QUESTIONS 155-170 QUESTION OF CONTINENCE (FOUR ARTICLES) We must next consider the potential parts of temperance: (1) continence; (2) clemency; (3) modesty.

Under the first head we must consider continence and incontinence. With regard to continence there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether continence is a virtue? (2) What is its matter? (3) What is its subject? (4) Of its comparison with temperance.

P(2b)- Q(155)- A(1) Whether continence is a virtue?

P(2b)- Q(155)- A(1)- O(1) — It would seem that continence is not a virtue.

For species and genus are not co-ordinate members of the same division.

But continence is co-ordinated with virtue, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 1,9). Therefore continence is not a virtue.

P(2b)- Q(155)- A(1)- O(2) — Further, no one sins by using a virtue, since, according to Augustine (De Lib. Arb. ii, 18,19), “a virtue is a thing that no one makes ill use of.” Yet one may sin by containing oneself: for instance, if one desire to do a good, and contain oneself from doing it. Therefore continence is not a virtue.

P(2b)- Q(155)- A(1)- O(3) — Further, no virtue withdraws man from that which is lawful, but only from unlawful things: for a gloss on Galatians 5:23, “Faith, modesty,” etc., says that by continence a man refrains even from things that are lawful. Therefore continence is not a virtue.

P(2b)- Q(155)- A(1) — On the contrary, Every praiseworthy habit would seem to be a virtue. Now such is continence, for Andronicus says [*De Affectibus] that “continence is a habit unconquered by pleasure.”

Therefore continence is a virtue.

P(2b)- Q(155)- A(1) — I answer that, The word “continence” is taken by various people in two ways. For some understand continence to denote abstention from all venereal pleasure: thus the Apostle joins continence to chastity ( Galatians 5:23). In this sense perfect continence is virginity in the first place, and widowhood in the second. Wherefore the same applies to continence understood thus, as to virginity which we have stated above ( Q(152), A(3) ) to be a virtue. Others, however, understand continence as signifying that whereby a man resists evil desires, which in him are vehement. In this sense the Philosopher takes continence (Ethic. vii, 7), and thus also it is used in the Conferences of the Fathers (Collat. xii, 10,11). In this way continence has something of the nature of a virtue, in so far, to wit, as the reason stands firm in opposition to the passions, lest it be led astray by them: yet it does not attain to the perfect nature of a moral virtue, by which even the sensitive appetite is subject to reason so that vehement passions contrary to reason do not arise in the sensitive appetite. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 9) that “continence is not a virtue but a mixture,” inasmuch as it has something of virtue, and somewhat falls short of virtue.

If, however, we take virtue in a broad sense, for any principle of commendable actions, we may say that continence is a virtue.

P(2b)- Q(155)- A(1)- RO(1) — The Philosopher includes continence in the same division with virtue in so far as the former falls short of virtue.

P(2b)- Q(155)- A(1)- RO(2) — Properly speaking, man is that which is according to reason. Wherefore from the very fact that a man holds [tenet se] to that which is in accord with reason, he is said to contain himself.

Now whatever pertains to perversion of reason is not according to reason.

Hence he alone is truly said to be continent who stands to that which is in accord with right reason, and not to that which is in accord with perverse reason. Now evil desires are opposed to right reason, even as good desires are opposed to perverse reason. Wherefore he is properly and truly continent who holds to right reason, by abstaining from evil desires, and not he who holds to perverse reason, by abstaining from good desires: indeed, the latter should rather be said to be obstinate in evil.

P(2b)- Q(155)- A(1)- RO(3) — The gloss quoted takes continence in the first sense, as denoting a perfect virtue, which refrains not merely from unlawful goods, but also from certain lawful things that are lesser goods, in order to give its whole attention to the more perfect goods.

P(2b)- Q(155)- A(2) Whether desires for pleasures of touch are the matter of continence?

P(2b)- Q(155)- A(2)- O(1) — It would seem that desires for pleasures of touch are not the matter of continence. For Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 46): “General decorum by its consistent form and the perfection of what is virtuous is restrained* in its every action.” [*”Continentem” according to St. Thomas’ reading; St. Ambrose wrote “concinentem = harmonious”].

P(2b)- Q(155)- A(2)- O(2) — Further, continence takes its name from a man standing for the good of right reason, as stated above ( A(1), ad 2). Now other passions lead men astray from right reason with greater vehemence than the desire for pleasures of touch: for instance, the fear of mortal dangers, which stupefies a man, and anger which makes him behave like a madman, as Seneca remarks [*De Ira i, 1]. Therefore continence does not properly regard the desires for pleasures of touch.

P(2b)- Q(155)- A(2)- O(3) — Further, Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 54): “It is continence that restrains cupidity with the guiding hand of counsel.”

Now cupidity is generally used to denote the desire for riches rather than the desire for pleasures of touch, according to 1 Timothy 6:10, “Cupidity [Douay: ‘The desire of money’] (\philargyria\), is the root of all evils.” Therefore continence is not properly about the desires for pleasures of touch P(2b)- Q(155)- A(2)- O(4) — Further, there are pleasures of touch not only in venereal matters but also in eating. But continence is wont to be applied only to the use of venereal matters. Therefore the desire for pleasures of touch is not its proper matter.

P(2b)- Q(155)- A(2)- O(5) — Further, among pleasures of touch some are not human but bestial, both as regards food — for instance, the pleasure of eating human flesh; and as regards venereal matters — for instance the abuse of animals or boys. But continence is not about such like things, as stated in Ethic. vii, 5. Therefore desires for pleasures of touch are not the proper matter of continence.

P(2b)- Q(155)- A(2) — On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 4) that “continence and incontinence are about the same things as temperance and intemperance.” Now temperance and intemperance are about the desires for pleasures of touch, as stated above ( Q(141), A(4) ).

Therefore continence and incontinence are also about that same matter.

P(2b)- Q(155)- A(2) — I answer that, Continence denotes, by its very name, a certain curbing, in so far as a man contains himself from following his passions. Hence continence is properly said in reference to those passions which urge a man towards the pursuit of something, wherein it is praiseworthy that reason should withhold man from pursuing: whereas it is not properly about those passions, such as fear and the like, which denote some kind of withdrawal: since in these it is praiseworthy to remain firm in pursuing what reason dictates, as stated above ( Q(123), AA(3),4 ). Now it is to be observed that natural inclinations are the principles of all supervening inclinations, as stated above ( P(1), Q(60) , A(2) ). Wherefore the more they follow the inclination of nature, the more strongly do the passions urge to the pursuance of an object. Now nature inclines chiefly to those things that are necessary to it, whether for the maintenance of the individual, such as food, or for the maintenance of the species, such as venereal acts, the pleasures of which pertain to the touch.

Therefore continence and incontinence refer properly to desires for pleasures of touch.

P(2b)- Q(155)- A(2)- RO(1) — Just as temperance may be used in a general sense in connection with any matter; but is properly applied to that matter wherein it is best for man to be curbed: so, too, continence properly speaking regards that matter wherein it is best and most difficult to contain oneself, namely desires for pleasures of touch, and yet in a general sense and relatively may be applied to any other matter: and in this sense Ambrose speaks of continence.

