act; but not for a vicious habit, so long as no act ensues. Therefore a vicious action is worse than a vicious habit.

P(2a)- Q(71)- A(3) — I answer that, A habit stands midway between power and act. Now it is evident that both in good and in evil, act precedes power, as stated in Metaph. ix, 19. For it is better to do well than to be able to do well, and in like manner, it is more blameworthy to do evil, than to be able to do evil: whence it also follows that both in goodness and in badness, habit stands midway between power and act, so that, to wit, even as a good or evil habit stands above the corresponding power in goodness or in badness, so does it stand below the corresponding act. This is also made clear from the fact that a habit is not called good or bad, save in so far as it induces to a good or bad act: wherefore a habit is called good or bad by reason of the goodness or badness of its act: so that an act surpasses its habit in goodness or badness, since “the cause of a thing being such, is yet more so.”

P(2a)- Q(71)- A(3)- RO(1) — Nothing hinders one thing from standing above another simply, and below it in some respect. Now a thing is deemed above another simply if it surpasses it in a point which is proper to both; while it is deemed above it in a certain respect, if it surpasses it in something which is accidental to both. Now it has been shown from the very nature of act and habit, that act surpasses habit both in goodness and in badness. Whereas the fact that habit is more lasting than act, is accidental to them, and is due to the fact that they are both found in a nature such that it cannot always be in action, and whose action consists in a transient movement. Consequently act simply excels in goodness and badness, but habit excels in a certain respect.

P(2a)- Q(71)- A(3)- RO(2) — A habit is several acts, not simply, but in a certain respect, i.e. virtually. Wherefore this does not prove that habit precedes act simply, both in goodness and in badness.

P(2a)- Q(71)- A(3)- RO(3) — Habit causes act by way of efficient causality: but act causes habit, by way of final causality, in respect of which we consider the nature of good and evil. Consequently act surpasses habit both in goodness and in badness.

P(2a)- Q(71)- A(4) Whether sin is compatible with virtue?

P(2a)- Q(71)- A(4)- O(1) — It would seem that a vicious act, i.e. sin, is incompatible with virtue. For contraries cannot be together in the same subject. Now sin is, in some way, contrary to virtue, as stated above ( A(1) ). Therefore sin is incompatible with virtue.

P(2a)- Q(71)- A(4)- O(2) — Further, sin is worse than vice, i.e. evil act than evil habit. But vice cannot be in the same subject with virtue: neither, therefore, can sin.

P(2a)- Q(71)- A(4)- O(3) — Further, sin occurs in natural things, even as in voluntary matters (Phys. ii, text. 82). Now sin never happens in natural things, except through some corruption of the natural power; thus monsters are due to corruption of some elemental force in the seed, as stated in Phys. 2:Therefore no sin occurs in voluntary matters, except through the corruption of some virtue in the soul: so that sin and virtue cannot be together in the same subject.

P(2a)- Q(71)- A(4) — On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 2,3) that “virtue is engendered and corrupted by contrary causes.” Now one virtuous act does not cause a virtue, as stated above ( Q(51), A(3) ): and, consequently, one sinful act does not corrupt virtue. Therefore they can be together in the same subject.

P(2a)- Q(71)- A(4) — I answer that, Sin is compared to virtue, as evil act to good habit. Now the position of a habit in the soul is not the same as that of a form in a natural thing. For the form of a natural thing produces, of necessity, an operation befitting itself; wherefore a natural form is incompatible with the act of a contrary form: thus heat is incompatible with the act of cooling, and lightness with downward movement (except perhaps violence be used by some extrinsic mover): whereas the habit that resides in the soul, does not, of necessity, produce its operation, but is used by man when he wills. Consequently man, while possessing a habit, may either fail to use the habit, or produce a contrary act; and so a man having a virtue may produce an act of sin. And this sinful act, so long as there is but one, cannot corrupt virtue, if we compare the act to the virtue itself as a habit: since, just as habit is not engendered by one act, so neither is it destroyed by one act as stated above ( Q(63), A(2), ad 2). But if we compare the sinful act to the cause of the virtues, then it is possible for some virtues to be destroyed by one sinful act. For every mortal sin is contrary to charity, which is the root of all the infused virtues, as virtues; and consequently, charity being banished by one act of mortal sin, it follows that all the infused virtues are expelled “as virtues.” And I say on account of faith and hope, whose habits remain unquickened after mortal sin, so that they are no longer virtues. On the other hand, since venial sin is neither contrary to charity, nor banishes it, as a consequence, neither does it expel the other virtues. As to the acquired virtues, they are not destroyed by one act of any kind of sin.

Accordingly, mortal sin is incompatible with the infused virtues, but is consistent with acquired virtue: while venial sin is compatible with virtues, whether infused or acquired.

P(2a)- Q(71)- A(4)- RO(1) — Sin is contrary to virtue, not by reason of itself, but by reason of its act. Hence sin is incompatible with the act, but not with the habit, of virtue.

P(2a)- Q(71)- A(4)- RO(2) — Vice is directly contrary to virtue, even as sin to virtuous act: and so vice excludes virtue, just as sin excludes acts of virtue.

P(2a)- Q(71)- A(4)- RO(3) — The natural powers act of necessity, and hence so long as the power is unimpaired, no sin can be found in the act.

On the other hand, the virtues of the soul do not produce their acts of necessity; hence the comparison fails.

P(2a)- Q(71)- A(5) Whether every sin includes an action?

P(2a)- Q(71)- A(5)- O(1) — It would seem that every sin includes an action. For as merit is compared with virtue, even so is sin compared with vice. Now there can be no merit without an action. Neither, therefore, can there be sin without action.

P(2a)- Q(71)- A(5)- O(2) — Further, Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. iii, 18) [*Cf. De Vera Relig. xiv.]: So “true is it that every sin is voluntary, that, unless it be voluntary, it is no sin at all.” Now nothing can be voluntary, save through an act of the will. Therefore every sin implies an act.

P(2a)- Q(71)- A(5)- O(3) — Further, if sin could be without act, it would follow that a man sins as soon as he ceases doing what he ought. Now he who never does something that he ought to do, ceases continually doing what he ought. Therefore it would follow that he sins continually; and this is untrue. Therefore there is no sin without an act.

P(2a)- Q(71)- A(5) — On the contrary, It is written ( James 4:17): “To him . . . who knoweth to do good, and doth it not, to him it is a sin.”

Now “not to do” does not imply an act. Therefore sin can be without act.

P(2a)- Q(71)- A(5) — I answer that, The reason for urging this question has reference to the sin of omission, about which there have been various opinions. For some say that in every sin of omission there is some act, either interior or exterior — interior, as when a man wills “not to go to church,” when he is bound to go — exterior, as when a man, at the very hour that he is bound to go to church (or even before), occupies himself in such a way that he is hindered from going. This seems, in a way, to amount to the same as the first, for whoever wills one thing that is incompatible with this other, wills, consequently, to go without this other: unless, perchance, it does not occur to him, that what he wishes to do, will hinder him from that which he is bound to do, in which case he might be deemed guilty of negligence. On the other hand, others say, that a sin of omission does not necessarily suppose an act: for the mere fact of not doing what one is bound to do is a sin.

Now each of these opinions has some truth in it. For if in the sin of omission we look merely at that in which the essence of the sin consists, the sin of omission will be sometimes with an interior act, as when a man wills “not to go to church”: while sometimes it will be without any act at all, whether interior or exterior, as when a man, at the time that he is bound to go to church, does not think of going or not going to church.

If, however, in the sin of omission, we consider also the causes, or occasions of the omission, then the sin of omission must of necessity include some act. For there is no sin of omission, unless we omit what we can do or not do: and that we turn aside so as not to do what we can do or not do, must needs be due to some cause or occasion, either united with the omission or preceding it. Now if this cause be not in man’s power, the omission will not be sinful, as when anyone omits going to church on account of sickness: but if the cause or occasion be subject to the will, the omission is sinful; and such cause, in so far as it is voluntary, must needs always include some act, at least the interior act of the will: which act sometimes bears directly on the omission, as when a man wills “not to go to church,” because it is too much trouble; and in this case this act, of its very nature, belongs to the omission, because the volition of any sin whatever, pertains, of itself, to that sin, since voluntariness is essential to sin. Sometimes, however, the act of the will bears directly on something else which hinders man from doing what he ought, whether this something else be united with the omission, as when a man wills to play at the time he ought to go to church — or, precede the omission, as when a man wills to sit up late at night, the result being that he does not go to church in the morning. In this case the act, interior or exterior, is accidental to the omission, since the omission follows outside the intention, and that which is outside the intention is said to be accidental (Phys. ii, text. 49,50).

Wherefore it is evident that then the sin of omission has indeed an act united with, or preceding the omission, but that this act is accidental to the sin of omission.

Now in judging about things, we must be guided by that which is proper to them, and not by that which is accidental: and consequently it is truer to say that a sin can be without any act; else the circumstantial acts and occasions would be essential to other actual sins.

P(2a)- Q(71)- A(5)- RO(1) — More things are required for good than for evil, since “good results from a whole and entire cause, whereas evil results from each single defect,” as Dionysius states (Div. Nom. iv): so that sin may arise from a man doing what he ought not, or by his not doing what he ought; while there can be no merit, unless a man do willingly what he ought to do: wherefore there can be no merit without act, whereas there can be sin without act.

P(2a)- Q(71)- A(5)- RO(2) — The term “voluntary” is applied not only to that on which the act of the will is brought to bear, but also to that which we have the power to do or not to do, as stated in Ethic. iii, 5. Hence even not to will may be called voluntary, in so far as man has it in his power to will, and not to will.

P(2a)- Q(71)- A(5)- RO(3) — The sin of omission is contrary to an affirmative precept which binds always, but not for always. Hence, by omitting to act, a man sins only for the time at which the affirmative precept binds him to act.

P(2a)- Q(71)- A(6) Whether sin is fittingly defined as a word, deed, or desire contrary to the eternal law?

P(2a)- Q(71)- A(6)- O(1) — It would seem that sin is unfittingly defined by saying: “Sin is a word, deed, or desire, contrary to the eternal law.”

Because “Word,” “deed,” and “desire” imply an act; whereas not every sin implies an act, as stated above ( A(5) ). Therefore this definition does not include every sin.

P(2a)- Q(71)- A(6)- O(2) — Further, Augustine says (De Duab. Anim. xii): “Sin is the will to retain or obtain what justice forbids.” Now will is comprised under desire, in so far as desire denotes any act of the appetite.

Therefore it was enough to say: “Sin is a desire contrary to the eternal law,” nor was there need to add “word” or “deed.”

P(2a)- Q(71)- A(6)- O(3) — Further, sin apparently consists properly in aversion from the end: because good and evil are measured chiefly with regard to the end as explained above ( Q(1) , A(3) ; Q(18), AA(4),6 ; Q(20), AA(2),3 ): wherefore Augustine (De Lib. Arb. i) defines sin in reference to the end, by saying that “sin is nothing else than to neglect eternal things, and seek after temporal things”: and again he says (Qq. lxxxii, qu. 30) that “all human wickedness consists in using what we should enjoy, and in enjoying what we should use.” Now the definition is question contains no mention of aversion from our due end: therefore it is an insufficient definition of sin.

P(2a)- Q(71)- A(6)- O(4) — Further, a thing is said to be forbidden, because it is contrary to the law. Now not all sins are evil through being forbidden, but some are forbidden because they are evil. Therefore sin in general should not be defined as being against the law of God.

P(2a)- Q(71)- A(6)- O(5) — Further, a sin denotes a bad human act, as was explained above ( A(1) ). Now man’s evil is to be against reason, as Dionysius states (Div. Nom. iv). Therefore it would have been better to say that sin is against reason than to say that it is contrary to the eternal law.

P(2a)- Q(71)- A(6) — On the contrary, the authority of Augustine suffices (Contra Faust. xxii, 27).

P(2a)- Q(71)- A(6) — I answer that, As was shown above ( A(1) ), sin is nothing else than a bad human act. Now that an act is a human act is due to its being voluntary, as stated above ( Q(1) , A(1) ), whether it be voluntary, as being elicited by the will, e.g. to will or to choose, or as being commanded by the will, e.g. the exterior actions of speech or operation.

Again, a human act is evil through lacking conformity with its due measure: and conformity of measure in a thing depends on a rule, from which if that thing depart, it is incommensurate. Now there are two rules of the human will: one is proximate and homogeneous, viz. the human reason; the other is the first rule, viz. the eternal law, which is God’s reason, so to speak.

Accordingly Augustine (Contra Faust. xxii, 27) includes two things in the definition of sin; one, pertaining to the substance of a human act, and which is the matter, so to speak, of sin, when he says “word,” “deed,” or “desire”; the other, pertaining to the nature of evil, and which is the form, as it were, of sin, when he says, “contrary to the eternal law.”

P(2a)- Q(71)- A(6)- RO(1) — Affirmation and negation are reduced to one same genus: e.g. in Divine things, begotten and unbegotten are reduced to the genus “relation,” as Augustine states (De Trin. v, 6,7): and so “word” and “deed” denote equally what is said and what is not said, what is done and what is not done.

P(2a)- Q(71)- A(6)- RO(2) — The first cause of sin is in the will, which commands all voluntary acts, in which alone is sin to be found: and hence it is that Augustine sometimes defines sin in reference to the will alone.

But since external acts also pertain to the substance of sin, through being evil of themselves, as stated, it was necessary in defining sin to include something referring to external action.

P(2a)- Q(71)- A(6)- RO(3) — The eternal law first and foremost directs man to his end, and in consequence, makes man to be well disposed in regard to things which are directed to the end: hence when he says, “contrary to the eternal law,” he includes aversion from the end and all other forms of inordinateness.

P(2a)- Q(71)- A(6)- RO(4) — When it is said that not every sin is evil through being forbidden, this must be understood of prohibition by positive law. If, however, the prohibition be referred to the natural law, which is contained primarily in the eternal law, but secondarily in the natural code of the human reason, then every sin is evil through being prohibited: since it is contrary to natural law, precisely because it is inordinate.

P(2a)- Q(71)- A(6)- RO(5) — The theologian considers sin chiefly as an offense against God; and the moral philosopher, as something contrary to reason. Hence Augustine defines sin with reference to its being “contrary to the eternal law,” more fittingly than with reference to its being contrary to reason; the more so, as the eternal law directs us in many things that surpass human reason, e.g. in matters of faith.

QUESTION OF THE DISTINCTION OF SINS (NINE ARTICLES) We must now consider the distinction of sins or vices: under which head there are nine points of inquiry: (1) Whether sins are distinguished specifically by their objects? (2) Of the distinction between spiritual and carnal sins; (3) Whether sins differ in reference to their causes? (4) Whether they differ with respect to those who are sinned against? (5) Whether sins differ in relation to the debt of punishment? (6) Whether they differ in regard to omission and commission? (7) Whether they differ according to their various stages? (8) Whether they differ in respect of excess and deficiency? (9) Whether they differ according to their various circumstances?

P(2a)- Q(72)- A(1) Whether sins differ in species according to their objects?

P(2a)- Q(72)- A(1)- O(1) — It would seem that sins do not differ in species, according to their objects. For acts are said to be good or evil, in relation, chiefly, to their end, as shown above ( Q(1) , A(3) ; Q(18), AA(4),6 ). Since then sin is nothing else than a bad human act, as stated above ( Q(71), A(1) ), it seems that sins should differ specifically according to their ends rather than according to their objects.

P(2a)- Q(72)- A(1)- O(2) — Further, evil, being a privation, differs specifically according to the different species of opposites. Now sin is an evil in the genus of human acts. Therefore sins differ specifically according to their opposites rather than according to their objects.

P(2a)- Q(72)- A(1)- O(3) — Further, if sins differed specifically according to their objects, it would be impossible to find the same specific sin with diverse objects: and yet such sins are to be found. For pride is about things spiritual and material as Gregory says (Moral. xxxiv, 18); and avarice is about different kinds of things. Therefore sins do not differ in species according to their objects.

P(2a)- Q(72)- A(1) — On the contrary, “Sin is a word, deed, or desire against God’s law.” Now words, deeds, and desires differ in species according to their various objects: since acts differ by their objects, as stated above ( Q(18), A(2) ). Therefore sins, also differ in species according to their objects.

P(2a)- Q(72)- A(1) — I answer that, As stated above ( Q(71), A(6) ), two things concur in the nature of sin, viz. the voluntary act, and its inordinateness, which consists in departing from God’s law. Of these two, one is referred essentially to the sinner, who intends such and such an act in such and such matter; while the other, viz. the inordinateness of the act, is referred accidentally to the intention of the sinner, for “no one acts intending evil,” as Dionysius declares (Div. Nom. iv). Now it is evident that a thing derives its species from that which is essential and not from that which is accidental: because what is accidental is outside the specific nature. Consequently sins differ specifically on the part of the voluntary acts rather than of the inordinateness inherent to sin. Now voluntary acts differ in species according to their objects, as was proved above ( Q(18), A(2) ). Therefore it follows that sins are properly distinguished in species by their objects.

P(2a)- Q(72)- A(1)- RO(1) — The aspect of good is found chiefly in the end: and therefore the end stands in the relation of object to the act of the will which is at the root of every sin. Consequently it amounts to the same whether sins differ by their objects or by their ends.

P(2a)- Q(72)- A(1)- RO(2) — Sin is not a pure privation but an act deprived of its due order: hence sins differ specifically according to their objects of their acts rather than according to their opposites, although, even if they were distinguished in reference to their opposite virtues, it would come to the same: since virtues differ specifically according to their objects, as stated above ( Q(60), A(5) ).

P(2a)- Q(72)- A(1)- RO(3) — In various things, differing in species or genus, nothing hinders our finding one formal aspect of the object, from which aspect sin receives its species. It is thus that pride seeks excellence in reference to various things; and avarice seeks abundance of things adapted to human use.

P(2a)- Q(72)- A(2) Whether spiritual sins are fittingly distinguished from carnal sins?

P(2a)- Q(72)- A(2)- O(1) — It would seem that spiritual sins are unfittingly distinguished from carnal sins. For the Apostle says ( Galatians 5:19): “The works of the flesh are manifest, which are fornication, uncleanness, immodesty, luxury, idolatry, witchcrafts,” etc. from which it seems that all kinds of sins are works of the flesh. Now carnal sins are called works of the flesh. Therefore carnal sins should not be distinguished from spiritual sins.

P(2a)- Q(72)- A(2)- O(2) — Further, whosoever sins, walks according to the flesh, as stated in Romans 8:13: “If you live according to the flesh, you shall die. But if by the spirit you mortify the deeds of the flesh, you shall live.”

Now to live or walk according to the flesh seems to pertain to the nature of carnal sin. Therefore carnal sins should not be distinguished from spiritual sins.

P(2a)- Q(72)- A(2)- O(3) — Further, the higher part of the soul, which is the mind or reason, is called the spirit, according to Ephesians 4:23: “Be renewed in the spirit of your mind,” where spirit stands for reason, according to a gloss. Now every sin, which is committed in accordance with the flesh, flows from the reason by its consent; since consent in a sinful act belongs to the higher reason, as we shall state further on ( Q(74), A(7) ). Therefore the same sins are both carnal and spiritual, and consequently they should not be distinguished from one another.

P(2a)- Q(72)- A(2)- O(4) — Further, if some sins are carnal specifically, this, seemingly, should apply chiefly to those sins whereby man sins against his own body. But, according to the Apostle ( 1 Corinthians 6:18), “every sin that a man doth, is without the body: but he that committeth fornication, sinneth against his own body.”

Therefore fornication would be the only carnal sin, whereas the Apostle ( Ephesians 5:3) reckons covetousness with the carnal sins.

P(2a)- Q(72)- A(2) — On the contrary, Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 17) says that “of the seven capital sins five are spiritual, and two carnal.”

P(2a)- Q(72)- A(2) — I answer that, As stated above ( A(1) ), sins take their species from their objects. Now every sin consists in the desire for some mutable good, for which man has an inordinate desire, and the possession of which gives him inordinate pleasure. Now, as explained above ( Q(31), A(3) ), pleasure is twofold. One belongs to the soul, and is consummated in the mere apprehension of a thing possessed in accordance with desire; this can also be called spiritual pleasure, e.g. when one takes pleasure in human praise or the like. The other pleasure is bodily or natural, and is realized in bodily touch, and this can also be called carnal pleasure.

Accordingly, those sins which consist in spiritual pleasure, are called spiritual sins; while those which consist in carnal pleasure, are called carnal sins, e.g. gluttony, which consists in the pleasures of the table; and lust, which consists in sexual pleasures. Hence the Apostle says ( <470701> Corinthians 7:1): “Let us cleanse ourselves from all defilement of the flesh and of the spirit.”

P(2a)- Q(72)- A(2)- RO(1) — As a gloss says on the same passage, these vices are called works of the flesh, not as though they consisted in carnal pleasure; but flesh here denotes man, who is said to live according to the flesh, when he lives according to himself, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 2,3). The reason of this is because every failing in the human reason is due in some way to the carnal sense.

This suffices for the Reply to the Second Objection.

P(2a)- Q(72)- A(2)- RO(3) — Even in the carnal sins there is a spiritual act, viz. the act of reason: but the end of these sins, from which they are named, is carnal pleasure.

P(2a)- Q(72)- A(2)- RO(4) — As the gloss says, “in the sin of fornication the soul is the body’s slave in a special sense, because at the moment of sinning it can think of nothing else”: whereas the pleasure of gluttony, although carnal, does not so utterly absorb the reason. It may also be said that in this sin, an injury is done to the body also, for it is defiled inordinately: wherefore by this sin alone is man said specifically to sin against his body. While covetousness, which is reckoned among the carnal sins, stands here for adultery, which is the unjust appropriation of another’s wife. Again, it may be said that the thing in which the covetous man takes pleasure is something bodily, and in this respect covetousness is numbered with the carnal sins: but the pleasure itself does not belong to the body, but to the spirit, wherefore Gregory says (Moral. xxxi, 17) that it is a spiritual sin.

P(2a)- Q(72)- A(3) Whether sins differ specifically in reference to their causes?

P(2a)- Q(72)- A(3)- O(1) — It would seem that sins differ specifically in reference to their causes. For a thing takes its species from that whence it derives its being. Now sins derive their being from their causes. Therefore they take their species from them also. Therefore they differ specifically in reference to their causes.

P(2a)- Q(72)- A(3)- O(2) — Further, of all the causes the material cause seems to have least reference to the species. Now the object in a sin is like its material cause. Since, therefore, sins differ specifically according to their objects, it seems that much more do they differ in reference to their other causes.

P(2a)- Q(72)- A(3)- O(3) — Further, Augustine, commenting on Psalm 79:17, “Things set on fire and dug down,” says that “every sin is due either to fear inducing false humility, or to love enkindling us to undue ardor.” For it is written ( 1 John 2:16) that “all that is in the world, is the concupiscence of the flesh, or [Vulg.: ‘and’] the concupiscence of the eyes, or [Vulg.: ‘and’] the pride of life.” Now a thing is said to be in the world on account of sin, in as much as the world denotes lovers of the world, as Augustine observes (Tract. ii in Joan.). Gregory, too (Moral. xxxi, 17), distinguishes all sins according to the seven capital vices. Now all these divisions refer to the causes of sins. Therefore, seemingly, sins differ specifically according to the diversity of their causes.

P(2a)- Q(72)- A(3) — On the contrary, If this were the case all sins would belong to one species, since they are due to one cause. For it is written (Ecclus. 10:15) that “pride is the beginning of all sin,” and ( 1 Timothy 6:10) that “the desire of money is the root of all evils.” Now it is evident that there are various species of sins. Therefore sins do not differ specifically according to their different causes.

P(2a)- Q(72)- A(3) — I answer that, Since there are four kinds of causes, they are attributed to various things in various ways. Because the “formal” and the “material” cause regard properly the substance of a thing; and consequently substances differ in respect of their matter and form, both in species and in genus. The “agent” and the “end” regard directly movement and operation: wherefore movements and operations differ specifically in respect of these causes; in different ways, however, because the natural active principles are always determined to the same acts; so that the different species of natural acts are taken not only from the objects, which are the ends or terms of those acts, but also from their active principles: thus heating and cooling are specifically distinct with reference to hot and cold. On the other hand, the active principles in voluntary acts, such as the acts of sins, are not determined, of necessity, to one act, and consequently from one active or motive principle, diverse species of sins can proceed: thus from fear engendering false humility man may proceed to theft, or murder, or to neglect the flock committed to his care; and these same things may proceed from love enkindling to undue ardor. Hence it is evident that sins do not differ specifically according to their various active or motive causes, but only in respect of diversity in the final cause, which is the end and object of the will. For it has been shown above ( Q(1) , A(3) ; Q(18), AA(4),6 ) that human acts take their species from the end.

P(2a)- Q(72)- A(3)- RO(1) — The active principles in voluntary acts, not being determined to one act, do not suffice for the production of human acts, unless the will be determined to one by the intention of the end, as the Philosopher proves (Metaph. ix, text. 15,16), and consequently sin derives both its being and its species from the end.

P(2a)- Q(72)- A(3)- RO(2) — Objects, in relation to external acts, have the character of matter “about which”; but, in relation to the interior act of the will, they have the character of end; and it is owing to this that they give the act its species. Nevertheless, even considered as the matter “about which,” they have the character of term, from which movement takes its species (Phys. v, text. 4; Ethic. x, 4); yet even terms of movement specify movements, in so far as term has the character of end.

P(2a)- Q(72)- A(3)- RO(3) — These distinctions of sins are given, not as distinct species of sins, but to show their various causes.

P(2a)- Q(72)- A(4) Whether sin is fittingly divided into sin against God, against oneself, and against one’s neighbor?

P(2a)- Q(72)- A(4)- O(1) — It would seem that sin is unfittingly divided into sin against God, against one’s neighbor, and against oneself. For that which is common to all sins should not be reckoned as a part in the division of sin. But it is common to all sins to be against God: for it is stated in the definition of sin that it is “against God’s law,” as stated above ( Q(66), A(6) ). Therefore sin against God should not be reckoned a part of the division of sin.

P(2a)- Q(72)- A(4)- O(2) — Further, every division should consist of things in opposition to one another. But these three kinds of sin are not opposed to one another: for whoever sins against his neighbor, sins against himself and against God. Therefore sin is not fittingly divided into these three.

P(2a)- Q(72)- A(4)- O(3) — Further, specification is not taken from things external. But God and our neighbor are external to us. Therefore sins are not distinguished specifically with regard to them: and consequently sin is unfittingly divided according to these three.

P(2a)- Q(72)- A(4) — On the contrary, Isidore (De Summo Bono), in giving the division of sins, says that “man is said to sin against himself, against God, and against his neighbor.”

P(2a)- Q(72)- A(4) — I answer that, As stated above ( Q(71), AA(1),6 ), sin is an inordinate act. Now there should be a threefold order in man: one in relation to the rule of reason, in so far as all our actions and passions should be commensurate with the rule of reason: another order is in relation to the rule of the Divine Law, whereby man should be directed in all things: and if man were by nature a solitary animal, this twofold order would suffice. But since man is naturally a civic and social animal, as is proved in Polit. i, 2, hence a third order is necessary, whereby man is directed in relation to other men among whom he has to dwell. Of these orders the second contains the first and surpasses it. For whatever things are comprised under the order of reason, are comprised under the order of God Himself. Yet some things are comprised under the order of God, which surpass the human reason, such as matters of faith, and things due to God alone. Hence he that sins in such matters, for instance, by heresy, sacrilege, or blasphemy, is said to sin against God. In like manner, the first order includes the third and surpasses it, because in all things wherein we are directed in reference to our neighbor, we need to be directed according to the order of reason. Yet in some things we are directed according to reason, in relation to ourselves only, and not in reference to our neighbor; and when man sins in these matters, he is said to sin against himself, as is seen in the glutton, the lustful, and the prodigal. But when man sins in matters concerning his neighbor, he is said to sin against his neighbor, as appears in the thief and murderer. Now the things whereby man is directed to God, his neighbor, and himself are diverse. Wherefore this distinction of sins is in respect of their objects, according to which the species of sins are diversified: and consequently this distinction of sins is properly one of different species of sins: because the virtues also, to which sins are opposed, differ specifically in respect of these three. For it is evident from what has been said ( Q(62), AA(1),2 ,3) that by the theological virtues man is directed to God; by temperance and fortitude, to himself; and by justice to his neighbor.

