QUESTIONS 144-154 QUESTION OF SHAMEFACEDNESS (FOUR ARTICLES) We must now consider the parts of temperance in particular: and in the first place the integral parts, which are shamefacedness and honesty. With regard to shamefacedness there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether shamefacedness is a virtue? (2) What is its object? (3) Who are the cause of a man being ashamed? (4) What kind of people are ashamed?

P(2b)- Q(144)- A(1) Whether shamefacedness is a virtue?

P(2b)- Q(144)- A(1)- O(1) — It seems that shamefacedness is a virtue. For it is proper to a virtue “to observe the mean as fixed by reason”: this is clear from the definition of virtue given in Ethic. ii, 6. Now shamefacedness observes the mean in this way, as the Philosopher observes (Ethic. ii, 7).

Therefore shamefacedness is a virtue.

P(2b)- Q(144)- A(1)- O(2) — Further, whatever is praiseworthy is either a virtue or something connected with virtue. Now shamefacedness is praiseworthy. But it is not part of a virtue. For it is not a part of prudence, since it is not in the reason but in the appetite; nor is it a part of justice. since shamefacedness implies a certain passion, whereas justice is not about the passions; nor again is it a part of fortitude, because it belongs to fortitude to be persistent and aggressive, while it belongs to shamefacedness to recoil from something; nor lastly is it a part of temperance, since the latter is about desires, whereas shamefacedness is a kind of fear according as the Philosopher states (Ethic. iv, 9) and Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 15). Hence it follows that shamefacedness is a virtue.

P(2b)- Q(144)- A(1)- O(3) — Further, the honest and the virtuous are convertible according to Tully (De Offic. i, 27). Now shamefacedness is a part of honesty: for Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 43) that “shamefacedness is the companion and familiar of the restful mind, averse to wantonness, a stranger to any kind of excess, the friend of sobriety and the support of what is honest, a seeker after the beautiful.” Therefore shamefacedness is a virtue.

P(2b)- Q(144)- A(1)- O(4) — Further, every vice is opposed to a virtue.

Now certain vices are opposed to shamefacedness, namely shamelessness and inordinate prudery. Therefore shamefacedness is a virtue.

P(2b)- Q(144)- A(1)- O(5) — Further, “like acts beget like habits,” according to Ethic. ii, 1. Now shamefacedness implies a praiseworthy act; wherefore from many such acts a habit results. But a habit of praiseworthy deeds is a virtue, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. i, 12).

Therefore shamefacedness is a virtue.

P(2b)- Q(144)- A(1) — On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 7; iv, 9) that shamefacedness is not a virtue.

P(2b)- Q(144)- A(1) — I answer that, Virtue is taken in two ways, in a strict sense and in a broad sense. Taken strictly virtue is a perfection, as stated in Phys. vii, 17,18. Wherefore anything that is inconsistent with perfection, though it be good, falls short of the notion of virtue. Now shamefacedness is inconsistent with perfection, because it is the fear of something base, namely of that which is disgraceful. Hence Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 15) that “shamefacedness is fear of a base action.”

Now just as hope is about a possible and difficult good, so is fear about a possible and arduous evil, as stated above ( P(1), Q(40) , A(1) ; P(1), Q(41) , A(2) ; P(1), Q(42) , A(3) ), when we were treating of the passions. But one who is perfect as to a virtuous habit, does not apprehend that which would be disgraceful and base to do, as being possible and arduous, that is to say difficult for him to avoid; nor does he actually do anything base, so as to be in fear of disgrace. Therefore shamefacedness, properly speaking, is not a virtue, since it falls short of the perfection of virtue.

Taken, however, in a broad sense virtue denotes whatever is good and praiseworthy in human acts or passions; and in this way /shamefacedness is sometimes called a virtue, since it is a praiseworthy passion.

P(2b)- Q(144)- A(1)- RO(1) — Observing the mean is not sufficient for the notion of virtue, although it is one of the conditions included in virtue’s definition: but it is requisite, in addition to this, that it be “an elective habit,” that is to say, operating from choice. Now shamefacedness denotes, not a habit but a passion, nor does its movement result from choice, but from an impulse of passion. Hence it falls short of the notion of virtue.

P(2b)- Q(144)- A(1)- RO(2) — As stated above, shamefacedness is fear of baseness and disgrace. Now it has been stated ( Q(142), A(4) ) that the vice of intemperance is most base and disgraceful. Wherefore shamefacedness pertains more to temperance than to any other virtue, by reason of its motive cause, which is a base action though not according to the species of the passion, namely fear. Nevertheless in so far as the vices opposed to other virtues are base and disgraceful, shamefacedness may also pertain to other virtues.

P(2b)- Q(144)- A(1)- RO(3) — Shamefacedness fosters honesty, by removing that which is contrary thereto, but not so as to attain to the perfection of honesty.

P(2b)- Q(144)- A(1)- RO(4) — Every defect causes a vice, but not every good is sufficient for the notion of virtue. Consequently it does not follow that whatever is directly opposed to vice is a virtue, although every vice is opposed to a virtue, as regards its origin. Hence shamelessness, in so far as it results from excessive love of disgraceful things, is opposed to temperance.

P(2b)- Q(144)- A(1)- RO(5) — Being frequently ashamed causes the habit of an acquired virtue whereby one avoids disgraceful things which are the object of shamefacedness, without continuing to be ashamed in their regard: although as a consequence of this acquired virtue, a man would be more ashamed, if confronted with the matter of shamefacedness.

P(2b)- Q(144)- A(2) Whether shamefacedness is about a disgraceful action?

P(2b)- Q(144)- A(2)- O(1) — It would seem that shamefacedness is not about a disgraceful action. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 9) that “shamefacedness is fear of disgrace.” Now sometimes those who do nothing wrong suffer ignominy, according to Psalm 67:8, “For thy sake I have borne reproach, shame hath covered my face.” Therefore shamefacedness is not properly about a disgraceful action.

P(2b)- Q(144)- A(2)- O(2) — Further, nothing apparently is disgraceful but what is sinful. Yet man is ashamed of things that are not sins, for instance when he performs a menial occupation. Therefore it seems that shamefacedness is not properly about a disgraceful action.

P(2b)- Q(144)- A(2)- O(3) — Further, virtuous deeds are not disgraceful but most beautiful according to Ethic. i, 8. Yet sometimes people are ashamed to do virtuous deeds, according to Luke 9:26, “He that shall be ashamed of Me and My words, of him the Son of man shall be ashamed,” etc.

Therefore shamefacedness is not about a disgraceful action.

P(2b)- Q(144)- A(2)- O(4) — Further, if shamefacedness were properly about a disgraceful action, it would follow that the more disgraceful the action the more ashamed would one be. Yet sometimes a man is more ashamed of lesser sins, while he glories in those which are most grievous, according to Psalm 51:3, “Why dost thou glory in malice?” Therefore shamefacedness is not properly about a disgraceful action.