P(2b)- Q(155)- A(2)- RO(2) — Properly speaking we do not speak of continence in relation to fear, but rather of firmness of mind which fortitude implies. As to anger, it is true that it begets an impulse to the pursuit of something, but this impulse follows an apprehension of the soul — in so far as a man apprehends that someone has injured him — rather than an inclination of nature. Wherefore a man may be said to be continent of anger, relatively but not simply.

P(2b)- Q(155)- A(2)- RO(3) — External goods, such as honors, riches and the like, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 4), seem to be objects of choice in themselves indeed, but not as being necessary for the maintenance of nature. Wherefore in reference to such things we speak of a person as being continent or incontinent, not simply, but relatively, by adding that they are continent or incontinent in regard to wealth, or honor and so forth. Hence Tully either understood continence in a general sense, as including relative continence, or understood cupidity in a restricted sense as denoting desire for pleasures of touch.

P(2b)- Q(155)- A(2)- RO(4) — Venereal pleasures are more vehement than pleasures of the palate: wherefore we are wont to speak of continence and incontinence in reference to venereal matters rather than in reference to food; although according to the Philosopher they are applicable to both.

P(2b)- Q(155)- A(2)- RO(5) — Continence is a good of the human reason: wherefore it regards those passions which can be connatural to man. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 5) that “if a man were to lay hold of a child with desire of eating him or of satisfying an unnatural passion whether he follow up his desire or not, he is said to be continent [*See A(4) ], not absolutely, but relatively.”

P(2b)- Q(155)- A(3) Whether the subject of continence is the concupiscible power?

P(2b)- Q(155)- A(3)- O(1) — It would seem that the subject of continence is the concupiscible power. For the subject of a virtue should be proportionate to the virtue’s matter. Now the matter of continence, as stated ( A(2) ), is desires for the pleasures of touch, which pertain to the concupiscible power. Therefore continence is in the concupiscible power.

P(2b)- Q(155)- A(3)- O(2) — Further, “Opposites are referred to one same thing” [*Categ. viii]. But incontinence is in the concupiscible, whose passions overcome reason, for Andronicus says [*De Affectibus] that “incontinence is the evil inclination of the concupiscible, by following which it chooses wicked pleasures in disobedience to reason.” Therefore continence is likewise in the concupiscible.

P(2b)- Q(155)- A(3)- O(3) — Further, the subject of a human virtue is either the reason, or the appetitive power, which is divided into the will, the concupiscible and the irascible. Now continence is not in the reason, for then it would be an intellectual virtue; nor is it in the will, since continence is about the passions which are not in the will; nor again is it in the irascible, because it is not properly about the passions of the irascible, as stated above ( A(2), ad 2). Therefore it follows that it is in the concupiscible.

P(2b)- Q(155)- A(3) — On the contrary, Every virtue residing in a certain power removes the evil act of that power. But continence does not remove the evil act of the concupiscible: since “the continent man has evil desires,” according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 9). Therefore continence is not in the concupiscible power.

P(2b)- Q(155)- A(3) — I answer that, Every virtue while residing in a subject, makes that subject have a different disposition from that which it has while subjected to the opposite vice. Now the concupiscible has the same disposition in one who is continent and in one who is incontinent, since in both of them it breaks out into vehement evil desires. Wherefore it is manifest that continence is not in the concupiscible as its subject. Again the reason has the same disposition in both, since both the continent and the incontinent have right reason, and each of them, while undisturbed by passion, purposes not to follow his unlawful desires. Now the primary difference between them is to be found in their choice: since the continent man, though subject to vehement desires, chooses not to follow them, because of his reason; whereas the incontinent man chooses to follow them, although his reason forbids. Hence continence must needs reside in that power of the soul, whose act it is to choose; and that is the will, as stated above ( P(2a), Q(13) , A(1) ).

P(2b)- Q(155)- A(3)- RO(1) — Continence has for its matter the desires for pleasures of touch, not as moderating them (this belongs to temperance which is in the concupiscible), but its business with them is to resist them.

For this reason it must be in another power, since resistance is of one thing against another.

P(2b)- Q(155)- A(3)- RO(2) — The will stands between reason and the concupiscible, and may be moved by either. In the continent man it is moved by the reason, in the incontinent man it is moved by the concupiscible. Hence continence may be ascribed to the reason as to its first mover, and incontinence to the concupiscible power: though both belong immediately to the will as their proper subject.

P(2b)- Q(155)- A(3)- RO(3) — Although the passions are not in the will as their subject, yet it is in the power of the will to resist them: thus it is that the will of the continent man resists desires.

P(2b)- Q(155)- A(4) Whether continence is better than temperance?

P(2b)- Q(155)- A(4)- O(1) — It would seem that continence is better than temperance. For it is written (Ecclus. 26:20): “No price is worthy of a continent soul.” Therefore no virtue can be equalled to continence.

P(2b)- Q(155)- A(4)- O(2) — Further, the greater the reward a virtue merits, the greater the virtue. Now continence apparently merits the greater reward; for it is written ( 2 Timothy 2:5): “He... is not crowned, except he strive lawfully,” and the continent man, since he is subject to vehement evil desires, strives more than the temperate man, in whom these things are not vehement. Therefore continence is a greater virtue than temperance.

P(2b)- Q(155)- A(4)- O(3) — Further, the will is a more excellent power than the concupiscible. But continence is in the will, whereas temperance is in the concupiscible, as stated above ( A(3) ). Therefore continence is a greater virtue than temperance.

P(2b)- Q(155)- A(4) — On the contrary, Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 54) and Andronicus [*De Affectibus] reckon continence to be annexed to temperance, as to a principal virtue.

P(2b)- Q(155)- A(4) — I answer that, As stated above ( A(1) ), continence has a twofold signification. In one way it denotes cessation from all venereal pleasures; and if continence be taken in this sense, it is greater than temperance considered absolutely, as may be gathered from what we said above ( Q(152), A(5) ) concerning the preeminence of virginity over chastity considered absolutely. In another way continence may be taken as denoting the resistance of the reason to evil desires when they are vehement in a man: and in this sense temperance is far greater than continence, because the good of a virtue derives its praise from that which is in accord with reason. Now the good of reason flourishes more in the temperate man than in the continent man, because in the former even the sensitive appetite is obedient to reason, being tamed by reason so to speak, whereas in the continent man the sensitive appetite strongly resists reason by its evil desires. Hence continence is compared to temperance, as the imperfect to the perfect.

P(2b)- Q(155)- A(4)- RO(1) — The passage quoted may be understood in two ways. First in reference to the sense in which continence denotes abstinence from all things venereal: and thus it means that “no price is worthy of a continent soul,” in the genus of chastity the fruitfulness of the flesh is the purpose of marriage is equalled to the continence of virginity or of widowhood, as stated above ( Q(152), AA(4),5 ). Secondly it may be understood in reference to the general sense in which continence denotes any abstinence from things unlawful: and thus it means that “no price is worthy of a continent soul,” because its value is not measured with gold or silver, which are appreciable according to weight.