P(2a)- Q(72)- A(4)- RO(1) — To sin against God is common to all sins, in so far as the order to God includes every human order; but in so far as order to God surpasses the other two orders, sin against God is a special kind of sin.

P(2a)- Q(72)- A(4)- RO(2) — When several things, of which one includes another, are distinct from one another, this distinction is understood to refer, not to the part contained in another, but to that in which one goes beyond another. This may be seen in the division of numbers and figures: for a triangle is distinguished from a four-sided figure not in respect of its being contained thereby, but in respect of that in which it is surpassed thereby: and the same applies to the numbers three and four.

P(2a)- Q(72)- A(4)- RO(3) — Although God and our neighbor are external to the sinner himself, they are not external to the act of sin, but are related to it as to its object.

P(2a)- Q(72)- A(5) Whether the division of sins according to their debt of punishment diversifies their species?

P(2a)- Q(72)- A(5)- O(1) — It would seem that the division of sins according to their debt of punishment diversifies their species; for instance, when sin is divided into “mortal” and “venial.” For things which are infinitely apart, cannot belong to the same species, nor even to the same genus. But venial and mortal sin are infinitely apart, since temporal punishment is due to venial sin, and eternal punishment to mortal sin; and the measure of the punishment corresponds to the gravity of the fault, according to Deuteronomy 25:2: “According to the measure of the sin shall the measure be also of the stripes be.”

Therefore venial and mortal sins are not of the same genus, nor can they be said to belong to the same species.

P(2a)- Q(72)- A(5)- O(2) — Further, some sins are mortal in virtue of their species [*”Ex genere,” genus in this case denoting the species], as murder and adultery; and some are venial in virtue of their species, as in an idle word, and excessive laughter. Therefore venial and mortal sins differ specifically.

P(2a)- Q(72)- A(5)- O(3) — Further, just as a virtuous act stands in relation to its reward, so does sin stand in relation to punishment. But the reward is the end of the virtuous act. Therefore punishment is the end of sin. Now sins differ specifically in relation to their ends, as stated above ( A(1), ad 1). Therefore they are also specifically distinct according to the debt of punishment.

P(2a)- Q(72)- A(5) — On the contrary, Those things that constitute a species are prior to the species, e.g. specific differences. But punishment follows sin as the effect thereof. Therefore sins do not differ specifically according to the debt of punishment.

P(2a)- Q(72)- A(5) — I answer that, In things that differ specifically we find a twofold difference: the first causes the diversity of species, and is not to be found save in different species, e.g. “rational” and “irrational,” “animate,” and “inanimate”: the other difference is consequent to specific diversity; and though, in some cases, it may be consequent to specific diversity, yet, in others, it may be found within the same species; thus “white” and “black” are consequent to the specific diversity of crow and swan, and yet this difference is found within the one species of man.

We must therefore say that the difference between venial and mortal sin, or any other difference is respect of the debt of punishment, cannot be a difference constituting specific diversity. For what is accidental never constitutes a species; and what is outside the agent’s intention is accidental (Phys. ii, text. 50). Now it is evident that punishment is outside the intention of the sinner, wherefore it is accidentally referred to sin on the part of the sinner. Nevertheless it is referred to sin by an extrinsic principle, viz. the justice of the judge, who imposes various punishments according to the various manners of sin. Therefore the difference derived from the debt of punishment, may be consequent to the specific diversity of sins, but cannot constitute it.

Now the difference between venial and mortal sin is consequent to the diversity of that inordinateness which constitutes the notion of sin. For inordinateness is twofold, one that destroys the principle of order, and another which, without destroying the principle of order, implies inordinateness in the things which follow the principle: thus, in an animal’s body, the frame may be so out of order that the vital principle is destroyed; this is the inordinateness of death; while, on the other hand, saving the vital principle, there may be disorder in the bodily humors; and then there is sickness. Now the principle of the entire moral order is the last end, which stands in the same relation to matters of action, as the indemonstrable principle does to matters of speculation (Ethic. vii, 8).

Therefore when the soul is so disordered by sin as to turn away from its last end, viz. God, to Whom it is united by charity, there is mortal sin; but when it is disordered without turning away from God, there is venial sin.

For even as in the body, the disorder of death which results from the destruction of the principle of life, is irreparable according to nature, while the disorder of sickness can be repaired by reason of the vital principle being preserved, so it is in matters concerning the soul. Because, in speculative matters, it is impossible to convince one who errs in the principles, whereas one who errs, but retains the principles, can be brought back to the truth by means of the principles. Likewise in practical matters, he who, by sinning, turns away from his last end, if we consider the nature of his sin, falls irreparably, and therefore is said to sin mortally and to deserve eternal punishment: whereas when a man sins without turning away from God, by the very nature of his sin, his disorder can be repaired, because the principle of the order is not destroyed; wherefore he is said to sin venially, because, to wit, he does not sin so as to deserve to be punished eternally.

P(2a)- Q(72)- A(5)- RO(1) — Mortal and venial sins are infinitely apart as regards what they “turn away from,” not as regards what they “turn to,” viz. the object which specifies them. Hence nothing hinders the same species from including mortal and venial sins; for instance, in the species “adultery” the first movement is a venial sin; while an idle word, which is, generally speaking, venial, may even be a mortal sin.

P(2a)- Q(72)- A(5)- RO(2) — From the fact that one sin is mortal by reason of its species, and another venial by reason of its species, it follows that this difference is consequent to the specific difference of sins, not that it is the cause thereof. And this difference may be found even in things of the same species, as stated above.

P(2a)- Q(72)- A(5)- RO(3) — The reward is intended by him that merits or acts virtually; whereas the punishment is not intended by the sinner, but, on the contrary, is against his will. Hence the comparison fails.

P(2a)- Q(72)- A(6) Whether sins of commission and omission differ specifically?

P(2a)- Q(72)- A(6)- O(1) — It would seem that sins of commission and omission differ specifically. For “offense” and “sin” are condivided with one another ( Ephesians 2:1), where it is written: “When you were dead in your offenses and sins,” which words a gloss explains, saying: “‘Offenses,’ by omitting to do what was commanded, and ‘sins,’ by doing what was forbidden.” Whence it is evident that “offenses” here denotes sins of omission; while “sin” denotes sins of commission. Therefore they differ specifically, since they are contrasted with one another as different species.

P(2a)- Q(72)- A(6)- O(2) — Further, it is essential to sin to be against God’s law, for this is part of its definition, as is clear from what has been said ( Q(71), A(6) ). Now in God’s law, the affirmative precepts, against which is the sin of omission, are different from the negative precepts, against which is the sin of omission. Therefore sins of omission and commission differ specifically.

P(2a)- Q(72)- A(6)- O(3) — Further, omission and commission differ as affirmation and negation. Now affirmation and negation cannot be in the same species, since negation has no species; for “there is neither species nor difference of non-being,” as the Philosopher states (Phys. iv, text. 67).

Therefore omission and commission cannot belong to the same species.

P(2a)- Q(72)- A(6) — On the contrary, Omission and commission are found in the same species of sin. For the covetous man both takes what belongs to others, which is a sin of commission; and gives not of his own to whom he should give, which is a sin of omission. Therefore omission and commission do not differ specifically.

P(2a)- Q(72)- A(6) — I answer that, There is a twofold difference in sins; a material difference and a formal difference: the material difference is to be observed in the natural species of the sinful act; while the formal difference is gathered from their relation to one proper end, which is also their proper object. Hence we find certain acts differing from one another in the material specific difference, which are nevertheless formally in the same species of sin, because they are directed to the one same end: thus strangling, stoning, and stabbing come under the one species of murder, although the actions themselves differ specifically according to the natural species.

Accordingly, if we refer to the material species in sins of omission and commission, they differ specifically, using species in a broad sense, in so far as negation and privation may have a species. But if we refer to the formal species of sins of omission and commission, they do not differ specifically, because they are directed to the same end, and proceed from the same motive. For the covetous man, in order to hoard money, both robs, and omits to give what he ought, and in like manner, the glutton, to satiate his appetite, both eats too much and omits the prescribed fasts.

The same applies to other sins: for in things, negation is always founded on affirmation, which, in a manner, is its cause. Hence in the physical order it comes under the same head, that fire gives forth heat, and that it does not give forth cold.

P(2a)- Q(72)- A(6)- RO(1) — This division in respect of commission and omission, is not according to different formal species, but only according to material species, as stated.

P(2a)- Q(72)- A(6)- RO(2) — In God’s law, the necessity for various affirmative and negative precepts, was that men might be gradually led to virtue, first by abstaining from evil, being induced to this by the negative precepts, and afterwards by doing good, to which we are induced by the affirmative precepts. Wherefore the affirmative and negative precepts do not belong to different virtues, but to different degrees of virtue; and consequently they are not of necessity, opposed to sins of different species. Moreover sin is not specified by that from which it turns away, because in this respect it is a negation or privation, but by that to which it turns, in so far as sin is an act. Consequently sins do not differ specifically according to the various precepts of the Law.

P(2a)- Q(72)- A(6)- RO(3) — This objection considers the material diversity of sins. It must be observed, however, that although, properly speaking, negation is not in a species, yet it is allotted to a species by reduction to the affirmation on which it is based.

P(2a)- Q(72)- A(7) Whether sins are fittingly divided into sins of thought, word, and deed?

P(2a)- Q(72)- A(7)- O(1) — It would seem that sins are unfittingly divided into sins of thought, word, and deed. For Augustine (De Trin. xii, 12) describes three stages of sin, of which the first is “when the carnal sense offers a bait,” which is the sin of thought; the second stage is reached “when one is satisfied with the mere pleasure of thought”; and the third stage, “when consent is given to the deed.” Now these three belong to the sin of thought. Therefore it is unfitting to reckon sin of thought as one kind of sin.

P(2a)- Q(72)- A(7)- O(2) — Further, Gregory (Moral. iv, 25) reckons four degrees of sin; the first of which is “a fault hidden in the heart”; the second, “when it is done openly”; the third, “when it is formed into a habit”; and the fourth, “when man goes so far as to presume on God’s mercy or to give himself up to despair”: where no distinction is made between sins of deed and sins of word, and two other degrees of sin are added. Therefore the first division was unfitting.

P(2a)- Q(72)- A(7)- O(3) — Further, there can be no sin of word or deed unless there precede sin of thought. Therefore these sins do not differ specifically. Therefore they should not be condivided with one another.

P(2a)- Q(72)- A(7) — On the contrary, Jerome in commenting on Ezech. 43:23: “The human race is subject to three kinds of sin, for when we sin, it is either by thought, or word, or deed.”

P(2a)- Q(72)- A(7) — I answer that, Things differ specifically in two ways: first, when each has the complete species; thus a horse and an ox differ specifically: secondly, when the diversity of species is derived from diversity of degree in generation or movement: thus the building is the complete generation of a house, while the laying of the foundations, and the setting up of the walls are incomplete species, as the Philosopher declares (Ethic. x, 4); and the same can apply to the generation of animals.

Accordingly sins are divided into these three, viz. sins of thought, word, and deed, not as into various complete species: for the consummation of sin is in the deed, wherefore sins of deed have the complete species; but the first beginning of sin is its foundation, as it were, in the sin of thought; the second degree is the sin of word, in so far as man is ready to break out into a declaration of his thought; while the third degree consists in the consummation of the deed. Consequently these three differ in respect of the various degrees of sin. Nevertheless it is evident that these three belong to the one complete species of sin, since they proceed from the same motive. For the angry man, through desire of vengeance, is at first disturbed in thought, then he breaks out into words of abuse, and lastly he goes on to wrongful deeds; and the same applies to lust and to any other sin.

P(2a)- Q(72)- A(7)- RO(1) — All sins of thought have the common note of secrecy, in respect of which they form one degree, which is, however, divided into three stages, viz. of cogitation, pleasure, and consent.

P(2a)- Q(72)- A(7)- RO(2) — Sins of words and deed are both done openly, and for this reason Gregory (Moral. iv, 25) reckons them under one head: whereas Jerome (in commenting on Ezekiel 43:23) distinguishes between them, because in sins of word there is nothing but manifestation which is intended principally; while in sins of deed, it is the consummation of the inward thought which is principally intended, and the outward manifestation is by way of sequel. Habit and despair are stages following the complete species of sin, even as boyhood and youth follow the complete generation of a man.

P(2a)- Q(72)- A(7)- RO(3) — Sin of thought and sin of word are not distinct from the sin of deed when they are united together with it, but when each is found by itself: even as one part of a movement is not distinct from the whole movement, when the movement is continuous, but only when there is a break in the movement.

P(2a)- Q(72)- A(8) Whether excess and deficiency diversify the species of sins?

P(2a)- Q(72)- A(8)- O(1) — It would seem that excess and deficiency do not diversify the species of sins. For excess and deficiency differ in respect of more and less. Now “more” and “less” do not diversify a species.

Therefore excess and deficiency do not diversify the species of sins.

P(2a)- Q(72)- A(8)- O(2) — Further, just as sin, in matters of action, is due to straying from the rectitude of reason, so falsehood, in speculative matters, is due to straying from the truth of the reality. Now the species of falsehood is not diversified by saying more or less than the reality.

Therefore neither is the species of sin diversified by straying more or less from the rectitude of reason.

P(2a)- Q(72)- A(8)- O(3) — Further, “one species cannot be made out of two,” as Porphyry declares [*Isagog.; cf. Arist. Metaph. i]. Now excess and deficiency are united in one sin; for some are at once illiberal and wasteful — illiberality being a sin of deficiency, and prodigality, by excess.

Therefore excess and deficiency do not diversify the species of sins.

P(2a)- Q(72)- A(8) — On the contrary, Contraries differ specifically, for “contrariety is a difference of form,” as stated in Metaph. x, text. 13,14.

Now vices that differ according to excess and deficiency are contrary to one another, as illiberality to wastefulness. Therefore they differ specifically.

P(2a)- Q(72)- A(8) — I answer that, While there are two things in sin, viz. the act itself and its inordinateness, in so far as sin is a departure from the order of reason and the Divine law, the species of sin is gathered, not from its inordinateness, which is outside the sinner’s intention, as stated above ( A(1) ), but one the contrary, from the act itself as terminating in the object to which the sinner’s intention is directed. Consequently wherever we find a different motive inclining the intention to sin, there will be a different species of sin. Now it is evident that the motive for sinning, in sins by excess, is not the same as the motive for sinning, in sins of deficiency; in fact, they are contrary to one another, just as the motive in the sin of intemperance is love for bodily pleasures, while the motive in the sin of insensibility is hatred of the same. Therefore these sins not only differ specifically, but are contrary to one another.

P(2a)- Q(72)- A(8)- RO(1) — Although “more” and “less” do not cause diversity of species, yet they are sometimes consequent to specific difference, in so far as they are the result of diversity of form; thus we may say that fire is lighter than air. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. viii, 1) that “those who held that there are no different species of friendship, by reason of its admitting of degree, were led by insufficient proof.” In this way to exceed reason or to fall short thereof belongs to sins specifically different, in so far as they result from different motives.

P(2a)- Q(72)- A(8)- RO(2) — It is not the sinner’s intention to depart from reason; and so sins of excess and deficiency do not become of one kind through departing from the one rectitude of reason. On the other hand, sometimes he who utters a falsehood, intends to hide the truth, wherefore in this respect, it matters not whether he tells more or less. If, however, departure from the truth be not outside the intention, it is evident that then one is moved by different causes to tell more or less; and in this respect there are different kinds of falsehood, as is evident of the “boaster,” who exceeds in telling untruths for the sake of fame, and the “cheat,” who tells less than the truth, in order to escape from paying his debts. This also explains how some false opinions are contrary to one another.

P(2a)- Q(72)- A(8)- RO(3) — One may be prodigal and illiberal with regard to different objects: for instance one may be illiberal [*Cf. P(2b) Q(119), A(1), ad 1] in taking what one ought not: and nothing hinders contraries from being in the same subject, in different respects.

P(2a)- Q(72)- A(9) Whether sins differ specifically in respect of different circumstances?

P(2a)- Q(72)- A(9)- O(1) — It would seem that vices and sins differ in respect of different circumstances. For, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv), “evil results from each single defect.” Now individual defects are corruptions of individual circumstances. Therefore from the corruption of each circumstance there results a corresponding species of sin.

P(2a)- Q(72)- A(9)- O(2) — Further, sins are human acts. But human acts sometimes take their species from circumstances, as stated above ( Q(18), A(10) ). Therefore sins differ specifically according as different circumstances are corrupted.

P(2a)- Q(72)- A(9)- O(3) — Further, diverse species are assigned to gluttony, according to the words contained in the following verse: ‘Hastily, sumptuously, too much, greedily, daintily.’ Now these pertain to various circumstances, for “hastily” means sooner than is right; “too much,” more than is right, and so on with the others. Therefore the species of sin is diversified according to the various circumstances.

P(2a)- Q(72)- A(9) — On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 7; iv, 1) that “every vice sins by doing more than one ought, and when one ought not”; and in like manner as to the other circumstances. Therefore the species of sins are not diversified in this respect.

P(2a)- Q(72)- A(9) — I answer that, As stated above ( A(8) ), wherever there is a special motive for sinning, there is a different species of sin, because the motive for sinning is the end and object of sin. Now it happens sometimes that although different circumstances are corrupted, there is but one motive: thus the illiberal man, for the same motive, takes when he ought not, where he ought not, and more than he ought, and so on with the circumstances, since he does this through an inordinate desire of hoarding money: and in such cases the corruption of different circumstances does not diversify the species of sins, but belongs to one and the same species.

Sometimes, however, the corruption of different circumstances arises from different motives: for instance that a man eat hastily, may be due to the fact that he cannot brook the delay in taking food, on account of a rapid exhaustion of the digestive humors; and that he desire too much food, may be due to a naturally strong digestion; that he desire choice meats, is due to his desire for pleasure in taking food. Hence in such matters, the corruption of different circumstances entails different species of sins.

P(2a)- Q(72)- A(9)- RO(1) — Evil, as such, is a privation, and so it has different species in respect of the thing which the subject is deprived, even as other privations. But sin does not take its species from the privation or aversion, as stated above ( A(1) ), but from turning to the object of the act.

P(2a)- Q(72)- A(9)- RO(2) — A circumstance never transfers an act from one species to another, save when there is another motive.

P(2a)- Q(72)- A(9)- RO(3) — In the various species of gluttony there are various motives, as stated.

QUESTION OF THE COMPARISON OF ONE SIN WITH ANOTHER (TEN ARTICLES) We must now consider the comparison of one sin with another: under which head there are ten points of inquiry: (1) Whether all sins and vices are connected with one another? (2) Whether all are equal? (3) Whether the gravity of sin depends on its object? (4) Whether it depends on the excellence of the virtue to which it is opposed? (5) Whether carnal sins are more grievous than spiritual sins? (6) Whether the gravity of sins depends on their causes? (7) Whether it depends on their circumstances? (8) Whether it depends on how much harm ensues? (9) Whether on the position of the person sinned against? (10) Whether sin is aggravated by reason of the excellence of the person sinning?

P(2a)- Q(73)- A(1) Whether all sins are connected with one another?

P(2a)- Q(73)- A(1)- O(1) — It would seem that all sins are connected. For it is written ( James 2:10): “Whosoever shall keep the whole Law, but offend in one point, is become guilty of all.”

Now to be guilty of transgressing all the precepts of Law, is the same as to commit all sins, because, as Ambrose says (De Parad. viii), “sin is a transgression of the Divine law, and disobedience of the heavenly commandments.” Therefore whoever commits one sin is guilty of all.

P(2a)- Q(73)- A(1)- O(2) — Further, each sin banishes its opposite virtue.

Now whoever lacks one virtue lacks them all, as was shown above ( Q(65), A(1) ). Therefore whoever commits one sin, is deprived of all the virtues.

Therefore whoever commits one sin, is guilty of all sins.

P(2a)- Q(73)- A(1)- O(3) — Further, all virtues are connected, because they have a principle in common, as stated above ( Q(65), AA(1),2 ). Now as the virtues have a common principle, so have sins, because, as the love of God, which builds the city of God, is the beginning and root of all the virtues, so self-love, which builds the city of Babylon, is the root of all sins, as Augustine declares (De Civ. Dei xiv, 28). Therefore all vices and sins are also connected so that whoever has one, has them all.

P(2a)- Q(73)- A(1) — On the contrary, Some vices are contrary to one another, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. ii, 8). But contraries cannot be together in the same subject. Therefore it is impossible for all sins and vices to be connected with one another.

P(2a)- Q(73)- A(1) — I answer that, The intention of the man who acts according to virtue in pursuance of his reason, is different from the intention of the sinner in straying from the path of reason. For the intention of every man acting according to virtue is to follow the rule of reason, wherefore the intention of all the virtues is directed to the same end, so that all the virtues are connected together in the right reason of things to be done, viz. prudence, as stated above ( Q(65), A(1) ). But the intention of the sinner is not directed to the point of straying from the path of reason; rather is it directed to tend to some appetible good whence it derives its species. Now these goods, to which the sinner’s intention is directed when departing from reason, are of various kinds, having no mutual connection; in fact they are sometimes contrary to one another.

Since, therefore, vices and sins take their species from that to which they turn, it is evident that, in respect of that which completes a sin’s species, sins are not connected with one another. For sin does not consist in passing from the many to the one, as is the case with virtues, which are connected, but rather in forsaking the one for the many.

P(2a)- Q(73)- A(1)- RO(1) — James is speaking of sin, not as regards the thing to which it turns and which causes the distinction of sins, as stated above ( Q(72), A(1) ), but as regards that from which sin turns away, in as much as man, by sinning, departs from a commandment of the law. Now all the commandments of the law are from one and the same, as he also says in the same passage, so that the same God is despised in every sin; and in this sense he says that whoever “offends in one point, is become guilty of all,” for as much as, by committing one sin, he incurs the debt of punishment through his contempt of God, which is the origin of all sins.

P(2a)- Q(73)- A(1)- RO(2) — As stated above ( Q(71), A(4) ), the opposite virtue is not banished by every act of sin; because venial sin does not destroy virtue; while mortal sin destroys infused virtue, by turning man away from God. Yet one act, even of mortal sin, does not destroy the habit of acquired virtue; though if such acts be repeated so as to engender a contrary habit, the habit of acquired virtue is destroyed, the destruction of which entails the loss of prudence, since when man acts against any virtue whatever, he acts against prudence, without which no moral virtue is possible, as stated above ( Q(58), A(4) ; Q(65), A(1) ). Consequently all the moral virtues are destroyed as to the perfect and formal being of virtue, which they have in so far as they partake of prudence, yet there remain the inclinations to virtuous acts, which inclinations, however, are not virtues.

Nevertheless it does not follow that for this reason man contracts all vices of sins — first, because several vices are opposed to one virtue, so that a virtue can be destroyed by one of them, without the others being present; secondly, because sin is directly opposed to virtue, as regards the virtue’s inclination to act, as stated above ( Q(71), A(1) ). Wherefore, as long as any virtuous inclinations remain, it cannot be said that man has the opposite vices or sins.

P(2a)- Q(73)- A(1)- RO(3) — The love of God is unitive, in as much as it draws man’s affections from the many to the one; so that the virtues, which flow from the love of God, are connected together. But self-love disunites man’s affections among different things, in so far as man loves himself, by desiring for himself temporal goods, which are various and of many kinds: hence vices and sins, which arise from self-love, are not connected together.

P(2a)- Q(73)- A(2) Whether all sins are equal?

P(2a)- Q(73)- A(2)- O(1) — It would seem that all sins are equal. Because sin is to do what is unlawful. Now to do what is unlawful is reproved in one and the same way in all things. Therefore sin is reproved in one and the same way. Therefore one sin is not graver than another.

P(2a)- Q(73)- A(2)- O(2) — Further, every sin is a transgression of the rule of reason, which is to human acts what a linear rule is in corporeal things.

Therefore to sin is the same as to pass over a line. But passing over a line occurs equally and in the same way, even if one go a long way from it or stay near it, since privations do not admit of more or less. Therefore all sins are equal.

P(2a)- Q(73)- A(2)- O(3) — Further, sins are opposed to virtues. But all virtues are equal, as Cicero states (Paradox. iii). Therefore all sins are equal.

P(2a)- Q(73)- A(2) — On the contrary, Our Lord said to Pilate ( John 19:11): “He that hath delivered me to thee, hath the greater sin,” and yet it is evident that Pilate was guilty of some sin. Therefore one sin is greater than another.

P(2a)- Q(73)- A(2) — I answer that, The opinion of the Stoics, which Cicero adopts in the book on Paradoxes (Paradox. iii), was that all sins are equal: from which opinion arose the error of certain heretics, who not only hold all sins to be equal, but also maintain that all the pains of hell are equal. So far as can be gathered from the words of Cicero the Stoics arrived at their conclusion through looking at sin on the side of the privation only, in so far, to wit, as it is a departure from reason; wherefore considering simply that no privation admits of more or less, they held that all sins are equal. Yet, if we consider the matter carefully, we shall see that there are two kinds of privation. For there is a simple and pure privation, which consists, so to speak, in “being” corrupted; thus death is privation of life, and darkness is privation of light. Such like privations do not admit of more or less, because nothing remains of the opposite habit; hence a man is not less dead on the first day after his death, or on the third or fourth days, than after a year, when his corpse is already dissolved; and, in like manner, a house is no darker if the light be covered with several shades, than if it were covered by a single shade shutting out all the light. There is, however, another privation which is not simple, but retains something of the opposite habit; it consists in “becoming” corrupted rather than in “being” corrupted, like sickness which is a privation of the due commensuration of the humors, yet so that something remains of that commensuration, else the animal would cease to live: and the same applies to deformity and the like. Such privations admit of more or less on the part of what remains or the contrary habit. For it matters much in sickness or deformity, whether one departs more or less from the due commensuration of humors or members. The same applies to vices and sins: because in them the privation of the due commensuration of reason is such as not to destroy the order of reason altogether; else evil, if total, destroys itself, as stated in Ethic. iv, 5. For the substance of the act, or the affection of the agent could not remain, unless something remained of the order of reason. Therefore it matters much to the gravity of a sin whether one departs more or less from the rectitude of reason: and accordingly we must say that sins are not all equal.

P(2a)- Q(73)- A(2)- RO(1) — To commit sin is lawful on account of some inordinateness therein: wherefore those which contain a greater inordinateness are more unlawful, and consequently graver sins.

P(2a)- Q(73)- A(2)- RO(2) — This argument looks upon sin as though it were a pure privation.

P(2a)- Q(73)- A(2)- RO(3) — Virtues are proportionately equal in one and the same subject: yet one virtue surpasses another in excellence according to its species; and again, one man is more virtuous than another, in the same species of virtue, as stated above ( Q(66), AA(1),2 ). Moreover, even if virtues were equal, it would not follow that vices are equal, since virtues are connected, and vices or sins are not.

P(2a)- Q(73)- A(3) Whether the gravity of sins varies according to their objects?

P(2a)- Q(73)- A(3)- O(1) — It would seem that the gravity of sins does not vary according to their objects. Because the gravity of a sin pertains to its mode or quality: whereas the object is the matter of the sin. Therefore the gravity of sins does not vary according to their various objects.

P(2a)- Q(73)- A(3)- O(2) — Further, the gravity of a sin is the intensity of its malice. Now sin does not derive its malice from its proper object to which it turns, and which is some appetible good, but rather from that which it turns away from. Therefore the gravity of sins does not vary according to their various objects.