P(2b)- Q(144)- A(2) — On the contrary, Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 15) and Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, (De Nat. Hom. xx)] say that “shamefacedness is fear of doing a disgraceful deed or of a disgraceful deed done.”

P(2b)- Q(144)- A(2) — I answer that, As stated above ( P(1), Q(41) , A(2) ; P(1), Q(42) , A(3) ), when we were treating of the passions, fear is properly about an arduous evil, one, namely, that is difficult to avoid. Now disgrace is twofold. There is the disgrace inherent to vice, which consists in the deformity of a voluntary act: and this, properly speaking, has not the character of an arduous evil. For that which depends on the will alone does not appear to be arduous and above man’s ability: wherefore it is not apprehended as fearful, and for this reason the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that such evils are not a matter of fear.

The other kind of disgrace is penal so to speak, and it consists in the reproach that attaches to a person, just as the clarity of glory consists in a person being honored. And since this reproach has the character of an arduous evil, just as honor has the character of an arduous good, shamefacedness, which is fear of disgrace, regards first and foremost reproach or ignominy. And since reproach is properly due to vice, as honor is due to virtue, it follows that shamefacedness regards also the disgrace inherent to vice. Hence the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that “a man is less ashamed of those defects which are not the result of any fault of his own.”

Now shamefacedness regards fault in two ways. In one way a man refrains from vicious acts through fear of reproach: in another way a man while doing a disgraceful deed avoids the public eye through fear of reproach. In the former case, according to Gregory of Nyssa (Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xx), we speak of a person “blushing,” in the latter we say that he is “ashamed.” Hence he says that “the man who is ashamed acts in secret, but he who blushes fears to be disgraced.”

P(2b)- Q(144)- A(2)- RO(1) — Shamefacedness properly regards disgrace as due to sin which is a voluntary defect. Hence the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 6) that “a man is more ashamed of those things of which he is the cause.” Now the virtuous man despises the disgrace to which he is subject on account of virtue, because he does not deserve it; as the Philosopher says of the magnanimous (Ethic. iv, 3). Thus we find it said of the apostles ( Acts 5:41) that “they (the apostles) went from the presence of the council, rejoicing that they were accounted worthy to suffer reproach for the name of Jesus.” It is owing to imperfection of virtue that a man is sometimes ashamed of the reproaches which he suffers on account of virtue, since the more virtuous a man is, the more he despises external things, whether good or evil. Wherefore it is written ( Isaiah 51:7): “Fear ye not the reproach of men.”

P(2b)- Q(144)- A(2)- RO(2) — As stated above ( Q(63) , A(3) ), though honor is not really due save to virtue alone, yet it regards a certain excellence: and the same applies to reproach, for though it is properly due to sin alone, yet, at least in man’s opinion, it regards any kind of defect.

Hence a man is ashamed of poverty, disrepute, servitude, and the like.

P(2b)- Q(144)- A(2)- RO(3) — Shamefacedness does not regard virtuous deeds as such. Yet it happens accidentally that a man is ashamed of them either because he looks upon them as vicious according to human opinion, or because he is afraid of being marked as presumptuous or hypocritical for doing virtuous deeds.

P(2b)- Q(144)- A(2)- RO(4) — Sometimes more grievous sins are less shameful, either because they are less disgraceful, as spiritual sins in comparison with sins of the flesh, or because they connote a certain abundance of some temporal good; thus a man is more ashamed of cowardice than of daring, of theft than of robbery, on account of a semblance of power. The same applies to other sins.

P(2b)- Q(144)- A(3) Whether man is more shamefaced of those who are more closely connected with him?

P(2b)- Q(144)- A(3)- O(1) — It would seem that man is not more shamefaced of those who are more closely connected with him. For it is stated in Rhet. ii, 6 that “men are more shamefaced of those from whom they desire approbation.” Now men desire this especially from people of the better sort who are sometimes not connected with them. Therefore man is not more shamefaced of those who are more closely connected with him.

P(2b)- Q(144)- A(3)- O(2) — Further, seemingly those are more closely connected who perform like deeds. Now man is not made ashamed of his sin by those whom he knows to be guilty of the same sin, because according to Rhet. ii, 6, “a man does not forbid his neighbor what he does himself.” Therefore he is not more shamefaced of those who are most closely connected with him.

P(2b)- Q(144)- A(3)- O(3) — Further, the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 6) that “men take more shame from those who retail their information to many, such as jokers and fable-tellers.” But those who are more closely connected with a man do not retail his vices. Therefore one should not take shame chiefly from them.

P(2b)- Q(144)- A(3)- O(4) — Further, the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 6) that “men are most liable to be made ashamed by those among whom they have done nothing amiss; by those of whom they ask something for the first time; by those whose friends they wish to become.” Now these are less closely connected with us. Therefore man is not made most ashamed by those who are more closely united to him.

P(2b)- Q(144)- A(3) — On the contrary, It is stated in Rhet. ii, 6 that “man is made most ashamed by those who are to be continually with him.”

P(2b)- Q(144)- A(3) — I answer that, Since reproach is opposed to honor, just as honor denotes attestation to someone’s excellence, especially the excellence which is according to virtue, so too reproach, the fear of which is shamefacedness, denotes attestation to a person’s defect, especially that which results from sin. Hence the more weighty a person’s attestation is considered to be, the more does he make another person ashamed. Now a person’s attestation may be considered as being more weighty, either because he is certain of the truth or because of its effect. Certitude of the truth attaches to a person’s attestations for two reasons. First on account of the rectitude of his judgement, as in the case of wise and virtuous men, by whom man is more desirous of being honored and by whom he is brought to a greater sense of shame. Hence children and the lower animals inspire no one with shame, by reason of their lack of judgment. Secondly, on account of his knowledge of the matter attested, because “everyone judges well of what is known to him” [*Ethic. i, 3]. In this way we are more liable to be made ashamed by persons connected with us, since they are better acquainted with our deeds: whereas strangers and persons entirely unknown to us, who are ignorant of what we do, inspire us with no shame at all.

An attestation receives weight from its effect by reason of some advantage or harm resulting therefrom; wherefore men are more desirous of being honored by those who can be of use to them, and are more liable to be made ashamed by those who are able to do them some harm. And for this reason again, in a certain respect, persons connected with us make us more ashamed, since we are to be continually in their society, as though this entailed a continual harm to us: whereas the harm that comes from strangers and passersby ceases almost at once.

P(2b)- Q(144)- A(3)- RO(1) — People of the better sort make us ashamed for the same reason as those who are more closely connected with us; because just as the attestation of the better men carries more weight since they have a more universal knowledge of things, and in their judgments hold fast to the truth: so, too, the attestation of those among whom we live is more cogent since they know more about our concerns in detail.

P(2b)- Q(144)- A(3)- RO(2) — We fear not the attestation of those who are connected with us in the likeness of sin, because we do not think that they look upon our defect as disgraceful.