P(2b)- Q(155)- A(4)- RO(2) — The strength or weakness of concupiscence may proceed from two causes. For sometimes it is owing to a bodily cause: because some people by their natural temperament are more prone to concupiscence than others; and again opportunities for pleasure which inflame the concupiscence are nearer to hand for some people than for others. Such like weakness of concupiscence diminishes merit, whereas strength of concupiscence increases it. on the other hand, weakness or strength of concupiscence arises from a praiseworthy spiritual cause, for instance the vehemence of charity, or the strength of reason, as in the case of a temperate man. In this way weakness of concupiscence, by reason of its cause, increases merit, whereas strength of concupiscence diminishes it.

P(2b)- Q(155)- A(4)- RO(3) — The will is more akin to the reason than the concupiscible power is. Wherefore the good of reason — on account of which virtue is praised by the very fact that it reaches not only to the will but also to the concupiscible power, as happens in the temperate man — is shown to be greater than if it reach only to the will, as in the case of one who is continent.

QUESTION OF INCONTINENCE (FOUR ARTICLES) We must now consider incontinence: and under this head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether incontinence pertains to the soul or to the body? (2) Whether incontinence is a sin? (3) The comparison between incontinence and intemperance; (4) Which is the worse, incontinence in anger, or incontinence in desire?

P(2b)- Q(156)- A(1) Whether incontinence pertains to the soul or to the body?

P(2b)- Q(156)- A(1)- O(1) — It would seem that incontinence pertains not to the soul but to the body. For sexual diversity comes not from the soul but from the body. Now sexual diversity causes diversity of incontinence: for the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 5) that women are not described either as continent or as incontinent. Therefore incontinence pertains not to the soul but to the body.

P(2b)- Q(156)- A(1)- O(2) — Further, that which pertains to the soul does not result from the temperament of the body. But incontinence results from the bodily temperament: for the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 7) that “it is especially people of a quick or choleric and atrabilious temper whose incontinence is one of unbridled desire.” Therefore incontinence regards the body.

P(2b)- Q(156)- A(1)- O(3) — Further, victory concerns the victor rather than the vanquished. Now a man is said to be incontinent, because “the flesh lusteth against the spirit,” and overcomes it. Therefore incontinence pertains to the flesh rather than to the soul.

P(2b)- Q(156)- A(1) — On the contrary, Man differs from beast chiefly as regards the soul. Now they differ in respect of continence and incontinence, for we ascribe neither continence nor incontinence to the beasts, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. vii, 3). Therefore incontinence is chiefly on the part of the soul.

P(2b)- Q(156)- A(1) — I answer that, Things are ascribed to their direct causes rather than to those which merely occasion them. Now that which is on the part of the body is merely an occasional cause of incontinence; since it is owing to a bodily disposition that vehement passions can arise in the sensitive appetite which is a power of the organic body. Yet these passions, however vehement they be, are not the sufficient cause of incontinence, but are merely the occasion thereof, since, so long as the use of reason remains, man is always able to resist his passions. If, however, the passions gain such strength as to take away the use of reason altogether — as in the case of those who become insane through the vehemence of their passions — the essential conditions of continence or incontinence cease, because such people do not retain the judgment of reason, which the continent man follows and the incontinent forsakes.

From this it follows that the direct cause of incontinence is on the part of the soul, which fails to resist a passion by the reason. This happens in two ways, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 7): first, when the soul yields to the passions, before the reason has given its counsel; and this is called “unbridled incontinence” or “impetuosity”: secondly, when a man does not stand to what has been counselled, through holding weakly to reason’s judgment; wherefore this kind of incontinence is called “weakness.” Hence it is manifest that incontinence pertains chiefly to the soul.

P(2b)- Q(156)- A(1)- RO(1) — The human soul is the form of the body, and has certain powers which make use of bodily organs. The operations of these organs conduce somewhat to those operations of the soul which are accomplished without bodily instruments, namely to the acts of the intellect and of the will, in so far as the intellect receives from the senses, and the will is urged by passions of the sensitive appetite. Accordingly, since woman, as regards the body, has a weak temperament, the result is that for the most part, whatever she holds to, she holds to it weakly; although in /rare cases the opposite occurs, according to Proverbs 31:10, “Who shall find a valiant woman?” And since small and weak things “are accounted as though they were not” [*Aristotle, Phys. ii, 5] the Philosopher speaks of women as though they had not the firm judgment of reason, although the contrary happens in some women. Hence he states that “we do not describe women as being continent, because they are vacillating” through being unstable of reason, and “are easily led” so that they follow their passions readily.

P(2b)- Q(156)- A(1)- RO(2) — It is owing to the impulse of passion that a man at once follows his passion before his reason counsels him. Now the impulse of passion may arise either from its quickness, as in bilious persons [*Cf. P(2a), Q(46) , A(5) ], or from its vehemence, as in the melancholic, who on account of their earthy temperament are most vehemently aroused. Even so, on the other hand, a man fails to stand to that which is counselled, because he holds to it in weakly fashion by reason of the softness of his temperament, as we have stated with regard to woman (ad 1). This is also the case with phlegmatic temperaments, for the same reason as in women. And these results are due to the fact that the bodily temperament is an occasional but not a sufficient cause of incontinence, as stated above.

P(2b)- Q(156)- A(1)- RO(3) — In the incontinent man concupiscence of the flesh overcomes the spirit, not necessarily, but through a certain negligence of the spirit in not resisting strongly.

P(2b)- Q(156)- A(2) Whether incontinence is a sin?

P(2b)- Q(156)- A(2)- O(1) — It would seem that incontinence is not a sin.

For as Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. iii, 18): “No man sins in what he cannot avoid.” Now no man can by himself avoid incontinence, according to Wis. 8:21, “I know [Vulg.: ‘knew’] that I could not... be continent, except God gave it.” Therefore incontinence is not a sin.

P(2b)- Q(156)- A(2)- O(2) — Further, apparently every sin originates in the reason. But the judgment of reason is overcome in the incontinent man.

Therefore incontinence is not a sin.

P(2b)- Q(156)- A(2)- O(3) — Further, no one sins in loving God vehemently. Now a man becomes incontinent through the vehemence of divine love: for Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that “Paul, through incontinence of divine love, exclaimed: I live, now not I” ( Galatians 2:20). Therefore incontinence is not a sin.

P(2b)- Q(156)- A(2) — On the contrary, It is numbered together with other sins ( 2 Timothy 3:3) where it is written: “Slanderers, incontinent, unmerciful,” etc. Therefore incontinence is a sin.

P(2b)- Q(156)- A(2) — I answer that, Incontinence about a matter may be considered in two ways. First it may be considered properly and simply: and thus incontinence is about concupiscences of pleasures of touch, even as intemperance is, as we have said in reference to continence ( Q(155), A(2) ). In this way incontinence is a sin for two reasons: first, because the incontinent man goes astray from that which is in accord with reason; secondly, because he plunges into shameful pleasures. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 4) that “incontinence is censurable not only because it is wrong” — that is, by straying from reason — ”but also because it is wicked” — that is, by following evil desires. Secondly, incontinence about a matter is considered, properly — inasmuch as it is a straying from reason — but not simply; for instance when a man does not observe the mode of reason in his desire for honor, riches, and so forth, which seem to be good in themselves. About such things there is incontinence, not simply but relatively, even as we have said above in reference to continence ( Q(155), A(2), ad 3). In this way incontinence is a sin, not from the fact that one gives way to wicked desires, but because one fails to observe the mode of reason even in the desire for things that are of themselves desirable.