P(2a)- Q(73)- A(3)- O(3) — Further, sins that have different objects are of different kinds. But things of different kinds cannot be compared with one another, as is proved in Phys. vii, text. 30, seqq. Therefore one sin is not graver than another by reason of the difference of objects.

P(2a)- Q(73)- A(3) — On the contrary, Sins take their species from their objects, as was shown above ( Q(72), A(1) ). But some sins are graver than others in respect of their species, as murder is graver than theft. Therefore the gravity of sins varies according to their objects.

P(2a)- Q(73)- A(3) — I answer that, As is clear from what has been said ( Q(71), A(5) ), the gravity of sins varies in the same way as one sickness is graver than another: for just as the good of health consists in a certain commensuration of the humors, in keeping with an animal’s nature, so the good of virtue consists in a certain commensuration of the human act in accord with the rule of reason. Now it is evident that the higher the principle the disorder of which causes the disorder in the humors, the graver is the sickness: thus a sickness which comes on the human body from the heart, which is the principle of life, or from some neighboring part, is more dangerous. Wherefore a sin must needs be so much the graver, as the disorder occurs in a principle which is higher in the order of reason.

Now in matters of action the reason directs all things in view of the end: wherefore the higher the end which attaches to sins in human acts, the graver the sin. Now the object of an act is its end, as stated above ( Q(72), A(3), ad 2); and consequently the difference of gravity in sins depends on their objects. Thus it is clear that external things are directed to man as their end, while man is further directed to God as his end. Wherefore a sin which is about the very substance of man, e.g. murder, is graver than a sin which is about external things, e.g. theft; and graver still is a sin committed directly against God, e.g. unbelief, blasphemy, and the like: and in each of these grades of sin, one sin will be graver than another according as it is about a higher or lower principle. And forasmuch as sins take their species from their objects, the difference of gravity which is derived from the objects is first and foremost, as resulting from the species.

P(2a)- Q(73)- A(3)- RO(1) — Although the object is the matter about which an act is concerned, yet it has the character of an end, in so far as the intention of the agent is fixed on it, as stated above ( Q(72), A(3), ad 2).

Now the form of a moral act depends on the end, as was shown above ( Q(72), A(6) ; Q(18), A(6) ).

P(2a)- Q(73)- A(3)- RO(2) — From the very fact that man turns unduly to some mutable good, it follows that he turns away from the immutable Good, which aversion completes the nature of evil. Hence the various degrees of malice in sins must needs follow the diversity of those things to which man turns.

P(2a)- Q(73)- A(3)- RO(3) — All the objects of human acts are related to one another, wherefore all human acts are somewhat of one kind, in so far as they are directed to the last end. Therefore nothing prevents all sins from being compared with one another.

P(2a)- Q(73)- A(4) Whether the gravity of sins depends on the excellence of the virtues to which they are opposed?

P(2a)- Q(73)- A(4)- O(1) — It would seem that the gravity of sins does not vary according to the excellence of the virtues to which they are opposed, so that, to wit, the graver the sin is opposed to the greater virtue. For, according to Proverbs 15:5, “In abundant justice there is the greatest strength.” Now, as Our Lord says ( Matthew 5:20, seqq.) abundant justice restrains anger, which is a less grievous sin than murder, which less abundant justice restrains. Therefore the least grievous sin is opposed to the greatest virtue.

P(2a)- Q(73)- A(4)- O(2) — Further, it is stated in Ethic. ii, 3 that “virtue is about the difficult and the good”: whence it seems to follow that the greater virtue is about what is more difficult. But it is a less grievous sin to fail in what is more difficult, than in what is less difficult. Therefore the less grievous sin is opposed to the greater virtue.

P(2a)- Q(73)- A(4)- O(3) — Further, charity is a greater virtue than faith or hope ( 1 Corinthians 13:13). Now hatred which is opposed to charity is a less grievous sin than unbelief or despair which are opposed to faith and hope. Therefore the less grievous sin is opposed to the greater virtue.

P(2a)- Q(73)- A(4) — On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. 8:10) that the “worst is opposed to the best.” Now in morals the best is the greatest virtue; and the worst is the most grievous sin. Therefore the most grievous sin is opposed to the greatest virtue.

P(2a)- Q(73)- A(4) — I answer that, A sin is opposed to a virtue in two ways: first, principally and directly; that sin, to with, which is about the same object: because contraries are about the same thing. In this way, the more grievous sin must needs be opposed to the greater virtue: because, just as the degrees of gravity in a sin depend on the object, so also does the greatness of a virtue, since both sin and virtue take their species from the object, as shown above ( Q(60), A(5) ; Q(72), A(1) ). Wherefore the greatest sin must needs be directly opposed to the greatest virtue, as being furthest removed from it in the same genus. Secondly, the opposition of virtue to sin may be considered in respect of a certain extension of the virtue in checking sin. For the greater a virtue is, the further it removes man from the contrary sin, so that it withdraws man not only from that sin, but also from whatever leads to it. And thus it is evident that the greater a virtue is, the more it withdraws man also from less grievous sins: even as the more perfect health is, the more does it ward off even minor ailments. And in this way the less grievous sin is opposed to the greater virtue, on the part of the latter’s effect.

P(2a)- Q(73)- A(4)- RO(1) — This argument considers the opposition which consists in restraining from sin; for thus abundant justice checks even minor sins.

P(2a)- Q(73)- A(4)- RO(2) — The greater virtue that is about a more difficult good is opposed directly to the sin which is about a more difficult evil. For in each case there is a certain superiority, in that the will is shown to be more intent on good or evil, through not being overcome by the difficulty.

P(2a)- Q(73)- A(4)- RO(3) — Charity is not any kind of love, but the love of God: hence not any kind of hatred is opposed to it directly, but the hatred of God, which is the most grievous of all sins.

P(2a)- Q(73)- A(5) Whether carnal sins are of less guilt than spiritual sins?

P(2a)- Q(73)- A(5)- O(1) — It would seem that carnal sins are not of less guilt than spiritual sins. Because adultery is a more grievous sin than theft: for it is written ( Proverbs 6:30,32): “The fault is not so great when a man has stolen . . . but he that is an adulterer, for the folly of his heart shall destroy his own soul.”

Now theft belongs to covetousness, which is a spiritual sin; while adultery pertains to lust, which is a carnal sin. Therefore carnal sins are of greater guilt than spiritual sins.

P(2a)- Q(73)- A(5)- O(2) — Further, Augustine says in his commentary on Leviticus [*The quotation is from De Civ. Dei ii, 4 and iv, 31.] that “the devil rejoices chiefly in lust and idolatry.” But he rejoices more in the greater sin. Therefore, since lust is a carnal sin, it seems that the carnal sins are of most guilt.

P(2a)- Q(73)- A(5)- O(3) — Further, the Philosopher proves (Ethic. vii, 6) that “it is more shameful to be incontinent in lust than in anger.” But anger is a spiritual sin, according to Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 17); while lust pertains to carnal sins. Therefore carnal sin is more grievous than spiritual sin.

P(2a)- Q(73)- A(5) — On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. xxxiii, 11) that carnal sins are of less guilt, but of more shame than spiritual sins.

P(2a)- Q(73)- A(5) — I answer that, Spiritual sins are of greater guilt than carnal sins: yet this does not mean that each spiritual sin is of greater guilt than each carnal sin; but that, considering the sole difference between spiritual and carnal, spiritual sins are more grievous than carnal sins, other things being equal. Three reasons may be assigned for this. The first is on the part of the subject: because spiritual sins belong to the spirit, to which it is proper to turn to God, and to turn away from Him; whereas carnal sins are consummated in the carnal pleasure of the appetite, to which it chiefly belongs to turn to goods of the body; so that carnal sin, as such, denotes more a “turning to” something, and for that reason, implies a closer cleaving; whereas spiritual sin denotes more a “turning from” something, whence the notion of guilt arises; and for this reason it involves greater guilt. A second reason may be taken on the part of the person against whom sin is committed: because carnal sin, as such, is against the sinner’s own body, which he ought to love less, in the order of charity, than God and his neighbor, against whom he commits spiritual sins, and consequently spiritual sins, as such, are of greater guilt. A third reason may be taken from the motive, since the stronger the impulse to sin, the less grievous the sin, as we shall state further on ( A(6) ). Now carnal sins have a stronger impulse, viz. our innate concupiscence of the flesh.

Therefore spiritual sins, as such, are of greater guilt.

P(2a)- Q(73)- A(5)- RO(1) — Adultery belongs not only to the sin of lust, but also to the sin of injustice, and in this respect may be brought under the head of covetousness, as a gloss observes on Ephesians 5:5. “No fornicator, or unclean, or covetous person,” etc.; so that adultery is so much more grievous than theft, as a man loves his wife more than his chattels.

P(2a)- Q(73)- A(5)- RO(2) — The devil is said to rejoice chiefly in the sin of lust, because it is of the greatest adhesion, and man can with difficulty be withdrawn from it. “For the desire of pleasure is insatiable,” as the Philosopher states (Ethic. iii, 12).

P(2a)- Q(73)- A(5)- RO(3) — As the Philosopher himself says (Ethic. vii, 6), the reason why it is more shameful to be incontinent in lust than in anger, is that lust partakes less of reason; and in the same sense he says (Ethic. iii, 10) that “sins of intemperance are most worthy of reproach, because they are about those pleasures which are common to us and irrational minds”: hence, by these sins man is, so to speak, brutalized; for which same reason Gregory says (Moral. xxxi, 17) that they are more shameful.

P(2a)- Q(73)- A(6) P(2a)- Whether the gravity of a sin depends on its cause?

P(2a)- Q(73)- A(6)- O(1) — It would seem that the gravity of a sin does not depend on its cause. Because the greater a sin’s cause, the more forcibly it moves to sin, and so the more difficult is it to resist. But sin is lessened by the fact that it is difficult to resist; for it denotes weakness in the sinner, if he cannot easily resist sin; and a sin that is due to weakness is deemed less grievous. Therefore sin does not derive its gravity from its cause.

P(2a)- Q(73)- A(6)- O(2) — Further, concupiscence is a general cause of sin; wherefore a gloss on Romans 7:7, “For I had not known concupiscence,” says: “The law is good, since by forbidding concupiscence, it forbids all evils.” Now the greater the concupiscence by which man is overcome, the less grievous his sin. Therefore the gravity of a sin is diminished by the greatness of its cause.

P(2a)- Q(73)- A(6)- O(3) — Further, as rectitude of the reason is the cause of a virtuous act, so defect in the reason seems to be the cause of sin. Now the greater the defect in the reason, the less grievous the sin: so much so that he who lacks the use of reason, is altogether excused from sin, and he who sins through ignorance, sins less grievously. Therefore the gravity of a sin is not increased by the greatness of its cause.

P(2a)- Q(73)- A(6) — On the contrary, If the cause be increased, the effect is increased. Therefore the greater the cause of sin, the more grievous the sin.

P(2a)- Q(73)- A(6) — I answer that, In the genus of sin, as in every other genus, two causes may be observed. The first is the direct and proper cause of sin, and is the will to sin: for it is compared to the sinful act, as a tree to its fruit, as a gloss observes on Matthew 7:18, “A good tree cannot bring forth evil fruit”: and the greater this cause is, the more grievous will the sin be, since the greater the will to sin, the more grievously does man sin.

The other causes of sin are extrinsic and remote, as it were, being those whereby the will is inclined to sin. Among these causes we must make a distinction; for some of them induce the will to sin in accord with the very nature of the will: such is the end, which is the proper object of the will; and by a such like cause sin is made more grievous, because a man sins more grievously if his will is induced to sin by the intention of a more evil end. Other causes incline the will to sin, against the nature and order of the will, whose natural inclination is to be moved freely of itself in accord with the judgment of reason. Wherefore those causes which weaken the judgment of reason (e.g. ignorance), or which weaken the free movement of the will, (e.g. weakness, violence, fear, or the like), diminish the gravity of sin, even as they diminish its voluntariness; and so much so, that if the act be altogether involuntary, it is no longer sinful.

P(2a)- Q(73)- A(6)- RO(1) — This argument considers the extrinsic moving cause, which diminishes voluntariness. The increase of such a cause diminishes the sin, as stated.

P(2a)- Q(73)- A(6)- RO(2) — If concupiscence be understood to include the movement of the will, then, where there is greater concupiscence, there is a greater sin. But if by concupiscence we understand a passion, which is a movement of the concupiscible power, then a greater concupiscence, forestalling the judgment of reason and the movement of the will, diminishes the sin, because the man who sins, being stimulated by a greater concupiscence, falls through a more grievous temptation, wherefore he is less to be blamed. On the other hand, if concupiscence be taken in this sense follows the judgment of reason, and the movement of the will, then the greater concupiscence, the graver the sin: because sometimes the movement of concupiscence is redoubled by the will tending unrestrainedly to its object.

P(2a)- Q(73)- A(6)- RO(3) — This argument considers the cause which renders the act involuntary, and such a cause diminishes the gravity of sin, as stated.

P(2a)- Q(73)- A(7) Whether a circumstance aggravates a sin?

P(2a)- Q(73)- A(7)- O(1) — It would seem that a circumstance does not aggravate a sin. Because sin takes its gravity from its species. Now a circumstance does not specify a sin, for it is an accident thereof. Therefore the gravity of a sin is not taken from a circumstance.

P(2a)- Q(73)- A(7)- O(2) — Further, a circumstance is either evil or not: if it is evil, it causes, of itself, a species of evil; and if it is not evil, it cannot make a thing worse. Therefore a circumstance nowise aggravates a sin.

P(2a)- Q(73)- A(7)- O(3) — Further, the malice of a sin is derived from its turning away (from God). But circumstances affect sin on the part of the object to which it turns. Therefore they do not add to the sin’s malice.

P(2a)- Q(73)- A(7) — On the contrary, Ignorance of a circumstance diminishes sin: for he who sins through ignorance of a circumstance, deserves to be forgiven (Ethic. iii, 1). Now this would not be the case unless a circumstance aggravated a sin. Therefore a circumstance makes a sin more grievous.

P(2a)- Q(73)- A(7) — I answer that, As the Philosopher says in speaking of habits of virtue (Ethic. ii, 1,2), “it is natural for a thing to be increased by that which causes it.” Now it is evident that a sin is caused by a defect in some circumstance: because the fact that a man departs from the order of reason is due to his not observing the due circumstances in his action.

Wherefore it is evident that it is natural for a sin to be aggravated by reason of its circumstances. This happens in three ways. First, in so far as a circumstance draws a sin from one kind to another: thus fornication is the intercourse of a man with one who is not his wife: but if to this be added the circumstance that the latter is the wife of another, the sin is drawn to another kind of sin, viz. injustice, in so far as he usurps another’s property; and in this respect adultery is a more grievous sin than fornication. Secondly, a circumstance aggravates a sin, not by drawing it into another genus, but only by multiplying the ratio of sin: thus if a wasteful man gives both when he ought not, and to whom he ought not to give, he commits the same kind of sin in more ways than if he were to merely to give to whom he ought not, and for that very reason his sin is more grievous; even as that sickness is the graver which affects more parts of the body. Hence Cicero says (Paradox. iii) that “in taking his father’s life a man commits many sins; for he outrages one who begot him, who fed him, who educated him, to whom he owes his lands, his house, his position in the republic.” Thirdly, a circumstance aggravates a sin by adding to the deformity which the sin derives from another circumstance: thus, taking another’s property constitutes the sin of theft; but if to this be added the circumstance that much is taken of another’s property, the sin will be more grievous; although in itself, to take more or less has not the character of a good or of an evil act.

P(2a)- Q(73)- A(7)- RO(1) — Some circumstances do specify a moral act, as stated above ( Q(18), A(10) ). Nevertheless a circumstance which does not give the species, may aggravate a sin; because, even as the goodness of a thing is weighed, not only in reference to its species, but also in reference to an accident, so the malice of an act is measured, not only according to the species of that act, but also according to a circumstance.

P(2a)- Q(73)- A(7)- RO(2) — A circumstance may aggravate a sin either way. For if it is evil, it does not follow that it constitutes the sin’s species; because it may multiply the ratio of evil within the same species, as stated above. And if it be not evil, it may aggravate a sin in relation to the malice of another circumstance.

P(2a)- Q(73)- A(7)- RO(3) — Reason should direct the action not only as regards the object, but also as regards every circumstance. Therefore one may turn aside from the rule of reason through corruption of any single circumstance; for instance, by doing something when one ought not or where one ought not; and to depart thus from the rule of reason suffices to make the act evil. This turning aside from the rule of reason results from man’s turning away from God, to Whom man ought to be united by right reason.

P(2a)- Q(73)- A(8) Whether sin is aggravated by reason of its causing more harm?

P(2a)- Q(73)- A(8)- O(1) — It would seem that a sin is not aggravated by reason of its causing more harm. Because the harm done is an issue consequent to the sinful act. But the issue of an act does not add to its goodness or malice, as stated above ( Q(20), A(5) ). Therefore a sin is not aggravated on account of its causing more harm.

P(2a)- Q(73)- A(8)- O(2) — Further, harm is inflicted by sins against our neighbor. Because no one wishes to harm himself: and no one can harm God, according to Job 35:6,8: “If thy iniquities be multiplied, what shalt thou do against Him? . . . Thy wickedness may hurt a man that is like thee.” If, therefore, sins were aggravated through causing more harm, it would follow that sins against our neighbor are more grievous than sins against God or oneself.

P(2a)- Q(73)- A(8)- O(3) — Further, greater harm is inflicted on a man by depriving him of the life of grace, than by taking away his natural life; because the life of grace is better than the life of nature, so far that man ought to despise his natural life lest he lose the life of grace. Now, speaking absolutely, a man who leads a woman to commit fornication deprives her of the life of grace by leading her into mortal sin. If therefore a sin were more grievous on account of its causing a greater harm, it would follow that fornication, absolutely speaking, is a more grievous sin than murder, which is evidently untrue. Therefore a sin is not more grievous on account of its causing a greater harm.

P(2a)- Q(73)- A(8) — On the contrary, Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. iii, 14): “Since vice is contrary to nature, a vice is the more grievous according as it diminishes the integrity of nature.” Now the diminution of the integrity of nature is a harm. Therefore a sin is graver according as it does more harm.

P(2a)- Q(73)- A(8) — I answer that, Harm may bear a threefold relation to sin. Because sometimes the harm resulting from a sin is foreseen and intended, as when a man does something with a mind to harm another, e.g. a murderer or a thief. In this case the quantity of harm aggravates the sin directly, because then the harm is the direct object of the sin. Sometimes the harm is foreseen, but not intended; for instance, when a man takes a short cut through a field, the result being that he knowingly injures the growing crops, although his intention is not to do this harm, but to commit fornication. In this case again the quantity of the harm done aggravates the sin; indirectly, however, in so far, to wit, as it is owing to his will being strongly inclined to sin, that a man does not forbear from doing, to himself or to another, a harm which he would not wish simply. Sometimes, however, the harm is neither foreseen nor intended: and then if this harm is connected with the sin accidentally, it does not aggravate the sin directly; but, on account of his neglecting to consider the harm that might ensue, a man is deemed punishable for the evil results of his action if it be unlawful.

If, on the other hand, the harm follow directly from the sinful act, although it be neither foreseen nor intended, it aggravates the sin directly, because whatever is directly consequent to a sin, belongs, in a manner, to the very species of that sin: for instance, if a man is a notorious fornicator, the result is that many are scandalized; and although such was not his intention, nor was it perhaps foreseen by him, yet it aggravates his sin directly.

But this does not seem to apply to penal harm, which the sinner himself incurs. Such like harm, if accidentally connected with the sinful act, and if neither foreseen nor intended, does not aggravate a sin, nor does it correspond with the gravity of the sin: for instance, if a man in running to slay, slips and hurts his foot. If, on the other hand, this harm is directly consequent to the sinful act, although perhaps it be neither foreseen nor intended, then greater harm does not make greater sin, but, on the contrary, a graver sin calls for the infliction of a greater harm. Thus, an unbeliever who has heard nothing about the pains of hell, would suffer greater pain in hell for a sin of murder than for a sin of theft: but his sin is not aggravated on account of his neither intending nor foreseeing this, as it would be in the case of a believer, who, seemingly, sins more grievously in the very fact that he despises a greater punishment, that he may satisfy his desire to sin; but the gravity of this harm is caused by the sole gravity of sin.

P(2a)- Q(73)- A(8)- RO(1) — As we have already stated ( Q(20), A(5) ), in treating of the goodness and malice of external actions, the result of an action if foreseen and intended adds to the goodness and malice of an act.

P(2a)- Q(73)- A(8)- RO(2) — Although the harm done aggravates a sin, it does not follow that this alone renders a sin more grievous: in fact, it is inordinateness which of itself aggravates a sin. Wherefore the harm itself that ensues aggravates a sin, in so far only as it renders the act more inordinate. Hence it does not follow, supposing harm to be inflicted chiefly by sins against our neighbor, that such sins are the most grievous, since a much greater inordinateness is to be found against which man commits against God, and in some which he commits against himself. Moreover we might say that although no man can do God any harm in His substance, yet he can endeavor to do so in things concerning Him, e.g. by destroying faith, by outraging holy things, which are most grievous sins. Again, a man sometimes knowingly and freely inflicts harm on himself, as in the case of suicide, though this be referred finally to some apparent good, for example, delivery from some anxiety.

P(2a)- Q(73)- A(8)- RO(3) — This argument does not prove, for two reasons: first, because the murderer intends directly to do harm to his neighbors; whereas the fornicator who solicits the woman intends not to harm but pleasure; secondly, because murder is the direct and sufficient cause of bodily death; whereas no man can of himself be the sufficient cause of another’s spiritual death, because no man dies spiritually except by sinning of his own will.

P(2a)- Q(73)- A(9) Whether a sin is aggravated by reason of the condition of the person against whom it is committed?

P(2a)- Q(73)- A(9)- O(1) — It would seem that sin is not aggravated by reason of the condition of the person against whom it is committed. For if this were the case a sin would be aggravated chiefly by being committed against a just and holy man. But this does not aggravate a sin: because a virtuous man who bears a wrong with equanimity is less harmed by the wrong done him, than others, who, through being scandalized, are also hurt inwardly. Therefore the condition of the person against whom a sin is committed does not aggravate the sin.

P(2a)- Q(73)- A(9)- O(2) — Further, if the condition of the person aggravated the sin, this would be still more the case if the person be near of kin, because, as Cicero says (Paradox. iii): “The man who kills his slave sins once: he that takes his father’s life sins many times.” But the kinship of a person sinned against does not apparently aggravate a sin, because every man is most akin to himself; and yet it is less grievous to harm oneself than another, e.g. to kill one’s own, than another’s horse, as the Philosopher declares (Ethic. v, 11). Therefore kinship of the person sinned against does not aggravate the sin.

P(2a)- Q(73)- A(9)- O(3) — Further, the condition of the person who sins aggravates a sin chiefly on account of his position or knowledge, according to Wis. 6:7: “The mighty shall be mightily tormented,” and Luke 12:47: “The servant who knew the will of his lord . . . and did it not . . . shall be beaten with many stripes.” Therefore, in like manner, on the part of the person sinned against, the sin is made more grievous by reason of his position and knowledge. But, apparently, it is not a more grievous sin to inflict an injury on a rich and powerful person than on a poor man, since “there is no respect of persons with God” ( Colossians 3:25), according to Whose judgment the gravity of a sin is measured. Therefore the condition of the person sinned against does not aggravate the sin.

P(2a)- Q(73)- A(9) — On the contrary, Holy Writ censures especially those sins that are committed against the servants of God. Thus it is written ( 1 Kings 19:14): “They have destroyed Thy altars, they have slain Thy prophets with the sword.” Moreover much blame is attached to the sin committed by a man against those who are akin to him, according to Micah 7:6: “the son dishonoreth the father, and the daughter riseth up against her mother.” Furthermore sins committed against persons of rank are expressly condemned: thus it is written ( Job 34:18): “Who saith to the king: ‘Thou art an apostate’; who calleth rulers ungodly.” Therefore the condition of the person sinned against aggravates the sin.

P(2a)- Q(73)- A(9) — I answer that, The person sinned against is, in a manner, the object of the sin. Now it has been stated above ( A(3) ) that the primary gravity of a sin is derived from its object; so that a sin is deemed to be so much the more grave, as its object is a more principal end. But the principal ends of human acts are God, man himself, and his neighbor: for whatever we do, it is on account of one of these that we do it; although one of them is subordinate to the other. Therefore the greater or lesser gravity of a sin, in respect of the person sinned against, may be considered on the part of these three.

First, on the part of God, to Whom man is the more closely united, as he is more virtuous or more sacred to God: so that an injury inflicted on such a person redounds on to God according to Zechariah 2:8: “He that toucheth you, toucheth the apple of My eye.” Wherefore a sin is the more grievous, according as it is committed against a person more closely united to God by reason of personal sanctity, or official station. On the part of man himself, it is evident that he sins all the more grievously, according as the person against whom he sins, is more united to him, either through natural affinity or kindness received or any other bond; because he seems to sin against himself rather than the other, and, for this very reason, sins all the more grievously, according to Ecclus. 14:5: “He that is evil to himself, to whom will he be good?” On the part of his neighbor, a man sins the more grievously, according as his sin affects more persons: so that a sin committed against a public personage, e.g. a sovereign prince who stands in the place of the whole people, is more grievous than a sin committed against a private person; hence it is expressly prohibited ( Exodus 22:28): “The prince of thy people thou shalt not curse.” In like manner it would seem that an injury done to a person of prominence, is all the more grave, on account of the scandal and the disturbance it would cause among many people.

P(2a)- Q(73)- A(9)- RO(1) — He who inflicts an injury on a virtuous person, so far as he is concerned, disturbs him internally and externally; but that the latter is not disturbed internally is due to his goodness, which does not extenuate the sin of the injurer.

P(2a)- Q(73)- A(9)- RO(2) — The injury which a man inflicts on himself in those things which are subject to the dominion of his will, for instance his possessions, is less sinful than if it were inflicted on another, because he does it of his own will; but in those things that are not subject to the dominion of his will, such as natural and spiritual goods, it is a graver sin to inflict an injury on oneself: for it is more grievous for a man to kill himself than another. Since, however, things belonging to our neighbor are not subject to the dominion of our will, the argument fails to prove, in respect of injuries done to such like things, that it is less grievous to sin in their regard, unless indeed our neighbor be willing, or give his approval.

P(2a)- Q(73)- A(9)- RO(3) — There is no respect for persons if God punishes more severely those who sin against a person of higher rank; for this is done because such an injury redounds to the harm of many.

P(2a)- Q(73)-A(10) Whether the excellence of the person sinning aggravates the sin?

P(2a)- Q(73)-A(10)- O(1) — It would seem that the excellence of the person sinning does not aggravate the sin. For man becomes great chiefly by cleaving to God, according to Ecclus. 25:13: “How great is he that findeth wisdom and knowledge! but there is none above him that feareth the Lord.” Now the more a man cleaves to God, the less is a sin imputed to him: for it is written (2 Paral. 30: 18,19): “The Lord Who is good will show mercy to all them, who with their whole heart seek the Lord the God of their fathers; and will not impute it to them that they are not sanctified.” Therefore a sin is not aggravated by the excellence of the person sinning.

P(2a)- Q(73)-A(10)- O(2) — Further, “there is no respect of persons with God” ( Romans 2:11). Therefore He does not punish one man more than another, for one and the same sin. Therefore a sin is not aggravated by the excellence of the person sinning.

P(2a)- Q(73)-A(10)- O(3) — Further, no one should reap disadvantage from good. But he would, if his action were the more blameworthy on account of his goodness. Therefore a sin is not aggravated by reason of the excellence of the person sinning.

P(2a)- Q(73)-A(10) — On the contrary, Isidore says (De Summo Bono ii, 18): “A sin is deemed so much the more grievous as the sinner is held to be a more excellent person.”