P(2b)- Q(144)- A(3)- RO(3) — Tale-bearers make us ashamed on account of the harm they do by making many think ill of us.

P(2b)- Q(144)- A(3)- RO(4) — Even those among whom we have done no wrong, make us more ashamed, on account of the harm that would follow, because, to wit, we should forfeit the good opinion they had of us: and again because when contraries are put in juxtaposition their opposition seems greater, so that when a man notices something disgraceful in one whom he esteemed good, he apprehends it as being the more disgraceful.

The reason why we are made more ashamed by those of whom we ask something for the first time, or whose friends we wish to be, is that we fear to suffer some injury, by being disappointed in our request, or by failing to become their friends.

P(2b)- Q(144)- A(4) Whether even virtuous men can be ashamed?

P(2b)- Q(144)- A(4)- O(1) — It would seem that even virtuous men can be ashamed. For contraries have contrary effects. Now those who excel in wickedness are not ashamed, according to Jeremiah 3:3, “Thou hadst a harlot’s forehead, thou wouldst not blush.” Therefore those who are virtuous are more inclined to be ashamed.

P(2b)- Q(144)- A(4)- O(2) — Further, the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 6) that “men are ashamed not only of vice, but also of the signs of evil”: and this happens also in the virtuous. Therefore virtuous men can be ashamed.

P(2b)- Q(144)- A(4)- O(3) — Further, shamefacedness is “fear of disgrace” [*Ethic. iv, 9]. Now virtuous people may happen to be ignominious, for instance if they are slandered, or if they suffer reproach undeservedly.

Therefore a virtuous man can be ashamed.

P(2b)- Q(144)- A(4)- O(4) — Further, shamefacedness is a part of temperance, as stated above ( Q(143) ). Now a part is not separated from its whole. Since then temperance is in a virtuous man, it means that shamefacedness is also.

P(2b)- Q(144)- A(4) — On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 9) that a “virtuous man is not shamefaced.”

P(2b)- Q(144)- A(4) — I answer that, As stated above ( AA(1),2 ) shamefacedness is fear of some disgrace. Now it may happen in two ways that an evil is not feared: first, because it is not reckoned an evil; secondly because one reckons it impossible with regard to oneself, or as not difficult to avoid.

Accordingly shame may be lacking in a person in two ways. First, because the things that should make him ashamed are not deemed by him to be disgraceful; and in this way those who are steeped in sin are without shame, for instead of disapproving of their sins, they boast of them.

Secondly, because they apprehend disgrace as impossible to themselves, or as easy to avoid. In this way the old and the virtuous are not shamefaced.

Yet they are so disposed, that if there were anything disgraceful in them they would be ashamed of it. Wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 9) that “shame is in the virtuous hypothetically.”

P(2b)- Q(144)- A(4)- RO(1) — Lack of shame occurs in the best and in the worst men through different causes, as stated in the Article. In the average men it is found, in so far as they have a certain love of good, and yet are not altogether free from evil.

P(2b)- Q(144)- A(4)- RO(2) — It belongs to the virtuous man to avoid not only vice, but also whatever has the semblance of vice, according to Thessalonians 5:22, “From all appearance of evil refrain yourselves.” The Philosopher, too, says (Ethic. iv, 9) that the virtuous man should avoid “not only what is really evil, but also those things that are regarded as evil.”

P(2b)- Q(144)- A(4)- RO(3) — As stated above ( A(1), ad 1) the virtuous man despises ignominy and reproach, as being things he does not deserve, wherefore he is not much ashamed of them. Nevertheless, to a certain extent, shame, like the other passions, may forestall reason.

P(2b)- Q(144)- A(4)- RO(4) — Shamefacedness is a part of temperance, not as though it entered into its essence, but as a disposition to it: wherefore Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 43) that “shamefacedness lays the first foundation of temperance,” by inspiring man with the horror of whatever is disgraceful.

QUESTION OF HONESTY* (FOUR ARTICLES) [*Honesty must be taken here in its broad sense as synonymous with moral goodness, from the point of view of decorum.] We must now consider honesty, under which head there are four points of inquiry: (1) The relation between the honest and the virtuous; (2) Its relation with the beautiful [*As honesty here denotes moral goodness, so beauty stands for moral beauty]; (3) Its relation with the useful and the pleasant; (4) Whether honesty is a part of temperance?

P(2b)- Q(145)- A(1) Whether honesty is the same as virtue?

P(2b)- Q(145)- A(1)- O(1) — It would seem that honesty is not the same as virtue. For Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 53) that “the honest is what is desired for its own sake.” Now virtue is desired, not for its own sake, but for the sake of happiness, for the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 9) that “happiness is the reward and the end of virtue.” Therefore honesty is not the same as virtue.

P(2b)- Q(145)- A(1)- O(2) — Further, according to Isidore (Etym. x) “honesty means an honorable state.” Now honor is due to many things besides virtue, since “it is praise that is the proper due of virtue” (Ethic. i, 12). Therefore honesty is not the same as virtue.

P(2b)- Q(145)- A(1)- O(3) — Further, the “principal part of virtue is the interior choice,” as the Philosopher says (Ethic. viii, 13). But honesty seems to pertain rather to exterior conduct, according to 1 Corinthians 14:40, “Let all things be done decently [honeste] and according to order” among you. Therefore honesty is not the same as virtue.

P(2b)- Q(145)- A(1)- O(4) — Further, honesty apparently consists in external wealth. According to Ecclus. 11:14, “good things and evil, life and death [poverty and riches] are from God” [*The words in brackets are omitted in the Leonine edition. For riches the Vulgate has ‘honestas’]. But virtue does not consist in external wealth. Therefore honesty is not the same as virtue.

P(2b)- Q(145)- A(1) — On the contrary, Tully (De Offic. i, 5; Rhet. ii, 53) divides honesty into the four principal virtues, into which virtue is also divided. Therefore honesty is the same as virtue.

P(2b)- Q(145)- A(1) — I answer that, As Isidore says (Etym. x) “honesty means an honorable state,” wherefore a thing may be said to be honest through being worthy of honor. Now honor, as stated above ( Q(144), A(2), ad 2), is due to excellence: and the excellence of a man is gauged chiefly according to his virtue, as stated in Phys. vii, 17. Therefore, properly speaking, honesty refers to the same thing as virtue.

P(2b)- Q(145)- A(1)- RO(1) — According to the Philosopher (Ethic. i, 7), of those things that are desired for their own sake, some are desired for their own sake alone, and never for the sake of something else, such as happiness which is the last end; while some are desired, not only for their own sake, inasmuch as they have an aspect of goodness in themselves, even if no further good accrued to us through them, but also for the sake of something else, inasmuch as they are conducive to some more perfect good. It is thus that the virtues are desirable for their own sake: wherefore Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 52) that “some things allure us by their own force, and attract us by their own worth, such as virtue, truth, knowledge.” And this suffices to give a thing the character of honest.