Thirdly, incontinence is said to be about a matter, not properly, but metaphorically. for instance about the desires for things of which one cannot make an evil use, such as the desire for virtue. A man may be said to be incontinent in these matters metaphorically, because just as the incontinent man is entirely led by his evil desire, even so is a man entirely led by his good desire which is in accord with reason. Such like incontinence is no sin, but pertains to the perfection of virtue.

P(2b)- Q(156)- A(2)- RO(1) — Man can avoid sin and do good, yet not without God’s help, according to John 15:5: “Without Me you can do nothing.” Wherefore the fact that man needs God’s help in order to be continent, does not show incontinence to be no sin, for, as stated in Ethic. iii, 3, “what we can do by means of a friend we do, in a way, ourselves.”

P(2b)- Q(156)- A(2)- RO(2) — The judgment of reason is overcome in the incontinent man, not necessarily, for then he would commit no sin, but through a certain negligence on account of his not standing firm in resisting the passion by holding to the judgment formed by his reason.

P(2b)- Q(156)- A(2)- RO(3) — This argument takes incontinence metaphorically and not properly.

P(2b)- Q(156)- A(3) Whether the incontinent man sins more gravely than the intemperate?

P(2b)- Q(156)- A(3)- O(1) — It would seem that the incontinent man sins more gravely than the intemperate. For, seemingly, the more a man acts against his conscience, the more gravely he sins, according to Luke 12:47, “That servant who knew the will of his lord... and did not... shall be beaten with many stripes.”

Now the incontinent man would seem to act against his conscience more than the intemperate because, according to Ethic. vii, 3, the incontinent man, though knowing how wicked are the things he desires, nevertheless acts through passion, whereas the intemperate man judges what he desires to be good. Therefore the incontinent man sins more gravely than the intemperate.

P(2b)- Q(156)- A(3)- O(2) — Further, apparently, the graver a sin is, the more incurable it is: wherefore the sins against the Holy Ghost, being most grave, are declared to be unpardonable. Now the sin of incontinence would appear to be more incurable than the sin of intemperance. For a person’s sin is cured by admonishment and correction, which seemingly are no good to the incontinent man, since he knows he is doing wrong, and does wrong notwithstanding: whereas it seems to the intemperate man that he is doing well, so that it were good for him to be admonished. Therefore it would appear that the incontinent man sins more gravely than the intemperate.

P(2b)- Q(156)- A(3)- O(3) — Further, the more eagerly man sins, the more grievous his sin. Now the incontinent sins more eagerly than the intemperate, since the incontinent man has vehement passions and desires, which the intemperate man does not always have. Therefore the incontinent man sins more gravely than the intemperate.

P(2b)- Q(156)- A(3) — On the contrary, Impenitence aggravates every sin: wherefore Augustine says (De Verb. Dom. serm. xi, 12,13) that “impenitence is a sin against the Holy Ghost.” Now according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 8) “the intemperate man is not inclined to be penitent, for he holds on to his choice: but every incontinent man is inclined to repentance.” Therefore the intemperate man sins more gravely than the incontinent.

P(2b)- Q(156)- A(3) — I answer that, According to Augustine [*De Duab.

Anim. x, xi] sin is chiefly an act of the will, because “by the will we sin and live aright” [*Retract. i, 9]. Consequently where there is a greater inclination of the will to sin, there is a graver sin. Now in the intemperate man, the will is inclined to sin in virtue of its own choice, which proceeds from a habit acquired through custom: whereas in the incontinent man, the will is inclined to sin through a passion. And since passion soon passes, whereas a habit is “a disposition difficult to remove,” the result is that the incontinent man repents at once, as soon as the passion has passed; but not so the intemperate man; in fact he rejoices in having sinned, because the sinful act has become connatural to him by reason of his habit.

Wherefore in reference to such persons it is written ( Proverbs 2:14) that “they are glad when they have done evil, and rejoice in most wicked things.” Hence it follows that “the intemperate man is much worse than the incontinent,” as also the Philosopher declares (Ethic. vii, 7).

P(2b)- Q(156)- A(3)- RO(1) — Ignorance in the intellect sometimes precedes the inclination of the appetite and causes it, and then the greater the ignorance, the more does it diminish or entirely excuse the sin, in so far as it renders it involuntary. On the other hand, ignorance in the reason sometimes follows the inclination of the appetite, and then such like ignorance, the greater it is, the graver the sin, because the inclination of the appetite is shown thereby to be greater. Now in both the incontinent and the intemperate man, ignorance arises from the appetite being inclined to something, either by passion, as in the incontinent, or by habit, as in the intemperate. Nevertheless greater ignorance results thus in the intemperate than in the incontinent. In one respect as regards duration, since in the incontinent man this ignorance lasts only while the passion endures, just as an attack of intermittent fever lasts as long as the humor is disturbed: whereas the ignorance of the intemperate man endures without ceasing, on account of the endurance of the habit, wherefore it is likened to phthisis or any chronic disease, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 8). In another respect the ignorance of the intemperate man is greater as regards the thing ignored. For the ignorance of the incontinent man regards some particular detail of choice (in so far as he deems that he must choose this particular thing now): whereas the intemperate man’s ignorance is about the end itself, inasmuch as he judges this thing good, in order that he may follow his desires without being curbed. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 7,8) that “the incontinent man is better than the intemperate, because he retains the best principle [*\To beltiston, e arche\, ‘the best thing, i.e. the principle’],” to wit, the right estimate of the end.

P(2b)- Q(156)- A(3)- RO(2) — Mere knowledge does not suffice to cure the incontinent man, for he needs the inward assistance of grace which quenches concupiscence, besides the application of the external remedy of admonishment and correction, which induce him to begin to resist his desires, so that concupiscence is weakened, as stated above ( Q(142), A(2) ). By these same means the intemperate man can be cured. But his curing is more difficult, for two reasons. The first is on the part of reason, which is corrupt as regards the estimate of the last end, which holds the same position as the principle in demonstrations. Now it is more difficult to bring back to the truth one who errs as to the principle; and it is the same in practical matters with one who errs in regard to the end. The other reason is on the part of the inclination of the appetite: for in the intemperate man this proceeds from a habit, which is difficult to remove, whereas the inclination of the incontinent man proceeds from a passion, which is more easily suppressed.

P(2b)- Q(156)- A(3)- RO(3) — The eagerness of the will, which increases a sin, is greater in the intemperate man than in the incontinent, as explained above. But the eagerness of concupiscence in the sensitive appetite is sometimes greater in the incontinent man, because he does not sin except through vehement concupiscence, whereas the intemperate man sins even through slight concupiscence and sometimes forestalls it. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 7) that we blame more the intemperate man, “because he pursues pleasure without desiring it or with calm,” i.e. slight desire. “For what would he have done if he had desired it with passion?”

P(2b)- Q(156)- A(4) Whether the incontinent in anger is worse than the incontinent in desire?