P(2a)- Q(73)-A(10) — I answer that, Sin is twofold. There is a sin which takes us unawares on account of the weakness of human nature: and such like sins are less imputable to one who is more virtuous, because he is less negligent in checking those sins, which nevertheless human weakness does not allow us to escape altogether. But there are other sins which proceed from deliberation: and these sins are all the more imputed to man according as he is more excellent. Four reasons may be assigned for this. First, because a more excellent person, e.g. one who excels in knowledge and virtue, can more easily resist sin; hence Our Lord said ( Luke 12:47) that the “servant who knew the will of his lord . . . and did it not . . . shall be beaten with many stripes.” Secondly, on account of ingratitude, because every good in which a man excels, is a gift of God, to Whom man is ungrateful when he sins: and in this respect any excellence, even in temporal goods, aggravates a sin, according to Wis. 6:7: “The mighty shall be mightily tormented.” Thirdly, on account of the sinful act being specially inconsistent with the excellence of the person sinning: for instance, if a prince were to violate justice, whereas he is set up as the guardian of justice, or if a priest were to be a fornicator, whereas he has taken the vow of chastity. Fourthly, on account of the example or scandal; because, as Gregory says (Pastor. i, 2): “Sin becomes much more scandalous, when the sinner is honored for his position”: and the sins of the great are much more notorious and men are wont to bear them with more indignation.

P(2a)- Q(73)-A(10)- RO(1) — The passage quoted alludes to those things which are done negligently when we are taken unawares through human weakness.

P(2a)- Q(73)-A(10)- RO(2) — God does not respect persons in punishing the great more severely, because their excellence conduces to the gravity of their sin, as stated.

P(2a)- Q(73)-A(10)- RO(3) — The man who excels in anything reaps disadvantage, not from the good which he has, but from his abuse thereof.

QUESTION OF THE SUBJECT OF SIN (TEN ARTICLES) We must now consider the subject of vice or sin: under which head there are ten points of inquiry: (1) Whether the will can be the subject of sin? (2) Whether the will alone is the subject of sin? (3) Whether the sensuality can be the subject of sin? (4) Whether it can be the subject of mortal sin? (5) Whether the reason can be the subject of sin? (6) Whether morose delectation or non-morose delectation be subjected in the higher reason? (7) Whether the sin of consent in the act of sin is subjected in the higher reason? (8) Whether the lower reason can be the subject of mortal sin? (9) Whether the higher reason can be the subject of venial sin? (10) Whether there can be in the higher reason a venial sin directed to its proper object?

P(2a)- Q(74)- A(1) Whether the will is a subject of sin?

P(2a)- Q(74)- A(1)- O(1) — It would seem that the will cannot be a subject of sin. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that “evil is outside the will and the intention.” But sin has the character of evil. Therefore sin cannot be in the will.

P(2a)- Q(74)- A(1)- O(2) — Further, the will is directed either to the good or to what seems good. Now from the fact that will wishes the good, it does not sin: and that it wishes what seems good but is not truly good, points to a defect in the apprehensive power rather than in the will.

Therefore sin is nowise in the will.

P(2a)- Q(74)- A(1)- O(3) — Further, the same thing cannot be both subject and efficient cause of sin: because “the efficient and the material cause do not coincide” (Phys. 2, text. 70). Now the will is the efficient cause of sin: because the first cause of sinning is the will, as Augustine states (De Duabus Anim. x, 10,11). Therefore it is not the subject of sin.

P(2a)- Q(74)- A(1) — On the contrary, Augustine says (Retract. i, 9) that “it is by the will that we sin, and live righteously.”

P(2a)- Q(74)- A(1) — I answer that, Sin is an act, as stated above ( Q(71), AA(1),6 ). Now some acts pass into external matter, e.g. “to cut” and “to burn”: and such acts have for their matter and subject, the thing into which the action passes: thus the Philosopher states (Phys. iii, text. 18) that “movement is the act of the thing moved, caused by a mover.” On the other hand, there are acts which do not pass into external matter, but remain in the agent, e.g. “to desire” and “to know”: and such are all moral acts, whether virtuous or sinful. Consequently the proper subject of sin must needs be the power which is the principle of the act. Now since it is proper to moral acts that they are voluntary, as stated above ( Q(1) , A(1) ; Q(18), A(6) ), it follows that the will, which is the principle of voluntary acts, both of good acts, and of evil acts or sins, is the principle of sins.

Therefore it follows that sin is in the will as its subject.

P(2a)- Q(74)- A(1)- RO(1) — Evil is said to be outside the will, because the will does not tend to it under the aspect of evil. But since some evil is an apparent good, the will sometimes desires an evil, and in this sense is in the will.

P(2a)- Q(74)- A(1)- RO(2) — If the defect in the apprehensive power were nowise subject to the will, there would be no sin, either in the will, or in the apprehensive power, as in the case of those whose ignorance is invincible. It remains therefore that when there is in the apprehensive power a defect that is subject to the will, this defect also is deemed a sin.

P(2a)- Q(74)- A(1)- RO(3) — This argument applies to those efficient causes whose actions pass into external matter, and which do not move themselves, but move other things; the contrary of which is to be observed in the will; hence the argument does not prove.

P(2a)- Q(74)- A(2) Whether the will alone is the subject of sin?

P(2a)- Q(74)- A(2)- O(1) — It would seem that the will alone is the subject of sin. For Augustine says (De Duabus Anim. x, 10) that “no one sins except by the will.” Now the subject of sin is the power by which we sin.

Therefore the will alone is the subject of sin.

P(2a)- Q(74)- A(2)- O(2) — Further, sin is an evil contrary to reason. Now good and evil pertaining to reason are the object of the will alone.

Therefore the will alone is the subject of sin.

P(2a)- Q(74)- A(2)- O(3) — Further, every sin is a voluntary act, because, as Augustine states (De Lib. Arb. iii, 18) [*Cf. De Vera Relig. xiv.], “so true is it that every sin is voluntary, that unless it be voluntary, it is no sin at all.” Now the acts of the other powers are not voluntary, except in so far as those powers are moved by the will; nor does this suffice for them to be the subject of sin, because then even the external members of the body, which are moved by the will, would be a subject of sin; which is clearly untrue. Therefore the will alone is the subject of sin.

P(2a)- Q(74)- A(2) — On the contrary, Sin is contrary to virtue: and contraries are about one same thing. But the other powers of the soul, besides the will, are the subject of virtues, as stated above ( Q(56) ).

Therefore the will is not the only subject of sin.

P(2a)- Q(74)- A(2) — I answer that, As was shown above ( A(1) ), whatever is the a principle of a voluntary act is a subject of sin. Now voluntary acts are not only those which are elicited by the will, but also those which are commanded by the will, as we stated above ( Q(6) , A(4) ) in treating of voluntariness. Therefore not only the will can be a subject of sin, but also all those powers which can be moved to their acts, or restrained from their acts, by the will; and these same powers are the subjects of good and evil moral habits, because act and habit belong to the same subject.

P(2a)- Q(74)- A(2)- RO(1) — We do not sin except by the will as first mover; but we sin by the other powers as moved by the will.

P(2a)- Q(74)- A(2)- RO(2) — Good and evil pertain to the will as its proper objects; but the other powers have certain determinate goods and evils, by reason of which they can be the subject of virtue, vice, and sin, in so far as they partake of will and reason.

P(2a)- Q(74)- A(2)- RO(3) — The members of the body are not principles but merely organs of action: wherefore they are compared to the soul which moves them, as a slave who is moved but moves no other. On the other hand, the internal appetitive powers are compared to reason as free agents, because they both act and are acted upon, as is made clear in Polit. i, 3. Moreover, the acts of the external members are actions that pass into external matter, as may be seen in the blow that is inflicted in the sin of murder. Consequently there is no comparison.

P(2a)- Q(74)- A(3) Whether there can be sin in the sensuality?

P(2a)- Q(74)- A(3)- O(1) — It would seem that there cannot be sin in the sensuality. For sin is proper to man who is praised or blamed for his actions. Now sensuality is common to us and irrational animals. Therefore sin cannot be in the sensuality.

P(2a)- Q(74)- A(3)- O(2) — Further, “no man sins in what he cannot avoid,” as Augustine states (De Lib. Arb. iii, 18). But man cannot prevent the movement of the sensuality from being inordinate, since “the sensuality ever remains corrupt, so long as we abide in this mortal life; wherefore it is signified by the serpent,” as Augustine declares (De Trin. xii, 12,13). Therefore the inordinate movement of the sensuality is not a sin.

P(2a)- Q(74)- A(3)- O(3) — Further, that which man himself does not do is not imputed to him as a sin. Now “that alone do we seem to do ourselves, which we do with the deliberation of reason,” as the Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 8). Therefore the movement of the sensuality, which is without the deliberation of reason, is not imputed to a man as a sin.

P(2a)- Q(74)- A(3) — On the contrary, It is written ( Romans 7:19): “The good which I will I do not; but the evil which I will not, that I do”: which words Augustine explains (Contra Julian. iii, 26; De Verb. Apost. xii, 2,3), as referring to the evil of concupiscence, which is clearly a movement of the sensuality. Therefore there can be sin in the sensuality.

P(2a)- Q(74)- A(3) — I answer that, As stated above ( AA(2),3 ), sin may be found in any power whose act can be voluntary and inordinate, wherein consists the nature of sin. Now it is evident that the act of the sensuality, or sensitive appetite, is naturally inclined to be moved by the will.

Wherefore it follows that sin can be in the sensuality.

P(2a)- Q(74)- A(3)- RO(1) — Although some of the powers of the sensitive part are common to us and irrational animals, nevertheless, in us, they have a certain excellence through being united to the reason; thus we surpass other animals in the sensitive part for as much as we have the powers of cogitation and reminiscence, as stated in the P(1), Q(78), A(4) . In the same way our sensitive appetite surpasses that of other animals by reason of a certain excellence consisting in its natural aptitude to obey the reason; and in this respect it can be the principle of a voluntary action, and, consequently, the subject of sin.

P(2a)- Q(74)- A(3)- RO(2) — The continual corruption of the sensuality is to be understood as referring to the “fomes,” which is never completely destroyed in this life, since, though the stain of original sin passes, its effect remains. However, this corruption of the “fomes” does not hinder man from using his rational will to check individual inordinate movements, if he be presentient to them, for instance by turning his thoughts to other things. Yet while he is turning his thoughts to something else, an inordinate movement may arise about this also: thus when a man, in order to avoid the movements of concupiscence, turns his thoughts away from carnal pleasures, to the considerations of science, sometimes an unpremeditated movement of vainglory will arise. Consequently, a man cannot avoid all such movements, on account of the aforesaid corruption: but it is enough, for the conditions of a voluntary sin, that he be able to avoid each single one.

P(2a)- Q(74)- A(3)- RO(3) — Man does not do perfectly himself what he does without the deliberation of reason, since the principal part of man does nothing therein: wherefore such is not perfectly a human act; and consequently it cannot be a perfect act of virtue or of sin, but is something imperfect of that kind. Therefore such movement of the sensuality as forestalls the reason, is a venial sin, which is something imperfect in the genus of sin.

P(2a)- Q(74)- A(4) Whether mortal sin can be in the sensuality?

P(2a)- Q(74)- A(4)- O(1) — It would seem that mortal sin can be in the sensuality. Because an act is discerned by its object. Now it is possible to commit a mortal sin about the objects of the sensuality, e.g. about carnal pleasures. Therefore the act of the sensuality can be a mortal sin, so that mortal sin can be found in the sensuality.

P(2a)- Q(74)- A(4)- O(2) — Further, mortal sin is opposed to virtue. But virtue can be in the sensuality; for temperance and fortitude are virtues of the irrational parts, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. iii, 10). Therefore, since it is natural to contraries to be about the same subject, sensuality can be the subject of mortal sin.

P(2a)- Q(74)- A(4)- O(3) — Further, venial sin is a disposition to mortal sin. Now disposition and habit are in the same subject. Since therefore venial sin may be in the sensuality, as stated above ( A(3), ad 3), mortal sin can be there also.

P(2a)- Q(74)- A(4) — On the contrary, Augustine says (Retract. i, 23): “The inordinate movement of concupiscence, which is the sin of the sensuality, can even be in those who are in a state of grace,” in whom, however, mortal sin is not to be found. Therefore the inordinate movement of the sensuality is not a mortal sin.

P(2a)- Q(74)- A(4) — I answer that, Just as a disorder which destroys the principle of the body’s life causes the body’s death, so too a disorder which destroys the principle of spiritual life, viz. the last end, causes spiritual death, which is mortal sin, as stated above ( Q(72), A(5) ). Now it belongs to the reason alone, and not to the sensuality, to order anything to the end: and disorder in respect of the end can only belong to the power whose function it is to order others to the end. Wherefore mortal sin cannot be in the sensuality, but only in the reason.

P(2a)- Q(74)- A(4)- RO(1) — The act of the sensuality can concur towards a mortal sin: yet the fact of its being a mortal sin is due, not to its being an act of the sensuality, but to its being an act of reason, to whom the ordering to the end belongs. Consequently mortal sin is imputed, not to the sensuality, but to reason.

P(2a)- Q(74)- A(4)- RO(2) — An act of virtue is perfected not only in that it is an act of the sensuality, but still more in the fact of its being an act of reason and will, whose function it is to choose: for the act of moral virtue is not without the exercise of choice: wherefore the act of moral virtue, which perfects the appetitive power, is always accompanied by an act of prudence, which perfects the rational power; and the same applies to mortal sin, as stated (ad 1).

P(2a)- Q(74)- A(4)- RO(3) — A disposition may be related in three ways to that to which it disposes: for sometimes it is the same thing and is in the same subject; thus inchoate science is a disposition to perfect science: sometimes it is in the same subject, but is not the same thing; thus heat is a disposition to the form of fire: sometimes it is neither the same thing, nor in the same subject, as in those things which are subordinate to one another in such a way that we can arrive at one through the other, e.g. goodness of the imagination is a disposition to science which is in the intellect. In this way the venial sin that is in the sensuality, may be a disposition to mortal sin, which is in the reason.

P(2a)- Q(74)- A(5) Whether sin can be in the reason?

P(2a)- Q(74)- A(5)- O(1) — It would seem that sin cannot be in the reason.

For the sin of any power is a defect thereof. But the fault of the reason is not a sin, on the contrary, it excuses sin: for a man is excused from sin on account of ignorance. Therefore sin cannot be in the reason.

P(2a)- Q(74)- A(5)- O(2) — Further, the primary object of sin is the will, as stated above ( A(1) ). Now reason precedes the will, since it directs it.

Therefore sin cannot be in the reason.

P(2a)- Q(74)- A(5)- O(3) — Further, there can be no sin except about things which are under our control. Now perfection and defect of reason are not among those things which are under our control: since by nature some are mentally deficient, and some shrewd-minded. Therefore no sin is in the reason.

P(2a)- Q(74)- A(5) — On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 12) that sin is in the lower and in the higher reason.

P(2a)- Q(74)- A(5) — I answer that, The sin of any power is an act of that power, as we have clearly shown ( AA(1),2,3 ). Now reason has a twofold act: one is its proper act in respect of its proper object, and this is the act of knowing the truth; the other is the act of reason as directing the other powers. Now in both of these ways there may be sin in the reason. First, in so far as it errs in the knowledge of truth, which error is imputed to the reason as a sin, when it is in ignorance or error about what it is able and ought to know: secondly, when it either commands the inordinate movements of the lower powers, or deliberately fails to check them.

P(2a)- Q(74)- A(5)- RO(1) — This argument considers the defect in the proper act of the reason in respect of its proper object, and with regard to the case when it is a defect of knowledge about something which one is unable to know: for then this defect of reason is not a sin, and excuses from sin, as is evident with regard to the actions of madmen. If, however, the defect of reason be about something which a man is able and ought to know, he is not altogether excused from sin, and the defect is imputed to him as a sin. The defect which belongs only to the act of directing the other powers, is always imputed to reason as a sin, because it can always obviate this defect by means of its proper act.

P(2a)- Q(74)- A(5)- RO(2) — As stated above ( Q(17), A(1) ), when we were treating of the acts of the will and reason, the will moves and precedes the reason, in one way, and the reason moves and precedes the will in another: so that both the movement of the will can be called rational, and the act of the reason, voluntary. Accordingly sin is found in the reason, either through being a voluntary defect of the reason, or through the reason being the principle of the will’s act.

The Reply to the Third Objection is evident from what has been said (ad 1).

P(2a)- Q(74)- A(6) Whether the sin of morose delectation is in the reason?

P(2a)- Q(74)- A(6)- O(1) — It would seem that the sin of morose delectation is not in the reason. For delectation denotes a movement of the appetitive power, as stated above ( Q(31), A(1) ). But the appetitive power is distinct from the reason, which is an apprehensive power. Therefore morose delectation is not in the reason.

P(2a)- Q(74)- A(6)- O(2) — Further, the object shows to which power an act belongs, since it is through the act that the power is directed to its object. Now a morose delectation is sometimes about sensible goods, and not about the goods of the reason. Therefore the sin of morose delectation is not in the reason.

P(2a)- Q(74)- A(6)- O(3) — Further, a thing is said to be morose [*From the Latin ‘mora’ — delay] through taking a length of time. But length of time is no reason why an act should belong to a particular power.

Therefore morose delectation does not belong to the reason.

P(2a)- Q(74)- A(6) — On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 12) that “if the consent to a sensual delectation goes no further than the mere thought of the pleasure, I deem this to be like as though the woman alone had partaken of the forbidden fruit.” Now “the woman” denotes the lower reason, as he himself explains (De Trin. xii, 12). Therefore the sin of morose delectation is in the reason.

P(2a)- Q(74)- A(6) — I answer that, As stated ( A(5) ), sin may be in the reason, not only in respect of reason’s proper act, but sometimes in respect of its directing human actions. Now it is evident that reason directs not only external acts, but also internal passions. Consequently when the reason fails in directing the internal passions, sin is said to be in the reason, as also when it fails in directing external actions. Now it fails, in two ways, in directing internal passions: first, when it commands unlawful passions; for instance, when a man deliberately provokes himself to a movement of anger, or of lust: secondly, when it fails to check the unlawful movement of a passion; for instance, when a man, having deliberately considered that a rising movement of passion is inordinate, continues, notwithstanding, to dwell [immoratur] upon it, and fails to drive it away. And in this sense the sin of morose delectation is said to be in the reason.

P(2a)- Q(74)- A(6)- RO(1) — Delectation is indeed in the appetitive power as its proximate principle; but it is in the reason as its first mover, in accordance with what has been stated above ( A(1) ), viz. that actions which do not pass into external matter are subjected in their principles.

P(2a)- Q(74)- A(6)- RO(2) — Reason has its proper elicited act about its proper object; but it exercises the direction of all the objects of those lower powers that can be directed by the reason: and accordingly delectation about sensible objects comes also under the direction of reason.

P(2a)- Q(74)- A(6)- RO(3) — Delectation is said to be morose not from a delay of time, but because the reason in deliberating dwells [immoratur] thereon, and fails to drive it away, “deliberately holding and turning over what should have been cast aside as soon as it touched the mind,” as Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 12).

P(2a)- Q(74)- A(7) Whether the sin of consent to the act is in the higher reason?

P(2a)- Q(74)- A(7)- O(1) — It would seem that the sin of consent to the act is not in the higher reason. For consent is an act of the appetitive power, as stated above ( Q(15), A(1) ): whereas the reason is an apprehensive power. Therefore the sin of consent to the act is not in the higher reason.

P(2a)- Q(74)- A(7)- O(2) — Further, “the higher reason is intent on contemplating and consulting the eternal law,” as Augustine states (De Trin. xii, 7). [*’Rationes aeternae,’ cf. P(1), Q(15), AA(2), [3] where as in similar passages ‘ratio’ has been rendered by the English ‘type,’ because St. Thomas was speaking of the Divine ‘idea’ as the archetype of the creature. Hence the type or idea is a rule of conduct, and is identified with the eternal law, (cf. A(8), O(1), A(9) )]. But sometimes consent is given to an act, without consulting the eternal law: since man does not always think about Divine things, whenever he consents to an act. Therefore the sin of consent to the act is not always in the higher reason.

P(2a)- Q(74)- A(7)- O(3) — Further, just as man can regulate his external actions according to the eternal law, so can he regulate his internal pleasures or other passions. But “consent to a pleasure without deciding to fulfil it by deed, belongs to the lower reason,” as Augustine states (De Trin. xii, 2). Therefore the consent to a sinful act should also be sometimes ascribed to the lower reason.

P(2a)- Q(74)- A(7)- O(4) — Further, just as the higher reason excels the lower, so does the reason excel the imagination. Now sometimes man proceeds to act through the apprehension of the power of imagination, without any deliberation of his reason, as when, without premeditation, he moves his hand, or foot. Therefore sometimes also the lower reason may consent to a sinful act, independently of the higher reason.

P(2a)- Q(74)- A(7) — On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 12): “If the consent to the evil use of things that can be perceived by the bodily senses, so far approves of any sin, as to point, if possible, to its consummation by deed, we are to understand that the woman has offered the forbidden fruit to her husband.”

P(2a)- Q(74)- A(7) — I answer that, Consent implies a judgment about the thing to which consent is given. For just as the speculative reason judges and delivers its sentence about intelligible matters, so the practical reason judges and pronounces sentence on matters of action. Now we must observe that in every case brought up for judgment, the final sentence belongs to the supreme court, even as we see that in speculative matters the final sentence touching any proposition is delivered by referring it to the first principles; since, so long as there remains a yet higher principle, the question can yet be submitted to it: wherefore the judgment is still in suspense, the final sentence not being as yet pronounced. But it is evident that human acts can be regulated by the rule of human reason, which rule is derived from the created things that man knows naturally; and further still, from the rule of the Divine law, as stated above ( Q(19), A(4) ).

Consequently, since the rule of the Divine law is the higher rule, it follows that the ultimate sentence, whereby the judgment is finally pronounced, belongs to the higher reason which is intent on the eternal types. Now when judgment has to be pronounced on several points, the final judgment deals with that which comes last; and, in human acts, the action itself comes last, and the delectation which is the inducement to the action is a preamble thereto. Therefore the consent to an action belongs properly to the higher reason, while the preliminary judgment which is about the delectation belongs to the lower reason, which delivers judgment in a lower court: although the higher reason can also judge of the delectation, since whatever is subject to the judgment of the lower court, is subject also to the judgment of the higher court, but not conversely.

P(2a)- Q(74)- A(7)- RO(1) — Consent is an act of the appetitive power, not absolutely, but in consequence of an act of reason deliberating and judging, as stated above ( Q(15), A(3) ). Because the fact that the consent is finally given to a thing is due to the fact that the will tends to that upon which the reason has already passed its judgment. Hence consent may be ascribed both to the will and to the reason.

P(2a)- Q(74)- A(7)- RO(2) — The higher reason is said to consent, from the very fact that it fails to direct the human act according to the Divine law, whether or not it advert to the eternal law. For if it thinks of God’s law, it holds it in actual contempt: and if not, it neglects it by a kind of omission.

Therefore the consent to a sinful act always proceeds from the higher reason: because, as Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 12), “the mind cannot effectively decide on the commission of a sin, unless by its consent, whereby it wields its sovereign power of moving the members to action, or of restraining them from action, it become the servant or slave of the evil deed.”

P(2a)- Q(74)- A(7)- RO(3) — The higher reason, by considering the eternal law, can direct or restrain the internal delectation, even as it can direct or restrain the external action: nevertheless, before the judgment of the higher reason is pronounced the lower reason, while deliberating the matter in reference to temporal principles, sometimes approves of this delectation: and then the consent to the delectation belongs to the lower reason. If, however, after considering the eternal law, man persists in giving the same consent, such consent will then belong to the higher reason.

P(2a)- Q(74)- A(7)- RO(4) — The apprehension of the power of imagination is sudden and indeliberate: wherefore it can cause an act before the higher or lower reason has time to deliberate. But the judgment of the lower reason is deliberate, and so requires time, during which the higher reason can also deliberate; consequently, if by its deliberation it does not check the sinful act, this will deservedly by imputed to it.

P(2a)- Q(74)- A(8) Whether consent to delectation is a mortal sin?

P(2a)- Q(74)- A(8)- O(1) — It would seem that consent to delectation is not a mortal sin, for consent to delectation belongs to the lower reason, which does not consider the eternal types, i.e. the eternal law, and consequently does not turn away from them. Now every mortal sin consists in turning away from Augustine’s definition of mortal sin, which was quoted above ( Q(71), A(6) ). Therefore consent to delectation is not a mortal sin.

P(2a)- Q(74)- A(8)- O(2) — Further, consent to a thing is not evil, unless the thing to which consent is given be evil. Now “the cause of anything being such is yet more so,” or at any rate not less. Consequently the thing to which a man consents cannot be a lesser evil than his consent. But delectation without deed is not a mortal sin, but only a venial sin.

Therefore neither is the consent to the delectation a mortal sin.

P(2a)- Q(74)- A(8)- O(3) — Further, delectations differ in goodness and malice, according to the difference of the deeds, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. x, 3,5). Now the inward thought is one thing, and the outward deed, e.g. fornication, is another. Therefore the delectation consequent to the act of inward thought, differs in goodness and malice from the pleasure of fornication, as much as the inward thought differs from the outward deed; and consequently there is a like difference of consent on either hand. But the inward thought is not a mortal sin, nor is the consent to that thought: and therefore neither is the consent to the delectation.

P(2a)- Q(74)- A(8)- O(4) — Further, the external act of fornication or adultery is a mortal sin, not by reason of the delectation, since this is found also in the marriage act, but by reason of an inordinateness in the act itself. Now he that consents to the delectation does not, for this reason, consent to the inordinateness of the act. Therefore he seems not to sin mortally.

P(2a)- Q(74)- A(8)- O(5) — Further, the sin of murder is more grievous than simple fornication. Now it is not a mortal sin to consent to the delectation resulting from the thought of murder. Much less therefore is it a mortal sin to consent to the delectation resulting from the thought of fornication.

P(2a)- Q(74)- A(8)- O(6) — Further, the Lord’s prayer is recited every day for the remission of venial sins, as Augustine asserts (Enchiridion lxxviii).

Now Augustine teaches that consent to delectation may be driven away by means of the Lord’s Prayer: for he says (De Trin. xii, 12) that “this sin is much less grievous than if it be decided to fulfil it by deed: wherefore we ought to ask pardon for such thoughts also, and we should strike our breasts and say: ‘Forgive us our trespasses.’“ Therefore consent to delectation is a venial sin.

P(2a)- Q(74)- A(8) — On the contrary, Augustine adds after a few words: “Man will be altogether lost unless, through the grace of the Mediator, he be forgiven those things which are deemed mere sins of thought, since without the will to do them, he desires nevertheless to enjoy them.” But no man is lost except through mortal sin. Therefore consent to delectation is a mortal sin.

P(2a)- Q(74)- A(8) — I answer that, There have been various opinions on this point, for some have held that consent to delectation is not a mortal sin, but only a venial sin, while others have held it to be a mortal sin, and this opinion is more common and more probable. For we must take note that since every delectation results from some action, as stated in Ethic. x, 4, and again, that since every delectation may be compared to two things, viz. to the operation from which it results, and to the object in which a person takes delight. Now it happens that an action, just as a thing, is an object of delectation, because the action itself can be considered as a good and an end, in which the person who delights in it, rests. Sometimes the action itself, which results in delectation, is the object of delectation, in so far as the appetitive power, to which it belongs to take delight in anything, is brought to bear on the action itself as a good: for instance, when a man thinks and delights in his thought, in so far as his thought pleases him; while at other times the delight consequent to an action, e.g. a thought, has for its object another action, as being the object of his thought; and then his thought proceeds from the inclination of the appetite, not indeed to the thought, but to the action thought of. Accordingly a man who is thinking of fornication, may delight in either of two things: first, in the thought itself, secondly, in the fornication thought of. Now the delectation in the thought itself results from the inclination of the appetite to the thought; and the thought itself is not in itself a mortal sin; sometimes indeed it is only a venial sin, as when a man thinks of such a thing for no purpose; and sometimes it is no sin at all, as when a man has a purpose in thinking of it; for instance, he may wish to preach or dispute about it. Consequently such affection or delectation in respect of the thought of fornication is not a mortal sin in virtue of its genus, but is sometimes a venial sin and sometimes no sin at all: wherefore neither is it a mortal sin to consent to such a thought. In this sense the first opinion is true.