P(2b)- Q(145)- A(1)- RO(2) — Some of the things which are honored besides virtue are more excellent than virtue, namely God and happiness, and such like things are not so well known to us by experience as virtue which we practice day by day. Hence virtue has a greater claim to the name of honesty. Other things which are beneath virtue are honored, in so far as they are a help to the practice of virtue, such as rank, power, and riches [*Ethic. i, 8]. For as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3) that these things “are honored by some people, but in truth it is only the good man who is worthy of honor.” Now a man is good in respect of virtue.

Wherefore praise is due to virtue in so far as the latter is desirable for the sake of something else, while honor is due to virtue for its own sake: and it is thus that virtue has the character of honesty.

P(2b)- Q(145)- A(1)- RO(3) — As we have stated honest denotes that to which honor is due. Now honor is an attestation to someone’s excellence, as stated above ( Q(103), AA(1),2 ). But one attests only to what one knows; and the internal choice is not made known save by external actions.

Wherefore external conduct has the character of honesty, in so far as it reflects internal rectitude. For this reason honesty consists radically in the internal choice, but its expression lies in the external conduct.

P(2b)- Q(145)- A(1)- RO(4) — It is because the excellence of wealth is commonly regarded as making a man deserving of honor, that sometimes the name of honesty is given to external prosperity.

P(2b)- Q(145)- A(2) Whether the honest is the same as the beautiful?

P(2b)- Q(145)- A(2)- O(1) — It would seem that the honest is not the same as the beautiful. For the aspect of honest is derived from the appetite, since the honest is “what is desirable for its own sake” [*Cicero, De Invent. Rhet. ii, 53]. But the beautiful regards rather the faculty of vision to which it is pleasing. Therefore the beautiful is not the same as the honest.

P(2b)- Q(145)- A(2)- O(2) — Further, beauty requires a certain clarity, which is characteristic of glory: whereas the honest regards honor. Since then honor and glory differ, as stated above ( Q(103), A(1), ad 3), it seems also that the honest and the beautiful differ.

P(2b)- Q(145)- A(2)- O(3) — Further, honesty is the same as virtue, as stated above ( A(1) ). But a certain beauty is contrary to virtue, wherefore it is written (Ezech. 16:15): “Trusting in thy beauty thou playest the harlot because of thy renown.” Therefore the honest is not the same as the beautiful.

P(2b)- Q(145)- A(2) — On the contrary, The Apostle says ( Corinthians 12:23,24): “Those that are our uncomely [inhonesta] parts, have more abundant comeliness [honestatem], but our comely [honesta] parts have no need.” Now by uncomely parts he means the baser members, and by comely parts the beautiful members. Therefore the honest and the beautiful are apparently the same.

P(2b)- Q(145)- A(2) — I answer that, As may be gathered from the words of Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv), beauty or comeliness results from the concurrence of clarity and due proportion. For he states that God is said to be beautiful, as being “the cause of the harmony and clarity of the universe.” Hence the beauty of the body consists in a man having his bodily limbs well proportioned, together with a certain clarity of color. In like manner spiritual beauty consists in a man’s conduct or actions being well proportioned in respect of the spiritual clarity of reason. Now this is what is meant by honesty, which we have stated ( A(1) ) to be the same as virtue; and it is virtue that moderates according to reason all that is connected with man. Wherefore “honesty is the same as spiritual beauty.”

Hence Augustine says ( QQ(83) , qu. 30): “By honesty I mean intelligible beauty, which we properly designate as spiritual,” and further on he adds that “many things are beautiful to the eye, which it would be hardly proper to call honest.”

P(2b)- Q(145)- A(2)- RO(1) — The object that moves the appetite is an apprehended good. Now if a thing is perceived to be beautiful as soon as it is apprehended, it is taken to be something becoming and good. Hence Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that “the beautiful and the good are beloved by all.” Wherefore the honest, inasmuch as it implies spiritual beauty, is an object of desire, and for this reason Tully says (De Offic. i, 5): “Thou perceivest the form and the features, so to speak, of honesty; and were it to be seen with the eye, would, as Plato declares, arouse a wondrous love of wisdom.”

P(2b)- Q(145)- A(2)- RO(2) — As stated above ( Q(103), A(1), ad 3), glory is the effect of honor: because through being honored or praised, a person acquires clarity in the eyes of others. Wherefore, just as the same thing makes a man honorable and glorious, so is the same thing honest and beautiful.

P(2b)- Q(145)- A(2)- RO(3) — This argument applies to the beauty of the body: although it might be replied that to be proud of one’s honesty is to play the harlot because of one’s spiritual beauty, according to Ezekiel 28:17, “Thy heart was lifted up with thy beauty, thou hast lost thy wisdom in thy beauty.”

P(2b)- Q(145)- A(3) Whether the honest differs from the useful and the pleasant?

P(2b)- Q(145)- A(3)- O(1) — It would seem that the honest does not differ from the useful and the pleasant. For the honest is “what is desirable for its own sake” [*Cicero, De Invent. Rhet. ii, 53]. Now pleasure is desired for its own sake, for “it seems ridiculous to ask a man why he wishes to be pleased,” as the Philosopher remarks (Ethic. x, 2). Therefore the honest does not differ from the pleasant.

P(2b)- Q(145)- A(3)- O(2) — Further, riches are comprised under the head of useful good: for Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 52): “There is a thing that attracts the desire not by any force of its own, nor by its very nature, but on account of its fruitfulness and utility”: and “that is money.” Now riches come under the head of honesty, for it is written (Ecclus. 11:14): “Poverty and riches [honestas] are from God,” and (Ecclus. 13:2): “He shall take a burden upon him that hath fellowship with one more honorable,” i.e. richer, “than himself.” Therefore the honest differs not from the useful.

P(2b)- Q(145)- A(3)- O(3) — Further, Tully proves (De Offic. ii, 3) that nothing can be useful unless it be honest: and Ambrose makes the same statement (De Offic. ii, 6). Therefore the useful differs not from the honest.

P(2b)- Q(145)- A(3) — On the contrary, Augustine says ( Q(83) , qu. 30): “The honest is that which is desirable for its own sake: the useful implies reference to something else.”

P(2b)- Q(145)- A(3) — I answer that, The honest concurs in the same subject with the useful and the pleasant, but it differs from them in aspect.

For, as stated above ( A(2) ), a thing is said to be honest, in so far as it has a certain beauty through being regulated by reason. Now whatever is regulated in accordance with reason is naturally becoming to man. Again, it is natural for a thing to take pleasure in that which is becoming to it.

Wherefore an honest thing is naturally pleasing to man: and the Philosopher proves this with regard to acts of virtue (Ethic. i, 8). Yet not all that is pleasing is honest, since a thing may be becoming according to the senses, but not according to reason. A pleasing thing of this kind is beside man’s reason which perfects his nature. Even virtue itself, which is essentially honest, is referred to something else as its end namely happiness. Accordingly the honest the useful, and the pleasant concur in the one subject.