P(2b)- Q(156)- A(4)- O(1) — It would seem that the incontinent in anger is worse than the incontinent in desire. For the more difficult it is to resist the passion, the less grievous, apparently is incontinence: wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 7): “It is not wonderful, indeed it is pardonable if a person is overcome by strong and overwhelming pleasures or pains.” Now, “as Heraclitus says, it is more difficult to resist desire than anger” [*Ethic. 2:3]. Therefore incontinence of desire is less grievous than incontinence of anger.

P(2b)- Q(156)- A(4)- O(2) — Further, one is altogether excused from sin if the passion be so vehement as to deprive one of the judgment of reason, as in the case of one who becomes demented through passion. Now he that is incontinent in anger retains more of the judgment of reason, than one who is incontinent in desire: since “anger listens to reason somewhat, but desire does not” as the Philosopher states (Ethic. vii, 6). Therefore the incontinent in anger is worse than the incontinent in desire.

P(2b)- Q(156)- A(4)- O(3) — Further, the more dangerous a sin the more grievous it is. Now incontinence of anger would seem to be more dangerous, since it leads a man to a greater sin, namely murder, for this is a more grievous sin than adultery, to which incontinence of desire leads.

Therefore incontinence of anger is graver than incontinence of desire.

P(2b)- Q(156)- A(4) — On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 6) that “incontinence of anger is less disgraceful than incontinence of desire.”

P(2b)- Q(156)- A(4) — I answer that, The sin of incontinence may be considered in two ways. First, on the part of the passion which occasions the downfall of reason. In this way incontinence of desire is worse than incontinence of anger, because the movement of desire is more inordinate than the movement of anger. There are four reasons for this, and the Philosopher indicates them, Ethic. vii, 6: First, because the movement of anger partakes somewhat of reason, since the angry man tends to avenge the injury done to him, and reason dictates this in a certain degree. Yet he does not tend thereto perfectly, because he does not intend the due mode of vengeance. on the other hand, the movement of desire is altogether in accord with sense and nowise in accord with reason. Secondly, because the movement of anger results more from the bodily temperament owing to the quickness of the movement of the bile which tends to anger. Hence one who by bodily temperament is disposed to anger is more readily angry than one who is disposed to concupiscence is liable to be concupiscent: wherefore also it happens more often that the children of those who are disposed to anger are themselves disposed to anger, than that the children of those who are disposed to concupiscence are also disposed to concupiscence. Now that which results from the natural disposition of the body is deemed more deserving of pardon. Thirdly, because anger seeks to work openly, whereas concupiscence is fain to disguise itself and creeps in by stealth. Fourthly, because he who is subject to concupiscence works with pleasure, whereas the angry man works as though forced by a certain previous displeasure.

Secondly, the sin of incontinence may be considered with regard to the evil into which one falls through forsaking reason; and thus incontinence of anger is, for the most part, more grievous, because it leads to things that are harmful to one’s neighbor.

P(2b)- Q(156)- A(4)- RO(1) — It is more difficult to resist pleasure perseveringly than anger, because concupiscence is enduring. But for the moment it is more difficult to resist anger, on account of its impetuousness.

P(2b)- Q(156)- A(4)- RO(2) — Concupiscence is stated to be without reason, not as though it destroyed altogether the judgment of reason, but because nowise does it follow the judgment of reason: and for this reason it is more disgraceful.

P(2b)- Q(156)- A(4)- RO(3) — This argument considers incontinence with regard to its result.

QUESTION OF CLEMENCY AND MEEKNESS (FOUR ARTICLES) We must next consider clemency and meekness, and the contrary vices.

Concerning the virtues themselves there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether clemency and meekness are altogether identical? (2) Whether each of them is a virtue? (3) Whether each is a part of temperance? (4) Of their comparison with the other virtues.

P(2b)- Q(157)- A(1) Whether clemency and meekness are absolutely the same?

P(2b)- Q(157)- A(1)- O(1) — It would seem that clemency and meekness are absolutely the same. For meekness moderates anger, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 5). Now anger is “desire of vengeance” [*Aristotle, Rhet. ii, 2]. Since, then, clemency “is leniency of a superior in inflicting punishment on an inferior,” as Seneca states (De Clementia ii, 3), and vengeance is taken by means of punishment, it would seem that clemency and meekness are the same.

P(2b)- Q(157)- A(1)- O(2) — Further, Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 54) that “clemency is a virtue whereby the mind is restrained by kindness when unreasonably provoked to hatred of a person,” so that apparently clemency moderates hatred. Now, according to Augustine [*Ep. ccxi], hatred is caused by anger; and this is the matter of meekness and clemency.

Therefore seemingly clemency and meekness are absolutely the same.

P(2b)- Q(157)- A(1)- O(3) — Further, the same vice is not opposed to different virtues. But the same vice, namely cruelty, is opposed to meekness and clemency. Therefore it seems that meekness and clemency are absolutely the same.

P(2b)- Q(157)- A(1) — On the contrary, According to the aforesaid definition of Seneca ( O(1) ) “clemency is leniency of a superior towards an inferior”: whereas meekness is not merely of superior to inferior, but of each to everyone. Therefore meekness and clemency are not absolutely the same.

P(2b)- Q(157)- A(1) — I answer that, As stated in Ethic. ii, 3, a moral virtue is “about passions and actions.” Now internal passions are principles of external actions, and are likewise obstacles thereto. Wherefore virtues that moderate passions, to a certain extent, concur towards the same effect as virtues that moderate actions, although they differ specifically. Thus it belongs properly to justice to restrain man from theft, whereunto he is inclined by immoderate love or desire of money, which is restrained by liberality; so that liberality concurs with justice towards the effect, which is abstention from theft. This applies to the case in point; because through the passion of anger a man is provoked to inflict a too severe punishment, while it belongs directly to clemency to mitigate punishment, and this might be prevented by excessive anger.

Consequently meekness, in so far as it restrains the onslaught of anger, concurs with clemency towards the same effect; yet they differ from one another, inasmuch as clemency moderates external punishment, while meekness properly mitigates the passion of anger.

P(2b)- Q(157)- A(1)- RO(1) — Meekness regards properly the desire itself of vengeance; whereas clemency regards the punishment itself which is applied externally for the purpose of vengeance.

P(2b)- Q(157)- A(1)- RO(2) — Man’s affections incline to the moderation of things that are unpleasant to him in themselves. Now it results from one man loving another that he takes no pleasure in the latter’s punishment in itself, but only as directed to something else, for instance justice, or the correction of the person punished. Hence love makes one quick to mitigate punishment — and this pertains to clemency — while hatred is an obstacle to such mitigation. For this reason Tully says that “the mind provoked to hatred” that is to punish too severely, “is restrained by clemency,” from inflicting too severe a punishment, so that clemency directly moderates not hatred but punishment.

P(2b)- Q(157)- A(1)- RO(3) — The vice of anger, which denotes excess in the passion of anger, is properly opposed to meekness, which is directly concerned with the passion of anger; while cruelty denotes excess in punishing. Wherefore Seneca says (De Clementia ii, 4) that “those are called cruel who have reason for punishing, but lack moderation in punishing.” Those who delight in a man’s punishment for its own sake may be called savage or brutal, as though lacking the human feeling that leads one man to love another.