But that a man in thinking of fornication takes pleasure in the act thought of, is due to his desire being inclined to this act. Wherefore the fact that a man consents to such a delectation, amounts to nothing less than a consent to the inclination of his appetite to fornication: for no man takes pleasure except in that which is in conformity with his appetite. Now it is a mortal sin, if a man deliberately chooses that his appetite be conformed to what is in itself a mortal sin. Wherefore such a consent to delectation in a mortal sin, is itself a mortal sin, as the second opinion maintains.

P(2a)- Q(74)- A(8)- RO(1) — Consent to delectation may be not only in the lower reason, but also in the higher reason, as stated above ( A(7) ).

Nevertheless the lower reason may turn away from the eternal types, for, though it is not intent on them, as regulating according to them, which is proper to the higher reason, yet, it is intent on them, as being regulated according to them: and by turning from them in this sense, it may sin mortally; since even the acts of the lower powers and of the external members may be mortal sins, in so far as the direction of the higher reason fails in directing them according to the eternal types.

P(2a)- Q(74)- A(8)- RO(2) — Consent to a sin that is venial in its genus, is itself a venial sin, and accordingly one may conclude that the consent to take pleasure in a useless thought about fornication, is a venial sin. But delectation in the act itself of fornication is, in its genus, a mortal sin: and that it be a venial sin before the consent is given, is accidental, viz. on account of the incompleteness of the act: which incompleteness ceases when the deliberate consent has been given, so that therefore it has its complete nature and is a mortal sin.

P(2a)- Q(74)- A(8)- RO(3) — This argument considers the delectation which has the thought for its object.

P(2a)- Q(74)- A(8)- RO(4) — The delectation which has an external act for its object, cannot be without complacency in the external act as such, even though there be no decision to fulfil it, on account of the prohibition of some higher authority: wherefore the act is inordinate, and consequently the delectation will be inordinate also.

P(2a)- Q(74)- A(8)- RO(5) — The consent to delectation, resulting from complacency in an act of murder thought of, is a mortal sin also: but not the consent to delectation resulting from complacency in the thought of murder.

P(2a)- Q(74)- A(8)- RO(6) — The Lord’s Prayer is to be said in order that we may be preserved not only from venial sin, but also from mortal sin.

P(2a)- Q(74)- A(9) Whether there can be venial sin in the higher reason as directing the lower powers?

P(2a)- Q(74)- A(9)- O(1) — It would seem that there cannot be venial sin in the higher reason as directing the lower powers, i.e. as consenting to a sinful act. For Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 7) that the “higher reason is intent on considering and consulting the eternal law.” But mortal sin consists in turning away from the eternal law. Therefore it seems that there can be no other than mortal sin in the higher reason.

P(2a)- Q(74)- A(9)- O(2) — Further, the higher reason is the principle of the spiritual life, as the heart is of the body’s life. But the diseases of the heart are deadly. Therefore the sins of the higher reason are mortal.

P(2a)- Q(74)- A(9)- O(3) — Further, a venial sin becomes a mortal sin if it be done out of contempt. But it would seem impossible to commit even a venial sin, deliberately, without contempt. Since then the consent of the higher reason is always accompanied by deliberate consideration of the eternal law, it seems that it cannot be without mortal sin, on account of the contempt of the Divine law.

P(2a)- Q(74)- A(9) — On the contrary, Consent to a sinful act belongs to the higher reason, as stated above ( A(7) ). But consent to an act of venial sin is itself a venial sin. Therefore a venial sin can be in the higher reason.

P(2a)- Q(74)- A(9) — I answer that, As Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 7), the higher reason “is intent on contemplating or consulting the eternal law”; it contemplates it by considering its truth; it consults it by judging and directing other things according to it: and to this pertains the fact that by deliberating through the eternal types, it consents to an act or dissents from it. Now it may happen that the inordinateness of the act to which it consents, is not contrary to the eternal law, in the same way as mortal sin is, because it does not imply aversion from the last end, but is beside that law, as an act of venial sin is. Therefore when the higher reason consents to the act of a venial sin, it does not turn away from the eternal law: wherefore it sins, not mortally, but venially.

This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.

P(2a)- Q(74)- A(9)- RO(2) — Disease of the heart is twofold: one which is in the very substance of the heart, and affects its natural consistency, and such a disease is always mortal: the other is a disease of the heart consisting in some disorder either of the movement or of the parts surrounding the heart, and such a disease is not always mortal. In like manner there is mortal sin in the higher reason whenever the order itself of the higher reason to its proper object which is the eternal law, is destroyed; but when the disorder leaves this untouched, the sin is not mortal but venial.

P(2a)- Q(74)- A(9)- RO(3) — Deliberate consent to a sin does not always amount to contempt of the Divine law, but only when the sin is contrary to the Divine law.

P(2a)- Q(74)-A(10) Whether venial sin can be in the higher reason as such?

P(2a)- Q(74)-A(10)- O(1) — It would seem that venial sin cannot be in the higher reason as such, i.e. as considering the eternal law. For the act of a power is not found to fail except that power be inordinately disposed with regard to its object. Now the object of the higher reason is the eternal law, in respect of which there can be no disorder without mortal sin. Therefore there can be no venial sin in the higher reason as such.

P(2a)- Q(74)-A(10)- O(2) — Further, since the reason is a deliberative power, there can be no act of reason without deliberation. Now every inordinate movement in things concerning God, if it be deliberate, is a mortal sin. Therefore venial sin is never in the higher reason as such.

P(2a)- Q(74)-A(10)- O(3) — Further, it happens sometimes that a sin which takes us unawares, is a venial sin. Now a deliberate sin is a mortal sin, through the reason, in deliberating, having recourse to some higher good, by acting against which, man sins more grievously; just as when the reason in deliberating about an inordinate pleasurable act, considers that it is contrary to the law of God, it sins more grievously in consenting, than if it only considered that it is contrary to moral virtue. But the higher reason cannot have recourse to any higher tribunal than its own object. Therefore if a movement that takes us unawares is not a mortal sin, neither will the subsequent deliberation make it a mortal sin; which is clearly false.

Therefore there can be no venial sin in the higher reason as such.

P(2a)- Q(74)-A(10) — On the contrary, A sudden movement of unbelief is a venial sin. But it belongs to the higher reason as such. Therefore there can be a venial sin in the higher reason as such.

P(2a)- Q(74)-A(10) — I answer that, The higher reason regards its own object otherwise than the objects of the lower powers that are directed by the higher reason. For it does not regard the objects of the lower powers, except in so far as it consults the eternal law about them, and so it does not regard them save by way of deliberation. Now deliberate consent to what is a mortal sin in its genus, is itself a mortal sin; and consequently the higher reason always sins mortally, if the acts of the lower powers to which it consents are mortal sins.

With regard to its own object it has a twofold act, viz. simple “intuition,” and “deliberation,” in respect of which it again consults the eternal law about its own object. But in respect of simple intuition, it can have an inordinate movement about Divine things, as when a man suffers a sudden movement of unbelief. And although unbelief, in its genus, is a mortal sin, yet a sudden movement of unbelief is a venial sin, because there is no mortal sin unless it be contrary to the law of God. Now it is possible for one of the articles of faith to present itself to the reason suddenly under some other aspect, before the eternal law, i.e. the law of God, is consulted, or can be consulted, on the matter; as, for instance, when a man suddenly apprehends the resurrection of the dead as impossible naturally, and rejects it, as soon as he had thus apprehended it, before he has had time to deliberate and consider that this is proposed to our belief in accordance with the Divine law. If, however, the movement of unbelief remains after this deliberation, it is a mortal sin. Therefore, in sudden movements, the higher reason may sin venially in respect of its proper object, even if it be a mortal sin in its genus; or it may sin mortally in giving a deliberate consent; but in things pertaining to the lower powers, it always sins mortally, in things which are mortal sins in their genus, but not in those which are venial sins in their genus.

P(2a)- Q(74)-A(10)- RO(1) — A sin which is against the eternal law, though it be mortal in its genus, may nevertheless be venial, on account of the incompleteness of a sudden action, as stated.

P(2a)- Q(74)-A(10)- RO(2) — In matters of action, the simple intuition of the principles from which deliberation proceeds, belongs to the reason, as well as the act of deliberation: even as in speculative matters it belongs to the reason both to syllogize and to form propositions: consequently the reason also can have a sudden movement.

P(2a)- Q(74)-A(10)- RO(3) — One and the same thing may be the subject of different considerations, of which one is higher than the other; thus the existence of God may be considered, either as possible to be known by the human reason, or as delivered to us by Divine revelation, which is a higher consideration. And therefore, although the object of the higher reason is, in its nature, something sublime, yet it is reducible to some yet higher consideration: and in this way, that which in the sudden movement was not a mortal sin, becomes a mortal sin in virtue of the deliberation which brought it into the light of a higher consideration, as was explained above.

QUESTION OF THE CAUSES OF SIN, IN GENERAL (FOUR ARTICLES)\parWe must now consider the causes of sin: (1) in general; (2) in particular.

Under the first head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether sin has a cause? (2) Whether it has an internal cause? (3) Whether it has an external cause? (4) Whether one sin is the cause of another?

P(2a)- Q(75)- A(1) Whether sin has a cause?

P(2a)- Q(75)- A(1)- O(1) — It would seem that sin has no cause. For sin has the nature of evil, as stated above ( Q(71), A(6) ). But evil has no cause, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv). Therefore sin has no cause.

P(2a)- Q(75)- A(1)- O(2) — Further, a cause is that from which something follows of necessity. Now that which is of necessity, seems to be no sin, for every sin is voluntary. Therefore sin has no cause.

P(2a)- Q(75)- A(1)- O(3) — Further, if sin has a cause, this cause is either good or evil. It is not a good, because good produces nothing but good, for “a good tree cannot bring forth evil fruit” ( Matthew 7:18). Likewise neither can evil be the cause of sin, because the evil of punishment is a sequel to sin, and the evil of guilt is the same as sin. Therefore sin has no cause.

P(2a)- Q(75)- A(1) — On the contrary, Whatever is done has a cause, for, according to Job 5:6, “nothing upon earth is done without a cause.” But sin is something done; since it a “word, deed, or desire contrary to the law of God.” Therefore sin has a cause.

P(2a)- Q(75)- A(1) — I answer that, A sin is an inordinate act.

Accordingly, so far as it is an act, it can have a direct cause, even as any other act; but, so far as it is inordinate, it has a cause, in the same way as a negation or privation can have a cause. Now two causes may be assigned to a negation: in the first place, absence of the cause of affirmation; i.e. the negation of the cause itself, is the cause of the negation in itself; since the result of the removing the cause is the removal of the effect: thus the absence of the sun is the cause of darkness. In the second place, the cause of an affirmation, of which a negation is a sequel, is the accidental cause of the resulting negation: thus fire by causing heat in virtue of its principal tendency, consequently causes a privation of cold. The first of these suffices to cause a simple negation. But, since the inordinateness of sin and of every evil is not a simple negation, but the privation of that which something ought naturally to have, such an inordinateness must needs have an accidental efficient cause. For that which naturally is and ought to be in a thing, is never lacking except on account of some impeding cause. And accordingly we are wont to say that evil, which consists in a certain privation, has a deficient cause, or an accidental efficient cause. Now every accidental cause is reducible to the direct cause. Since then sin, on the part of its inordinateness, has an accidental efficient cause, and on the part of the act, a direct efficient cause, it follows that the inordinateness of sin is a result of the cause of the act. Accordingly then, the will lacking the direction of the rule of reason and of the Divine law, and intent on some mutable good, causes the act of sin directly, and the inordinateness of the act, indirectly, and beside the intention: for the lack of order in the act results from the lack of direction in the will.

P(2a)- Q(75)- A(1)- RO(1) — Sin signifies not only the privation of good, which privation is its inordinateness, but also the act which is the subject of that privation, which has the nature of evil: and how this evil has a cause, has been explained.

P(2a)- Q(75)- A(1)- RO(2) — If this definition is to be verified in all cases, it must be understood as applying to a cause which is sufficient and not impeded. For it happens that a thing is the sufficient cause of something else, and that the effect does not follow of necessity, on account of some supervening impediment: else it would follow that all things happen of necessity, as is proved in Metaph. vi, text. 5. Accordingly, though sin has a cause, it does not follow that this is a necessary cause, since its effect can be impeded.

P(2a)- Q(75)- A(1)- RO(3) — As stated above, the will in failing to apply the rule of reason or of the Divine law, is the cause of sin. Now the fact of not applying the rule of reason or of the Divine law, has not in itself the nature of evil, whether of punishment or of guilt, before it is applied to the act. Wherefore accordingly, evil is not the cause of the first sin, but some good lacking some other good.

P(2a)- Q(75)- A(2) Whether sin has an internal cause?

P(2a)- Q(75)- A(2)- O(1) — It would seem that sin has no internal cause.

For that which is within a thing is always in it. If therefore sin had an internal cause, man would always be sinning, since given the cause, the effect follows.

P(2a)- Q(75)- A(2)- O(2) — Further, a thing is not its own cause. But the internal movements of a man are sins. Therefore they are not the cause of sin.

P(2a)- Q(75)- A(2)- O(3) — Further, whatever is within man is either natural or voluntary. Now that which is natural cannot be the cause of sin, for sin is contrary to nature, as Damascene states (De Fide Orth. ii, 3; iv, 21); while that which is voluntary, if it be inordinate, is already a sin.

Therefore nothing intrinsic can be the cause of the first sin.

P(2a)- Q(75)- A(2) — On the contrary, Augustine says (De Duabus Anim. x, 10,11; Retract. i, 9) that “the will is the cause of sin.”

P(2a)- Q(75)- A(2) — I answer that, As stated above ( A(1) ), the direct cause of sin must be considered on the part of the act. Now we may distinguish a twofold internal cause of human acts, one remote, the other proximate. The proximate internal cause of the human act is the reason and will, in respect of which man has a free-will; while the remote cause is the apprehension of the sensitive part, and also the sensitive appetite. For just as it is due to the judgment of reason, that the will is moved to something in accord with reason, so it is due to an apprehension of the senses that the sensitive appetite is inclined to something; which inclination sometimes influences the will and reason, as we shall explain further on ( Q(77), A(1) ).

Accordingly a double interior cause of sin may be assigned; one proximate, on the part of the reason and will; and the other remote, on the part of the imagination or sensitive appetite.

But since we have said above ( A(1), ad 3) that the cause of sin is some apparent good as motive, yet lacking the due motive, viz. the rule of reason or the Divine law, this motive which is an apparent good, appertains to the apprehension of the senses and to the appetite; while the lack of the due rule appertains to the reason, whose nature it is to consider this rule; and the completeness of the voluntary sinful act appertains to the will, so that the act of the will, given the conditions we have just mentioned, is already a sin.

P(2a)- Q(75)- A(2)- RO(1) — That which is within a thing as its natural power, is always in it: but that which is within it, as the internal act of the appetitive or apprehensive power, is not always in it. Now the power of the will is the potential cause of sin, but is made actual by the preceding movements, both of the sensitive part, in the first place, and afterwards, of the reason. For it is because a thing is proposed as appetible to the senses, and because the appetite is inclined, that the reason sometimes fails to consider the due rule, so that the will produces the act of sin. Since therefore the movements that precede it are not always actual, neither is man always actually sinning.

P(2a)- Q(75)- A(2)- RO(2) — It is not true that all the internal acts belong to the substance of sin, for this consists principally in the act of the will; but some precede and some follow the sin itself.

P(2a)- Q(75)- A(2)- RO(3) — That which causes sin, as a power produces its act, is natural; and again, the movement of the sensitive part, from which sin follows, is natural sometimes, as, for instance, when anyone sins through appetite for food. Yet sin results in being unnatural from the very fact that the natural rule fails, which man, in accord with his nature, ought to observe.

P(2a)- Q(75)- A(3) Whether sin has an external cause?

P(2a)- Q(75)- A(3)- O(1) — It would seem that sin has no external cause.

For sin is a voluntary act. Now voluntary acts belong to principles that are within us, so that they have no external cause. Therefore sin has no external cause.

P(2a)- Q(75)- A(3)- O(2) — Further, as nature is an internal principle, so is the will. Now in natural things sin can be due to no other than an internal cause; for instance, the birth of a monster is due to the corruption of some internal principle. Therefore in the moral order, sin can arise from no other than an internal cause. Therefore it has no external cause.

P(2a)- Q(75)- A(3)- O(3) — Further, if the cause is multiplied, the effect is multiplied. Now the more numerous and weighty the external inducements to sin are, the less is a man’s inordinate act imputed to him as a sin.

Therefore nothing external is a cause of sin.

P(2a)- Q(75)- A(3) — On the contrary, It is written ( Numbers 21:16): “Are not these they, that deceived the children of Israel by the counsel of Balaam, and made you transgress against the Lord by the sin of Phogor?”

Therefore something external can be a cause of sin.

P(2a)- Q(75)- A(3) — I answer that, As stated above ( A(2) ), the internal cause of sin is both the will, as completing the sinful act, and the reason, as lacking the due rule, and the appetite, as inclining to sin. Accordingly something external might be a cause of sin in three ways, either by moving the will itself immediately, or by moving the reason, or by moving the sensitive appetite. Now, as stated above ( Q(9) , A(6) ; Q(10), A(4) ), none can move the will inwardly save God alone, who cannot be a cause of sin, as we shall prove further on ( Q(79), A(1) ). Hence it follows that nothing external can be a cause of sin, except by moving the reason, as a man or devil by enticing to sin; or by moving the sensitive appetite, as certain external sensibles move it. Yet neither does external enticement move the reason, of necessity, in matters of action, nor do things proposed externally, of necessity move the sensitive appetite, except perhaps it be disposed thereto in a certain way; and even the sensitive appetite does not, of necessity, move the reason and will. Therefore something external can be a cause moving to sin, but not so as to be a sufficient cause thereof: and the will alone is the sufficient completive cause of sin being accomplished.

P(2a)- Q(75)- A(3)- RO(1) — From the very fact that the external motive causes of sin do not lead to sin sufficiently and necessarily, it follows that it remains in our power to sin or not to sin.

P(2a)- Q(75)- A(3)- RO(2) — The fact that sin has an internal cause does not prevent its having an external cause; for nothing external is a cause of sin, except through the medium of the internal cause, as stated.

P(2a)- Q(75)- A(3)- RO(3) — If the external causes inclining to sin be multiplied, the sinful acts are multiplied, because they incline to the sinful act in both greater numbers and greater frequency. Nevertheless the character of guilt is lessened, since this depends on the act being voluntary and in our power.

P(2a)- Q(75)- A(4) Whether one sin is a cause of another?

P(2a)- Q(75)- A(4)- O(1) — It would seem that one sin cannot be the cause of another. For there are four kinds of cause, none of which will fit in with one sin causing another. Because the end has the character of good; which is inconsistent with sin, which has the character of evil. In like manner neither can a sin be an efficient cause, since “evil is not an efficient cause, but is weak and powerless,” as Dionysius declares (Div. Nom. iv). The material and formal cause seems to have no place except in natural bodies, which are composed of matter and form. Therefore sin cannot have either a material or a formal cause.

P(2a)- Q(75)- A(4)- O(2) — Further, “to produce its like belongs to a perfect thing,” as stated in Meteor. iv, 2 [*Cf. De Anima ii.]. But sin is essentially something imperfect. Therefore one sin cannot be a cause of another.

P(2a)- Q(75)- A(4)- O(3) — Further, if one sin is the cause of a second sin, in the same way, yet another sin will be the cause of the first, and thus we go on indefinitely, which is absurd. Therefore one sin is not the cause of another.

P(2a)- Q(75)- A(4) — On the contrary, Gregory says on Ezechiel (Hom. xi): “A sin is not quickly blotted out by repentance, is both a sin and a cause of sin.”

P(2a)- Q(75)- A(4) — I answer that, Forasmuch as a sin has a cause on the part of the act of sin, it is possible for one sin to be the cause of another, in the same way as one human act is the cause of another. Hence it happens that one sin may be the cause of another in respect of the four kinds of causes. First, after the manner of an efficient or moving cause, both directly and indirectly. Indirectly, as that which removes an impediment is called an indirect cause of movement: for when man, by one sinful act, loses grace, or charity, or shame, or anything else that withdraws him from sin, he thereby falls into another sin, so that the first sin is the accidental cause of the second. Directly, as when, by one sinful act, man is disposed to commit more readily another like act: because acts cause dispositions and habits inclining to like acts. Secondly, after the manner of a material cause, one sin is the cause of another, by preparing its matter: thus covetousness prepares the matter for strife, which is often about the wealth a man has amassed together. Thirdly, after the manner of a final cause, one sin causes another, in so far as a man commits one sin for the sake of another which is his end; as when a man is guilty of simony for the end of ambition, or fornication for the purpose of theft. And since the end gives the form to moral matters, as stated above ( Q(1) , A(3) ; Q(18), AA(4),6 ), it follows that one sin is also the formal cause of another: because in the act of fornication committed for the purpose of theft, the former is material while the latter is formal.

P(2a)- Q(75)- A(4)- RO(1) — Sin, in so far as it is inordinate, has the character of evil; but, in so far as it is an act, it has some good, at least apparent, for its end: so that, as an act, but not as being inordinate, it can be the cause, both final and efficient, of another sin. A sin has matter, not “of which” but “about which” it is: and it has its form from its end.

Consequently one sin can be the cause of another, in respect of the four kinds of cause, as stated above.

P(2a)- Q(75)- A(4)- RO(2) — Sin is something imperfect on account of its moral imperfection on the part of its inordinateness. Nevertheless, as an act it can have natural perfection: and thus it can be the cause of another sin.

P(2a)- Q(75)- A(4)- RO(3) — Not every cause of one sin is another sin; so there is no need to go on indefinitely: for one may come to one sin which is not caused by another sin.

QUESTION OF THE CAUSES OF SIN, IN PARTICULAR (FOUR ARTICLES)\parWe must now consider the causes of sin, in particular, and (1) The internal causes of sin; (2) its external causes; and (3) sins which are the causes of other sins.

In view of what has been said above ( A(2) ), the first consideration will be threefold: so that in the first place we shall treat of ignorance, which is the cause of sin on the part of reason; secondly, of weakness or passion, which is the cause of sin on the part of the sensitive appetite; thirdly, of malice, which is the cause of sin on the part of the will.

Under the first head, there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether ignorance is a cause of sin? (2) Whether ignorance is a sin? (3) Whether it excuses from sin altogether? (4) Whether it diminishes sin?

P(2a)- Q(76)- A(1) Whether ignorance can be a cause of sin?

P(2a)- Q(76)- A(1)- O(1) — It would seem that ignorance cannot be a cause of sin: because a non-being is not the cause of anything. Now ignorance is a non-being, since it is a privation of knowledge. Therefore ignorance is not a cause of sin.

P(2a)- Q(76)- A(1)- O(2) — Further, causes of sin should be reckoned in respect of sin being a “turning to” something, as was stated above ( Q(75), A(1) ). Now ignorance seems to savor of “turning away” from something.

Therefore it should not be reckoned a cause of sin.

P(2a)- Q(76)- A(1)- O(3) — Further, every sin is seated in the will. Now the will does not turn to that which is not known, because its object is the good apprehended. Therefore ignorance cannot be a cause of sin.

P(2a)- Q(76)- A(1) — On the contrary, Augustine says (De Nat. et Grat. lxvii) “that some sin through ignorance.”

I answer that, According to the Philosopher (Phys. viii, 27) a moving cause is twofold, direct and indirect. A direct cause is one that moves by its own power, as the generator is the moving cause of heavy and light things. An indirect cause, is either one that removes an impediment, or the removal itself of an impediment: and it is in this way that ignorance can be the cause of a sinful act; because it is a privation of knowledge perfecting the reason that forbids the act of sin, in so far as it directs human acts.

Now we must observe that the reason directs human acts in accordance with a twofold knowledge, universal and particular: because in conferring about what is to be done, it employs a syllogism, the conclusion of which is an act of judgment, or of choice, or an operation. Now actions are about singulars: wherefore the conclusion of a practical syllogism is a singular proposition. But a singular proposition does not follow from a universal proposition, except through the medium of a particular proposition: thus a man is restrained from an act of parricide, by the knowledge that it is wrong to kill one’s father, and that this man is his father. Hence ignorance about either of these two propositions, viz. of the universal principle which is a rule of reason, or of the particular circumstance, could cause an act of parricide. Hence it is clear that not every kind of ignorance is the cause of a sin, but that alone which removes the knowledge which would prevent the sinful act. Consequently if a man’s will be so disposed that he would not be restrained from the act of parricide, even though he recognized his father, his ignorance about his father is not the cause of his committing the sin, but is concomitant with the sin: wherefore such a man sins, not “through ignorance” but “in ignorance,” as the Philosopher states (Ethic. iii, 1).

P(2a)- Q(76)- A(1)- RO(1) — Non-being cannot be the direct cause of anything: but it can be an accidental cause, as being the removal of an impediment.

P(2a)- Q(76)- A(1)- RO(2) — As knowledge, which is removed by ignorance, regards sin as turning towards something, so too, ignorance of this respect of a sin is the cause of that sin, as removing its impediment.

P(2a)- Q(76)- A(1)- RO(3) — The will cannot turn to that which is absolutely unknown: but if something be known in one respect, and unknown in another, the will can will it. It is thus that ignorance is the cause of sin: for instance, when a man knows that what he is killing is a man, but not that it is his own father; or when one knows that a certain act is pleasurable, but not that it is a sin.

P(2a)- Q(76)- A(2) Whether ignorance is a sin?

P(2a)- Q(76)- A(2)- O(1) — It would seem that ignorance is not a sin. For sin is “a word, deed or desire contrary to God’s law,” as stated above ( Q(71), A(5) ). Now ignorance does not denote an act, either internal or external. Therefore ignorance is not a sin.

P(2a)- Q(76)- A(2)- O(2) — Further, sin is more directly opposed to grace than to knowledge. Now privation of grace is not a sin, but a punishment resulting from sin. Therefore ignorance which is privation of knowledge is not a sin.

P(2a)- Q(76)- A(2)- O(3) — Further, if ignorance is a sin, this can only be in so far as it is voluntary. But if ignorance is a sin, through being voluntary, it seems that the sin will consist in the act itself of the will, rather than in the ignorance. Therefore the ignorance will not be a sin, but rather a result of sin.

P(2a)- Q(76)- A(2)- O(4) — Further, every sin is taken away by repentance, nor does any sin, except only original sin, pass as to guilt, yet remain in act. Now ignorance is not removed by repentance, but remains in act, all its guilt being removed by repentance. Therefore ignorance is not a sin, unless perchance it be original sin.

P(2a)- Q(76)- A(2)- O(5) — Further, if ignorance be a sin, then a man will be sinning, as long as he remains in ignorance. But ignorance is continual in the one who is ignorant. Therefore a person in ignorance would be continually sinning, which is clearly false, else ignorance would be a most grievous sin. Therefore ignorance is not a sin.

P(2a)- Q(76)- A(2) — On the contrary, Nothing but sin deserves punishment. But ignorance deserves punishment, according to Corinthians 14:38: “If any man know not, he shall not be known.”

Therefore ignorance is a sin.