Nevertheless they differ in aspect. For a thing is said to be honest as having a certain excellence deserving of honor on account of its spiritual beauty: while it is said to be pleasing, as bringing rest to desire, and useful, as referred to something else. The pleasant, however, extends to more things than the useful and the honest: since whatever is useful and honest is pleasing in some respect, whereas the converse does not hold (Ethic. ii, 3).

P(2b)- Q(145)- A(3)- RO(1) — A thing is said to be honest, if it is desired for its own sake by the rational appetite. which tends to that which is in accordance with reason: while a thing is said to be pleasant if it is desired for its own sake by the sensitive appetite.

P(2b)- Q(145)- A(3)- RO(2) — Riches are denominated honesty according of the opinion of the many who honor wealth: or because they are intended to be the instruments of virtuous deeds, as stated above ( A(1), ad 2).

P(2b)- Q(145)- A(3)- RO(3) — Tully and Ambrose mean to say that nothing incompatible with honesty can be simply and truly useful, since it follows that it is contrary to man’s last end, which is a good in accordance with reason; although it may perhaps be useful in some respect, with regard to a particular end. But they do not mean to say that every useful thing as such may be classed among those that are honest.

P(2b)- Q(145)- A(4) Whether honesty should be reckoned a part of temperance?

P(2b)- Q(145)- A(4)- O(1) — It would seem that honesty should not be reckoned a part of temperance. For it is not possible for a thing to be part and whole in respect of one same thing. Now “temperance is a part of honesty,” according to Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 53). Therefore honesty is not a part of temperance.

P(2b)- Q(145)- A(4)- O(2) — Further, it is stated (3 Esdra 3:21) that “wine... makes all thoughts honest.” But the use of wine, especially in excess, in which sense the passage quoted should seemingly be taken, pertains to intemperance rather than to temperance. Therefore honesty is not a part of temperance.

P(2b)- Q(145)- A(4)- O(3) — Further, the honest is that which is deserving of honor. Now “it is the just and the brave who receive most honor,” according to the Philosopher (Rhet. i, 9). Therefore honesty pertains, not to temperance, but rather to justice and fortitude: wherefore Eleazar said as related in 2 Macc. 6:28: “I suffer an honorable [honesta] death, for the most venerable and most holy laws.”

P(2b)- Q(145)- A(4) — On the contrary, Macrobius [*In Somn. Scip. i] reckons honesty a part of temperance, and Ambrose (De Offic. i, 43) ascribes honesty as pertaining especially to temperance.

P(2b)- Q(145)- A(4) — I answer that, As stated above ( A(2) ), honesty is a kind of spiritual beauty. Now the disgraceful is opposed to the beautiful: and opposites are most manifest of one another. Wherefore seemingly honesty belongs especially to temperance, since the latter repels that which is most disgraceful and unbecoming to man, namely animal lusts.

Hence by its very name temperance is most significative of the good of reason to which it belongs to moderate and temper evil desires.

Accordingly honesty, as being ascribed for a special reason to temperance, is reckoned as a part thereof, not as a subjective part, nor as an annexed virtue, but as an integral part or condition attaching thereto.

P(2b)- Q(145)- A(4)- RO(1) — Temperance is accounted a subjective part of honesty taken in a wide sense: it is not thus that the latter is reckoned a part of temperance.

P(2b)- Q(145)- A(4)- RO(2) — When a man is intoxicated, “the wine makes his thoughts honest” according to his own reckoning because he deems himself great and deserving of honor [*Cf. Q(148), A(6) ].

P(2b)- Q(145)- A(4)- RO(3) — Greater honor is due to justice and fortitude than to temperance, because they excel in the point of a greater good: yet greater honor is due to temperance, because the vices which it holds in check are the most deserving of reproach, as stated above. Thus honesty is more to be ascribed to temperance according to the rule given by the Apostle ( 1 Corinthians 12:23) when he says that “our uncomely parts have more abundant comeliness,” which, namely, destroys whatever is uncomely.

QUESTION OF ABSTINENCE (TWO ARTICLES) We must now consider the subjective parts of temperance: first, those which are about pleasures of food; secondly, those which are about pleasures of sex. The first consideration will include abstinence, which is about meat and drink, and sobriety, which is specifically about drink.

With regard to abstinence three points have to be considered: (1) Abstinence itself; (2) its act which is fasting; (3) its opposite vice which is gluttony.

Under the first head there are two points of inquiry: (1) Whether abstinence is a virtue? (2) Whether it is a special virtue?

P(2b)- Q(146)- A(1) Whether abstinence is a virtue?

P(2b)- Q(146)- A(1)- O(1) — It seems that abstinence is not a virtue. For the Apostle says ( 1 Corinthians 4:20): “The kingdom of God is not in speech but in power [virtute].” Now the kingdom of God does not consist in abstinence, for the Apostle says ( Romans 14:17): “The kingdom of God is not meat and drink,” where a gloss [*Cf. St. Augustine, QQ. Evang. ii, qu. 11] observes that “justice consists neither in abstaining nor in eating.” Therefore abstinence is not a virtue.

P(2b)- Q(146)- A(1)- O(2) — Further, Augustine says (Confess. x, 11) addressing himself to God: “This hast Thou taught me, that I should set myself to take food as physic.” Now it belongs not to virtue, but to the medical art to regulate medicine. Therefore, in like manner, to regulate one’s food, which belongs to abstinence, is an act not of virtue but of art.

P(2b)- Q(146)- A(1)- O(3) — Further, every virtue “observes the mean,” as stated in Ethic. ii, 6,7. But abstinence seemingly inclines not to the mean but to deficiency, since it denotes retrenchment. Therefore abstinence is not a virtue.

P(2b)- Q(146)- A(1)- O(4) — Further, no virtue excludes another virtue.

But abstinence excludes patience: for Gregory says (Pastor. iii, 19) that “impatience not unfrequently dislodges the abstainer’s mind from its peaceful seclusion.” Likewise he says (Pastor. iii, 19) that “sometimes the sin of pride pierces the thoughts of the abstainer,” so that abstinence excludes humility. Therefore abstinence is not a virtue.

P(2b)- Q(146)- A(1) — On the contrary, It is written ( 2 Peter 1:5,6): “Join with your faith virtue, and with virtue knowledge, and with knowledge abstinence”; where abstinence is numbered among other virtues. Therefore abstinence is a virtue.

I answer that, Abstinence by its very name denotes retrenchment of food.

Hence the term abstinence may be taken in two ways. First, as denoting retrenchment of food absolutely, and in this way it signifies neither a virtue nor a virtuous act, but something indifferent. Secondly, it may be taken as regulated by reason, and then it signifies either a virtuous habit or a virtuous act. This is the meaning of Peter’s words quoted above, where he says that we ought “to join abstinence with knowledge,” namely that in abstaining from food a man should act with due regard for those among whom he lives, for his own person, and for the requirements of health.