P(2b)- Q(157)- A(2) Whether both clemency and meekness are virtues?

P(2b)- Q(157)- A(2)- O(1) — It would seem that neither clemency nor meekness is a virtue. For no virtue is opposed to another virtue. Yet both of these are apparently opposed to severity, which is a virtue. Therefore neither clemency nor meekness is a virtue.

P(2b)- Q(157)- A(2)- O(2) — Further, “Virtue is destroyed by excess and defect” [*Ethic. ii, 2]. But both clemency and meekness consist in a certain decrease; for clemency decreases punishment, and meekness decreases anger. Therefore neither clemency nor meekness is a virtue.

P(2b)- Q(157)- A(2)- O(3) — Further, meekness or mildness is included ( Matthew 5:4) among the beatitudes, and ( Galatians 5:23) among the fruits. Now the virtues differ from the beatitudes and fruits. Therefore they are not comprised under virtue.

P(2b)- Q(157)- A(2) — On the contrary, Seneca says (De Clementia ii, 5): “Every good man is conspicuous for his clemency and meekness.” Now it is virtue properly that belongs to a good man, since “virtue it is that makes its possessor good, and renders his works good also” (Ethic. ii, 6).

Therefore clemency and meekness are virtues.

P(2b)- Q(157)- A(2) — I answer that, The nature of moral virtue consists in the subjection of appetite to reason, as the Philosopher declares (Ethic. i, 13). Now this is verified both in clemency and in meekness. For clemency, in mitigating punishment, “is guided by reason,” according to Seneca (De Clementia ii, 5), and meekness, likewise, moderates anger according to right reason, as stated in Ethic. iv, 5. Wherefore it is manifest that both clemency and meekness are virtues.

P(2b)- Q(157)- A(2)- RO(1) — Meekness is not directly opposed to severity; for meekness is about anger. On the other hand, severity regards the external infliction of punishment, so that accordingly it would seem rather to be opposed to clemency, which also regards external punishing, as stated above ( A(1) ). Yet they are not really opposed to one another, since they are both according to right reason. For severity is inflexible in the infliction of punishment when right reason requires it; while clemency mitigates punishment also according to right reason, when and where this is requisite. Wherefore they are not opposed to one another as they are not about the same thing.

P(2b)- Q(157)- A(2)- RO(2) — According to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 5), “the habit that observes the mean in anger is unnamed; so that the virtue is denominated from the diminution of anger, and is designated by the name of meekness.” For the virtue is more akin to diminution than to excess, because it is more natural to man to desire vengeance for injuries done to him, than to be lacking in that desire, since “scarcely anyone belittles an injury done to himself,” as Sallust observes [*Cf. Q(120) ]. As to clemency, it mitigates punishment, not in respect of that which is according to right reason, but as regards that which is according to common law, which is the object of legal justice: yet on account of some particular consideration, it mitigates the punishment, deciding, as it were, that a man is not to be punished any further. Hence Seneca says (De Clementia ii, 1): “Clemency grants this, in the first place, that those whom she sets free are declared immune from all further punishment; and remission of punishment due amounts to a pardon.” Wherefore it is clear that clemency is related to severity as equity [the Greek ‘epieikeia’ [*Cf. Q(120) ]] to legal justice, whereof severity is a part, as regards the infliction of punishment in accordance with the law. Yet clemency differs from equity, as we shall state further on ( A(3), ad 1).

P(2b)- Q(157)- A(2)- RO(3) — The beatitudes are acts of virtue: while the fruits are delights in virtuous acts. Wherefore nothing hinders meekness being reckoned both virtue, and beatitude and fruit.

P(2b)- Q(157)- A(3) Whether the aforesaid virtues are parts of temperance?

P(2b)- Q(157)- A(3)- O(1) — It would seem that the aforesaid virtues are not parts of temperance. For clemency mitigates punishment, as stated above ( A(2) ). But the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 10) ascribes this to equity, which pertains to justice, as stated above ( Q(120), A(2) ). Therefore seemingly clemency is not a part of temperance.

P(2b)- Q(157)- A(3)- O(2) — Further, temperance is concerned with concupiscences; whereas meekness and clemency regard, not concupiscences, but anger and vengeance. Therefore they should not be reckoned parts of temperance.

P(2b)- Q(157)- A(3)- O(3) — Further, Seneca says (De Clementia ii, 4): “A man may be said to be of unsound mind when he takes pleasure in cruelty.” Now this is opposed to clemency and meekness. Since then an unsound mind is opposed to prudence, it seems that clemency and meekness are parts of prudence rather than of temperance.

P(2b)- Q(157)- A(3) — On the contrary, Seneca says (De Clementia ii, 3) that “clemency is temperance of the soul in exercising the power of taking revenge.” Tully also (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 54) reckons clemency a part of temperance.

P(2b)- Q(157)- A(3) — I answer that, Parts are assigned to the principal virtues, in so far as they imitate them in some secondary matter as to the mode whence the virtue derives its praise and likewise its name. Thus the mode and name of justice consist in a certain “equality,” those of fortitude in a certain “strength of mind,” those of temperance in a certain “restraint,” inasmuch as it restrains the most vehement concupiscences of the pleasures of touch. Now clemency and meekness likewise consist in a certain restraint, since clemency mitigates punishment, while meekness represses anger, as stated above ( AA(1),2 ). Therefore both clemency and meekness are annexed to temperance as principal virtue, and accordingly are reckoned to be parts thereof.

P(2b)- Q(157)- A(3)- RO(1) — Two points must be considered in the mitigation of punishment. one is that punishment should be mitigated in accordance with the lawgiver’s intention, although not according to the letter of the law; and in this respect it pertains to equity. The other point is a certain moderation of a man’s inward disposition, so that he does not exercise his power of inflicting punishment. This belongs properly to clemency, wherefore Seneca says (De Clementia ii, 3) that “it is temperance of the soul in exercising the power of taking revenge.” This moderation of soul comes from a certain sweetness of disposition, whereby a man recoils from anything that may be painful to another.

Wherefore Seneca says (De Clementia ii, 3) that “clemency is a certain smoothness of the soul”; for, on the other hand, there would seem to be a certain roughness of soul in one who fears not to pain others.

P(2b)- Q(157)- A(3)- RO(2) — The annexation of secondary to principal virtues depends on the mode of virtue, which is, so to speak, a kind of form of the virtue, rather than on the matter. Now meekness and clemency agree with temperance in mode, as stated above, though they agree not in matter.

P(2b)- Q(157)- A(3)- RO(3) — “Unsoundness” is corruption of “soundness.” Now just as soundness of body is corrupted by the body lapsing from the condition due to the human species, so unsoundness of mind is due to the mind lapsing from the disposition due to the human species. This occurs both in respect of the reason, as when a man loses the use of reason, and in respect of the appetitive power, as when a man loses that humane feeling whereby “every man is naturally friendly towards all other men” (Ethic. viii, 1). The unsoundness of mind that excludes the use of reason is opposed to prudence. But that a man who takes pleasure in the punishment of others is said to be of unsound mind, is because he seems on this account to be devoid of the humane feeling which gives rise to clemency.