P(2a)- Q(76)- A(2) — I answer that, Ignorance differs from nescience, in that nescience denotes mere absence of knowledge; wherefore whoever lacks knowledge about anything, can be said to be nescient about it: in which sense Dionysius puts nescience in the angels (Coel. Hier. vii). On the other hand, ignorance denotes privation of knowledge, i.e. lack of knowledge of those things that one has a natural aptitude to know. Some of these we are under an obligation to know, those, to wit, without the knowledge of which we are unable to accomplish a due act rightly.

Wherefore all are bound in common to know the articles of faith, and the universal principles of right, and each individual is bound to know matters regarding his duty or state. Meanwhile there are other things which a man may have a natural aptitude to know, yet he is not bound to know them, such as the geometrical theorems, and contingent particulars, except in some individual case. Now it is evident that whoever neglects to have or do what he ought to have or do, commits a sin of omission. Wherefore through negligence, ignorance of what one is bound to know, is a sin; whereas it is not imputed as a sin to man, if he fails to know what he is unable to know. Consequently ignorance of such like things is called “invincible,” because it cannot be overcome by study. For this reason such like ignorance, not being voluntary, since it is not in our power to be rid of it, is not a sin: wherefore it is evident that no invincible ignorance is a sin.

On the other hand, vincible ignorance is a sin, if it be about matters one is bound to know; but not, if it be about things one is not bound to know.

P(2a)- Q(76)- A(2)- RO(1) — As stated above ( Q(71), A(6), ad 1), when we say that sin is a “word, deed or desire,” we include the opposite negations, by reason of which omissions have the character of sin; so that negligence, in as much as ignorance is a sin, is comprised in the above definition of sin; in so far as one omits to say what one ought, or to do what one ought, or to desire what one ought, in order to acquire the knowledge which we ought to have.

P(2a)- Q(76)- A(2)- RO(2) — Although privation of grace is not a sin in itself, yet by reason of negligence in preparing oneself for grace, it may have the character of sin, even as ignorance; nevertheless even here there is a difference, since man can acquire knowledge by his acts, whereas grace is not acquired by acts, but by God’s favor.

P(2a)- Q(76)- A(2)- RO(3) — Just as in a sin of transgression, the sin consists not only in the act of the will, but also in the act willed, which is commanded by the will; so in a sin of omission not only the act of the will is a sin, but also the omission, in so far as it is in some way voluntary; and accordingly, the neglect to know, or even lack of consideration is a sin.

P(2a)- Q(76)- A(2)- RO(4) — Although when the guilt has passed away through repentance, the ignorance remains, according as it is a privation of knowledge, nevertheless the negligence does not remain, by reason of which the ignorance is said to be a sin.

P(2a)- Q(76)- A(2)- RO(5) — Just as in other sins of omission, man sins actually only at the time at which the affirmative precept is binding, so is it with the sin of ignorance. For the ignorant man sins actually indeed, not continually, but only at the time for acquiring the knowledge that he ought to have.

P(2a)- Q(76)- A(3) Whether ignorance excuses from sin altogether?

P(2a)- Q(76)- A(3)- O(1) — It would seem that ignorance excuses from sin altogether. For as Augustine says (Retract. i, 9), every sin is voluntary.

Now ignorance causes involuntariness, as stated above ( Q(6) , A(8) ).

Therefore ignorance excuses from sin altogether.

P(2a)- Q(76)- A(3)- O(2) — Further, that which is done beside the intention, is done accidentally. Now the intention cannot be about what is unknown. Therefore what a man does through ignorance is accidental in human acts. But what is accidental does not give the species. Therefore nothing that is done through ignorance in human acts, should be deemed sinful or virtuous.

P(2a)- Q(76)- A(3)- O(3) — Further, man is the subject of virtue and sin, inasmuch as he is partaker of reason. Now ignorance excludes knowledge which perfects the reason. Therefore ignorance excuses from sin altogether.

P(2a)- Q(76)- A(3) — On the contrary, Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. iii, 18) that “some things done through ignorance are rightly reproved.” Now those things alone are rightly reproved which are sins. Therefore some things done through ignorance are sins. Therefore ignorance does not altogether excuse from sin.

P(2a)- Q(76)- A(3) — I answer that, Ignorance, by its very nature, renders the act which it causes involuntary. Now it has already been stated ( AA(1),2 ) that ignorance is said to cause the act which the contrary knowledge would have prevented; so that this act, if knowledge were to hand, would be contrary to the will, which is the meaning of the word involuntary. If, however, the knowledge, which is removed by ignorance, would not have prevented the act, on account of the inclination of the will thereto, the lack of this knowledge does not make that man unwilling, but not willing, as stated in Ethic. iii, 1: and such like ignorance which is not the cause of the sinful act, as already stated, since it does not make the act to be involuntary, does not excuse from sin. The same applies to any ignorance that does not cause, but follows or accompanies the sinful act.

On the other hand, ignorance which is the cause of the act, since it makes it to be involuntary, of its very nature excuses from sin, because voluntariness is essential to sin. But it may fail to excuse altogether from sin, and this for two reasons. First, on the part of the thing itself which is not known. For ignorance excuses from sin, in so far as something is not known to be a sin. Now it may happen that a person ignores some circumstance of a sin, the knowledge of which circumstance would prevent him from sinning, whether it belong to the substance of the sin, or not; and nevertheless his knowledge is sufficient for him to be aware that the act is sinful; for instance, if a man strike someone, knowing that it is a man (which suffices for it to be sinful) and yet be ignorant of the fact that it is his father, (which is a circumstance constituting another species of sin); or, suppose that he is unaware that this man will defend himself and strike him back, and that if he had known this, he would not have struck him (which does not affect the sinfulness of the act). Wherefore, though this man sins through ignorance, yet he is not altogether excused, because, not withstanding, he has knowledge of the sin. Secondly, this may happen on the part of the ignorance itself, because, to wit, this ignorance is voluntary, either directly, as when a man wishes of set purpose to be ignorant of certain things that he may sin the more freely; or indirectly, as when a man, through stress of work or other occupations, neglects to acquire the knowledge which would restrain him from sin. For such like negligence renders the ignorance itself voluntary and sinful, provided it be about matters one is bound and able to know. Consequently this ignorance does not altogether excuse from sin. If, however, the ignorance be such as to be entirely involuntary, either through being invincible, or through being of matters one is not bound to know, then such like ignorance excuses from sin altogether.

P(2a)- Q(76)- A(3)- RO(1) — Not every ignorance causes involuntariness, as stated above ( Q(6) , A(8) ). Hence not every ignorance excuses from sin altogether.

P(2a)- Q(76)- A(3)- RO(2) — So far as voluntariness remains in the ignorant person, the intention of sin remains in him: so that, in this respect, his sin is not accidental.

P(2a)- Q(76)- A(3)- RO(3) — If the ignorance be such as to exclude the use of reason entirely, it excuses from sin altogether, as is the case with madmen and imbeciles: but such is not always the ignorance that causes the sin; and so it does not always excuse from sin altogether.

P(2a)- Q(76)- A(4) Whether ignorance diminishes a sin?

P(2a)- Q(76)- A(4)- O(1) — It would seem that ignorance does not diminish a sin. For that which is common to all sins does not diminish sin. Now ignorance is common to all sins, for the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 1) that “every evil man is ignorant.” Therefore ignorance does not diminish sin.

P(2a)- Q(76)- A(4)- O(2) — Further, one sin added to another makes a greater sin. But ignorance is itself a sin, as stated above ( A(2) ). Therefore it does not diminish a sin.

P(2a)- Q(76)- A(4)- O(3) — Further, the same thing does not both aggravate and diminish sin. Now ignorance aggravates sin; for Ambrose commenting on Romans 2:4, “Knowest thou not that the benignity of God leadeth thee to penance?” says: “Thy sin is most grievous if thou knowest not.”

Therefore ignorance does not diminish sin.

P(2a)- Q(76)- A(4)- O(4) — Further, if any kind of ignorance diminishes a sin, this would seem to be chiefly the case as regards the ignorance which removes the use of reason altogether. Now this kind of ignorance does not diminish sin, but increases it: for the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 5) that the “punishment is doubled for a drunken man.” Therefore ignorance does not diminish sin.

P(2a)- Q(76)- A(4) — On the contrary, Whatever is a reason for sin to be forgiven, diminishes sin. Now such is ignorance, as is clear from Timothy 1:13: “I obtained . . . mercy . . . because I did it ignorantly.”

Therefore ignorance diminishes or alleviates sin.

P(2a)- Q(76)- A(4) — I answer that, Since every sin is voluntary, ignorance can diminish sin, in so far as it diminishes its voluntariness; and if it does not render it less voluntary, it nowise alleviates the sin. Now it is evident that the ignorance which excuses from sin altogether (through making it altogether involuntary) does not diminish a sin, but does away with it altogether. On the other hand, ignorance which is not the cause of the sin being committed, but is concomitant with it, neither diminishes nor increases the sin.

Therefore sin cannot be alleviated by any ignorance, but only by such as is a cause of the sin being committed, and yet does not excuse from the sin altogether. Now it happens sometimes that such like ignorance is directly and essentially voluntary, as when a man is purposely ignorant that he may sin more freely, and ignorance of this kind seems rather to make the act more voluntary and more sinful, since it is through the will’s intention to sin that he is willing to bear the hurt of ignorance, for the sake of freedom in sinning. Sometimes, however, the ignorance which is the cause of a sin being committed, is not directly voluntary, but indirectly or accidentally, as when a man is unwilling to work hard at his studies, the result being that he is ignorant, or as when a man willfully drinks too much wine, the result being that he becomes drunk and indiscreet, and this ignorance diminishes voluntariness and consequently alleviates the sin. For when a thing is not known to be a sin, the will cannot be said to consent to the sin directly, but only accidentally; wherefore, in that case there is less contempt, and therefore less sin.

P(2a)- Q(76)- A(4)- RO(1) — The ignorance whereby “every evil man is ignorant,” is not the cause of sin being committed, but something resulting from that cause, viz. of the passion or habit inclining to sin.

P(2a)- Q(76)- A(4)- RO(2) — One sin is added to another makes more sins, but it does not always make a sin greater, since, perchance, the two sins do not coincide, but are separate. It may happen, if the first diminishes the second, that the two together have not the same gravity as one of them alone would have; thus murder is a more grievous sin if committed by a man when sober, than if committed by a man when drunk, although in the latter case there are two sins: because drunkenness diminishes the sinfulness of the resulting sin more than its own gravity implies.

P(2a)- Q(76)- A(4)- RO(3) — The words of Ambrose may be understood as referring to simply affected ignorance; or they may have reference to a species of the sin of ingratitude, the highest degree of which is that man even ignores the benefits he has received; or again, they may be an allusion to the ignorance of unbelief, which undermines the foundation of the spiritual edifice.

P(2a)- Q(76)- A(4)- RO(4) — The drunken man deserves a “double punishment” for the two sins which he commits, viz. drunkenness, and the sin which results from his drunkenness: and yet drunkenness, on account of the ignorance connected therewith, diminishes the resulting sin, and more, perhaps, than the gravity of the drunkenness implies, as stated above (ad 2). It might also be said that the words quoted refer to an ordinance of the legislator named Pittacus, who ordered drunkards to be more severely punished if they assaulted anyone; having an eye, not to the indulgence which the drunkard might claim, but to expediency, since more harm is done by the drunk than by the sober, as the Philosopher observes (Polit. ii).

QUESTION OF THE CAUSE OF SIN, ON THE PART OF THE SENSITIVE APPETITE (EIGHT ARTICLES) We must now consider the cause of sin, on the part of the sensitive appetite, as to whether a passion of the soul may be a cause of sin: and under this head there are eight points of inquiry: (1) Whether a passion of the sensitive appetite can move or incline the will? (2) Whether it can overcome the reason against the latter’s knowledge? (3) Whether a sin resulting from a passion is a sin of weakness? (4) Whether the passion of self-love is the cause of every sin? (5) Of three causes mentioned in 1 John 2:16: “Concupiscence of the eyes, Concupiscence of the flesh,” and “Pride of life.” (6) Whether the passion which causes a sin diminishes it? (7) Whether passion excuses from sin altogether? (8) Whether a sin committed through passion can be mortal?

P(2a)- Q(77)- A(1) Whether the will is moved by a passion of the senstive appetite?

P(2a)- Q(77)- A(1)- O(1) — It would seem that the will is not moved by a passion of the sensitive appetite. For no passive power is moved except by its object. Now the will is a power both passive and active, inasmuch as it is mover and moved, as the Philosopher says of the appetitive power in general (De Anima iii, text. 54). Since therefore the object of the will is not a passion of the sensitive appetite, but good defined by the reason, it seems that a passion of the sensitive appetite does not move the will.

P(2a)- Q(77)- A(1)- O(2) — Further, the higher mover is not moved by the lower; thus the soul is not moved by the body. Now the will, which is the rational appetite, is compared to the sensitive appetite, as a higher mover to a lower: for the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, text. 57) that “the rational appetite moves the sensitive appetite, even as, in the heavenly bodies, one sphere moves another.” Therefore the will cannot be moved by a passion of the sensitive appetite.

P(2a)- Q(77)- A(1)- O(3) — Further, nothing immaterial can be moved by that which is material. Now the will is an immaterial power, because it does not use a corporeal organ, since it is in the reason, as stated in De Anima iii, text. 42: whereas the sensitive appetite is a material force, since it is seated in an organ of the body. Therefore a passion of the sensitive appetite cannot move the intellective appetite.

P(2a)- Q(77)- A(1) — On the contrary, It is written (Daniel 13:56): “Lust hath perverted thy heart.”

P(2a)- Q(77)- A(1) — I answer that, A passion of the sensitive appetite cannot draw or move the will directly; but it can do so indirectly, and this in two ways. First, by a kind of distraction: because, since all the soul’s powers are rooted in the one essence of the soul, it follows of necessity that, when one power is intent in its act, another power becomes remiss, or is even altogether impeded, in its act, both because all energy is weakened through being divided, so that, on the contrary, through being centered on one thing, it is less able to be directed to several; and because, in the operations of the soul, a certain attention is requisite, and if this be closely fixed on one thing, less attention is given to another. In this way, by a kind of distraction, when the movement of the sensitive appetite is enforced in respect of any passion whatever, the proper movement of the rational appetite or will must, of necessity, become remiss or altogether impeded.

Secondly, this may happen on the part of the will’s object, which is good apprehended by reason. Because the judgment and apprehension of reason is impeded on account of a vehement and inordinate apprehension of the imagination and judgment of the estimative power, as appears in those who are out of their mind. Now it is evident that the apprehension of the imagination and the judgment of the estimative power follow the passion of the sensitive appetite, even as the verdict of the taste follows the disposition of the tongue: for which reason we observe that those who are in some kind of passion, do not easily turn their imagination away from the object of their emotion, the result being that the judgment of the reason often follows the passion of the sensitive appetite, and consequently the will’s movement follows it also, since it has a natural inclination always to follow the judgment of the reason.

P(2a)- Q(77)- A(1)- RO(1) — Although the passion of the sensitive appetite is not the direct object of the will, yet it occasions a certain change in the judgment about the object of the will, as stated.

P(2a)- Q(77)- A(1)- RO(2) — The higher mover is not directly moved by the lower; but, in a manner, it can be moved by it indirectly, as stated.

The Third Objection is solved in like manner.

P(2a)- Q(77)- A(2) Whether the reason can be overcome by a passion, against its knowledge?

P(2a)- Q(77)- A(2)- O(1) — It would seem that the reason cannot be overcome by a passion, against its knowledge. For the stronger is not overcome by the weaker. Now knowledge, on account of its certitude, is the strongest thing in us. Therefore it cannot be overcome by a passion, which is weak and soon passes away.

P(2a)- Q(77)- A(2)- O(2) — Further, the will is not directed save to the good or the apparent good. Now when a passion draws the will to that which is really good, it does not influence the reason against its knowledge; and when it draws it to that which is good apparently, but not really, it draws it to that which appears good to the reason. But what appears to the reason is in the knowledge of the reason. Therefore a passion never influences the reason against its knowledge.

P(2a)- Q(77)- A(2)- O(3) — Further, if it be said that it draws the reason from its knowledge of something in general, to form a contrary judgment about a particular matter — on the contrary, if a universal and a particular proposition be opposed, they are opposed by contradiction, e.g. “Every man,” and “Not every man.” Now if two opinions contradict one another, they are contrary to one another, as stated in Peri Herm. 2:If therefore anyone, while knowing something in general, were to pronounce an opposite judgment in a particular case, he would have two contrary opinions at the same time, which is impossible.

P(2a)- Q(77)- A(2)- O(4) — Further, whoever knows the universal, knows also the particular which he knows to be contained in the universal: thus who knows that every mule is sterile, knows that this particular animal is sterile, provided he knows it to be a mule, as is clear from Poster. i, text. 2.

Now he who knows something in general, e.g. that “no fornication is lawful,” knows this general proposition to contain, for example, the particular proposition, “This is an act of fornication.” Therefore it seems that his knowledge extends to the particular.

P(2a)- Q(77)- A(2)- O(5) — Further, according to the Philosopher (Peri Herm. i), “words express the thoughts of the mind.” Now it often happens that man, while in a state of passion, confesses that what he has chosen is an evil, even in that particular case. Therefore he has knowledge, even in particular.

Therefore it seems that the passions cannot draw the reason against its universal knowledge; because it is impossible for it to have universal knowledge together with an opposite particular judgment.

P(2a)- Q(77)- A(2) — On the contrary, The Apostle says ( Romans 7:23): “I see another law in my members, fighting against the law of my mind, and captivating me in the law of sin.” Now the law that is in the members is concupiscence, of which he had been speaking previously.

Since then concupiscence is a passion, it seems that a passion draws the reason counter to its knowledge.

P(2a)- Q(77)- A(2) — I answer that, As the Philosopher states (Ethic. vii, 2), the opinion of Socrates was that knowledge can never be overcome by passion; wherefore he held every virtue to be a kind of knowledge, and every sin a kind of ignorance. In this he was somewhat right, because, since the object of the will is a good or an apparent good, it is never moved to an evil, unless that which is not good appear good in some respect to the reason; so that the will would never tend to evil, unless there were ignorance or error in the reason. Hence it is written ( Proverbs 14:22): “They err that work evil.”

Experience, however, shows that many act contrary to the knowledge that they have, and this is confirmed by Divine authority, according to the words of Luke 12:47: “The servant who knew that the will of his lord . . . and did not . . . shall be beaten with many stripes,” and of James 4:17: “To him . . . who knoweth to do good, and doth it not, to him it is a sin.”

Consequently he was not altogether right, and it is necessary, with the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 3) to make a distinction. Because, since man is directed to right action by a twofold knowledge, viz. universal and particular, a defect in either of them suffices to hinder the rectitude of the will and of the deed, as stated above ( Q(76), A(1) ). It may happen, then, that a man has some knowledge in general, e.g. that no fornication is lawful, and yet he does not know in particular that this act, which is fornication, must not be done; and this suffices for the will not to follow the universal knowledge of the reason. Again, it must be observed that nothing prevents a thing which is known habitually from not being considered actually: so that it is possible for a man to have correct knowledge not only in general but also in particular, and yet not to consider his knowledge actually: and in such a case it does not seem difficult for a man to act counter to what he does not actually consider. Now, that a man sometimes fails to consider in particular what he knows habitually, may happen through mere lack of attention: for instance, a man who knows geometry, may not attend to the consideration of geometrical conclusions, which he is ready to consider at any moment. Sometimes man fails to consider actually what he knows habitually, on account of some hindrance supervening, e.g. some external occupation, or some bodily infirmity; and, in this way, a man who is in a state of passion, fails to consider in particular what he knows in general, in so far as the passions hinder him from considering it. Now it hinders him in three ways. First, by way of distraction, as explained above ( A(1) ).

Secondly, by way of opposition, because a passion often inclines to something contrary to what man knows in general. Thirdly, by way of bodily transmutation, the result of which is that the reason is somehow fettered so as not to exercise its act freely; even as sleep or drunkenness, on account of some change wrought on the body, fetters the use of reason.

That this takes place in the passions is evident from the fact that sometimes, when the passions are very intense, man loses the use of reason altogether: for many have gone out of their minds through excess of love or anger. It is in this way that passion draws the reason to judge in particular, against the knowledge which it has in general.

P(2a)- Q(77)- A(2)- RO(1) — Universal knowledge, which is most certain, does not hold the foremost place in action, but rather particular knowledge, since actions are about singulars: wherefore it is not astonishing that, in matters of action, passion acts counter to universal knowledge, if the consideration of particular knowledge be lacking.

P(2a)- Q(77)- A(2)- RO(2) — The fact that something appears good in particular to the reason, whereas it is not good, is due to a passion: and yet this particular judgment is contrary to the universal knowledge of the reason.

P(2a)- Q(77)- A(2)- RO(3) — It is impossible for anyone to have an actual knowledge or true opinion about a universal affirmative proposition, and at the same time a false opinion about a particular negative proposition, or vice versa: but it may well happen that a man has true habitual knowledge about a universal affirmative proposition, and actually a false opinion about a particular negative: because an act is directly opposed, not to a habit, but to an act.

P(2a)- Q(77)- A(2)- RO(4) — He that has knowledge in a universal, is hindered, on account of a passion, from reasoning about that universal, so as to draw the conclusion: but he reasons about another universal proposition suggested by the inclination of the passion, and draws his conclusion accordingly. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 3) that the syllogism of an incontinent man has four propositions, two particular and two universal, of which one is of the reason, e.g. No fornication is lawful, and the other, of passion, e.g. Pleasure is to be pursued. Hence passion fetters the reason, and hinders it from arguing and concluding under the first proposition; so that while the passions lasts, the reason argues and concludes under the second.

P(2a)- Q(77)- A(2)- RO(5) — Even as a drunken man sometimes gives utterance to words of deep signification, of which, however, he is incompetent to judge, his drunkenness hindering him; so that a man who is in a state of passion, may indeed say in words that he ought not to do so and so, yet his inner thought is that he must do it, as stated in Ethic. vii, 3.

P(2a)- Q(77)- A(3) Whether a sin committed through passion, should be called a sin of weakness?

P(2a)- Q(77)- A(3)- O(1) — It would seem that a sin committed through passion should not be called a sin of weakness. For a passion is a vehement movement of the sensitive appetite, as stated above ( A(1) ). Now vehemence of movements is evidence of strength rather than of weakness.

Therefore a sin committed through passion, should not be called a sin of weakness.

P(2a)- Q(77)- A(3)- O(2) — Further, weakness in man regards that which is most fragile in him. Now this is the flesh; whence it is written ( Psalm 77:39): “He remembered that they are flesh.” Therefore sins of weakness should be those which result from bodily defects, rather than those which are due to a passion.

P(2a)- Q(77)- A(3)- O(3) — Further, man does not seem to be weak in respect of things which are subject to his will. Now it is subject to man’s will, whether he do or do not the things to which his passions incline him, according to Genesis 4:7: “Thy appetite shall be under thee [*Vulg.: ‘The lust thereof shall be under thee.’], and thou shalt have dominion over it.” Therefore sin committed through passion is not a sin of weakness.

P(2a)- Q(77)- A(3) — On the contrary, Cicero (De Quaest. Tusc. iv) calls the passions diseases of the soul. Now weakness is another name for disease. Therefore a sin that arises from passion should be called a sin of weakness.

P(2a)- Q(77)- A(3) — I answer that, The cause of sin is on the part of the soul, in which, chiefly, sin resides. Now weakness may be applied to the soul by way of likeness to weakness of the body. Accordingly, man’s body is said to be weak, when it is disabled or hindered in the execution of its proper action, through some disorder of the body’s parts, so that the humors and members of the human body cease to be subject to its governing and motive power. Hence a member is said to be weak, when it cannot do the work of a healthy member, the eye, for instance, when it cannot see clearly, as the Philosopher states (De Hist. Animal. x, 1).

Therefore weakness of the soul is when the soul is hindered from fulfilling its proper action on account of a disorder in its parts. Now as the parts of the body are said to be out of order, when they fail to comply with the order of nature, so too the parts of the soul are said to be inordinate, when they are not subject to the order of reason, for the reason is the ruling power of the soul’s parts. Accordingly, when the concupiscible or irascible power is affected by any passion contrary to the order of reason, the result being that an impediment arises in the aforesaid manner to the due action of man, it is said to be a sin of weakness. Hence the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 8) compares the incontinent man to an epileptic, whose limbs move in a manner contrary to his intention.

P(2a)- Q(77)- A(3)- RO(1) — Just as in the body the stronger the movement against the order of nature, the greater the weakness, so likewise, the stronger the movement of passion against the order of reason, the greater the weakness of the soul.

P(2a)- Q(77)- A(3)- RO(2) — Sin consists chiefly in an act of the will, which is not hindered by weakness of the body: for he that is weak in body may have a will ready for action, and yet be hindered by a passion, as stated above ( A(1) ). Hence when we speak of sins of weakness, we refer to weakness of soul rather than of body. And yet even weakness of soul is called weakness of the flesh, in so far as it is owing to a condition of the flesh that the passions of the soul arise in us through the sensitive appetite being a power using a corporeal organ.

P(2a)- Q(77)- A(3)- RO(3) — It is in the will’s power to give or refuse its consent to what passion inclines us to do, and it is in this sense that our appetite is said to be under us; and yet this consent or dissent of the will is hindered in the way already explained ( A(1) ).

P(2a)- Q(77)- A(4) Whether self-love is the source of every sin?

P(2a)- Q(77)- A(4)- O(1) — It would seem that self-love is not the source of every sin. For that which is good and right in itself is not the proper cause of sin. Now love of self is a good and right thing in itself: wherefore man is commanded to love his neighbor as himself ( Leviticus 19:18).

Therefore self-love cannot be the proper cause of sin.

P(2a)- Q(77)- A(4)- O(2) — Further, the Apostle says ( Romans 7:8): “Sin taking occasion by the commandment wrought in me all manner of concupiscence”; on which words a gloss says that “the law is good, since by forbidding concupiscence, it forbids all evils,” the reason for which is that concupiscence is the cause of every sin. Now concupiscence is a distinct passion from love, as stated above ( Q(3) , A(2) ; Q(23), A(4) ).

Therefore self-love is not the cause of every sin.

P(2a)- Q(77)- A(4)- O(3) — Further, Augustine in commenting on Psalm 79:17, “Things set on fire and dug down,” says that “every sin is due either to love arousing us to undue ardor or to fear inducing false humility.”

Therefore self-love is not the only cause of sin.

P(2a)- Q(77)- A(4)- O(4) — Further, as man sins at times through inordinate love of self, so does he sometimes through inordinate love of his neighbor. Therefore self-love is not the cause of every sin.

P(2a)- Q(77)- A(4) — On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 28) that “self-love, amounting to contempt of God, builds up the city of Babylon.” Now every sin makes man a citizen of Babylon. Therefore selflove is the cause of every sin.

P(2a)- Q(77)- A(4) — I answer that, As stated above ( Q(75), A(1) ), the proper and direct cause of sin is to be considered on the part of the adherence to a mutable good; in which respect every sinful act proceeds from inordinate desire for some temporal good. Now the fact that anyone desires a temporal good inordinately, is due to the fact that he loves himself inordinately; for to wish anyone some good is to love him.

Therefore it is evident that inordinate love of self is the cause of every sin.

P(2a)- Q(77)- A(4)- RO(1) — Well ordered self-love, whereby man desires a fitting good for himself, is right and natural; but it is inordinate self-love, leading to contempt of God, that Augustine (De Civ. Dei xiv, 28) reckons to be the cause of sin.

P(2a)- Q(77)- A(4)- RO(2) — Concupiscence, whereby a man desires good for himself, is reduced to self-love as to its cause, as stated.

P(2a)- Q(77)- A(4)- RO(3) — Man is said to love both the good he desires for himself, and himself to whom he desires it. Love, in so far as it is directed to the object of desire (e.g. a man is said to love wine or money) admits, as its cause, fear which pertains to avoidance of evil: for every sin arises either from inordinate desire for some good, or from inordinate avoidance of some evil. But each of these is reduced to self-love, since it is through loving himself that man either desires good things, or avoids evil things.