P(2b)- Q(146)- A(1)- RO(1) — The use of and abstinence from food, considered in themselves, do not pertain to the kingdom of God, since the Apostle says ( 1 Corinthians 8:8): “Meat doth not commend us to God. For neither, if we eat not [*Vulg.: ‘Neither if we eat... nor if we eat not’], shall we have the less, nor if we eat, shall we have the more,” i.e. spiritually. Nevertheless they both belong to the kingdom of God, in so far as they are done reasonably through faith and love of God.

P(2b)- Q(146)- A(1)- RO(2) — The regulation of food, in the point of quantity and quality, belongs to the art of medicine as regards the health of the body: but in the point of internal affections with regard to the good of reason, it belongs to abstinence. Hence Augustine says (QQ. Evang. ii, qu. 11): “It makes no difference whatever to virtue what or how much food a man takes, so long as he does it with due regard for the people among whom he lives, for his own person, and for the requirements of his health: but it matters how readily and uncomplainingly he does without food when bound by duty or necessity to abstain.”

P(2b)- Q(146)- A(1)- RO(3) — It belongs to temperance to bridle the pleasures which are too alluring to the soul, just as it belongs to fortitude to strengthen the soul against fears that deter it from the good of reason.

Wherefore, just as fortitude is commended on account of a certain excess, from which all the parts of fortitude take their name, so temperance is commended for a kind of deficiency, from which all its parts are denominated. Hence abstinence, since it is a part of temperance, is named from deficiency, and yet it observes the mean, in so far as it is in accord with right reason.

P(2b)- Q(146)- A(1)- RO(4) — Those vices result from abstinence in so far as it is not in accord with right reason. For right reason makes one abstain as one ought, i.e. with gladness of heart, and for the due end, i.e. for God’s glory and not one’s own.

P(2b)- Q(146)- A(2) Whether abstinence is a special virtue?

P(2b)- Q(146)- A(2)- O(1) — It would seem that abstinence is not a special virtue. For every virtue is praiseworthy by itself. But abstinence is not praiseworthy by itself; for Gregory says (Pastor. iii, 19) that “the virtue of abstinence is praised only on account of the other virtues.” Therefore abstinence is not a special virtue.

P(2b)- Q(146)- A(2)- O(2) — Further, Augustine [*Fulgentius] says (De Fide ad Pet. xlii) that “the saints abstain from meat and drink, not that any creature of God is evil, but merely in order to chastise the body.” Now this belongs to chastity, as its very name denotes. Therefore abstinence is not a special virtue distinct from chastity.

P(2b)- Q(146)- A(2)- O(3) — Further, as man should be content with moderate meat, so should he be satisfied with moderate clothes, according to 1 Timothy 6:8, “Having food, and wherewith to be covered, with these we should be [Vulg.: ‘are’] content.”

Now there is no special virtue in being content with moderate clothes.

Neither, therefore, is there in abstinence which moderates food.

P(2b)- Q(146)- A(2) — On the contrary, Macrobius [*In Somn. Scip. i, 8] reckons abstinence as a special part of temperance.

P(2b)- Q(146)- A(2) — I answer that, As stated above ( Q(136), A(1) ; Q(141), A(3) ) moral virtue maintains the good of reason against the onslaught of the passions: hence whenever we find a special motive why a passion departs from the good of reason, there is need of a special virtue.

Now pleasures of the table are of a nature to withdraw man from the good of reason, both because they are so great, and because food is necessary to man who needs it for the maintenance of life, which he desires above all other things. Therefore abstinence is a special virtue.

P(2b)- Q(146)- A(2)- RO(1) — Virtues are of necessity connected together, as stated above ( P(1), Q(65) , A(1) ). Wherefore one virtue receives help and commendation from another, as justice from fortitude. Accordingly in this way the virtue of abstinence receives commendation on account of the other virtues.

P(2b)- Q(146)- A(2)- RO(2) — The body is chastised by means of abstinence, not only against the allurements of lust, but also against those of gluttony: since by abstaining a man gains strength for overcoming the onslaughts of gluttony, which increase in force the more he yields to them.

Yet abstinence is not prevented from being a special virtue through being a help to chastity, since one virtue helps another.

P(2b)- Q(146)- A(2)- RO(3) — The use of clothing was devised by art, whereas the use of food is from nature. Hence it is more necessary to have a special virtue for the moderation of food than for the moderation of clothing.

QUESTION OF FASTING (EIGHT ARTICLES) We must now consider fasting: under which head there are eight points of inquiry: (1) Whether fasting is an act of virtue? (2) Of what virtue is it the act? (3) Whether it is a matter of precept? (4) Whether anyone is excused from fulfilling this precept? (5) The time of fasting; (6) Whether it is requisite for fasting to eat but once? (7) The hour of eating for those who fast; (8) The meats from which it is necessary to abstain.

P(2b)- Q(147)- A(1) Whether fasting is an act of virtue?

P(2b)- Q(147)- A(1)- O(1) — It would seem that fasting is not an act of virtue. For every act of virtue is acceptable to God. But fasting is not always acceptable to God, according to Isaiah 58:3, “Why have we fasted and Thou hast not regarded?” Therefore fasting is not an act of virtue.

P(2b)- Q(147)- A(1)- O(2) — Further, no act of virtue forsakes the mean of virtue. Now fasting forsakes the mean of virtue, which in the virtue of abstinence takes account of the necessity of supplying the needs of nature, whereas by fasting something is retrenched therefrom: else those who do not fast would not have the virtue of abstinence. Therefore fasting is not an act of virtue.

P(2b)- Q(147)- A(1)- O(3) — Further, that which is competent to all, both good and evil, is not an act of virtue. Now such is fasting, since every one is fasting before eating. Therefore fasting is not an act of virtue.

P(2b)- Q(147)- A(1) — On the contrary, It is reckoned together with other virtuous acts ( 2 Corinthians 6:5,6) where the Apostle says: “In fasting, in knowledge, in chastity, etc. [Vulg.: ‘in chastity, in knowledge’].”

P(2b)- Q(147)- A(1) — I answer that, An act is virtuous through being directed by reason to some virtuous [honestum] [*Cf. Q(145), A(1) ] good.

Now this is consistent with fasting, because fasting is practiced for a threefold purpose. First, in order to bridle the lusts of the flesh, wherefore the Apostle says ( 2 Corinthians 6:5,6): “In fasting, in chastity,” since fasting is the guardian of chastity. For, according to Jerome [*Contra Jov. ii.] “Venus is cold when Ceres and Bacchus are not there,” that is to say, lust is cooled by abstinence in meat and drink. Secondly, we have recourse to fasting in order that the mind may arise more freely to the contemplation of heavenly things: hence it is related ( Daniel 10) of Daniel that he received a revelation from God after fasting for three weeks.

Thirdly, in order to satisfy for sins: wherefore it is written ( Joel 2:12): “Be converted to Me with all your heart, in fasting and in weeping and in mourning.”