P(2b)- Q(157)- A(4) Whether clemency and meekness are the greatest virtues?

P(2b)- Q(157)- A(4)- O(1) — It would seem that clemency and meekness are the greatest virtues. For virtue is deserving of praise chiefly because it directs man to happiness that consists in the knowledge of God. Now meekness above all directs man to the knowledge of God: for it is written ( James 1:21): “With meekness receive the ingrafted word,” and (Ecclus. 5:13): “Be meek to hear the word” of God. Again, Dionysius says (Ep. viii ad Demophil.) that “Moses was deemed worthy of the Divine apparition on account of his great meekness.” Therefore meekness is the greatest of virtues.

P(2b)- Q(157)- A(4)- O(2) — Further, seemingly a virtue is all the greater according as it is more acceptable to God and men. Now meekness would appear to be most acceptable to God. For it is written (Ecclus. 1:34,35): “That which is agreeable” to God is “faith and meekness”; wherefore Christ expressly invites us to be meek like unto Himself ( Matthew 11:29), where He says: “Learn of Me, because I am meek and humble of heart”; and Hilary declares [*Comment. in Matthew 4:3] that “Christ dwells in us by our meekness of soul.” Again, it is most acceptable to men; wherefore it is written (Ecclus. 3:19): “My son, do thy works in meekness, and thou shalt be beloved above the glory of men”: for which reason it is also declared ( Proverbs 20:28) that the King’s “throne is strengthened by clemency.” Therefore meekness and clemency are the greatest of virtues.

P(2b)- Q(157)- A(4)- O(3) — Further, Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 2) that “the meek are they who yield to reproaches, and resist not evil, but overcome evil by good.” Now this seems to pertain to mercy or piety which would seem to be the greatest of virtues: because a gloss of Ambrose [*Hilary the deacon] on 1 Timothy 4:8, “Piety [Douay: ‘Godliness’] is profitable to all things,” observes that “piety is the sum total of the Christian religion.” Therefore meekness and clemency are the greatest virtues.

P(2b)- Q(157)- A(4) — On the contrary, They are not reckoned as principal virtues, but are annexed to another, as to a principal, virtue.

P(2b)- Q(157)- A(4) — I answer that, Nothing prevents certain virtues from being greatest, not indeed simply, nor in every respect, but in a particular genus. It is impossible for clemency or meekness to be absolutely the greatest virtues, since they owe their praise to the fact that they withdraw a man from evil, by mitigating anger or punishment. Now it is more perfect to obtain good than to lack evil. Wherefore those virtues like faith, hope, charity, and likewise prudence and justice, which direct one to good simply, are absolutely greater virtues than clemency and meekness.

Yet nothing prevents clemency and meekness from having a certain restricted excellence among the virtues which resist evil inclinations. For anger, which is mitigated by meekness, is, on account of its impetuousness, a very great obstacle to man’s free judgment of truth: wherefore meekness above all makes a man self-possessed. Hence it is written (Ecclus. 10:31): “My son, keep thy soul in meekness.” Yet the concupiscences of the pleasures of touch are more shameful, and harass more incessantly, for which reason temperance is more rightly reckoned as a principal virtue. as stated above ( Q(141), A(7), ad 2). As to clemency, inasmuch as it mitigates punishment, it would seem to approach nearest to charity, the greatest of the virtues, since thereby we do good towards our neighbor, and hinder his evil.

P(2b)- Q(157)- A(4)- RO(1) — Meekness disposes man to the knowledge of God, by removing an obstacle; and this in two ways. First, because it makes man self-possessed by mitigating his anger, as stated above; secondly, because it pertains to meekness that a man does not contradict the words of truth, which many do through being disturbed by anger.

Wherefore Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. ii, 7): “To be meek is not to contradict Holy Writ, whether we understand it, if it condemn our evil ways, or understand it not, as though we might know better and have a clearer insight of the truth.”

P(2b)- Q(157)- A(4)- RO(2) — Meekness and clemency make us acceptable to God and men, in so far as they concur with charity, the greatest of the virtues, towards the same effect, namely the mitigation of our neighbor’s evils.

P(2b)- Q(157)- A(4)- RO(3) — Mercy and piety agree indeed with meekness and clemency by concurring towards the same effect, namely the mitigation of our neighbor’s evils. Nevertheless they differ as to motive.

For piety relieves a neighbor’s evil through reverence for a superior, for instance God or one’s parents: mercy relieves a neighbor’s evil, because this evil is displeasing to one, in so far as one looks upon it as affecting oneself, as stated above ( Q(30) , A(2) ): and this results from friendship which makes friends rejoice and grieve for the same things: meekness does this, by removing anger that urges to vengeance, and clemency does this through leniency of soul, in so far as it judges equitable that a person be no further punished.

QUESTION OF ANGER (EIGHT ARTICLES) We must next consider the contrary vices: (1) Anger that is opposed to meekness; (2) Cruelty that is opposed to clemency.

Concerning anger there are eight points of inquiry: (1) Whether it is lawful to be angry? (2) Whether anger is a sin? (3) Whether it is a mortal sin? (4) Whether it is the most grievous of sins? (5) Of its species; (6) Whether anger is a capital vice? (7) Of its daughters; (8) Whether it has a contrary vice?

P(2b)- Q(158)- A(1) Whether it is lawful to be angry?

P(2b)- Q(158)- A(1)- O(1) — It would seem that it cannot be lawful to be angry. For Jerome in his exposition on Matthew 5:22, “Whosoever is angry with his brother,” etc. says: “Some codices add ‘without cause.’

However, in the genuine codices the sentence is unqualified, and anger is forbidden altogether.” Therefore it is nowise lawful to be angry.

P(2b)- Q(158)- A(1)- O(2) — Further, according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv) “The soul’s evil is to be without reason.” Now anger is always without reason: for the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 6) that “anger does not listen perfectly to reason”; and Gregory says (Moral. v, 45) that “when anger sunders the tranquil surface of the soul, it mangles and rends it by its riot”; and Cassian says (De Inst. Caenob. viii, 6): “From whatever cause it arises, the angry passion boils over and blinds the eye of the mind.”

Therefore it is always evil to be angry.

P(2b)- Q(158)- A(1)- O(3) — Further, anger is “desire for vengeance” [*Aristotle, Rhet. ii, 2] according to a gloss on Leviticus 19:17, “Thou shalt not hate thy brother in thy heart.” Now it would seem unlawful to desire vengeance, since this should be left to God, according to Deuteronomy 32:35, “Revenge is Mine.” Therefore it would seem that to be angry is always an evil.

P(2b)- Q(158)- A(1)- O(4) — Further, all that makes us depart from likeness to God is evil. Now anger always makes us depart from likeness to God, since God judges with tranquillity according to Wis. 12:18.

Therefore to be angry is always an evil.

P(2b)- Q(158)- A(1) — On the contrary, Chrysostom [*Hom. xi in the Opus Imperfectum, falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom] says: “He that is angry without cause, shall be in danger; but he that is angry with cause, shall not be in danger: for without anger, teaching will be useless, judgments unstable, crimes unchecked.” Therefore to be angry is not always an evil.