P(2a)- Q(77)- A(4)- RO(4) — A friend is like another self (Ethic. ix): wherefore the sin which is committed through love for a friend, seems to be committed through self-love.

P(2a)- Q(77)- A(5) Whether concupiscence of the flesh, concupiscence of the eyes, and pride of life are fittingly described as causes of sin?

P(2a)- Q(77)- A(5)- O(1) — It would seem that “concupiscence of the flesh, concupiscence of the eyes, and pride of life” are unfittingly described as causes of sin. Because, according to the Apostle ( 1 Timothy 6:10), “covetousness [*Douay: ‘The desire of money’] is the root of all evils.”

Now pride of life is not included in covetousness. Therefore it should not be reckoned among the causes of sin.

P(2a)- Q(77)- A(5)- O(2) — Further, concupiscence of the flesh is aroused chiefly by what is seen by the eyes, according to Daniel 13:56: “Beauty hath deceived thee.” Therefore concupiscence of the eyes should not be condivided with concupiscence of the flesh.

P(2a)- Q(77)- A(5)- O(3) — Further, concupiscence is desire for pleasure, as stated above ( Q(30), A(2) ). Now objects of pleasure are perceived not only by the sight, but also by the other senses. Therefore “concupiscence of the hearing” and of the other senses should also have been mentioned.

P(2a)- Q(77)- A(5)- O(4) — Further, just as man is induced to sin, through inordinate desire of good things, so is he also, through inordinate avoidance of evil things, as stated above ( A(4), ad 3). But nothing is mentioned here pertaining to avoidance of evil. Therefore the causes of sin are insufficiently described.

P(2a)- Q(77)- A(5) — On the contrary, It is written ( 1 John 2:16): “All that is in the world is concupiscence of the flesh, or [Vulg.: ‘and’] pride of life.”

Now a thing is said to be “in the world” by reason of sin: wherefore it is written ( 1 John 5:19): “The whole world is seated in wickedness.”

Therefore these three are causes of sin.

P(2a)- Q(77)- A(5) — I answer that, As stated above ( A(4) ), inordinate self-love is the cause of every sin. Now self-love includes inordinate desire of good: for a man desires good for the one he loves. Hence it is evident that inordinate desire of good is the cause of every sin. Now good is, in two ways, the object of the sensitive appetite, wherein are the passions which are the cause of sin: first, absolutely, according as it is the object of the concupiscible part; secondly, under the aspect of difficulty, according as it is the object of the irascible part, as stated above ( Q(23), A(1) ).

Again, concupiscence is twofold, as stated above ( Q(30), A(3) ). One is natural, and is directed to those things which sustain the nature of the body, whether as regards the preservation of the individual, such as food, drink, and the like, or as regards the preservation of the species, such as sexual matters: and the inordinate appetite of such things is called “concupiscence of the flesh.” The other is spiritual concupiscence, and is directed to those things which do not afford sustentation or pleasure in respect of the fleshly senses, but are delectable in respect of the apprehension or imagination, or some similar mode of perception; such are money, apparel, and the like; and this spiritual concupiscence is called “concupiscence of the eyes,” whether this be taken as referring to the sight itself, of which the eyes are the organ, so as to denote curiosity according to Augustine’s exposition (Confess. x); or to the concupiscence of things which are proposed outwardly to the eyes, so as to denote covetousness, according to the explanation of others.

The inordinate appetite of the arduous good pertains to the “pride of life”; for pride is the inordinate appetite of excellence, as we shall state further on ( Q(84), A(2) ; P(2b) Q(162), A(1) ).

It is therefore evident that all passions that are a cause of sin can be reduced to these three: since all the passions of the concupiscible part can be reduced to the first two, and all the irascible passions to the third, which is not divided into two because all the irascible passions conform to spiritual concupiscence.

P(2a)- Q(77)- A(5)- RO(1) — “Pride of life” is included in covetousness according as the latter denotes any kind of appetite for any kind of good.

How covetousness, as a special vice, which goes by the name of “avarice,” is the root of all sins, shall be explained further on ( Q(84), A(1) ).

P(2a)- Q(77)- A(5)- RO(2) — “Concupiscence of the eyes” does not mean here the concupiscence for all things which can be seen by the eyes, but only for such things as afford, not carnal pleasure in respect of touch, but in respect of the eyes, i.e. of any apprehensive power.

P(2a)- Q(77)- A(5)- RO(3) — The sense of sight is the most excellent of all the senses, and covers a larger ground, as stated in Metaph. i: and so its name is transferred to all the other senses, and even to the inner apprehensions, as Augustine states (De Verb. Dom., serm. xxxiii).

P(2a)- Q(77)- A(5)- RO(4) — Avoidance of evil is caused by the appetite for good, as stated above ( Q(25), A(2) ; Q(39), A(2) ); and so those passions alone are mentioned which incline to good, as being the causes of those which cause inordinately the avoidance of evil.

P(2a)- Q(77)- A(6) Whether sin is alleviated on account of a passion?

P(2a)- Q(77)- A(6)- O(1) — It would seem that sin is not alleviated on account of passion. For increase of cause adds to the effect: thus if a hot thing causes something to melt, a hotter will do so yet more. Now passion is a cause of sin, as stated ( A(5) ). Therefore the more intense the passion, the greater the sin. Therefore passion does not diminish sin, but increases it.

P(2a)- Q(77)- A(6)- O(2) — Further, a good passion stands in the same relation to merit, as an evil passion does to sin. Now a good passion increases merit: for a man seems to merit the more, according as he is moved by a greater pity to help a poor man. Therefore an evil passion also increases rather than diminishes a sin.

P(2a)- Q(77)- A(6)- O(3) — Further, a man seems to sin the more grievously, according as he sins with a more intense will. But the passion that impels the will makes it tend with greater intensity to the sinful act.

Therefore passion aggravates a sin.

P(2a)- Q(77)- A(6) — On the contrary, The passion of concupiscence is called a temptation of the flesh. But the greater the temptation that overcomes a man, the less grievous his sin, as Augustine states (De Civ.

Dei iv, 12).

P(2a)- Q(77)- A(6) — I answer that, Sin consists essentially in an act of the free will, which is a faculty of the will and reason; while passion is a movement of the sensitive appetite. Now the sensitive appetite can be related to the free-will, antecedently and consequently: antecedently, according as a passion of the sensitive appetite draws or inclines the reason or will, as stated above ( AA(1),2 ; Q(10), A(3) ); and consequently, in so far as the movements of the higher powers redound on to the lower, since it is not possible for the will to be moved to anything intensely, without a passion being aroused in the sensitive appetite.

Accordingly if we take passion as preceding the sinful act, it must needs diminish the sin: because the act is a sin in so far as it is voluntary, and under our control. Now a thing is said to be under our control, through the reason and will: and therefore the more the reason and will do anything of their own accord, and not through the impulse of a passion, the more is it voluntary and under our control. In this respect passion diminishes sin, in so far as it diminishes its voluntariness.

On the other hand, a consequent passion does not diminish a sin, but increases it; or rather it is a sign of its gravity, in so far, to wit, as it shows the intensity of the will towards the sinful act; and so it is true that the greater the pleasure or the concupiscence with which anyone sins, the greater the sin.

P(2a)- Q(77)- A(6)- RO(1) — Passion is the cause of sin on the part of that to which the sinner turns. But the gravity of a sin is measured on the part of that from which he turns, which results accidentally from his turning to something else — accidentally, i.e. beside his intention. Now an effect is increased by the increase, not of its accidental cause, but of its direct cause.

P(2a)- Q(77)- A(6)- RO(2) — A good passion consequent to the judgment of reason increases merit; but if it precede, so that a man is moved to do well, rather by his passion than by the judgment of his reason, such a passion diminishes the goodness and praiseworthiness of his action.

P(2a)- Q(77)- A(6)- RO(3) — Although the movement of the will incited by the passion is more intense, yet it is not so much the will’s own movement, as if it were moved to sin by the reason alone.

P(2a)- Q(77)- A(7) Whether passion excuses from sin altogether?

P(2a)- Q(77)- A(7)- O(1) — It would seem that passion excuses from sin altogether. For whatever causes an act to be involuntary, excuses from sin altogether. But concupiscence of the flesh, which is a passion, makes an act to be involuntary, according to Galatians 5:17: “The flesh lusteth against the spirit . . . so that you do not the things that you would.”

Therefore passion excuses from sin altogether.

P(2a)- Q(77)- A(7)- O(2) — Further, passion causes a certain ignorance of a particular matter, as stated above ( A(2) ; Q(76), A(3) ). But ignorance of a particular matter excuses from sin altogether, as stated above ( Q(6) , A(8) ).

Therefore passion excuses from sin altogether.

P(2a)- Q(77)- A(7)- O(3) — Further, disease of the soul is graver than disease of the body. But bodily disease excuses from sin altogether, as in the case of mad people. Much more, therefore, does passion, which is a disease of the soul.

P(2a)- Q(77)- A(7) — On the contrary, The Apostle ( Romans 7:5) speaks of the passions as “passions of sins,” for no other reason than that they cause sin: which would not be the case if they excused from sin altogether. Therefore passion does not excuse from sin altogether.

P(2a)- Q(77)- A(7) — I answer that, An act which, in its genus, is evil, cannot be excused from sin altogether, unless it be rendered altogether involuntary. Consequently, if the passion be such that it renders the subsequent act wholly involuntary, it entirely excuses from sin; otherwise, it does not excuse entirely. In this matter two points apparently should be observed: first, that a thing may be voluntary either “in itself,” as when the will tends towards it directly; or “in its cause,” when the will tends towards that cause and not towards the effect; as is the case with one who wilfully gets drunk, for in that case he is considered to do voluntarily whatever he does through being drunk. Secondly, we must observe that a thing is said to be voluntary “directly” or “indirectly”; directly, if the will tends towards it; indirectly, if the will could have prevented it, but did not.

Accordingly therefore we must make a distinction: because a passion is sometimes so strong as to take away the use of reason altogether, as in the case of those who are mad through love or anger; and then if such a passion were voluntary from the beginning, the act is reckoned a sin, because it is voluntary in its cause, as we have stated with regard to drunkenness. If, however, the cause be not voluntary but natural, for instance, if anyone through sickness or some such cause fall into such a passion as deprives him of the use of reason, his act is rendered wholly involuntary, and he is entirely excused from sin. Sometimes, however, the passion is not such as to take away the use of reason altogether; and then reason can drive the passion away, by turning to other thoughts, or it can prevent it from having its full effect; since the members are not put to work, except by the consent of reason, as stated above ( Q(17), A(9) ): wherefore such a passion does not excuse from sin altogether.

P(2a)- Q(77)- A(7)- RO(1) — The words, “So that you do not the things that you would” are not to be referred to outward deeds, but to the inner movement of concupiscence; for a man would wish never to desire evil, in which sense we are to understand the words of Romans 7:19: “The evil which I will not, that I do.” Or again they may be referred to the will as preceding the passion, as is the case with the incontinent, who act counter to their resolution on account of their concupiscence.

P(2a)- Q(77)- A(7)- RO(2) — The particular ignorance which excuses altogether, is ignorance of a circumstance, which a man is unable to know even after taking due precautions. But passion causes ignorance of law in a particular case, by preventing universal knowledge from being applied to a particular act, which passion the reason is able to drive away, as stated.

P(2a)- Q(77)- A(7)- RO(3) — Bodily disease is involuntary: there would be a comparison, however, if it were voluntary, as we have stated about drunkenness, which is a kind of bodily disease.

P(2a)- Q(77)- A(8) Whether a sin committed through passion can be mortal?

P(2a)- Q(77)- A(8)- O(1) — It would seem that sin committed through passion cannot be mortal. Because venial sin is condivided with mortal sin.

Now sin committed from weakness is venial, since it has in itself a motive for pardon [venia]. Since therefore sin committed through passion is a sin of weakness, it seems that it cannot be mortal.

P(2a)- Q(77)- A(8)- O(2) — Further, the cause is more powerful than its effect. But passion cannot be a mortal sin, for there is no mortal sin in the sensuality, as stated above ( Q(74), A(4) ). Therefore a sin committed through passion cannot be mortal.

P(2a)- Q(77)- A(8)- O(3) — Further, passion is a hindrance to reason, as explained above ( AA(1),2 ). Now it belongs to the reason to turn to God, or to turn away from Him, which is the essence of a mortal sin. Therefore a sin committed through passion cannot be mortal.

P(2a)- Q(77)- A(8) — On the contrary, The Apostle says ( Romans 7:5) that “the passions of the sins . . . work [Vulg.: ‘did work’] in our members to bring forth fruit unto death.”

Now it is proper to mortal sin to bring forth fruit unto death. Therefore sin committed through passion may be mortal.

P(2a)- Q(77)- A(8) — I answer that, Mortal sin, as stated above ( Q(72), A(5) ), consists in turning away from our last end which is God, which aversion pertains to the deliberating reason, whose function it is also to direct towards the end. Therefore that which is contrary to the last end can happen not to be a mortal sin, only when the deliberating reason is unable to come to the rescue, which is the case in sudden movements. Now when anyone proceeds from passion to a sinful act, or to a deliberate consent, this does not happen suddenly: and so the deliberating reason can come to the rescue here, since it can drive the passion away, or at least prevent it from having its effect, as stated above: wherefore if it does not come to the rescue, there is a mortal sin; and it is thus, as we see, that many murders and adulteries are committed through passion.

P(2a)- Q(77)- A(8)- RO(1) — A sin may be venial in three ways. First, through its cause, i.e. through having cause to be forgiven, which cause lessens the sin; thus a sin that is committed through weakness or ignorance is said to be venial. Secondly, through its issue; thus every sin, through repentance, becomes venial, i.e. receives pardon [veniam]. Thirdly, by its genus, e.g. an idle word. This is the only kind of venial sin that is opposed to mortal sin: whereas the objection regards the first kind.

P(2a)- Q(77)- A(8)- RO(2) — Passion causes sin as regards the adherence to something. But that this be a mortal sin regards the aversion, which follows accidentally from the adherence, as stated above ( A(6), ad 1): hence the argument does not prove.

P(2a)- Q(77)- A(8)- RO(3) — Passion does not always hinder the act of reason altogether: consequently the reason remains in possession of its free-will, so as to turn away from God, or turn to Him. If, however, the use of reason be taken away altogether, the sin is no longer either mortal or venial.

QUESTION OF THAT CAUSE OF SIN WHICH IS MALICE (FOUR ARTICLES) We must now consider the cause of sin on the part of the will, viz. malice: and under this head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether it is possible for anyone to sin through certain malice, i.e. purposely? (2) Whether everyone that sins through habit, sins through certain malice? (3) Whether every one that sins through certain malice, sins through habit? (4) Whether it is more grievous to sin through certain malice, than through passion?

P(2a)- Q(78)- A(1) Whether anyone sins through certain malice?

P(2a)- Q(78)- A(1)- O(1) — It would seem that no one sins purposely, or through certain malice. Because ignorance is opposed to purpose or certain malice. Now “every evil man is ignorant,” according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 1); and it is written ( Proverbs 14:22): “They err that work evil.” Therefore no one sins through certain malice.

P(2a)- Q(78)- A(1)- O(2) — Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that “no one works intending evil.” Now to sin through malice seems to denote the intention of doing evil [*Alluding to the derivation of “malitia” (malice) from “malum” (evil)] in sinning, because an act is not denominated from that which is unintentional and accidental. Therefore no one sins through malice.

P(2a)- Q(78)- A(1)- O(3) — Further, malice itself is a sin. If therefore malice is a cause of sin, it follows that sin goes on causing sin indefinitely, which is absurd. Therefore no one sins through malice.

P(2a)- Q(78)- A(1) — On the contrary, It is written ( Job 34:27): “[Who] as it were on purpose have revolted from God [Vulg.: ‘Him’], and would not understand all His ways.”

Now to revolt from God is to sin. Therefore some sin purposely or through certain malice.

P(2a)- Q(78)- A(1) — I answer that, Man like any other being has naturally an appetite for the good; and so if his appetite incline away to evil, this is due to corruption or disorder in some one of the principles of man: for it is thus that sin occurs in the actions of natural things. Now the principles of human acts are the intellect, and the appetite, both rational (i.e. the will) and sensitive. Therefore even as sin occurs in human acts, sometimes through a defect of the intellect, as when anyone sins through ignorance, and sometimes through a defect in the sensitive appetite, as when anyone sins through passion, so too does it occur through a defect consisting in a disorder of the will. Now the will is out of order when it loves more the lesser good. Again, the consequence of loving a thing less is that one chooses to suffer some hurt in its regard, in order to obtain a good that one loves more: as when a man, even knowingly, suffers the loss of a limb, that he may save his life which he loves more. Accordingly when an inordinate will loves some temporal good, e.g. riches or pleasure, more than the order of reason or Divine law, or Divine charity, or some such thing, it follows that it is willing to suffer the loss of some spiritual good, so that it may obtain possession of some temporal good. Now evil is merely the privation of some good; and so a man wishes knowingly a spiritual evil, which is evil simply, whereby he is deprived of a spiritual good, in order to possess a temporal good: wherefore he is said to sin through certain malice or on purpose, because he chooses evil knowingly.

P(2a)- Q(78)- A(1)- RO(1) — Ignorance sometimes excludes the simple knowledge that a particular action is evil, and then man is said to sin through ignorance: sometimes it excludes the knowledge that a particular action is evil at this particular moment, as when he sins through passion: and sometimes it excludes the knowledge that a particular evil is not to be suffered for the sake of possessing a particular good, but not the simple knowledge that it is an evil: it is thus that a man is ignorant, when he sins through certain malice.

P(2a)- Q(78)- A(1)- RO(2) — Evil cannot be intended by anyone for its own sake; but it can be intended for the sake of avoiding another evil, or obtaining another good, as stated above: and in this case anyone would choose to obtain a good intended for its own sake, without suffering loss of the other good; even as a lustful man would wish to enjoy a pleasure without offending God; but with the two set before him to choose from, he prefers sinning and thereby incurring God’s anger, to being deprived of the pleasure.

P(2a)- Q(78)- A(1)- RO(3) — The malice through which anyone sins, may be taken to denote habitual malice, in the sense in which the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 1) calls an evil habit by the name of malice, just as a good habit is called virtue: and in this way anyone is said to sin through malice when he sins through the inclination of a habit. It may also denote actual malice, whether by malice we mean the choice itself of evil (and thus anyone is said to sin through malice, in so far as he sins through making a choice of evil), or whether by malice we mean some previous fault that gives rise to a subsequent fault, as when anyone impugns the grace of his brother through envy. Nor does this imply that a thing is its own cause: for the interior act is the cause of the exterior act, and one sin is the cause of another; not indefinitely, however, since we can trace it back to some previous sin, which is not caused by any previous sin, as was explained above ( Q(75), A(4), ad 3).

P(2a)- Q(78)- A(2) Whether everyone that sins through habit, sins through certain malice?

P(2a)- Q(78)- A(2)- O(1) — It would seem that not every one who sins through habit, sins through certain malice. Because sin committed through certain malice, seems to be most grievous. Now it happens sometimes that a man commits a slight sin through habit, as when he utters an idle word.

Therefore sin committed from habit is not always committed through certain malice.

P(2a)- Q(78)- A(2)- O(2) — Further, “Acts proceeding from habits are like the acts by which those habits were formed” (Ethic. ii, 1,2). But the acts which precede a vicious habit are not committed through certain malice.

Therefore the sins that arise from habit are not committed through certain malice.

P(2a)- Q(78)- A(2)- O(3) — Further, when a man commits a sin through certain malice, he is glad after having done it, according to Proverbs 2:14: “Who are glad when they have done evil, and rejoice in most wicked things”: and this, because it is pleasant to obtain what we desire, and to do those actions which are connatural to us by reason of habit. But those who sin through habit, are sorrowful after committing a sin: because “bad men,” i.e. those who have a vicious habit, “are full of remorse” (Ethic. ix, 4).

Therefore sins that arise from habit are not committed through certain malice.

P(2a)- Q(78)- A(2) — On the contrary, A sin committed through certain malice is one that is done through choice of evil. Now we make choice of those things to which we are inclined by habit, as stated in Ethic. vi, 2 with regard to virtuous habits. Therefore a sin that arises from habit is committed through certain malice.

P(2a)- Q(78)- A(2) — I answer that, There is a difference between a sin committed by one who has the habit, and a sin committed by habit: for it is not necessary to use a habit, since it is subject to the will of the person who has that habit. Hence habit is defined as being “something we use when we will,” as stated above ( Q(50), A(1) ). And thus, even as it may happen that one who has a vicious habit may break forth into a virtuous act, because a bad habit does not corrupt reason altogether, something of which remains unimpaired, the result being that a sinner does some works which are generically good; so too it may happen sometimes that one who has a vicious habit, acts, not from that habit, but through the uprising of a passion, or again through ignorance. But whenever he uses the vicious habit he must needs sin through certain malice: because to anyone that has a habit, whatever is befitting to him in respect of that habit, has the aspect of something lovable, since it thereby becomes, in a way, connatural to him, according as custom and habit are a second nature. Now the very thing which befits a man in respect of a vicious habit, is something that excludes a spiritual good: the result being that a man chooses a spiritual evil, that he may obtain possession of what befits him in respect of that habit: and this is to sin through certain malice. Wherefore it is evident that whoever sins through habit, sins through certain malice.

P(2a)- Q(78)- A(2)- RO(1) — Venial sin does not exclude spiritual good, consisting in the grace of God or charity. Wherefore it is an evil, not simply, but in a relative sense: and for that reason the habit thereof is not a simple but a relative evil.

P(2a)- Q(78)- A(2)- RO(2) — Acts proceeding from habits are of like species as the acts from which those habits were formed: but they differ from them as perfect from imperfect. Such is the difference between sin committed through certain malice and sin committed through passion.

P(2a)- Q(78)- A(2)- RO(3) — He that sins through habit is always glad for what he does through habit, as long as he uses the habit. But since he is able not to use the habit, and to think of something else, by means of his reason, which is not altogether corrupted, it may happen that while not using the habit he is sorry for what he has done through the habit. And so it often happens that such a man is sorry for his sin not because sin in itself is displeasing to him, but on account of his reaping some disadvantage from the sin.

P(2a)- Q(78)- A(3) Whether one who sins through certain malice, sins through habit?

P(2a)- Q(78)- A(3)- O(1) — It would seem that whoever sins through certain malice, sins through habit. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 9) that “an unjust action is not done as an unjust man does it,” i.e. through choice, “unless it be done through habit.” Now to sin through certain malice is to sin through making a choice of evil, as stated above ( A(1) ).

Therefore no one sins through certain malice, unless he has the habit of sin.

P(2a)- Q(78)- A(3)- O(2) — Further, Origen says (Peri Archon iii) that “a man is not suddenly ruined and lost, but must needs fall away little by little.” But the greatest fall seems to be that of the man who sins through certain malice. Therefore a man comes to sin through certain malice, not from the outset, but from inveterate custom, which may engender a habit.

P(2a)- Q(78)- A(3)- O(3) — Further, whenever a man sins through certain malice, his will must needs be inclined of itself to the evil he chooses. But by the nature of that power man is inclined, not to evil but to good.

Therefore if he chooses evil, this must be due to something supervening, which is passion or habit. Now when a man sins through passion, he sins not through certain malice, but through weakness, as stated ( Q(77), A(3) ).

Therefore whenever anyone sins through certain malice, he sins through habit.

P(2a)- Q(78)- A(3) — On the contrary, The good habit stands in the same relation to the choice of something good, as the bad habit to the choice of something evil. But it happens sometimes that a man, without having the habit of a virtue, chooses that which is good according to that virtue.

Therefore sometimes also a man, without having the habit of a vice, may choose evil, which is to sin through certain malice.

P(2a)- Q(78)- A(3) — I answer that, The will is related differently to good and to evil. Because from the very nature of the power, it is inclined to the rational good, as its proper object; wherefore every sin is said to be contrary to nature. Hence, if a will be inclined, by its choice, to some evil, this must be occasioned by something else. Sometimes, in fact, this is occasioned through some defect in the reason, as when anyone sins through ignorance; and sometimes this arises through the impulse of the sensitive appetite, as when anyone sins through passion. Yet neither of these amounts to a sin through certain malice; for then alone does anyone sin through certain malice, when his will is moved to evil of its own accord.

This may happen in two ways. First, through his having a corrupt disposition inclining him to evil, so that, in respect of that disposition, some evil is, as it were, suitable and similar to him; and to this thing, by reason of its suitableness, the will tends, as to something good, because everything tends, of its own accord, to that which is suitable to it.

Moreover this corrupt disposition is either a habit acquired by custom, or a sickly condition on the part of the body, as in the case of a man who is naturally inclined to certain sins, by reason of some natural corruption in himself. Secondly, the will, of its own accord, may tend to an evil, through the removal of some obstacle: for instance, if a man be prevented from sinning, not through sin being in itself displeasing to him, but through hope of eternal life, or fear of hell, if hope give place to despair, or fear to presumption, he will end in sinning through certain malice, being freed from the bridle, as it were.

It is evident, therefore, that sin committed through certain malice, always presupposes some inordinateness in man, which, however, is not always a habit: so that it does not follow of necessity, if a man sins through certain malice, that he sins through habit.

P(2a)- Q(78)- A(3)- RO(1) — To do an action as an unjust man does, may be not only to do unjust things through certain malice, but also to do them with pleasure, and without any notable resistance on the part of reason, and this occurs only in one who has a habit.

P(2a)- Q(78)- A(3)- RO(2) — It is true that a man does not fall suddenly into sin from certain malice, and that something is presupposed; but this something is not always a habit, as stated above.

P(2a)- Q(78)- A(3)- RO(3) — That which inclines the will to evil, is not always a habit or a passion, but at times is something else. Moreover, there is no comparison between choosing good and choosing evil: because evil is never without some good of nature, whereas good can be perfect without the evil of fault.

P(2a)- Q(78)- A(4) Whether it is more grievous to sin through certain malice than through passion?

P(2a)- Q(78)- A(4)- O(1) — It would seem that it is not more grievous to sin through certain malice than through passion. Because ignorance excuses from sin either altogether or in part. Now ignorance is greater in one who sins through certain malice, than in one who sins through passion; since he that sins through certain malice suffers from the worst form of ignorance, which according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 8) is ignorance of principle, for he has a false estimation of the end, which is the principle in matters of action. Therefore there is more excuse for one who sins through certain malice, than for one who sins through passion.

P(2a)- Q(78)- A(4)- O(2) — Further, the more a man is impelled to sin, the less grievous his sin, as is clear with regard to a man who is thrown headlong into sin by a more impetuous passion. Now he that sins through certain malice, is impelled by habit, the impulse of which is stronger than that of passion. Therefore to sin through habit is less grievous than to sin through passion.

P(2a)- Q(78)- A(4)- O(3) — Further, to sin through certain malice is to sin through choosing evil. Now he that sins through passion, also chooses evil.

Therefore he does not sin less than the man who sins through certain malice.

P(2a)- Q(78)- A(4) — On the contrary, A sin that is committed on purpose, for this very reason deserves heavier punishment, according to Job 34:26: “He hath struck them as being wicked, in open sight, who, as it were, on purpose, have revolted from Him.” Now punishment is not increased except for a graver fault. Therefore a sin is aggravated through being done on purpose, i.e. through certain malice.

P(2a)- Q(78)- A(4) — I answer that, A sin committed through malice is more grievous than a sin committed through passion, for three reasons.