The same is declared by Augustine in a sermon (De orat. et Jejun. [*Serm. lxxii (ccxxx, de Tempore)]): “Fasting cleanses the soul, raises the mind, subjects one’s flesh to the spirit, renders the heart contrite and humble, scatters the clouds of concupiscence, quenches the fire of lust, kindles the true light of chastity.”

P(2b)- Q(147)- A(1)- RO(1) — An act that is virtuous generically may be rendered vicious by its connection with certain circumstances. Hence the text goes on to say: “Behold in the day of your fast your own will is founded,” and a little further on ( Isaiah 58:4): “You fast for debates and strife and strike with the fist wickedly.” These words are expounded by Gregory (Pastor. iii, 19) as follows: “The will indicates joy and the fist anger. In vain then is the flesh restrained if the mind allowed to drift to inordinate movements be wrecked by vice.” And Augustine says (in the same sermon) that “fasting loves not many words, deems wealth superfluous, scorns pride, commends humility, helps man to perceive what is frail and paltry.”

P(2b)- Q(147)- A(1)- RO(2) — The mean of virtue is measured not according to quantity but according to right reason, as stated in Ethic. ii, 6.

Now reason judges it expedient, on account of some special motive, for a man to take less food than would be becoming to him under ordinary circumstances, for instance in order to avoid sickness, or in order to perform certain bodily works with greater ease: and much more does reason direct this to the avoidance of spiritual evils and the pursuit of spiritual goods. Yet reason does not retrench so much from one’s food as to refuse nature its necessary support: thus Jerome says:* “It matters not whether thou art a long or a short time in destroying thyself, since to afflict the body immoderately, whether by excessive lack of nourishment, or by eating or sleeping too little, is to offer a sacrifice of stolen goods.” [*The quotation is from the Corpus of Canon Law (Cap. Non mediocriter, De Consecrationibus, dist. 5). Gratian there ascribes the quotation to St.

Jerome, but it is not to be found in the saint’s works.] In like manner right reason does not retrench so much from a man’s food as to render him incapable of fulfilling his duty. Hence Jerome says (in the same reference) “Rational man forfeits his dignity, if he sets fasting before chastity, or night-watchings before the well-being of his senses.”

P(2b)- Q(147)- A(1)- RO(3) — The fasting of nature, in respect of which a man is said to be fasting until he partakes of food, consists in a pure negation, wherefore it cannot be reckoned a virtuous act. Such is only the fasting of one who abstains in some measure from food for a reasonable purpose. Hence the former is called natural fasting [jejunium jejunii] [*Literally the ‘fast of fasting’]: while the latter is called the faster’s fast, because he fasts for a purpose.

P(2b)- Q(147)- A(2) Whether fasting is an act of abstinence?

P(2b)- Q(147)- A(2)- O(1) — It would seem that fasting is not an act of abstinence. For Jerome [*The quotation is from the Ordinary Gloss, where the reference is lacking] commenting on Matthew 17:20, “This kind of devil” says: “To fast is to abstain not only from food but also from all manner of lusts.” Now this belongs to every virtue. Therefore fasting is not exclusively an act of abstinence.

P(2b)- Q(147)- A(2)- O(2) — Further, Gregory says in a Lenten Homily (xvi in Evang.) that “the Lenten fast is a tithe of the whole year.” Now paying tithes is an act of religion, as stated above ( Q(87) , A(1) ). Therefore fasting is an act of religion and not of abstinence.

P(2b)- Q(147)- A(2)- O(3) — Further, abstinence is a part of temperance, as stated above ( QQ(143),146 , A(1), ad 3). Now temperance is condivided with fortitude, to which it belongs to endure hardships, and this seems very applicable to fasting. Therefore fasting is not an act of abstinence.

P(2b)- Q(147)- A(2) — On the contrary, Isidore says (Etym. vi, 19) that “fasting is frugality of fare and abstinence from food.”

P(2b)- Q(147)- A(2) — I answer that, Habit and act have the same matter.

Wherefore every virtuous act about some particular matter belongs to the virtue that appoints the mean in that matter. Now fasting is concerned with food, wherein the mean is appointed by abstinence. Wherefore it is evident that fasting is an act of abstinence.

P(2b)- Q(147)- A(2)- RO(1) — Properly speaking fasting consists in abstaining from food, but speaking metaphorically it denotes abstinence from anything harmful, and such especially is sin.

We may also reply that even properly speaking fasting is abstinence from all manner of lust, since, as stated above ( A(1), ad 1), an act ceases to be virtuous by the conjunction of any vice.

P(2b)- Q(147)- A(2)- RO(2) — Nothing prevents the act of one virtue belonging to another virtue, in so far as it is directed to the end of that virtue, as explained above ( Q(32) , A(1), ad 2; Q(85) , A(3) ). Accordingly there is no reason why fasting should not be an act of religion, or of chastity, or of any other virtue.

P(2b)- Q(147)- A(2)- RO(3) — It belongs to fortitude as a special virtue, to endure, not any kind of hardship, but only those connected with the danger of death. To endure hardships resulting from privation of pleasure of touch, belongs to temperance and its parts: and such are the hardships of fasting.

P(2b)- Q(147)- A(3) Whether fasting is a matter of precept?

P(2b)- Q(147)- A(3)- O(1) — It would seem that fasting is not a matter of precept. For precepts are not given about works of supererogation which are a matter of counsel. Now fasting is a work of supererogation: else it would have to be equally observed at all places and times. Therefore fasting is not a matter of precept.

P(2b)- Q(147)- A(3)- O(2) — Further, whoever infringes a precept commits a mortal sin. Therefore if fasting were a matter of precept, all who do not fast would sin mortally, and a widespreading snare would be laid for men.

P(2b)- Q(147)- A(3)- O(3) — Further, Augustine says (De Vera Relig. 17) that “the Wisdom of God having taken human nature, and called us to a state of freedom, instituted a few most salutary sacraments whereby the community of the Christian people, that is, of the free multitude, should be bound together in subjection to one God.” Now the liberty of the Christian people seems to be hindered by a great number of observances no less than by a great number of sacraments. For Augustine says (Ad inquis. Januar., Ep. lv) that “whereas God in His mercy wished our religion to be distinguished by its freedom and the evidence and small number of its solemn sacraments, some people render it oppressive with slavish burdens.” Therefore it seems that the Church should not have made fasting a matter of precept.

P(2b)- Q(147)- A(3) — On the contrary, Jerome (Ad Lucin., Ep. lxxi) speaking of fasting says: “Let each province keep to its own practice, and look upon the commands of the elders as though they were laws of the apostles.” Therefore fasting is a matter of precept.

P(2b)- Q(147)- A(3) — I answer that, Just as it belongs to the secular authority to make legal precepts which apply the natural law to matters of common weal in temporal affairs, so it belongs to ecclesiastical superiors to prescribe by statute those things that concern the common weal of the faithful in spiritual goods.