P(2b)- Q(158)- A(1) — I answer that, Properly speaking anger is a passion of the sensitive appetite, and gives its name to the irascible power, as stated above ( P(2a), Q(46) , A(1) ) when we were treating of the passions.

Now with regard to the passions of the soul, it is to be observed that evil may be found in them in two ways. First by reason of the passion’s very species, which is derived from the passion’s object. Thus envy, in respect of its species, denotes an evil, since it is displeasure at another’s good, and such displeasure is in itself contrary to reason: wherefore, as the Philosopher remarks (Ethic. ii, 6), “the very mention of envy denotes something evil.” Now this does not apply to anger, which is the desire for revenge, since revenge may be desired both well and ill. Secondly, evil is found in a passion in respect of the passion’s quantity, that is in respect of its excess or deficiency; and thus evil may be found in anger, when, to wit, one is angry, more or less than right reason demands. But if one is angry in accordance with right reason, one’s anger is deserving of praise.

P(2b)- Q(158)- A(1)- RO(1) — The Stoics designated anger and all the other passions as emotions opposed to the order of reason; and accordingly they deemed anger and all other passions to be evil, as stated above ( P(2a), Q(24) , A(2) ) when we were treating of the passions. It is in this sense that Jerome considers anger; for he speaks of the anger whereby one is angry with one’s neighbor, with the intent of doing him a wrong. — But, according to the Peripatetics, to whose opinion Augustine inclines (De Civ. Dei ix, 4), anger and the other passions of the soul are movements of the sensitive appetite, whether they be moderated or not, according to reason: and in this sense anger is not always evil.

P(2b)- Q(158)- A(1)- RO(2) — Anger may stand in a twofold relation to reason. First, antecedently; in this way it withdraws reason from its rectitude, and has therefore the character of evil. Secondly, consequently, inasmuch as the movement of the sensitive appetite is directed against vice and in accordance with reason, this anger is good, and is called “zealous anger.” Wherefore Gregory says (Moral. v, 45): “We must beware lest, when we use anger as an instrument of virtue, it overrule the mind, and go before it as its mistress, instead of following in reason’s train, ever ready, as its handmaid, to obey.” This latter anger, although it hinder somewhat the judgment of reason in the execution of the act, does not destroy the rectitude of reason. Hence Gregory says (Moral. v, 45) that “zealous anger troubles the eye of reason, whereas sinful anger blinds it.” Nor is it incompatible with virtue that the deliberation of reason be interrupted in the execution of what reason has deliberated: since art also would be hindered in its act, if it were to deliberate about what has to be done, while having to act.

P(2b)- Q(158)- A(1)- RO(3) — It is unlawful to desire vengeance considered as evil to the man who is to be punished, but it is praiseworthy to desire vengeance as a corrective of vice and for the good of justice; and to this the sensitive appetite can tend, in so far as it is moved thereto by the reason: and when revenge is taken in accordance with the order of judgment, it is God’s work, since he who has power to punish “is God’s minister,” as stated in Romans 13:4.

P(2b)- Q(158)- A(1)- RO(4) — We can and ought to be like to God in the desire for good; but we cannot be altogether likened to Him in the mode of our desire, since in God there is no sensitive appetite, as in us, the movement of which has to obey reason. Wherefore Gregory says (Moral. v, 45) that “anger is more firmly erect in withstanding vice, when it bows to the command of reason.”

P(2b)- Q(158)- A(2) Whether anger is a sin?

P(2b)- Q(158)- A(2)- O(1) — It would seem that anger is not a sin. For we demerit by sinning. But “we do not demerit by the passions, even as neither do we incur blame thereby,” as stated in Ethic. ii, 5. Consequently no passion is a sin. Now anger is a passion as stated above ( P(2a), Q(46) , A(1) ) in the treatise on the passions. Therefore anger is not a sin.

P(2b)- Q(158)- A(2)- O(2) — Further, in every sin there is conversion to some mutable good. But in anger there is conversion not to a mutable good, but to a person’s evil. Therefore anger is not a sin.

P(2b)- Q(158)- A(2)- O(3) — Further, “No man sins in what he cannot avoid,” as Augustine asserts [*De Lib. Arb. iii, 18]. But man cannot avoid anger, for a gloss on Psalm 4:5, “Be ye angry and sin not,” says: “The movement of anger is not in our power.” Again, the Philosopher asserts (Ethic. vii, 6) that “the angry man acts with displeasure.” Now displeasure is contrary to the will. Therefore anger is not a sin.

P(2b)- Q(158)- A(2)- O(4) — Further, sin is contrary to nature, according to Damascene [*De Fide Orth. ii, 4,30]. But it is not contrary to man’s nature to be angry, and it is the natural act of a power, namely the irascible; wherefore Jerome says in a letter [*Ep. xii ad Anton. Monach.] that “to be angry is the property of man.” Therefore it is not a sin to be angry.

P(2b)- Q(158)- A(2) — On the contrary, The Apostle says ( Ephesians 4:31): “Let all indignation and anger [*Vulg.: ‘Anger and indignation’]... be put away from you.”

P(2b)- Q(158)- A(2) — I answer that, Anger, as stated above ( A(1) ), is properly the name of a passion. A passion of the sensitive appetite is good in so far as it is regulated by reason, whereas it is evil if it set the order of reason aside. Now the order of reason, in regard to anger, may be considered in relation to two things. First, in relation to the appetible object to which anger tends, and that is revenge. Wherefore if one desire revenge to be taken in accordance with the order of reason, the desire of anger is praiseworthy, and is called “zealous anger” [*Cf. Greg., Moral. v, 45]. On the other hand, if one desire the taking of vengeance in any way whatever contrary to the order of reason, for instance if he desire the punishment of one who has not deserved it, or beyond his deserts, or again contrary to the order prescribed by law, or not for the due end, namely the maintaining of justice and the correction of defaults, then the desire of anger will be sinful, and this is called sinful anger.

Secondly, the order of reason in regard to anger may be considered in relation to the mode of being angry, namely that the movement of anger should not be immoderately fierce, neither internally nor externally; and if this condition be disregarded, anger will not lack sin, even though just vengeance be desired.

P(2b)- Q(158)- A(2)- RO(1) — Since passion may be either regulated or not regulated by reason, it follows that a passion considered absolutely does not include the notion of merit or demerit, of praise or blame. But as regulated by reason, it may be something meritorious and deserving of praise; while on the other hand, as not regulated by reason, it may be demeritorious and blameworthy. Wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 5) that “it is he who is angry in a certain way, that is praised or blamed.”

P(2b)- Q(158)- A(2)- RO(2) — The angry man desires the evil of another, not for its own sake but for the sake of revenge, towards which his appetite turns as to a mutable good.

P(2b)- Q(158)- A(2)- RO(3) — Man is master of his actions through the judgment of his reason, wherefore as to the movements that forestall that judgment, it is not in man’s power to prevent them as a whole, i.e. so that none of them arise, although his reason is able to check each one, if it arise.

Accordingly it is stated that the movement of anger is not in man’s power, to the extent namely that no such movement arise. Yet since this movement is somewhat in his power, it is not entirely sinless if it be inordinate. The statement