First, because, as sin consists chiefly in an act of the will, it follows that, other things being equal, a sin is all the more grievous, according as the movement of the sin belongs more to the will. Now when a sin is committed through malice, the movement of sin belongs more to the will, which is then moved to evil of its own accord, than when a sin is committed through passion, when the will is impelled to sin by something extrinsic, as it were. Wherefore a sin is aggravated by the very fact that it is committed through certain malice, and so much the more, as the malice is greater; whereas it is diminished by being committed through passion, and so much the more, as the passion is stronger. Secondly, because the passion which incites the will to sin, soon passes away, so that man repents of his sin, and soon returns to his good intentions; whereas the habit, through which a man sins, is a permanent quality, so that he who sins through malice, abides longer in his sin. For this reason the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 8) compares the intemperate man, who sins through malice, to a sick man who suffers from a chronic disease, while he compares the incontinent man, who sins through passion, to one who suffers intermittently. Thirdly, because he who sins through certain malice is ill-disposed in respect of the end itself, which is the principle in matters of action; and so the defect is more dangerous than in the case of the man who sins through passion, whose purpose tends to a good end, although this purpose is interrupted on account of the passion, for the time being.

Now the worst of all defects is defect of principle. Therefore it is evident that a sin committed through malice is more grievous than one committed through passion.

P(2a)- Q(78)- A(4)- RO(1) — Ignorance of choice, to which the objection refers, neither excuses nor diminishes a sin, as stated above ( Q(76), A(4) ).

Therefore neither does a greater ignorance of the kind make a sin to be less grave.

P(2a)- Q(78)- A(4)- RO(2) — The impulse due to passion, is, as it were, due to a defect which is outside the will: whereas, by a habit, the will is inclined from within. Hence the comparison fails.

P(2a)- Q(78)- A(4)- RO(3) — It is one thing to sin while choosing, and another to sin through choosing. For he that sins through passion, sins while choosing, but not through choosing, because his choosing is not for him the first principle of his sin; for he is induced through the passion, to choose what he would not choose, were it not for the passion. On the other hand, he that sins through certain malice, chooses evil of his own accord, in the way already explained ( AA(2),3 ), so that his choosing, of which he has full control, is the principle of his sin: and for this reason he is said to sin “through” choosing.

QUESTION OF THE EXTERNAL CAUSES OF SIN (FOUR ARTICLES)\parWe must now consider the external causes of sin, and (1) on the part of God; (2) on the part of the devil; (3) on the part of man.

Under the first head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether God is a cause of sin? (2) Whether the act of sin is from God? (3) Whether God is the cause of spiritual blindness and hardness of heart? (4) Whether these things are directed to the salvation of those who are blinded or hardened?

P(2a)- Q(79)- A(1) Whether God is a cause of sin?

P(2a)- Q(79)- A(1)- O(1) — It would seem that God is a cause of sin. For the Apostle says of certain ones ( Romans 1:28): “God delivered them up to a reprobate sense, to do those things which are not right [Douay: ‘convenient’],” and a gloss comments on this by saying that “God works in men’s hearts, by inclining their wills to whatever He wills, whether to good or to evil.”

Now sin consists in doing what is not right, and in having a will inclined to evil. Therefore God is to man a cause of sin.

P(2a)- Q(79)- A(1)- O(2) — Further, it is written (Wis. 14:11): “The creatures of God are turned to an abomination; and a temptation to the souls of men.” But a temptation usually denotes a provocation to sin.

Since therefore creatures were made by God alone, as was established in the P(1), Q(44), A(1), it seems that God is a cause of sin, by provoking man to sin.

P(2a)- Q(79)- A(1)- O(3) — Further, the cause of the cause is the cause of the effect. Now God is the cause of the free-will, which itself is the cause of sin. Therefore God is the cause of sin.

P(2a)- Q(79)- A(1)- O(4) — Further, every evil is opposed to good. But it is not contrary to God’s goodness that He should cause the evil of punishment; since of this evil it is written ( Isaiah 45:7) that God creates evil, and ( Amos 3:6): “Shall there be evil in the city which God [Vulg.: ‘the Lord’] hath not done?”

Therefore it is not incompatible with God’s goodness that He should cause the evil of fault.

P(2a)- Q(79)- A(1) — On the contrary, It is written (Wis. 11:25): “Thou . . . hatest none of the things which Thou hast made.” Now God hates sin, according to Wis. 14:9: “To God the wicked and his wickedness are hateful.” Therefore God is not a cause of sin.

I answer that, Man is, in two ways, a cause either of his own or of another’s sin. First, directly, namely be inclining his or another’s will to sin; secondly, indirectly, namely be not preventing someone from sinning.

Hence ( Ezekiel 3:18) it is said to the watchman: “If thou say not to the wicked: ‘Thou shalt surely die’ [*Vulg.: “If, when I say to the wicked, ‘Thou shalt surely die,’ thou declare it not to him.”] . . . I will require his blood at thy hand.” Now God cannot be directly the cause of sin, either in Himself or in another, since every sin is a departure from the order which is to God as the end: whereas God inclines and turns all things to Himself as to their last end, as Dionysius states (Div. Nom. i): so that it is impossible that He should be either to Himself or to another the cause of departing from the order which is to Himself. Therefore He cannot be directly the cause of sin. In like manner neither can He cause sin indirectly.

For it happens that God does not give some the assistance, whereby they may avoid sin, which assistance were He to give, they would not sin. But He does all this according to the order of His wisdom and justice, since He Himself is Wisdom and Justice: so that if someone sin it is not imputable to Him as though He were the cause of that sin; even as a pilot is not said to cause the wrecking of the ship, through not steering the ship, unless he cease to steer while able and bound to steer. It is therefore evident that God is nowise a cause of sin.

P(2a)- Q(79)- A(1)- RO(1) — As to the words of the Apostle, the solution is clear from the text. For if God delivered some up to a reprobate sense, it follows that they already had a reprobate sense, so as to do what was not right. Accordingly He is said to deliver them up to a reprobate sense, in so far as He does not hinder them from following that reprobate sense, even as we are said to expose a person to danger if we do not protect him. The saying of Augustine (De Grat. et Lib. Arb. xxi, whence the gloss quoted is taken) to the effect that “God inclines men’s wills to good and evil,” is to be understood as meaning that He inclines the will directly to good; and to evil, in so far as He does not hinder it, as stated above. And yet even this is due as being deserved through a previous sin.

P(2a)- Q(79)- A(1)- RO(2) — When it is said the “creatures of God are turned ‘to’ an abomination, and a temptation to the souls of men,” the preposition “to” does not denote causality but sequel [*This is made clear by the Douay Version: the Latin “factae sunt in abominationem” admits of the translation “were made to be an abomination,” which might imply causality.]; for God did not make the creatures that they might be an evil to man; this was the result of man’s folly, wherefore the text goes on to say, “and a snare to the feet of the unwise,” who, to wit, in their folly, use creatures for a purpose other than that for which they were made.

P(2a)- Q(79)- A(1)- RO(3) — The effect which proceeds from the middle cause, according as it is subordinate to the first cause, is reduced to that first cause; but if it proceed from the middle cause, according as it goes outside the order of the first cause, it is not reduced to that first cause: thus if a servant do anything contrary to his master’s orders, it is not ascribed to the master as though he were the cause thereof. In like manner sin, which the free-will commits against the commandment of God, is not attributed to God as being its cause.

P(2a)- Q(79)- A(1)- RO(4) — Punishment is opposed to the good of the person punished, who is thereby deprived of some good or other: but fault is opposed to the good of subordination to God; and so it is directly opposed to the Divine goodness; consequently there is no comparison between fault and punishment.

P(2a)- Q(79)- A(2) Whether the act of sin is from God?

P(2a)- Q(79)- A(2)- O(1) — It would seem that the act of sin is not from God. For Augustine says (De Perfect. Justit. ii) that “the act of sin is not a thing.” Now whatever is from God is a thing. Therefore the act of sin is not from God.

P(2a)- Q(79)- A(2)- O(2) — Further, man is not said to be the cause of sin, except because he is the cause of the sinful act: for “no one works, intending evil,” as Dionysius states (Div. Nom. iv). Now God is not a cause of sin, as stated above ( A(1) ). Therefore God is not the cause of the act of sin.

P(2a)- Q(79)- A(2)- O(3) — Further, some actions are evil and sinful in their species, as was shown above ( Q(18), AA(2),8 ). Now whatever is the cause of a thing, causes whatever belongs to it in respect of its species. If therefore God caused the act of sin, He would be the cause of sin, which is false, as was proved above ( A(1) ). Therefore God is not the cause of the act of sin.

P(2a)- Q(79)- A(2) — On the contrary, The act of sin is a movement of the free-will. Now “the will of God is the cause of every movement,” as Augustine declares (De Trin. iii, 4,9). Therefore God’s will is the cause of the act of sin.

P(2a)- Q(79)- A(2) — I answer that, The act of sin is both a being and an act; and in both respects it is from God. Because every being, whatever the mode of its being, must be derived from the First Being, as Dionysius declares (Div. Nom. v). Again every action is caused by something existing in act, since nothing produces an action save in so far as it is in act; and every being in act is reduced to the First Act, viz. God, as to its cause, Who is act by His Essence. Therefore God is the cause of every action, in so far as it is an action. But sin denotes a being and an action with a defect: and this defect is from the created cause, viz. the free-will, as falling away from the order of the First Agent, viz. God. Consequently this defect is not reduced to God as its cause, but to the free-will: even as the defect of limping is reduced to a crooked leg as its cause, but not to the motive power, which nevertheless causes whatever there is of movement in the limping. Accordingly God is the cause of the act of sin: and yet He is not the cause of sin, because He does not cause the act to have a defect.

P(2a)- Q(79)- A(2)- RO(1) — In this passage Augustine calls by the name of “thing,” that which is a thing simply, viz. substance; for in this sense the act of sin is not a thing.

P(2a)- Q(79)- A(2)- RO(2) — Not only the act, but also the defect, is reduced to man as its cause, which defect consists in man not being subject to Whom he ought to be, although he does not intend this principally.

Wherefore man is the cause of the sin: while God is the cause of the act, in such a way, that nowise is He the cause of the defect accompanying the act, so that He is not the cause of the sin.

P(2a)- Q(79)- A(2)- RO(3) — As stated above ( Q(72), A(1) ), acts and habits do not take their species from the privation itself, wherein consists the nature of evil, but from some object, to which that privation is united: and so this defect which consists in not being from God, belongs to the species of the act consequently, and not as a specific difference.

P(2a)- Q(79)- A(3) Whether God is the cause of spiritual blindness and hardness of heart?

P(2a)- Q(79)- A(3)- O(1) — It would seem that God is not the cause of spiritual blindness and hardness of heart. For Augustine says (Qq. lxxxiii, qu. 3) that God is not the cause of that which makes man worse. Now man is made worse by spiritual blindness and hardness of heart. Therefore God is not the cause of spiritual blindness and hardness of heart.

P(2a)- Q(79)- A(3)- O(2) — Further, Fulgentius says (De Dupl. Praedest. i, 19): “God does not punish what He causes.” Now God punishes the hardened heart, according to Ecclus. 3:27: “A hard heart shall fear evil at the last.” Therefore God is not the cause of hardness of heart.

P(2a)- Q(79)- A(3)- O(3) — Further, the same effect is not put down to contrary causes. But the cause of spiritual blindness is said to be the malice of man, according to Wis. 2:21: “For their own malice blinded them,” and again, according to 2 Corinthians 4:4: “The god of this world hath blinded the minds of unbelievers”: which causes seem to be opposed to God. Therefore God is not the cause of spiritual blindness and hardness of heart.

P(2a)- Q(79)- A(3) — On the contrary, It is written ( Isaiah 6:10): “Blind the heart of this people, and make their ears heavy,” and Romans 9:18: “He hath mercy on whom He will, and whom He will He hardeneth.”

P(2a)- Q(79)- A(3) — I answer that, Spiritual blindness and hardness of heart imply two things. One is the movement of the human mind in cleaving to evil, and turning away from the Divine light; and as regards this, God is not the cause of spiritual blindness and hardness of heart, just as He is not the cause of sin. The other thing is the withdrawal of grace, the result of which is that the mind is not enlightened by God to see aright, and man’s heart is not softened to live aright; and as regards this God is the cause of spiritual blindness and hardness of heart.

Now we must consider that God is the universal cause of the enlightening of souls, according to John 1:9: “That was the true light which enlighteneth every man that cometh into this world,” even as the sun is the universal cause of the enlightening of bodies, though not in the same way; for the sun enlightens by necessity of nature, whereas God works freely, through the order of His wisdom. Now although the sun, so far as it is concerned, enlightens all bodies, yet if it be encountered by an obstacle in a body, it leaves it in darkness, as happens to a house whose window-shutters are closed, although the sun is in no way the cause of the house being darkened, since it does not act of its own accord in failing to light up the interior of the house; and the cause of this is the person who closed the shutters. On the other hand, God, of His own accord, withholds His grace from those in whom He finds an obstacle: so that the cause of grace being withheld is not only the man who raises an obstacle to grace; but God, Who, of His own accord, withholds His grace.

In this way, God is the cause of spiritual blindness, deafness of ear, and hardness of heart.

These differ from one another in respect of the effects of grace, which both perfects the intellect by the gift of wisdom, and softens the affections by the fire of charity. And since two of the senses excel in rendering service to the intellect, viz. sight and hearing, of which the former assists “discovery,” and the latter, “teaching,” hence it is that spiritual “blindness” corresponds to sight, “heaviness of the ears” to hearing, and “hardness of heart” to the affections.

P(2a)- Q(79)- A(3)- RO(1) — Blindness and hardheartedness, as regards the withholding of grace, are punishments, and therefore, in this respect, they make man no worse. It is because he is already worsened by sin that he incurs them, even as other punishments.

P(2a)- Q(79)- A(3)- RO(2) — This argument considers hardheartedness in so far as it is a sin.

P(2a)- Q(79)- A(3)- RO(3) — Malice is the demeritorious cause of blindness, just as sin is the cause of punishment: and in this way too, the devil is said to blind, in so far as he induces man to sin.

P(2a)- Q(79)- A(4) Whether blindness and hardness of heart are directed to the salvation of those who are blinded and hardened?

P(2a)- Q(79)- A(4)- O(1) — It would seem that blindness and hardness of heart are always directed to the salvation of those who are blinded and hardened. For Augustine says (Enchiridion xi) that “as God is supremely good, He would nowise allow evil to be done, unless He could draw some good from every evil.” Much more, therefore, does He direct to some good, the evil of which He Himself is the cause. Now God is the cause of blindness and hardness of heart, as stated above ( A(3) ). Therefore they are directed to the salvation of those who are blinded and hardened.

P(2a)- Q(79)- A(4)- O(2) — Further, it is written (Wis. 1:13) that “God hath no pleasure in the destruction of the ungodly [*Vulg.: ‘God made not death, neither hath He pleasure in the destruction of the living.’].” Now He would seem to take pleasure in their destruction, if He did not turn their blindness to their profit: just as a physician would seem to take pleasure in torturing the invalid, if he did not intend to heal the invalid when he prescribes a bitter medicine for him. Therefore God turns blindness to the profit of those who are blinded.

P(2a)- Q(79)- A(4)- O(3) — Further, “God is not a respecter of persons” ( Acts 10:34). Now He directs the blinding of some, to their salvation, as in the case of some of the Jews, who were blinded so as not to believe in Christ, and, through not believing, to slay Him, and afterwards were seized with compunction, and converted, as related by Augustine (De Quaest.

Evang. iii). Therefore God turns all blindness to the spiritual welfare of those who are blinded.

P(2a)- Q(79)- A(4)- O(4) — On the other hand, according to Romans 3:8, evil should not be done, that good may ensue. Now blindness is an evil.

Therefore God does not blind some for the sake of their welfare.

P(2a)- Q(79)- A(4) — I answer that, Blindness is a kind of preamble to sin.

Now sin has a twofold relation — to one thing directly, viz. to the sinner’s damnation — to another, by reason of God’s mercy or providence, viz. that the sinner may be healed, in so far as God permits some to fall into sin, that by acknowledging their sin, they may be humbled and converted, as Augustine states (De Nat. et Grat. xxii). Therefore blindness, of its very nature, is directed to the damnation of those who are blinded; for which reason it is accounted an effect of reprobation. But, through God’s mercy, temporary blindness is directed medicinally to the spiritual welfare of those who are blinded. This mercy, however, is not vouchsafed to all those who are blinded, but only to the predestinated, to whom “all things work together unto good” ( Romans 8:28). Therefore as regards some, blindness is directed to their healing; but as regards others, to their damnation; as Augustine says (De Quaest. Evang. iii).

P(2a)- Q(79)- A(4)- RO(1) — Every evil that God does, or permits to be done, is directed to some good; yet not always to the good of those in whom the evil is, but sometimes to the good of others, or of the whole universe: thus He directs the sin of tyrants to the good of the martyrs, and the punishment of the lost to the glory of His justice.

P(2a)- Q(79)- A(4)- RO(2) — God does not take pleasure in the loss of man, as regards the loss itself, but by reason of His justice, or of the good that ensues from the loss.

P(2a)- Q(79)- A(4)- RO(3) — That God directs the blindness of some to their spiritual welfare, is due to His mercy; but that the blindness of others is directed to their loss is due to His justice: and that He vouchsafes His mercy to some, and not to all, does not make God a respecter of persons, as explained in the P(1), Q(23), A(5), ad 3.

P(2a)- Q(79)- A(4)- RO(4) — Evil of fault must not be done, that good may ensue; but evil of punishment must be inflicted for the sake of good.

QUESTION OF THE CAUSE OF SIN, AS REGARDS THE DEVIL (FOUR ARTICLES) We must now consider the cause of sin, as regards the devil; and under this head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether the devil is directly the cause of sin? (2) Whether the devil induces us to sin, by persuading us inwardly? (3) Whether he can make us sin of necessity? (4) Whether all sins are due to the devil’s suggestion?

P(2a)- Q(80)- A(1) Whether the devil is directly the cause of man’s sinning?

P(2a)- Q(80)- A(1)- O(1) — It would seem that the devil is directly the cause of man’s sinning. For sin consists directly in an act of the appetite.

Now Augustine says (De Trin. iv, 12) that “the devil inspires his friends with evil desires”; and Bede, commenting on Acts 5:3, says that the devil “draws the mind to evil desires”; and Isidore says (De Summo Bono ii, 41; iii, 5) that the devil “fills men’s hearts with secret lusts.” Therefore the devil is directly the cause of sin.

P(2a)- Q(80)- A(1)- O(2) — Further, Jerome says (Contra Jovin. ii, 2) that “as God is the perfecter of good, so is the devil the perfecter of evil.” But God is directly the cause of our good. Therefore the devil is directly the cause of our sins.

P(2a)- Q(80)- A(1)- O(3) — Further, the Philosopher says in a chapter of the Eudemein Ethics (vii, 18): “There must needs be some extrinsic principle of human counsel.” Now human counsel is not only about good things but also about evil things. Therefore, as God moves man to take good counsel, and so is the cause of good, so the devil moves him to take evil counsel, and consequently is directly the cause of sin.

P(2a)- Q(80)- A(1) — On the contrary, Augustine proves (De Lib. Arb. i, 11) that “nothing else than his own will makes man’s mind the slave of his desire.” Now man does not become a slave to his desires, except through sin. Therefore the cause of sin cannot be the devil, but man’s own will alone.

I answer that, Sin is an action: so that a thing can be directly the cause of sin, in the same way as anyone is directly the cause of an action; and this can only happen by moving that action’s proper principle to act. Now the proper principle of a sinful action is the will, since every sin is voluntary.

Consequently nothing can be directly the cause of sin, except that which can move the will to act.

Now the will, as stated above ( Q(9) , AA(3),4,6 ), can be moved by two things: first by its object, inasmuch as the apprehended appetible is said to move the appetite: secondly by that agent which moves the will inwardly to will, and this is no other than the will itself, or God, as was shown above ( Q(9) , AA(3),4,6 ). Now God cannot be the cause of sin, as stated above ( Q(79), A(1) ). Therefore it follows that in this respect, a man’s will alone is directly the cause of his sin.

As regards the object, a thing may be understood as moving the will in three ways. First, the object itself which is proposed to the will: thus we say that food arouses man’s desire to eat. Secondly, he that proposes or offers this object. Thirdly, he that persuades the will that the object proposed has an aspect of good, because he also, in a fashion, offers the will its proper object, which is a real or apparent good of reason.

Accordingly, in the first way the sensible things, which approach from without, move a man’s will to sin. In the second and third ways, either the devil or a man may incite to sin, either by offering an object of appetite to the senses, or by persuading the reason. But in none of these three ways can anything be the direct cause of sin, because the will is not, of necessity, moved by any object except the last end, as stated above ( Q(10), AA(1),2 ). Consequently neither the thing offered from without, nor he that proposes it, nor he that persuades, is the sufficient cause of sin. Therefore it follows that the devil is a cause of sin, neither directly nor sufficiently, but only by persuasion, or by proposing the object of appetite.

P(2a)- Q(80)- A(1)- RO(1) — All these, and other like authorities, if we meet with them, are to be understood as denoting that the devil induces man to affection for a sin, either by suggesting to him, or by offering him objects of appetite.

P(2a)- Q(80)- A(1)- RO(2) — This comparison is true in so far as the devil is somewhat the cause of our sins, even as God is in a certain way the cause of our good actions, but does not extend to the mode of causation: for God causes good things in us by moving the will inwardly, whereas the devil cannot move us in this way.

P(2a)- Q(80)- A(1)- RO(3) — God is the universal principle of all inward movements of man; but that the human will be determined to an evil counsel, is directly due to the human will, and to the devil as persuading or offering the object of appetite.

P(2a)- Q(80)- A(2) Whether the devil can induce man to sin, by internal instigations?

P(2a)- Q(80)- A(2)- O(1) — It would seem that the devil cannot induce man to sin, by internal instigations. Because the internal movements of the soul are vital functions. Now no vital functions can be exercised except by an intrinsic principle, not even those of the vegetal soul, which are the lowest of vital functions. Therefore the devil cannot instigate man to evil through his internal movements.

P(2a)- Q(80)- A(2)- O(2) — Further, all the internal movements arise from the external senses according to the order of nature. Now it belongs to God alone to do anything beside the order of nature, as was stated in the P(1), Q(110), A(4) . Therefore the devil cannot effect anything in man’s internal movements, except in respect of things which are perceived by the external senses.

P(2a)- Q(80)- A(2)- O(3) — Further, the internal acts of the soul are to understand and to imagine. Now the devil can do nothing in connection with either of these, because, as stated in the P(1), Q(111), AA(2),3 , ad 2, the devil cannot impress species on the human intellect, nor does it seem possible for him to produce imaginary species, since imaginary forms, being more spiritual, are more excellent than those which are in sensible matter, which, nevertheless, the devil is unable to produce, as is clear from what we have said in the P(1), Q(110), A(2) ; P(1), Q(111), AA(2),3 , ad 2.

Therefore the devil cannot through man’s internal movements induce him to sin.

P(2a)- Q(80)- A(2) — On the contrary, In that case, the devil would never tempt man, unless he appeared visibly; which is evidently false.

P(2a)- Q(80)- A(2) — I answer that, The interior part of the soul is intellective and sensitive; and the intellective part contains the intellect and the will. As regards the will, we have already stated ( A(1) ; P(1), Q(111), A(1) ) what is the devil’s relation thereto. Now the intellect, of its very nature, is moved by that which enlightens it in the knowledge of truth, which the devil has no intention of doing in man’s regard; rather does he darken man’s reason so that it may consent to sin, which darkness is due to the imagination and sensitive appetite. Consequently the operation of the devil seems to be confined to the imagination and sensitive appetite, by moving either of which he can induce man to sin. For his operation may result in presenting certain forms to the imagination; and he is able to incite the sensitive appetite to some passion or other.

The reason of this is, that as stated in the P(1), Q(110), A(3), the corporeal nature has a natural aptitude to be moved locally by the spiritual nature: so that the devil can produce all those effects which can result from the local movement of bodies here below, except he be restrained by the Divine power. Now the representation of forms to the imagination is due, sometimes, to local movement: for the Philosopher says (De Somno et Vigil.) [*De Insomn. iii, iv.] that “when an animal sleeps, the blood descends in abundance to the sensitive principle, and the movements descend with it, viz. the impressions left by the action of sensible objects, which impressions are preserved by means of sensible species, and continue to move the apprehensive principle, so that they appear just as though the sensitive principles were being affected by them at the time.”

Hence such a local movement of the vital spirits or humors can be procured by the demons, whether man sleep or wake: and so it happens that man’s imagination is brought into play.

In like manner, the sensitive appetite is incited to certain passions according to certain fixed movements of the heart and the vital spirits: wherefore the devil can cooperate in this also. And through certain passions being aroused in the sensitive appetite, the result is that man more easily perceives the movement or sensible image which is brought in the manner explained, before the apprehensive principle, since, as the Philosopher observes (De Somno et Virgil.: De Insomn. iii, iv), “lovers are moved, by even a slight likeness, to an apprehension of the beloved.” It also happens, through the rousing of a passion, that what is put before the imagination, is judged, as being something to be pursued, because, to him who is held by a passion, whatever the passion inclines him to, seems good. In this way the devil induces man inwardly to sin.

P(2a)- Q(80)- A(2)- RO(1) — Although vital functions are always from an intrinsic principle, yet an extrinsic agent can cooperate with them, even as external heat cooperates with the functions of the vegetal soul, that food may be more easily digested.

P(2a)- Q(80)- A(2)- RO(2) — This apparition of imaginary forms is not altogether outside the order of nature, nor is it due to a command alone, but according to local movement, as explained above.

Consequently the Reply to the Third Objection is clear, because these forms are received originally from the senses.

P(2a)- Q(80)- A(3) Whether the devil can induce man to sin of necessity?

P(2a)- Q(80)- A(3)- O(1) — It would seem that the devil can induce man to sin of necessity. Because the greater can compel the lesser. Now it is said of the devil ( Job 41:24) that “there is no power on earth that can compare with him.”

Therefore he can compel man to sin, while he dwells on the earth.

P(2a)- Q(80)- A(3)- O(2) — Further, man’s reason cannot be moved except in respect of things that are offered outwardly to the senses, or are represented to the imagination: because “all our knowledge arises from the senses, and we cannot understand without a phantasm” (De Anima iii, text. 30. 39). Now the devil can move man’s imagination, as stated above ( A(2) ); and also the external senses, for Augustine says (Qq. lxxxiii, qu. 12) that “this evil,” of which, to wit, the devil is the cause, “extends gradually through all the approaches to the senses, it adapts itself to shapes, blends with colors, mingles with sounds, seasons every flavor.” Therefore it can incline man’s reason to sin of necessity.

P(2a)- Q(80)- A(3)- O(3) — Further, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 4) that “there is some sin when the flesh lusteth against the spirit.” Now the devil can cause concupiscence of the flesh, even as other passions, in the way explained above ( A(2) ). Therefore he can induce man to sin of necessity.

P(2a)- Q(80)- A(3) — On the contrary, It is written ( 1 Peter 5:8): “Your adversary the devil, as a roaring lion, goeth about seeking whom he may devour.”

Now it would be useless to admonish thus, if it were true that man were under the necessity of succumbing to the devil. Therefore he cannot induce man to sin of necessity.

P(2a)- Q(80)- A(3) — Further, it is likewise written ( James 4:7): “Be subject . . . to God, but resist the devil, and he will fly from you,” which would be said neither rightly nor truly, if the devil were able to compel us, in any way whatever, to sin; for then neither would it be possible to resist him, nor would he fly from those who do. Therefore he does not compel to sin.

P(2a)- Q(80)- A(3) — I answer that, The devil, by his own power, unless he be restrained by God, can compel anyone to do an act which, in its genus, is a sin; but he cannot bring about the necessity of sinning. This is evident from the fact that man does not resist that which moves him to sin, except by his reason; the use of which the devil is able to impede altogether, by moving the imagination and the sensitive appetite; as is the case with one who is possessed. But then, the reason being thus fettered, whatever man may do, it is not imputed to him as a sin. If, however, the reason is not altogether fettered, then, in so