Now it has been stated above ( A(1) ) that fasting is useful as atoning for and preventing sin, and as raising the mind to spiritual things. And everyone is bound by the natural dictate of reason to practice fasting as far as it is necessary for these purposes. Wherefore fasting in general is a matter of precept of the natural law, while the fixing of the time and manner of fasting as becoming and profitable to the Christian people, is a matter of precept of positive law established by ecclesiastical authority: the latter is the Church fast, the former is the fast prescribed by nature.

P(2b)- Q(147)- A(3)- RO(1) — Fasting considered in itself denotes something not eligible but penal: yet it becomes eligible in so far as it is useful to some end. Wherefore considered absolutely it is not binding under precept, but it is binding under precept to each one that stands in need of such a remedy. And since men, for the most part, need this remedy, both because “in many things we all offend” ( James 3:2), and because “the flesh lusteth against the spirit” ( Galatians 5:17), it was fitting that the Church should appoint certain fasts to be kept by all in common. In doing this the Church does not make a precept of a matter of supererogation, but particularizes in detail that which is of general obligation.

P(2b)- Q(147)- A(3)- RO(2) — Those commandments which are given under the form of a general precept, do not bind all persons in the same way, but subject to the requirements of the end intended by the lawgiver.

It will be a mortal sin to disobey a commandment through contempt of the lawgiver’s authority, or to disobey it in such a way as to frustrate the end intended by him: but it is not a mortal sin if one fails to keep a commandment, when there is a reasonable motive, and especially if the lawgiver would not insist on its observance if he were present. Hence it is that not all, who do not keep the fasts of the Church, sin mortally.

P(2b)- Q(147)- A(3)- RO(3) — Augustine is speaking there of those things “that are neither contained in the authorities of Holy Scripture, nor found among the ordinances of bishops in council, nor sanctioned by the custom of the universal Church.” On the other hand, the fasts that are of obligation are appointed by the councils of bishops and are sanctioned by the custom of the universal Church. Nor are they opposed to the freedom of the faithful, rather are they of use in hindering the slavery of sin, which is opposed to spiritual freedom, of which it is written ( Galatians 5:13): “You, brethren, have been called unto liberty; only make not liberty an occasion to the flesh.”

P(2b)- Q(147)- A(4) Whether all are bound to keep the fasts of the Church?

P(2b)- Q(147)- A(4)- O(1) — It would seem that all are bound to keep the fasts of the Church. For the commandments of the Church are binding even as the commandments of God, according to Luke 10:16, “He that heareth you heareth Me.” Now all are bound to keep the commandments of God. Therefore in like manner all are bound to keep the fasts appointed by the Church.

P(2b)- Q(147)- A(4)- O(2) — Further, children especially are seemingly not exempt from fasting, on account of their age: for it is written ( Joel 2:15): “Sanctify a fast,” and further on ( Joel 2:16): “Gather together the little ones, and them that suck the breasts.” Much more therefore are all others bound to keen the fasts.

P(2b)- Q(147)- A(4)- O(3) — Further, spiritual things should be preferred to temporal, and necessary things to those that are not necessary. Now bodily works are directed to temporal gain; and pilgrimages, though directed to spiritual things, are not a matter of necessity. Therefore, since fasting is directed to a spiritual gain, and is made a necessary thing by the commandment of the Church, it seems that the fasts of the Church ought not to be omitted on account of a pilgrimage, or bodily works.

P(2b)- Q(147)- A(4)- O(4) — Further, it is better to do a thing willingly than through necessity, as stated in 2 Corinthians 9:7. Now the poor are wont to fast through necessity, owing to lack of food. Much more therefore ought they to fast willingly.

P(2b)- Q(147)- A(4) — On the contrary, It seems that no righteous man is bound to fast. For the commandments of the Church are not binding in opposition to Christ’s teaching. But our Lord said ( Luke 5:34) that “the children of the bridegroom cannot fast whilst the bridegroom is with them [*Vulg.: ‘Can you make the children of the bridegroom fast, whilst the bridegroom is with them?’].” Now He is with all the righteous by dwelling in them in a special manner [*Cf. P(1), Q(8) , A(3) ], wherefore our Lord said ( Matthew 28:20): “Behold I am with you... even to the consummation of the world.” Therefore the righteous are not bound by the commandment of the Church to fast.

I answer that, As stated above ( P(1), Q(90) , A(2) ; P(1), Q(98) , AA(2),6 ), general precepts are framed according to the requirements of the many.

Wherefore in making such precepts the lawgiver considers what happens generally and for the most part, and he does not intend the precept to be binding on a person in whom for some special reason there is something incompatible with observance of the precept. Yet discretion must be brought to bear on the point. For if the reason be evident, it is lawful for a man to use his own judgment in omitting to fulfil the precept, especially if custom be in his favor, or if it be difficult for him to have recourse to superior authority. on the other hand, if the reason be doubtful, one should have recourse to the superior who has power to grant a dispensation in such cases. And this must be done in the fasts appointed by the Church, to which all are bound in general, unless there be some special obstacle to this observance.

P(2b)- Q(147)- A(4)- RO(1) — The commandments of God are precepts of the natural law, which are, of themselves, necessary for salvation. But the commandments of the Church are about matters which are necessary for salvation, not of themselves, but only through the ordinance of the Church.

Hence there may be certain obstacles on account of which certain persons are not bound to keep the fasts in question.

P(2b)- Q(147)- A(4)- RO(2) — In children there is a most evident reason for not fasting, both on account of their natural weakness, owing to which they need to take food frequently, and not much at a time, and because they need much nourishment owing to the demands of growth, which results from the residuum of nourishment. Wherefore as long as the stage of growth lasts, which as a rule lasts until they have completed the third period of seven years, they are not bound to keep the Church fasts: and yet it is fitting that even during that time they should exercise themselves in fasting, more or less, in accordance with their age. Nevertheless when some great calamity threatens, even children are commanded to fast, in sign of more severe penance, according to Jonas 3:7, “Let neither men nor beasts... taste anything... nor drink water.”

P(2b)- Q(147)- A(4)- RO(3) — Apparently a distinction should be made with regard to pilgrims and working people. For if the pilgrimage or laborious work can be conveniently deferred or lessened without detriment to the bodily health and such external conditions as are necessary for the upkeep of bodily or spiritual life, there is no reason for omitting the fasts of the Church. But if one be under the necessity of starting on the pilgrimage at once, and of making long stages, or of doing much work, either for one’s bodily livelihood, or for some need of the spiritual life, and it be impossible at the same time to keep the fasts of the Church, one is not bound to fast: because in ordering fasts the Church would not seem to have intended to prevent other pious and more necessary undertakings.

Nevertheless, in such cases one ought seemingly, to seek the superior’s dispensation; except perhaps when the above course is recognized by custom, since when superiors are silent they would seem to consent.

P(2b)- Q(147)- A(4)- RO(4) — Those poor who ca